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ABSTRACT 
 
The internet meme is one of contemporary online culture’s definitive media. 
They’re widely distributed online and, in the past few years, have had an 
increasingly large impact on offline culture as well. The premise of this thesis is 
that the internet meme poses a theoretical problem for media theory, because 
they’re difficult to conceptualise as media.  
 
This thesis uses this premise as the basis for a wide-ranging epistemological 
analysis of how we practice media theory in the present. The internet meme, it 
argues, exemplifies a wide-ranging problem in media theory: that the discipline 
has yet to adequately conceptualise circulation. This is problematic for the 
internet meme, because it’s defined by its capacity to mutate as it’s circulated 
by users. It’s also problematic more broadly, because the circulation of media is 
central to our contemporary media situation. This thesis frames this problem by 
arguing that our contemporary media situation is “indeterminate”; that is, that 
massive distribution and ubiquitous media challenge our capacity to think 
media in the present. In response, it uses the internet meme as the fulcrum for 
a series of propositions about how media theory might respond. 
 
To think circulation, it adopts a method from the history and philosophy of 
science known as “historical epistemology”. It uses this method to analyse 
circulation as a concept—rather than through its theoretical frameworks—and 
to establish why it remains undertheorised in media theory. It uses this analysis 
to argue that circulation is a foundational media theoretical concept; to 
reconstruct this concept; and to posit an approach to thinking media in the 
present that it calls “meme theory”. This approach is characterised by 
emphasising the epistemological influence that media exercise over our 
theories of them. By positing a new concept of circulation, a new method of 
analysis—media-historical epistemology—and a new approach to practicing 
media theory, this thesis argues that to think media in the present, we have to 
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understand how they shape our media-theoretical epistemologies in turn. The 








Friedrich Kittler infamously claimed that “[m]edia determine our situation.”1 
Today, it might be more accurate to say that our media situation is 
indeterminate. To be online today is to be overwhelmed by and subject to 
seemingly-incessant circulations—of media; of data; of content; of all that’s 
processed by networked computation. To be in the world today is to 
constantly produce media, data, or content, whether intentionally or 
incidentally. Between the internet’s massive, global distribution and what’s 
often characterised as media’s contemporary ubiquity, the boundaries between 
what we call “the digital” and what we don’t are as tenuous as the boundaries 
between online and off-. This situation constitutes what some scholars 
compellingly describe as a “postdigital” condition.2  
 
In the essay that first posited the concept, Florian Cramer argues that digital 
media are so ubiquitous that it’s no longer appropriate to talk about digital 
media in distinction to analogue media, because the ways we use analogue 
media are shaped by digital media’s ubiquity.3 We are “postdigital” in the sense 
that this distinction no longer holds, in that we’ve passed an historical 
threshold. This concept also marks the shaping influence that massively-
distributed digital media have on everyday life. Digital media are so ubiquitous 
that it’s no longer appropriate to use “the digital” as a noun, as though to 
                                                        
1 Friedrich Kittler. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Stanford University Press, 1999. 1. 
2 See: David M. Berry and Michael Dieter, eds. Thinking Postdigital Aesthetics: Art, Computation 
and Design Springer, 2015; Ryan Bishop, Kristoffer Gansing, Jussi Parikka, and Elvia Wilk, 
eds. Across & Beyond - a Transmediale Reader on Post-Digital Practices, Concepts and 
Institutions Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2017. 
3 Florian Cramer. “What is “Post-Digital”?” A Peer-Reviewed Journal About 3, no. 1 (2013): 
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indicate that it constitutes a domain distinct from everyday life—if we ever 
could. As David M. Berry and Michael Dieter argue, these approaches are part 
of a “constellation” of thought that collectively registers how the 
reconditioning of the everyday by the internet has reconditioned our cultural 
practices.4 To be postdigital is to acknowledge and to work through the sense 
that what we do comes after after the digital, that it’s a condition of thinking, 
making, and doing in the present.  
 
A third sense lurks in the concept of the postdigital. The encroachment of 
ubiquitous media and the massively distributed internet on to the everyday has 
epistemological consequences—not only for thinking, but for what we use 
thought to do. Media are part of the everyday; which is to say, part of culture, 
part of society, and part of politics. Crucially for us, they are also part of the 
circumstances in which we must do theory. They constitute what I want to call 
our postdigital media situation. Kittler’s oft-quoted claim is underwritten by the 
idea that media constitute the a priori conditions of possibility for subjectivity: 
that they determine who or what we—who Kittler often glibly referred to as 
“so called man”—can be.5 To claim that we are postdigital is to accord media a 
different role. It strips Kittler’s totalising pronouncement of its metaphysical 
baggage. It conceives of media, somewhat more modestly, as contemporary 
life’s concrete constituents, rather than their conditions of possibility.  
 
Our postdigital media situation is indeterminate: media are everywhere; 
because they are everywhere, they are hard to apprehend; because they are 
everywhere harder to apprehend, they exert concrete, conditioning effects on 
our media-theoretical practices. To do media theory, we have to be able to 
apprehend, and so to know, media. Media make it hard for us to apprehend 
them because they’re part of the means by which we know media and do 
                                                        
4 Berry and Dieter. “Thinking Postdigital Aesthetics: Art, Computation, and Design,” In 
Postdigital Aesthetics: Art, Computation and Design, edited by David M. Berry, and Michael 
Dieter. Dordrecht: Springer, 2015. 2-3. 
5 Eva Horn. “Editor’s Introduction: “ There Are No Media."” Grey Room 29 (2007): 6–13. For 
background, see: Scott Wark. “Media After the “Medial a Priori."” Cultural Politics 13, no. 2 
(2017): 259–62. 
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theory. Or: media theory is situated in and subject to the same conditions as 
the media that it takes as its objects of theorisation. These are the conditions 
in which we encounter the internet meme—the vernacular, internet-native 
media that perhaps best defines contemporary online culture. 
 
 
0.1 EVERYWHERE, AFTER THE INTERNET 
Anyone who’s had a cursory exposure to online culture will be familiar with 
internet memes. In online parlance, internet memes are understood to be types 
of media that are produced, copied, varied, and shared online by communities 
of users. We’re most likely to recognise them in the form of images that 
circulate as variations on particular themes in online exchanges, but they can 
also take the form of phrases, hashtags, GIFs, videos, or sound clips, to list but 
the most frequent types of media that instantiate them. The silly pictures of 
cats or dogs with childish captions; the recurrent use of GIFs posted in lieu of 
text responses; quotes, shared in painful earnestness or ironically 
misattributed; strident, lo-res agitprop—these are all examples of internet 
memes.  
 
Internet memes have become a fixture of contemporary online culture. We 
find them on the platforms, bulletin boards, and forums that constitute the 
slice of the internet we most often access. We find them in the tweets, chats, 
and posts that produce online culture in these spaces. They typify the mix of 
seriousness and banality, irony and kitsch, or pathos and bathos that’s come to 
be associated with these communities and with online culture at large. Internet 
memes are often humorous, though their humour is often in bad taste. Their 
aesthetics range from cute and sweet to deliberately lo-fi, shoddy, or “shit."6 
They often seem impenetrably absurd to outsiders, but it’s just as often their 
impenetrability that’s the joke, for those who are in on it. They can be political, 
in the sense that they thematise politics overtly, but they can also be mobilised 
                                                        
6  Nick Douglas. “It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit: The Internet Ugly Aesthetic.” Journal of 
Visual Culture 13, no. 3 (2014): 314–39. 
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for cultural-political ends in the internet’s alternately low- or high-stakes 
culture wars. As we’ve increasingly seen over the past few years, internet 
memes can also be glibly or, quite earnestly, hateful. In the internet meme, we 
find all that’s good about contemporary online culture and all that makes it 
horrible. Insofar as online culture persists in the production and circulation of 
media, it in part exists in—is reflected in, expressed through, instantiated by, or 
even invoked as—circulating internet memes.  
 
Internet memes are arguably contemporary online culture’s definitive media 
because they exemplify a culture that’s renewed each time our dynamic 
accounts, pages, or feeds are refreshed. But to qualify the contemporary 
culture of which the internet meme is a constituent part with the epithet 
“online” is a little misleading. The internet’s massive global distribution, the 
proliferation of internet-connected media devices, and the increasing 
integration of distributed online services into our daily work and our everyday 
life has made the distinction between “online” and “offline” increasingly 
irrelevant—perhaps even naïve. To borrow a phrase of Hito Steyerl’s, the 
internet has “crossed the screen."7 Internet memes might be internet-native, 
but they are also one of the primary means by which online culture made 
spectacular incursions from the internet’s siloed subcultures into the 
mainstream.  
 
These incursions include the 2016 United States Presidential election, when 
the now-infamous Pepe the Frog meme became associated with both the Alt-
Right—a far-right movement that fomented in online groups, chats, and bulletin 
boards—and with then-candidate Donald J. Trump.8 Other political 
movements, like Occupy Wall Street or, particularly, Anonymous, made heavy 
use of the internet meme to shape both their politics and identities: 
Anonymous turned a mask from the film V for Vendetta from an internet meme 
                                                        
7  Hito Steyerl. “Too Much World: Is the Internet Dead?” e-flux journal 49 (2013). 
8  I documented this phenomenon at the time in the form of a primer. See: Scott Wark. “Does 
This Meme Prove Donald Trump is a White Supremacist?” Public Seminar October 6, 2016: 
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into a political icon.9 In more quotidian, but no less bizarre, registers, cult online 
fans of the TV show Rick and Morty instigated a series of riots outside 
McDonald’s restaurants across the U.S. over a dipping sauce mentioned in a 
particular episode,10 whilst cultural critics have noted the meme-like spread of 
particular absurd and, at times, chilling tropes in kids’ YouTube videos.11 As 
emblematic vernacular, internet-native media, the internet meme indexes the 
internet’s capacity to turn from distributor of services or infrastructure into 
something more substantive, more influential, more pervasive—or even more 
threatening. What Steyerl means with her claim that the internet has “crossed 
the screen” is that it “persists offline” as “a mode of life, surveillance, 
production and organisation."12 The same applies to online culture, and the 
internet meme is its one of its primary—postdigital—means.  
 
Internet memes are everywhere. In circulation, they’re a key constituent of 
contemporary online culture; yet their circulations take it beyond the tenuous 
boundaries marked out by the epithet “online” and in to culture at large. Their 
domain is as massively distributed as the contemporary internet itself. They 
demands to be thought of as a part of contemporary culture writ large, rather 
than a media type that’s only encountered in the internet’s toxic backwaters. 
We copy, create, and share them; we’re by turns affected, pleased, or horrified 
by them; we analyse, catalogue, and critique them. There are websites, groups, 
and pages dedicated to producing, explaining, and even—ironically—trading and 
selling them.13 We might say, in other words, that we know them when we see 
                                                                                                                                                            
Accessed 28 September, 2018, http://www.publicseminar.org/2016/10/does-this-meme-
prove-donald-trump-is-a-white-supremacist/. 
9  Ryan M. Milner. “Pop Polyvocality: Internet Memes, Public Participation, and the Occupy 
Wall Street Movement.” International Journal of Communication 7 (2013): 2357-2390. 
10  Aja Romano. “What Rick and Morty Fans’ Meltdown Over McDonald’s Szechuan Sauce 
Says About Geek Culture.” Vox, October 10 2017: Accessed 28 September, 2018, 
https://www.vox.com/culture/2017/10/10/16448816/rick-and-morty-szechuan-sauce-
backlash 
11  James Bridle. “Something is Wrong on the Internet.” (2017): Accessed September 28, 2018. 
https://medium.com/@jamesbridle/something-is-wrong-on-the-internet-c39c471271d2. 
12  Hito Steyerl. “Too Much World: Is the Internet Dead?." 
13  Ioana Literat and Sarah van den Berg. “Buy Memes Low, Sell Memes High: Vernacular 
Criticism and Collective Negotiations of Value on Reddit’s Meme economy.” Information, 
Communication & Society (2017): 1–18. 
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them. But the very quality that makes internet memes intuitively apprehensible 
also makes them resistant to theorisation. The internet meme is contemporary 
online culture’s definitive, internet-native media for another reason again: it 
arguably expresses and reflects media theory’s struggle to conceptualise media 
in circulation.  
 
 
0.2 MEDIA, TODAY 
As its title no doubt suggests, the aim of this thesis is to formulate a theory of 
the internet meme. However, the approach that I want to take to this task is 
not straightforwardly “theoretical”, in the sense of applying theory to media to 
generate propositions about what media are and what they do. From the 
outset, this aim confronts us with what I want to conceive of as a nested 
“problem." In the internet meme, the indeterminacy that characterises our 
postdigital media situation and the necessity of thinking media in circulation 
converge. These are the complementary basic constituents of the problem that 
animates this thesis and around which it will be organised. 
 
In attempting to formulate a theory of the internet meme, it’s not possible to 
avoid asking a—seemingly perennial, seemingly hackneyed—question: What 
does it mean to theorise media, today? Whilst there are a lot of media-
theoretical answers to this question, the internet meme—the definitive media 
of our indeterminate postdigital media situation—arguably invites a non-
standard response. It enjoins us to consider not only how it might be theorised 
or what theoretical resources we might use to theorise it, but what it means to 
theorise media when they contribute to the conditions by which they become 
objects of theorisation. In the internet meme, the indeterminacy that 
characterises our postdigital media situation and the necessity of thinking 
media in circulation converge, because it highlights how media theory has 
taken circulation for granted—both as concept and as concrete process. 
 
  7 
What sets the internet meme apart from other, similar internet-native media—
like viral media, for instance—14is that it’s usually reiterated as it’s shared, 
mutating as it’s collectively produced and copied by communities of users. The 
constituent components of internet memes vary wildly, because they are 
iteratively shaped as internet memes are collectively produced. Internet meme 
formats are also subject to constant change. Up until a few years ago, we 
might have associated the internet meme with the macro. In the online 
vernacular, a macro is an image, like the seminal Lolcat meme, that’s 
accompanied by header and/or footer text in white Impact font.15 Macro-
based internet memes still circulate, but they’ve been displaced by more 
complex formats and a greater variety of media types. The styles or aesthetics 
that define particular internet memes are also subject to constant change. 
Particular production techniques, aesthetics, or recurrent stylistic tropes slick 
the surface of online culture for short or long periods of time, but are always 
displaced by others. Each internet meme we encounter expresses a variation 
on a theme, reiterating a set of features—a base image, a phrase, a scenario, a 
style, a font, a sound, a plot, and so on—to instantiate that meme differently 
and anew.  
 
But “internet meme” is an ambiguous locution. An internet meme can mean 
either a meme-instance that we encounter online, in the singular: “a” cat 
meme. Or, it can mean the plurality of memes that lend that instance its 
parameters, meaning and sufficiency: to recall one of meme culture’s early 
classics, “the” Lolcat meme. This distinction isn’t just linguistic. The plurality of 
internet memes is irreducible to the collection of instances that comprise it; at 
the same time, this series can’t transcend the collection of instances that 
instantiate it. To reconcile this ambiguity, media theory invokes a term that it 
often uses to designate a process or to describe an action or a movement: we 
say that internet memes circulate. Like other kinds of internet-native media—
                                                        
14  On the circulation of online images, see: Marissa Olson, “Lost not Found: The Circulation of 
Images in Digital Visual Culture." Mass Effect: Art and the Internet in the Twenty-First Century. 
Eds. Lauren Cornell and Ed Halter. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2015. 159-167. 
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viral media, for instance—the internet meme is a type of media that circulates 
online.16 The meme is distinguishable from these other media by virtue of 
being collectively produced and, crucially, by varying as it circulates. We might 
intuitively apprehend that internet memes circulate—it’s self-evident that 
internet memes move between platforms, pages and feeds on their way to us. 
We could even say that what we intuit seems to merge with the theories of 
the internet meme that we posit. But the problem that animates this thesis 
arises because media theory arguably takes circulation for granted as a self-
evident process.  
 
There are a number of different theoretical and/or vernacular answers to the 
question, What is circulation? However, one of the foundational propositions of 
this thesis is that none provides a sufficient basis for a media-theoretical 
concept of the internet meme. A cursory keyword search quickly demonstrates 
just how commonplace circulation is in media theory. It’s frequently ascribed to 
all kinds of media, both on-line and off-. In media theory, we often use 
circulation to ascribe economic, vital, linguistic, or material qualities to media. 
Outside of media theory, circulation has become a key concept in disciplines 
like sociology, science and technology studies, and global history.17 My 
contention is that it remains under-articulated as a media-theoretical concept; 
that is, as a concept that is of media and that concerns what media are and 
what they do. To provide a preliminary illustration of why this is problematic, 
we can posit a pair of basic questions. If we ask the—media-theoretical—
question, What is circulated?, the answer is usually a variation on media, data, 
or content. But if we follow this question up with another—What is 
circulation?—we end up with a tautology: in media theory, circulation is 
                                                                                                                                                            
15  Kate Brideau and Charles Berret. “A Brief Introduction to Impact:‘ the Meme Font’.” Journal 
of Visual Culture 13, no. 3 (2014): 307–13. 
16  On the circulation of online images, see: Marissa Olson, “Lost not Found: The Circulation of 
Images in Digital Visual Culture." Mass Effect: Art and the Internet in the Twenty-First Century. 
Eds. Lauren Cornell and Ed Halter. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2015. 159-167. 
17  For respective overviews, see: Melissa Aronczyk, and Ailsa Craig. “Introduction: Cultures of 
Circulation.” Poetics 40, no. 2 (2012): 93–100; Lissa Roberts. “Situating Science in Global 
History: Local Exchanges and Networks of Circulation.” Itinerario 33, no. 1 (2009): 9–30; 
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typically understood to be the circulation of media, data, or content. 
Circulation’s self-evidence obfuscates its tautological self-reference. As a 
concept, it doesn’t actually give us any purchase on media’s circulations. 
Rather, it takes these circulations for granted as processes that just happen. 
My claim is that circulation’s self-evidence is of crucial importance to the 
internet meme: invoking circulation fails to reconcile its ambiguous double 
status as instance and plurality. More than this, my claim is that circulation’s 
self-evidence is of crucial importance to media theory, per se.  
 
Part of what I want to establish in this thesis is that circulation is a foundational 
media-theoretical concept. Positing the internet meme as a problem for media 
theory helps us to identify what’s at stake in this claim. Treating circulation as 
self-evident leaves media theory with a self-inflicted epistemological blind 
spot. If circulation is held to be something that just happens, taking media’s 
concrete online circulations for granted allows the distributed computational 
processes that put media in to circulation online to exercise an epistemological 
influence over media theory itself. Online, media are actively put in to 
circulation by something: not just by users, singular or collective, but by media 
technologies, like platforms. Treating circulation as self-evident allows media 
themselves to be taken for granted as they are presented to us by these 
computational processes. Treating circulation as self-evident has an 
epistemological knock-on effect, informing not only how or whether we think 
media in circulation, but how we conceptualise media themselves. Circulation 
is crucial to the internet meme because the capacity for reinvention that 
defines the internet meme won’t be found in the media that instantiate them, 
their particular content, their formats, or their styles. If we’re to theorise the 
internet meme as media, my contention is that we have to theorise it in 
circulation. So, the question, What is the internet meme?, entails another, 
reiterated now with more foundational force: What is circulation?  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Stefanie Gänger. “Circulation: Reflections on Circularity, Entity, and Liquidity in the 
Language of Global History.” Journal of Global History 12, no. 3 (2017): 303–18. 
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If the aim of this thesis is to formulate a theory of the internet meme, its 
premise is that we can only do so by working through the nested problem that 
the internet meme presents. This circulating internet meme is this thesis’s 
primary object. To theorise it, we also have to posit a concept of circulation. 
Just as media’s concrete circulations are seemingly self-evident, media theory 
arguably treats circulation as a self-evident process—and fails to conceptualise 
it. This problem is nested, moreover, because it’s not restricted to abstract, 
media-theoretical questions about how we might theorise the internet meme 
differently or how circulation might be conceptualised anew. To think the 
internet meme in circulation—to think media in circulation—we have to be able 
to think in circulation. That is, we have to be able to apprehend media both as 
they circulate, with our media-theoretical concepts; and in circulation, or as 
they present themselves to us as objects of theorisation.  
 
Our nested problem opens out on to—or, perhaps, circles back to—the 
question of what it means to theorise media today. The response to this 
question that I want to adopt in this thesis is at once epistemological and 
methodological. It necessitates treating media theory as a practice that can be 
worked on—not only to better apprehend its objects, like the circulating 
internet meme, but also to better suit the conditions that it’s used to think and 
that inform it in turn. 
 
 
0.3 THINKING MEDIA 
To theorise media like the internet meme in the present is to attempt to think 
them in circulation: not only as media that circulate, but as media whose 
circulations both render them indeterminate and contribute to the 
indeterminacy that characterises our postdigital media situation. This assertion 
seems tautological—in fact, it seems to reprise the very tautology that renders 
the internet meme itself ambiguous. It’s nevertheless central to the approach 
to the internet meme in particular and media in general that I want to adopt in 
this thesis. By treating media theory as a practice, we can use this tautology as 
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a point of departure for a method of doing theory that takes media, their 
contexts, and our concepts of them as material that must be made adequate to 
the internet meme, rather than a mode of theorisation that unilaterally takes 
the internet meme as its object.   
 
To frame this method, I want to recall another of Kittler’s earlier claims about 
media. In a little-referenced article that predates his infamous claim that media 
determine our situation, Kittler argued that media constitute the conditions of 
possibility for theorisation itself.18 Reflecting both on how he himself 
composed his media theory, several decades before us, and on how notable 
philosophers once composed their work, several decades before him, Kittler 
describes how the composition of theory and philosophy requires what he calls 
a “little apparatus”: notes, books, markers, words, notecards, and library stacks 
are all essential for the actual process by which theory and philosophy is 
researched, outlined, written, and circulated.19 That is, Kittler claims that media 
are essential to the production of theory and philosophy. In this early article, 
Kittler uses this observation to critique the philosophical tradition for being 
ignorant of the role that media themselves play in the production of theory 
and philosophy. What’s interesting for our purposes is that he also uses this 
observation to make a more general claim: media, he posits, are the a priori 
conditions for theorisation itself.  
 
In one sense, his claim is banal: media’s effects on theory are easily over-
inflated. In another, it’s reductive: if media constitute the conditions of 
possibility for thought, media explain epistemology in its entirety—which is 
another way of saying that they explain nothing about it at all.20 The 
implication of his argument is nevertheless compelling, if we draw a modest 
                                                        
18  Kittler. “Forgetting.” Discourse 3 (1981): 88–121. Harold A. Innis also makes a similar point 
in his late work. See: Empire and Communications. Lanham, ML: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. 
29. 
Kittler would later observe, by way of Friedrich Nietzsche, that  “[o]ur writing tools are also 
working on our thoughts." Quoted in Kittler. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. 200. 
19  Kittler. “Forgetting." 93. 
20  Krämer. Medium, Messenger, Transmission. 29. 
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lesson from it. To fail to think theory outside of the role that media play as 
both the means of and—more crucially—as the objects of thought can produce 
subtle, but nevertheless far-reaching consequences. Media are curious objects 
of thought: because they mediate, they come already-embedded with 
epistemologies.21 Ubiquitous media and the massively distributed internet 
compound this capacity. The media that constitute our postdigital situation 
automate epistemology, processing data, experience, and even how we think in 
ways that potentially impact the theories we posit of them. Media might not 
determine how we think, as thought’s a priori conditions; but, they certainly 
inform how we think of them, as the concrete constituents of what’s 
apprehensible and what’s thinkable in our postdigital present. My claim is that 
theory must be subject to those conditions, too—and the overarching aim of 
this thesis is to develop an epistemological framework that not only accounts 
for media’s influence on how we think them, but that turns this modest claim 
in to a method that we can use to think through—to think and to think with—
media in our postdigital present.   
 
This approach to theory is further complicated by the fact that we arguably 
don’t usually conceive of theory as a practice that’s subject to historically-
specific or concrete conditions.22 Notwithstanding how we talk about 
theoretical practice—which we often think of as immanent to or imbricated 
with its objects—we tend to actually practice theory as a mode of reflection 
that holds its objects at a remove. Though we might fix and modify theory to 
suit new objects—media change, so does media theory—we often ignore the 
historicity of theory and all of the components that constitute its armature: its 
tacit methods, its relationship to its objects, and, crucially, its concepts. As a 
                                                        
21  Richard Rogers makes the following claim of the technologies that order the internet: “As I 
have remarked, search engines, a crucial point of entry to the Web, are epistemological 
machines in the sense that they crawl, index, cache and ultimately order content." My claim 
could be read as a generalisation of this—insofar as media mediate, they order the 
presentation of what’s mediated; they’re embedded with epistemologies that inform how 
this mediation operates. See: Richard Rogers. The End of the Virtual: Digital Methods. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009. 19. 
22  On the a-historical practice of theorisation inherited from the “high theory” moment, see: 
Ian Hunter. “The History of Theory.” Critical Inquiry 33, no. 1 (2006): 78–112. 
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consequence, we don’t always recognise the impact that historically-specific 
objects have on the formation of our theoretical frameworks or our concepts. 
As Peter Osborne argues, this is a hangover from the “high theory” moment. 
We often treat theory’s main concepts—of which media is one and circulation 
another—as though they’re “trans-disciplinary”: as though they can be adopted 
in distinct disciplinary domains and reconciled with other concepts in the 
abstract medium of theorisation itself.23 We practice theory, in other words, as 
though its constituents are all “contemporary”24 with each other. Taken on 
their own, we might tinker with particular theories or theoretical frameworks. 
But we don’t often reflect on what theory is as a practice—and how objects like 
media inform this practice.  
 
To put concretely what Kittler institutes as an a priori, my claim is that our 
indeterminate postdigital media situation has real, epistemological effects on 
the production of media theory. So long as we think of theory as a practice 
carried out at a remove from the world, this claim will collapse into recursion: 
media think our thoughts of media think… If we understand media theory as a set 
of concrete practices, though, this claim takes on a different valence. It 
indicates a gap into which we can propose an alternate approach to 




I’ve chosen to begin this thesis by identifying its nested “problem” for both 
organisational and methodological reasons. The chapters that follow will be 
organised by the aim of “resolving” this nested problem. Yet the proposition 
that the internet meme presents media theory with a problem is problematic 
itself, insofar as it defies linear exposition. This problem encompasses media 
themselves, here the internet meme; the concepts we use to think them, 
                                                        
23  Peter Osborne. “Philosophy After Theory: Transdiciplinarity and the New,” In Theory After 
‘Theory’, edited by Jane Elliott, and Derek Attridge, 19–33. London and New York: 
Routledge, 2011. 21. 
24  Osborne. “Philosophy After Theory: Transdiciplinarity and the New.” 29. 
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specifically circulation; and the contexts in which we adopt media theory as a 
practice of thinking media: what I’ve described as our indeterminate postdigital 
media situation. As I’ve introduced them here, each of these components is 
interrelated. What I’ve been calling a problem articulates—that is, both 
expresses and conjoins—each of these components in their seeming 
disparateness. To be able to deal with one of these components necessitated 
being able to deal with each, simultaneously. Thankfully, the problem also 
articulates its own methodological solution: it’s a concept that comes with an 
attendant set of epistemological tools that I want to use to think media as they 
inform our theories of them.  
 
The concept of the problem has been developed in different ways by a 
number of key philosophers working in the continental tradition. For media 
theorists, it’s probably most closely associated with the work of Gilles 
Deleuze25. The concept I want to adopt comes from fields that are adjacent to 
media scholarship, but that don’t necessarily inform analyses of media: science 
and technology studies and the history and philosophy of science. As media is 
a technology, scholars of media do enter in to conversation with scholars 
working in science and technology studies, particularly when working on media 
systems like infrastructure.26 They have less cause to draw on the history and 
philosophy of science. The concept I want to adopt comes from an area of 
study that straddles these fields known as historical epistemology. As the name 
suggests, this subfield often focuses on the historical development of 
knowledge. However, it’s not what we might think of as an epistemology in the 
classical sense. Classical epistemology is concerned with the science of 
knowledge, or how we know what we know; in contrast, historical 
epistemology studies how scientific knowledge is produced, focusing in 
                                                        
25  For a good recent overview of the use of the concept of the problem that contextualises 
Canguilhem’s approach alongside readings of Bachelard and Deleuze—that also, ultimately, 
takes a different approach to the one I’ve adopted—see: Sean Bowden. “An Anti-Positivist 
Conception of Problems: Deleuze, Bergson and the French Epistemological Tradition.” 
Angelaki 23, no. 2 (2018): 45–63. 
26  Christian Sandvig. “The Internet as Infrastructure,” In The Oxford Handbook of Internet 
Studies, 86–108. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
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particular on the relationship between science’s material and historical 
conditions and scientific theory. I’ll outline this subfield in much more detail in 
a later chapter. For now, what’s crucial to note is that historical epistemology 
allows us to conceptualise a “problem”—like the one identified in this 
introduction—as an instrument of epistemological enquiry.  
 
For proponents of historical epistemology like Gaston Bachelard, Georges 
Canguilhem, and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, the problem is tied to a key 
component of theoretical practice: the concept.27 Writing with Camille Planet, 
Canguilhem describes the concept as “the enunciation of a problem to be 
solved."28 In other words, the problem articulates that for the sake of which 
concepts are posited. Their concept of the problem also provides us with a 
concept of the concept that we can use to carry out particular kinds of 
epistemological enquiry. Problems shape the knowledge that concepts 
produce, their relationship to their concrete objects, and the epistemologies 
into which they’re enrolled and that they set in train.29 This strain of historical 
epistemology helps us shift the domain of theoretical practice from the 
adoption or formulation of theoretical frameworks that can be applied to 
objects to the relationship between problems and concepts. What’s particularly 
compelling about it is that it’s based on another key proposition: that concepts 
themselves can be analysed as concrete things. Per the “historical” part of the 
moniker “historical epistemology”, concepts are determinate and historicisable, 
changing as their contexts, objects, and the theoretical frameworks in which 
they operate also change. The problem articulates this mutability by capturing 
the interrelation between concept, context, object, and prevailing 
epistemology. It captures knowledge production’s tendencies, allowing us to 
apprehend and engage with theory as a practice subject to concrete 
                                                        
27 Georges Canguilhem. “The Object of the History of Sciences,” In Continental Philosophy of 
Science, edited by Gary Gutting. Malden, M.A. and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005. 198–
207. 
28 Canguilhem and Planet quoted in Henning Schmidgen. “The Life of Concepts.” History and 
Philosophy of the Life Sciences 36, no. 2 (2014): 247. 
29 Elie During. “‘A History of Problems’: Bergson and the French Epistemological Tradition.” 
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 35, no. 1 (2004): 11. 
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conditions. To paraphrase Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, the strand of historical 
epistemology I want to adopt makes epistemology concrete.30  
 
Above, I suggested that the internet meme invites us to ask what it means to 
theorise media today. This is not a new claim. As media scholars like Lisa 
Gitelman and Benjamin Peters have persuasively argued, the drive to confer 
the status of “newest” on to whatever media has most recently emerged 
typically operates as epistemological legerdemain, investing our theories of 
these media with both necessity and novelty whilst eliding their historical 
precursors.31 My proposition is not that the internet meme invites us to think it 
in its “newness”, but rather that the problem it opens up invites us to place a 
much greater emphasis on the theorise. What does it mean to theorise media 
today, in their ubiquity, their massive distribution, and their consequent 
indeterminacy? How can we articulate a theory of a media type that defined 
by its capacity for reinvention, given the influence these media exercise on our 
theories of them and this claim’s obverse, that a practice that construes theory 
as “contemporary” won’t be able to apprehend, let alone deal with, the 
epistemological implications of this situation? Following historical 
epistemology, I want to suggest that we need to reconstruct our media-
theoretical practices by articulating a concrete media-theoretical epistemology. 
We can do so by analysing concepts. To formulate a theory of the internet 
meme, my proposition is that we need to focus on one concept in particular: 
circulation. 
 
Each of the components that make up this thesis’s particular problem has 
something in common. The ambiguous internet meme highlights the 
theoretical problem of conceptualising circulation; circulating internet memes 
are concrete constituents of the indeterminacy that characterises our 
indeterminate postdigital media situation; in circulation, internet memes 
                                                        
30  Hans-Jörg Rheinberger. An Epistemology of the Concrete: Twentieth-Century Histories of Life. 
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2010. 
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contribute to a form of epistemological indeterminacy created by the influence 
of media on theory. What they hold in common is circulation—conceived of as 
concept, as process, and as theoretical component of media theory, both in 
themselves and insofar as they express an interrelated set of processes. This 
commonality also allows us to articulate this thesis’s organising problem with 
more concision. In their ambiguity, as media that contribute to media’s 
concrete ubiquity, and as constituents of indeterminacy, internet memes 
continuously challenge us to theorise media in excess of themselves. They do 
so literally, when media are defined by their capacity to exceed themselves; in 
the ubiquitous and distributed excess that constitutes their contemporary 
context; and as objects of theorisation that influence media theory in turn. The 
problem they pose us is this: How might we theorise media in excess of 
themselves? The answer, as I’ll spend most of this thesis arguing, is deceptively 
simple: in circulation. 
 
The components of what I’m calling our problem converge, in circulation. It’s 
tautological to say that media, data, or content are what circulates and that 
circulation is the circulation of media, content, or data. But to recognise—in a 
preliminary way and from an historical epistemological vantage point—that the 
content of the concept of circulation is informed by the concrete conditions in 
which it’s posited, in which it, the concept, circulates, and to which it’s applied, 
delimits the concrete-epistemological domain in which we might begin to 
resolve the problem posed by the internet meme. This thesis will use the 
problem—in the fullest, epistemological sense—to inform an approach to 
theorising the internet meme that I’ll call “meme theory." This approach will 
draw on methodological tools from historical epistemology and adapt them to 
the specificities of media theory to turn theory itself into concrete material for 
further conceptualisation.    
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
31  Lisa Gitelman. Always Already New. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2008; Benjamin 
Peters. “And Lead Us Not in to Thinking the New is New: A Bibliographic Case for New 
Media History.” new media & society 11, no. 1&2 (2009): 13–30. 
  18 
0.5 THE METHOD OF THEORY 
For a thesis called “meme theory”, there are far fewer analyses of actual 
internet memes in the chapters that follow than one might expect. What I’m 
calling “meme theory” is an approach that’s concerned not with applying 
theory to internet memes to produce knowledge about them, but with 
resolving their concrete-epistemological problem. In a departure from 
conventional theoretical practice, this thesis will formulate its theory of the 
internet meme by taking circulation itself as the concrete object of a series of 
epistemological analyses. This approach entails forms of theoretical labour that 
propose and apply methods to theoretical practice itself. 
 
Typically, we order the production of knowledge in the humanities and social 
sciences by distinguishing between the theories that inform, guide, and govern 
our scholarship and the methods we use to apprehend our objects. Whilst 
methods might be informed by theory, we tend to treat method as separate 
from theory. This thesis was produced in a research centre that takes a 
different approach to method. It operates very much in dialogue with a field 
that I want to identify as “media theory." But given the problem that I’ve 
identified above, it’s also concerned with asking how we might articulate the 
method of media-theoretical practice. The conditions in which we practice 
theory have changed—and so, too, must our theoretical practices. What I’m 
calling “meme theory” mobilises this claim as methodological leitmotif. The 
novelty of the method that this thesis will adopt will be derived from two 
gestures: first, synthesising historical epistemology with media theory; and 
second, treating theory itself as material for further conceptualisation.  
 
In the scientific practices analysed by historical epistemology, concepts are 
treated as mobile units of knowledge.32 They can be assimilated to distinct 
theoretical frameworks, even as they’re produced in specific circumstances. 
Because they’re mobile, they can carry assumptions about the epistemological, 
                                                        
32  For a related approach in the social sciences, see: Mieke Bal. “Working With Concepts.” 
European Journal of English Studies 13, no. 1 (2009): 13–23. 
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technical, and institutional conditions in which they’re produced and the 
objects they originally take into new contexts. Historical epistemologists use 
concepts as foci to analyse how knowledge production shifts over time. But 
we can also use their concept of the concept to identify and analyse the 
influence that media themselves exercise over our concepts of them. Media 
differ from scientific objects, in ways that I’ll elucidate at length later on. 
Nevertheless, in mediating, media also inform our concepts of them. Our 
practices of theorising media intercede between media theory and its objects. 
What I’m calling “meme theory” works on this interceding space—on media, on 
the concepts we use to think media, and on media theory itself. For if media 
inform our theories of them, the theories we formulate have to be responsive: 
not only to what’s “new”, as the perpetually reinvented internet meme 
indomitably is, or to what’s indeterminate, as ubiquitous and massively-
distributed media are, but to its own concrete conditions. If circulation is the 
concept that’s key to resolving the problem posed by the internet meme, I 
want to ask how we can make this concept adequate to its object. This 
question is necessary not only for our task of formulating a theory of the 
internet meme, but because circulation is far more fundamental to our 
theoretical understanding of media than we typically acknowledge.  
 
This approach will adopt a few key concepts from historical epistemology: 
Canguilhem’s concept of the concept, as expanded upon by Rheinberger; what 
Canguilhem calls the “filiation”; and Lorraine Daston’s notion of the 
“commonplace." By positing that concepts are determinate, historicisable 
things, Canguilhem, and Rheinberger after him, offer us with epistemological 
tools that are as applicable to concepts in the present as they are to how 
concepts have developed in the past. We can adapt this insight to thinking 
media in our indeterminate postdigital media situation if we use it to 
acknowledge that our concepts can continue to be informed by prior 
theoretical frameworks, concrete-historical contexts, and the objects they 
were originally or subsequently used to think—and that they can carry these 
influences with them into new theoretical situations. Canguilhem calls these 
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persistent influences “filiations."33 In the chapters to follow, I want to use this 
insight to claim that media theory lacks an adequate concept of circulation 
because its use of circulation continuously reproduces filiations from other 
domains of knowledge—like political economy, biology, political science, 
infrastructure studies, or even conceptualisations of prior media. For 
Canguilhem, a filiation isn’t just a derivative relation; it’s also a determinate 
historical thing. Using methods derived fro historical epistemology, we can 
work through these extant filiations to make circulation adequate to the 
internet meme. 
 
Here, we run in to a seeming contradiction. I’ve claimed that we lack a media-
theoretical concept of circulation; yet I’m also claiming not only that that media 
theory employs this concept, if incorrectly, but that it can be made adequate to 
the internet meme. How can we apply a method derived from historical 
epistemology to a concept that’s not been adequately conceptualised? Here, I 
want to draw on another concept from a separate branch of historical 
epistemology to distinguish between concepts that are formalised as such and 
the informal conceptual work that particular terms do for specific disciplines.  
 
We do, in fact, claim that media circulate. This term is widely used throughout 
media scholarship. But it functions as what I want to call a “commonplace."34 In 
her historical epistemological work, Lorraine Daston makes a distinction 
between different epistemological registers that is essential to this thesis. One 
way of conceiving theoretical practice would be to say that it formalises the 
abstractions we use to produce knowledge about the world. For Daston, what 
historical epistemology is particularly adept at uncovering is those forms of 
knowledge that contribute to theoretical practice and that form a part of the 
epistemologies that inform knowledge production, but that have receded in to 
the background of formal theoretical practice. There are forms of knowledge 
                                                        
33  Canguilhem. A Vital Rationalist: Selected Writings From Georges Canguilhem. New York: Zone 
Books, 2000. 181. 
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that are so thoroughly woven through formations like disciplines that we take 
them for granted. They not only become commonplace, but can begin to 
function as “commonplaces”or, epistemological components that do occluded 
epistemological work. My claim is that circulation is just such a “commonplace." 
Although circulation has yet to be formalised as a concept that’s specific to 
media theory, it nevertheless plays a key role in our media-theoretical 
practices. In discussions and analyses of contemporary media, we frequently 
use circulation as a descriptive term. We say that media circulate so often that 
we rarely question what this means. But because we don’t usually 
acknowledge this conceptual work, each use also risks reproducing filiations to 
other contexts, other theoretical frameworks, and prior media.  
 
The internet meme remains ambiguous, because our concept of circulation is 
inadequate to the task of theorising it; we struggle to theorise it, because the 
epistemological work that circulation does for media theory remains 
unacknowledged; to make this concept adequate to the internet meme, 
therefore, we need to theorise it in its concrete circulations, in the present. By 
adopting methods derived from historical epistemology, what I want to show is 
that we can only make this concept adequate to the internet meme if we 
identify and articulate the kinds of epistemological work that circulation already 
does for media theory, in its role as a commonplace—and if our methods of 
practicing theory think across our problem’s concrete, epistemological, and 
theoretical-practical levels, simultaneously. 
 
This method of practicing theory widens its scope. When we begin to ask 
questions like, What epistemological work does circulation do for media theory?, 
or How do a concept’s theoretical frameworks, contexts, or objects inform them in 
return?, we can’t help but begin to posit some basic questions about media 
theory itself. These questions don’t primarily operate in an ontological register; 
they’re not primarily concerned about what media are, for instance. 
                                                                                                                                                            
34  Lorraine Daston. “The History of Emergences’. Essay Review of Ian Hacking: The Emergence 
of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, Induction, and Statistical 
Inference. New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.” Isis 98, no. 4 (2007): 808. 
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Nonetheless, they touch on media theory’s foundations. Each of the 
interrelated propositions I’ve introduced above touches on one of the key 
claims I want to make in this thesis: that circulation continues to recur as 
commonplace and despite its informality because it’s foundational to how we 
think media. Adopting a term from Ian Hacking, whose work in the field of the 
history and philosophy of science is very close to historical epistemology, I 
want to assert that circulation functions as an “organising concept”35, or a 
concept around which media theory itself articulates its practices. In using the 
problem posed by the internet meme as a point of departure, this thesis will 
arrive at this insight from below, so to speak, by reconstructing the concept of 
circulation out of its under-articulated epistemological effects.  
 
This approach brings the method of theory to the fore. But in positing that 
theory needs a method, we allow methods themselves to proliferate. After 
spending a major chunk of this thesis working on circulation, I will return to the 
internet meme and apply the renovated concept of circulation I’ve developed 
to concrete instances. Does this analysis then require us to articulate another 
method? If it does, which is primary—the method we apply to our theoretical 
practices, or the method we use to apply circulation to the internet meme? As I 
want to demonstrate throughout this thesis, method isn’t just something we 
adopt to guide the application of theory to objects. Methods are better 
thought of in process, as frameworks that we adopt to formalise our analyses 
during each stage of our response to a particular problem. I want to use the 
methods introduced above not only to reconstruct circulation, but to renovate 
theoretical practice as what I’m calling “meme theory”. 
 
“Meme theory” is a theoretical practice that concretises epistemology and, in 
doing so, posits the concrete and the epistemological in reciprocal relation. 
This practice begins with problems, because it’s only by beginning with 
problems that we can identify the lineaments of a media-theoretical 
epistemology that’s adequate to the present, without being contemporary. It 
                                                        
35  Ian Hacking. Historical Ontology. London: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
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encourages us not only to recognise that theoretical practice is always guided 
by methods, but to seek out those methods of practicing theory that best suit 
a particular problem. “Meme theory” operates in the interrogative. It asks 
questions: What does it mean to theorise media today? How might we think media 
in excess of themselves? How might we formulate a theory of the internet meme? 
That is, it also operates process and responsively, by making theory responsive 
enough to its objects to think with the internet meme and after it. Here is 
where we find the relevance of an “historical” approach to epistemology for 
the present. In making epistemology concrete, this approach acknowledges 




Before glossing the structure of this thesis and introducing each of these 
chapters, I want to clarify its disciplinary positioning. In outline, this thesis 
might be difficult to place within a particular discipline. Its object, the internet 
meme, is typically studied by media scholars; its concern with how we theorise 
media might be fitted into the more general field of “theory”; it derives its 
methods in large part from a field that straddles science and technology 
studies and the history and philosophy of science. To further complicate 
matters, its concern with epistemology is heavily informed by particular strains 
of continental philosophy. How, then, ought we to place this thesis within the 
broader disciplinary formations that govern not only how we do scholarly 
work, but how it’s received and by whom? Though this thesis derives its 
methods from historical epistemology, I want to position it explicitly within a 
filed that I want to call “media theory." More than this, I want to distinguish 
media theory, which is perhaps commonly thought of as a subset of a broader 
field of media and communications scholarship, as a discipline in itself.  
 
This thesis has been written under the auspices of a research centre that 
investigates “interdisciplinary methodologies." It follows that it’s concerned not 
only with methods, as we saw above, but with interdisciplinarity. Whilst this 
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context might invite us to eschew disciplines altogether, the methods I want to 
adopt to formulate a theory of the internet meme and, so, to rethink theory as 
practice actually invite the opposite. Adopting methods derived from historical 
epistemology necessarily enjoins us to trace concepts, filiations, and 
commonplaces beyond their disciplinary bounds. At the same time, these 
methods also tacitly invite us to examine our theoretical practices as they’re 
disciplined. Though these tasks might seem to run at cross-purposes, they 
aren’t mutually exclusive. Interdisciplinary work opens up fields of knowledge 
to one another. But it’s also constrained by the weight of assumptions—
commonplaces—that each extra discipline brings to scholarship. To work 
between disciplines, we have to understand how particular disciplines conceive 
their practices in contradistinction to other fields. 
 
A theoretical engagement with the internet meme’s natural home, the 
scholarship on contemporary media in general and social media in particular, 
includes a number of recent—and typically incisive—analyses of the internet 
meme. Over the past decade or so, scholars of media have produced analyses 
of internet memes that provide essential overviews of how meme cultures 
have developed as well as analyses of particular internet memes. Chapter 3 will 
outline these in much more detail, but for now I want to note that this work is 
typically animated by epistemological preconceptions—about how media ought 
to be conceived, what it does, and how it might be analysed—than differ 
drastically from those that inform this thesis. This is best expressed through 
the concept of the problem that I’ve used to frame this thesis. As I’ve posited 
this problem, the task of formulating a theory of the internet meme is 
contingent upon our capacity to resolve a nested problem that concerns not 
only what the internet meme is, but what concepts we use to think it and how 
the act of thinking it might be positioned in relation to our indeterminate 
postdigital media situation. The analyses of internet memes in the work of their 
three most influential scholars—Limor Shifman, Wendy Phillips, and Ryan M. 
Milner—don’t share its abstruse epistemological concerns. Their work, whilst 
undoubtedly incisive and very formative, is much more concerned with 
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situating internet memes in contemporary online culture, conceived of as 
“participatory”; analysing internet memes using empirical methods, like 
ethnography; and teasing out the normatively-construed democratic nature of 
meme cultures, respectively. The field in which they operate, what I think of as 
“media studies”, doesn’t have room for the kind of scholarly enquiry this thesis 
will carry out. But what I’m calling “media theory” does. 
 
Is “media theory” a discipline? My answer is yes—insofar as it expresses a 
shared epistemological interest in questions of what media are and insofar as 
it’s organised around collectively-acknowledged precursors. I’ll outline this 
particular claim in much greater depth in Chapter 6 in particular. Here, I want 
to note that what distinguishes “media theory” as an identifiable 
epistemological formation is its concern with foundational questions about 
what media are and what they do. The analyses in the chapters to follow will 
range across very different domains of knowledge. But these forays will 
always, though often tacitly, be concerned with examining how the internet 
meme might be understood as media and what this media does. This concern 
is not be wholly alien to the field I’ve identified as “media studies." But the 
kinds of work that asks this kind of question using methods and 
epistemological frameworks of the kind I want to adopt won’t be found in that 
field. To judge these disparate approaches using the same criteria would be to 
commit a category error. In later chapters, this thesis will engage with broader 
work on the internet meme and online media from what I’m calling “media 
studies”, particularly when glossing how the internet meme has been theorised. 
Whilst it will avoid critiquing this work outright, it will nevertheless adopt 
different epistemological premises. It will be positioned in relation to other sets 
of literature that are concerned with asking theoretical questions about how 
we might understand media in excess of themselves, including recent 
conceptualisations of media; theories of media systems; and other 
epistemological approaches to media theory.  
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The analyses I want to present in this thesis will focus heavily on circulation, 
following its commonplace usages and its filiations from the internet meme to 
familiar domains, like meme cultures, contemporary online platforms, media 
infrastructures, the discipline of media theory and the role that materialism 
plays for it. But they will also take us to less familiar domains, like political 
economy, vitalist philosophy, and even Renaissance anatomical practices and 
the discovery of the circulation of the blood. Many of these domains aren’t 
strictly media-theoretical; but taken as a whole, this thesis arguably is. It’s aim, 
after all, is to formulate a theory of the internet meme—in circulation, through 
the concept of circulation, as this concept circulates; or, by whatever 




I have chosen to allow the structure of this thesis to be determined by the 
exigencies of its organising problem. This structure is a little unusual in that a 
significant proportion of this thesis is given over to epistemological analyses of 
circulation. Yet the premises that I’ve outlined in this introduction also 
demonstrate its necessity. In what follows, I aim to formulate a theory of the 
internet meme. But to do so, we first need to reconceptualise circulation by 
identifying the conceptual work it does, as a commonplace; substantiating the 
foundational role it plays for media theory; and establishing it as a component 
of a media-theoretical practice that’s responsive to the concreteness of 
epistemological work. Guided by our problem, this thesis’s three sections turn 
these reciprocal tasks into a programme. 
 
The first section does the work of positioning this thesis’s approach to the 
internet meme. Chapter 1 acts as a literature review, contextualising the 
internet meme in relation to two bodies of scholarship: extant work on the 
meme itself, including the biological work that from which it originated; and 
recent media theory that conceptualises media in excess of themselves. It 
argues that neither adequately conceptualises the internet meme—or media 
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more broadly—in circulation, setting the scene for the analyses to follow. 
Chapter 3 acts as a methods chapter, providing an overview of historical 
epistemology. It argues that historical epistemology can provide us with a 
powerful method for analysing the influence media exercise on our concepts 
of them, but only if we adapt its precepts to media’s epistemological 
specificities. In response, it posits what I call “media-historical epistemology” 
and, after distinguishing it from other historical approaches to studying media, 
uses it as the basis for a method. Where these chapters are more typical, the 
middle chapter in this section carries out an unconventional, more speculative, 
kind of preliminary work. Through an analysis of an artwork by Constant 
Dullaart called Jennifer in Paradise, this chapter demonstrates why circulation is 
necessary for thinking the internet meme—by demonstrating how a meme 
that’s no longer in circulation cannot be called a meme. In the process, it also 
unpacks the temporality of circulation and its relationship to media-theoretical 
practice, outlining in more detail how we might avoid “contemporary” media 
theory. 
 
The next section uses the method introduced in the first to begin to 
reconstruct circulation. It does so using unconventional means: by analysing 
the conceptual work that circulation does as a “commonplace” in order to 
identify how it remains underdetermined as a concept of media; how it 
reproduces filiations; and what qualities of media we invoke it to think. 
Chapter 4 presents an overview of some of the typical media-theoretical uses 
of circulation, before arguing that invoking it as a commonplace takes for 
granted the media-technical ensembles that put media like internet memes in 
to circulation. It focuses in particular on the platform, the ensemble most 
relevant to online culture in general and the internet meme in particular. By 
taking the circulation of media by platforms for granted, it argues that we allow 
platforms to exercise an epistemological influence over media itself, reducing 
media to their “content”. Chapter 5 swerves deeper into circulation’s 
epistemological history. This chapter returns to the discovery of the circulation 
of the blood by the anatomist William Harvey to argue that our commonplace 
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usages of circulation retain a filiation to the anatomical body. It argues that this 
filiation reduces circulation to a circulation-for-the-sake-of: if not the literal 
body, than an epistemological substitute. The net effect is that some 
invocations of circulation reduce media in circulation to expressions of basic 
ontological categories.  
 
Chapter 6 rounds out these section by returning to the much more recent 
media-theoretical concept of infrastructure. Media infrastructures are essential 
for understanding what media are in circulation in the present. Yet, the 
concept of infrastructure also institutes a filiation. Where the previous 
chapters analysed how circulation can remain filiated to specific objects or 
theoretical frameworks, this chapter opens our analysis out to the discipline of 
media theory itself. Through engagements with concepts of infrastructure, the 
crucial precursive work of James W. Carey, and the epistemological techniques 
we use to produce overviews of theoretical movements, it argues that 
conceiving of circulation as a derivative of infrastructure recuperates it to a 
problem that plays out at the level of the discipline itself, conceived of as a 
concrete set of practices that inform our use of concepts: the question of 
whether or how media ought to be materialised. So long as we construe 
circulation through the basic category of materiality, I argue, we can’t use it to 
think media in excess of themselves. 
 
These analyses culminate in the third section’s two chapters. The second 
section’s analyses of circulation’s filiations provided us with insights in to those 
qualities of media that we use circulation to think. They also provided us with 
epistemological materials for circulation’s reconceptualisation. Chapter 7 uses 
these materials to make four propositions about circulation: after platforms, 
circulation is technical; in circulation, media’s materiality is a technical-
epistemological product rather than an ontological predicate; circulation bodies 
media as milieu; and that in circulation, media can be expressed as instance 
and/or plurality. Taken together, these propositions provide us with a concept 
that we can use to formulate the internet meme. 
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And yet the very premises this thesis establishes from the beginning of this 
introduction all the way through preclude the positing of a concept that we 
could simply take up and apply to the internet meme. This concept emerges in 
and through concrete epistemological analyses and in response to the internet 
meme and its particular problem. This concept is also formulated to remain 
reflexively responsive to the exigencies of concrete, circulating media. 
Together, these premises preclude formulating a theory of the internet meme 
in a “contemporary” mode. Chapter 8 realises this thesis’s aim by adopting a 
media-theoretical practice that I call “meme theory”. This practice adopts the 
reconstructed concept of circulation to engage in the analysis of three internet 
memes associated with the new online culture wars: the infamous Pepe meme, 
the “Punch a Nazi” meme, and the delightfully-titled “Fuck 2016” meme. It uses 
our reconstructed concept of circulation to suggest that what these internet 
memes body—what the circulate for—is “negativity”, a complex of politics, 
feeling, and negation that emerges with forms of antagonism made possible by 
platforms.  
 
Following the problem posed by the internet meme necessitates qualifying our 
aim. The internet meme is in circulation. If our theories of it are to avoid falling 
in to redundancy even as they’re posited—even as, with their positing, internet 
memes reinvent themselves—we have to enter media theory in to circulation, 
too. Rather than positing a theory of the internet meme, this thesis develops a 
media-theoretical practice that’s able to operate in responsive relationship to 
the internet meme. This is what I call “meme theory”. In the conclusion to this 
thesis, I’ll reflect more on how this practice might be adapted to the study of 
other media. What it offers, I want to suggest, is an epistemological template 
that we can adapt to other media and their problems. What organising role 
circulation might play for our concepts of media in general is unclear; that we 
adopt practices of thinking media in circulation is what’s key. 
 
I. THE MEME IS— 
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Keep hitting refresh on the right bulletin board, Facebook group, or 
community-maintained webpage and you’ll be confronted with a deluge of 
new internet memes. Some will be variations on memes you might have seen 
before; some will creatively combine distinct memes to produce something 
else or something new; some might even present formats you’ve not yet 
encountered. This furious proliferation of novelty is a product of the internet 
meme’s capacity for reinvention. It’s tempting to base a theory of the internet 
meme on this novelty, or to claim that in the new, an adequate theory is to be 
found. But what a theory of the internet meme really has to grapple with is the 
threat of its own redundancy in the face of this deluge—and this deluge’s its 
drivers, contemporary media’s ubiquity and their massive distribution. The 
novel obscures the persistent influence of what’s known, or what’s receded 
into the familiarity of what’s commonplace. It’s tempting to focus on the 
internet meme, but it’s not the—already-apprehensible—internet meme itself 
that requires epistemological scrutiny.  
 
In this chapter, I want to frame the extended engagement with the internet 
meme by presenting a survey of extant literature on it. The first three sections 
are structured around a periodisation that I want to impose on extant internet 
meme scholarship. As most scholars of the internet meme note, the concept 
first originated in the evolutionary-biological work of Richard Dawkins. The 
first section of this chapter will specify the difference between Dawkins’ 
original concept of the “meme” and the “internet meme”, as adopted in 
vernacular online usage and taken up by media scholars. After this initial phase 
of biological meme scholarship, the next section will outline what I identify as 
its intermediary phase. Here, we see the concept of the meme being taken up 
by mid-nineties ‘net critics, who wrote about online culture as participants in it, 
before being adopted by media theorists in the 2000’s. In this phase, media 
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theorists express a critical relationship to the concept, whilst nevertheless 
enlisting it to productive ends. Nevertheless, “meme” was still treated as a 
broad concept that encompassed all kinds of media, from those found online 
to those distributed using other means. It’s not until the final phase, beginning 
around the 2010’s, that concept adopts the modifier “internet." In this most 
recent phase, media scholarship begins to reproduce the vernacular online 
conception of the internet meme commonly found online.  
 
As I’ll argue, this provenance lends the internet meme a self-evident quality—
and typically leads scholars to fail to question what it means for an internet 
meme to be in circulation. In doing so, however, they also open this thesis out 
to a media-theoretical literature that operates beyond the internet meme. 
Taking its cue from this thesis’s organising problem, the fourth section of this 
literature review will position this thesis in relation to other, recent media-
theoretical attempts to think media in excess of themselves. As I want to show, 
this extant literature is often very incisive, but also addresses a different set of 
objects and a different set of problems to those that concern us here. 
Outlining what’s similar in this literature and what’s different will help us to 
position the claims this thesis makes about internet memes, about media, and 
about the practice of theorising media in the present. This final section will 
focus on three recent media-theoretical strands: analyses of media as, in my 
language, in excess of themselves; epistemological approaches to media, 
patched together from Anglophone and German sources; and engagements 
with media systems. 
 
In toto, this literature constitutes the natural context for the analyses I want to 
present in this thesis. But it’s not this literature to which this thesis will directly 
respond. This survey constitutes something akin to a literature review, but its 
aim is different. The aim of the literature review is to take stock of extant 
literature on a particular topic, using acts of positioning and repositioning to 
frame its methodological and theoretical claims. Insofar as this thesis adopts an 
approach that takes media theory itself as the epistemological material for 
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further conceptualisation, its modes of engaging with and analysing material 
work in constant rapport with a number of fields of literature, ranging across 
media theory and into the other disciplinary domains of knowledge. Much of it 
will be given over to extended epistemological engagements with these fields 
of knowledge that take forms like the standard literature review, only executed 
with the aim of producing new knowledge rather than positioning this thesis as 
a whole. These engagements constitute a form of continuous positioning and 
re-positioning. This literature review helps us establish the context for these 
later engagements—but it’s presented with the knowledge that later chapters 
will necessarily introduce and respond to other bodies of literature, too. This 
chapter necessarily does double duty as an epistemological anchor, fixing the 
engagements that follow in other chapters—which will range far from online 
culture and its definitive media—to the internet meme.  
 
 
1.1 MEME BIOLOGY 
The literature on the internet meme has a history that’s as convoluted as the 
concept itself. The concept of the meme was first coined by Richard Dawkins 
in his career-defining, 1976 work on evolution, The Selfish Gene, and expanded 
upon in the book’s 1989 reissue. In The Selfish Gene, Dawkins posited the 
influential argument that the object of evolutionary processes of natural 
selection is not the organism, but rather a smaller unit.1 This unit, the titular 
selfish gene, is the focal point of an approach to evolution that analyses how 
specific genes prosper over time at the expense of others. For our purposes, 
Dawkins’ evolutionary biology is significant for three main reasons.  
 
First and most obviously, it posited the “meme” as the cultural equivalent of 
the selfish gene. Dawkins conceived of this term—whose name he derived 
from the Ancient Greek word mimesis, which can mean imitation or mimicry—
as a unit of culture that is also subject to evolutionary processes; his examples 
included things like the hooks from pop songs or catch phrases. Second, 
                                                        
1  Richard Dawkins. The Selfish Gene [Revised Edition]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
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Dawkins introduced a conceptual language that distinguished genes from their 
host organisms, which he referred to, respectively, as “replicators” and 
“vehicles.”2 His conception of the replicator is quite specific. He originally 
posits this term to explain the emergence of life in the form of complex strings 
of chemical molecules from a primordial soup, likening the replicator molecule 
to a “mould or template” whose “affinity” for like molecules sets in train a 
process that “automatically” arranges them into a “stable chain.”3 As Jeremy 
Trevelyan Burman notes, the replicator can either refer to something that “can 
make copies of itself” or to something that “is easily and automatically copied 
by virtue of its relationship to the medium in which it is found.”4 In other 
words, it’s an ambivalent concept—at least, from an humanities perspective for 
which questions of agency are foundational. Dawkins’ concept of the meme 
acts as a cultural equivalent of a gene because it functions as a replicator. 
Third, The Selfish Gene had an outsize cultural impact: this book launched the 
concept of the meme into mainstream popular-scientific and cultural-critical 
discussions.5  
 
A few other key events punctuate the broader uptake of the biological concept 
of the meme. In 1993, Richard Dawkins published an essay called “Viruses of 
the Mind”, using the concept of the meme to characterise religion with this 
eponymous phrase—and prefiguring his late-period, antagonistic atheism.6 By 
1995, “memetics” had evolved into a fully-fledged field complete with its own 
peer-reviewed outlet, the Journal of Memetics—Evolutionary Models of 
Information Transmission. Most crucially, in 2000 Susan Blackmore published 
The Meme Machine, which provided a book-length, coherent overview of the 
meme concept. Burman puts its influence like this: “ultimately”, he says, The 
                                                        
2 Dawkins. The Selfish Gene. 15. 
3 Dawkins. The Selfish Gene. 15. 
4 Jeremy Trevelyan Burman. “The Misunderstanding of Memes: Biography of an Unscientific 
Object, 1976–1999.” Perspectives on Science 20, no. 1 (2012): 80. 
Burman also notes that Dawkins’ original object of processes of natural selection was not the 
specific unit—the gene—but the class of replicators. 
5 Burman. “The Misunderstanding of Memes." 80. 
6 Dawkins. “Viruses of the Mind,” In Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind, edited by Bo 
Dahlbom, Maldon: Blackwell, 1993. 
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Meme Machine “became the point of departure for all subsequent discussions 
of memetics.”7 Qua Dawkins, Blackmore emphasises memes’ role as 
replicators; but she also specifies three key criteria by which their “fitness” 
might be measured: “fidelity”, or accuracy; “fecundity”, or the capacity to 
produce many copies; and “longevity.”8 Moreover, she introduced the concept 
of a “memetic drive”, which claims that memes have influenced the 
environments that we inhabit and in which our genes are selected and, so, 
have informed genetic evolution itself.9 Blackmore generalised the Darwinian-
evolutionary logic of replication, popularising it further and providing the 
conceptual tools for it to be applied in general analyses of culture.  
 
Both Dawkins’ and Blackmore’s conceptualisations of memes would go on to 
be highly influential. More importantly, these biologists popularised a concept 
that—once allowed to percolate—could be extended to media in general and, 




1.2 MEMETIC MEDIA 
In what I’m calling its intermediate phase, the concept of the meme enters 
discussions of media, but does not yet accrue the modifier “internet." This 
phase was made possible by the mid-nineties internet-enraptured discussions 
of magazines like Wired, where some of the earliest and more influential 
popular discussions of the meme concept first took place. In 1994, Mike 
Godwin wrote an article for Wired that introduced this concept into online 
culture by characterising internet users’ tendency to compare other users to 
Nazis on bulletin boards—known, in online vernacular, as “Godwin’s Law”—as a 
kind of “meme.”10 In the same year, Michael Schrage, then-fellow at the MIT 
Media Lab, wrote an article in the same magazine with the provocative title, “Is 
                                                        
7  Burman. “The Misunderstanding of Memes." 97. 
8  Susan Blackmore. The Meme Machine. Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 2000. 100. 
9  Blackmore. The Meme Machine. 111. 
10  Mike Godwin. “Meme, Counter-Meme.” Wired, October 1994. 
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Advertising Dead?”, using the meme concept to discuss the interrelated 
futures of advertising and media.11 Most importantly, Schrage wrote a longer, 
exhortative cover-profile on Dawkins and his meme concept for Wired in 
1995.12 Burman accords this article the largest share of the credit for placing 
the meme concept in the popular—North American—consciousness.13 It 
represents the moment that the concept was taken up by media critics—and 
establishes the popular context in which it would be taken up by media 
theorists.  
 
Media theorists responded to the meme concept in a few key ways. Scholars 
like Stephen Downes and W. Lance Bennett used it to conceptualise the 
tactical, bottom-up use of media for political ends. In 1999, Downes used the 
meme concept to theorise the potential uses of the internet for what he called 
subversive “information warfare.” A few years later, Bennett adopted the 
concept to explicate the more moderate, but no less activist, practices of 
“culture jamming.”14 In these examples, the meme concept was adapted to 
discussions of media with little theoretical modification. A few years later, 
another set of media theorists adopted a more cautious and critical approach 
to the meme concept, citing it as a potentially-useful theoretical tool whilst 
also expressing reservations about the fit between its neo-Darwinian 
epistemology and the specificities of media theory.  
 
In 2005, Matthew Fuller included an extended reflection on the meme 
concept in his influential theorisation of “media ecologies." Fuller asserted that 
“the meme as conceptual device has the potential for intensifying speculation 
                                                        
11  Michael Schrage. “Is Advertising Dead?” Wired, January 1994. 
12  Schrage. “Revolutionary Evolutionist.” Wired, July 1995. 120-24. 
13  Burman. “The Misunderstanding of Memes." 91. 
14  Stephen Downes. “Hacking Memes.” First Monday 4, no. 10 (1999): 
http://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/694/604; W. Lance Bennett. “New Media 
Power: The Internet and Global Activism,” In Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a 
Networked World, edited by Nick Couldry, and James Curran, 17–38. Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 
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on the paradoxical consequences of reflexive mediality.”15 He notes that one 
of its advantages is that it doesn’t “rely on any necessary sensibility, teleology, 
or interpretation in culture” in order to be used to analyse cultural products.16 
But at the same time, he also notes that what he calls meme theory—the echo 
with my “meme theory” is incidental; Fuller uses it to distinguish a media-
theoretical approach to memes from the formalised scientific field of 
memetics—“needs to be coupled with other approaches, historical analysis for 
example, in order to take full advantage of its capacities.”17 Moreover, he 
argues that “memetics” is often premised on “an artificial distinction between a 
hylomorphically arranged “content” and “form”” that negates the role that 
media play in replication.18 For Fuller, the meme concept can be adopted to 
think media—but only if it’s revised. 
 
Tony D. Sampson’s 2009 study of virality also addresses the meme concept 
whilst drawing on the work of Gabriel Tarde to develop its own, novel 
conceptualisation of how media proliferate. Sampson is more critical than 
Fuller—for him, both the meme and virality alike represent “the marketing 
buzzwords of the network age.”19 His critique echoes Fuller’s in claiming that 
“in memetics, the medium in which an idea is transmitted is typically dismissed 
as an inert channel.”20 But he also extends Fuller’s critique. When Sampson 
argues that it’s “the assumed capacity of the virally encoded meme to hide its 
source, and make its contagion appear accidental, that has arguably appealed 
to the marketer”, he suggests that it’s the meme’s mediatic capacity to recede 
in use that actually facilitates the epistemological spread of the concept, which 
is made powerful because it ignores actual memes’ contexts.21 Of Dawkins’ 
meme concept, Sampson also observes that it denotes “a self-copying message 
                                                        
15  Matthew Fuller. Media Ecologies: Materialist Energies in Art and Technoculture. MIT Press, 
2005. 112. 
16  Fuller. Media Ecologies. 114. 
17  Fuller. Media Ecologies. 113. 
18  Fuller. Media Ecologies. 114. 
19  Tony D. Sampson. Virality: Contagion Theory in the Age of Networks. U of Minnesota Press, 
2012. 
20  Sampson. Virality. 72. 
21  Sampson. Virality. 65. 
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system, regulated by the decision-making process of an evolutionary 
algorithm.”22 This raises the immediate question—How, then, is the meme 
concept compatible with the algorithmically-mediated spaces of online culture? 
Most damningly for Sampson, the meme concept fails to adequately identify 
the unit of memetic replication. As he puts it, for memetics, “the meme is 
missing.”23 Jussi Parikka’s 2007 take on memes presents a critique of the 
meme concept that goes even further than Sampson’s: for Parikka, the 
influence of the meme concept can be chalked up to its role as a “viral theory 
of the consumer object and post-Fordist networks."24 In stark contrast to 
Fuller, Sampson, and Parikka’s work, Vito Campinelli’s 2010 adoption of the 
meme concept for thinking online culture avows the meme as the internet’s 
“minimal unit of information.”25 Campinelli posits as a strength what Sampson 
argues is the meme concept’s greatest weakness, presenting a notable, positive 
uptake of the original biological concept of the meme in media theory.  
 
Summarising these positions, intermediate phase media theorists weigh the 
relative utility of the meme concept for thinking media based on the perceived 
efficacy of reducing media to the “unit”; of its compatibility with the media 
concept; or on its tacit or explicit politics. These theorists arguably respond to 
the cultural prominence enjoyed by the meme concept at the time, which it 
accrued as a constituent part of an evolutionary, Darwinian epistemology. I 
want to take cues from some of these works: in particular, Sampson’s 
observation that “the meme is missing” and Fuller’s acknowledgement that the 
meme concept provides critical purchase on thinking “reflexive mediality." That 
said, the meme that this thesis deals with is, arguably, not the same as the 
meme concept that these media theorists critiqued. Online, what’s called a 
meme is more properly denoted as an “internet meme." It’s this media type 
                                                        
22  Sampson. Virality. 72. 
23  Sampson. Virality. 70. 
24  Jussi Parikka. “Contagion and Repetition: On the Viral Logic of Network Culture.” ephemera 
7, no. 2 (2007): 295. 
25  Vito Bardo Campanelli. Web Aesthetics: How Digital Media Affect Culture and Society. NAi 
Publishers, 2010. 73. 
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that’s the subject of this thesis—and it’s the literature on this media type to 
which I’ll now turn.  
 
 
1.3 THE INTERNET MEME 
The internet meme is not the same as the meme that Dawkins originally 
conceptualised. In a moment that is reminiscent of nothing other than a 
particularly popular Simpsons meme called “old man yells at cloud”, Dawkins 
has recently repudiated the general uptake of the meme concept in online 
culture.26 For Dawkins, the meme concept is supposed to explain the broad-
scale evolution of culture according to the logic of its replicators. The 
vernacular online usages of this concept are much more narrow, because 
they’re restricted to media that are produced and that circulate online. They 
are also, arguably, more suggestive—online, the circulation of media is, 
necessarily, a mediated process. As already stated, my claim is that the internet 
meme has to be thought in circulation. I want to overview the recent literature 
on the internet meme with this focus in mind.  
 
Much recent academic work on the internet meme is informed by the concept 
of “participatory culture”—that is, the idea that online culture is actively 
produced by the users who participate in it.27 A significant subset of this work 
focuses on politics. The work of Ryan M. Milner is particularly representative: 
in his recent book and in an earlier article, Milner uses examples like Occupy 
Wall Street to argue that memes play a significant role in facilitating 
contemporary political commentary and action.28 Andrew S. Ross and Damian 
                                                        
26  Dawkins. “Just for Hits." Keynote Presentation, Saatchi & Saatchi New Directors Showcase, 
Cannes, 23 June, 2013. Available to watch online: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GFn-ixX9edg 
27  Henry Jenkins. Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide. NYU press, 2006. 
See also: Barney, Darin, Gabriella Coleman, Christine Ross, Jonathan Sterne, and Tamar 
Tembeck, eds. The Participatory Condition in the Digital Age Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2016. 
28  Ryan M. Milner. “Pop Polyvocality: Internet Memes, Public Participation, and the Occupy 
Wall Street Movement.” International Journal of Communication 7 (2013): 2357–90; The 
World Made Meme: Public Conversations and Participatory Media. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
Press, 2016. 
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J. Rivers’ analysis of the use of internet memes during the 2016 Presidential 
election and Heidi E. Huntington’s reframing of internet memes as forms of 
political rhetorical speech adopt similar conceptual frameworks to analyse 
politics at the interface between deliberative democracy, protest, and 
participatory culture.29 Another subset—represented by Carrie A. Rentschler 
and Samantha C. Thrift’s feminist analysis of the “binders full of women” meme 
and Milner and Whitney Phillips’ feminist standpoint analysis of the 
#yesallwomen movement—uses feminist approaches to analyse forms of 
activism that employ internet memes. A third significant subset focuses 
explicitly on the “culture” part of online culture. Phillips’ and Milner’s recent co-
authored book on what they call the “ambivalent internet”—which proposes 
that online culture is best characterised by its capacity to both facilitate 
expression and to breed ugliness, often in dizzying simultaneity—exemplifies 
this approach, using the internet meme, amongst other media, to characterise 
online culture as a whole.30 Other studies—like Jacqueline Ryan Vickery’s 
analysis of users’ reappropriation of images or Michael Soha and Zachary J. 
Macdowell’s analysis of the monetisation of the wildly-popular Harlem shake 
meme—use particular case studies to reflect on the general, popular-cultural 
role of internet memes today.31 Asaf Nissenbaum and Limor Shifman’s study of 
the use of internet memes to build or spend cultural capital on 4Chan’s 
infamous /b/ board represents an approach that focuses on their community-
building role.32 Whilst noting that some of these studies provide useful and 
incisive overviews of online culture, their emphasis on participation expresses a 
                                                        
29  Andrew S., Ross and Damian J. Rivers. “Digital Cultures of Political Participation: Internet 
Memes and the Discursive Delegitimization of the 2016 Us Presidential Candidates.” 
Discourse, Context & Media 16 (2017): 1–11; Heidi E.Huntington. “Pepper Spray Cop and 
the American Dream: Using Synecdoche and Metaphor to Unlock Internet Memes’ Visual 
Political Rhetoric.” Communication Studies 67, no. 1 (2016): 77–93. 
30  Whitney Phillips and Ryan M. Milner. “Decoding Memes: Barthes’ Punctum, Feminist 
Standpoint Theory, and the Political Significance of# Yesallwomen,” In Entertainment Values, 
edited by Stephen Harrington. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 195–211. 
31  Jacqueline Ryan Vickery. “The Curious Case of Confession Bear: The Reappropriation of 
Online Macro-Image Memes.” Information, Communication & Society 17, no. 3 (2014): 301–
25; Michael Soha and Zachary J. McDowell. “Monetizing a Meme: Youtube, Content Id, and 
the Harlem Shake.” Social Media+ Society 2, no. 1 (2016): 1-12. 
32  Asaf Nissenbaum and Limor Shifman. “Internet Memes as Contested Cultural Capital: The 
Case of 4chan’s/b/board.” New Media & Society 19, no. 4 (2017): 483–501. 
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set of founding assumptions about online culture that are incongruent with the 
approach this thesis adopts. 
 
In these studies of the internet meme, participation and its cognates—like 
citizenship, democracy, political discourse, rhetoric, protest, and so on—take 
online culture for granted: the “online” part, by typically failing to interrogate 
the technologies that make participation possible; and the “culture” part, by 
uncritically according the user with agency. I don’t mean to critique these 
approaches so much as point out that they are informed by wholly different 
epistemological preconceptions. This points to two key overarching themes 
that organise recent studies of the internet meme. First, they fall—not 
necessarily neatly—into one of two disciplinary categories: media studies and 
media theory. In presenting these categories, I don’t mean to reproduce the 
reductive, canonical distinction between socially-constructivist and 
technological determinist accounts of media. Rather, I mean to distinguish 
between these disciplinary frames to position this thesis within the discipline of 
media theory. This disciplinary framing will become crucial in later chapters. 
For now, I want to use it to position this thesis’s approach to the internet 
meme. Second, these approaches reproduce vernacular online culture’s own 
concept of the internet meme to a greater or lesser extent. This is necessary, 
insofar as this culture is defined by its own capacity for reinvention; but it’s 
also problematic, because online culture also has a tendency to reproduce the 
epistemologies produced by the media technologies that make it possible.  
 
This disciplinary framing helps us to contextualise different recent theoretical 
approaches to the question of what the internet meme is. Media studies 
scholars tend to approach this question by offering definitions. In an early 
attempt to clarify the concept of the internet meme, Patrick Davison defined 
this kind of media as a “piece of culture” with three “components”: the 
“manifestation” of the meme, individual or collective; the “behaviour” of the 
meme, as carried out by users in its “service”; and the “ideal” of the meme, or 
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the concept or idea conveyed.33 More recently, Limor Shiman’s influential work 
on the internet meme proposed a definition that seems to have become the 
scholarly standard. Shifman argues that the internet meme is characterised by 
three chief features: it encapsulates “a group of digital items sharing common 
characteristics of content, form, and/or stance”; it states that these items 
“were created with awareness of each other”; and it stipulates that these items 
“were circulated, imitated, and/or transformed via the internet by many 
users.”34 Other notable definitions include Bradley E. Wiggins and G. Bret 
Bowers’ argument that memes should be conceptualised as a “developing 
genre of communication”, where each type of meme is considered a genre 
incorporating “messages transmitted by consumers-producers for discursive 
purposes”;35 or Dominik Maeder and Natalie Wentz’s adoption of the term 
“seriality” to characterise what I call internet memes’ plurality.36 These 
definitions are distinct and some of them—namely, Shifman’s—are more 
influential than others. What they share is a basic belief that the internet 
meme is created by users; a tendency to take the technology that enables this 
creation for granted; and an assumption that memes are circulated. If we take 
Shifman’s definition as their exemplar, circulation is crucial to the internet 
meme but is, crucially, left unconceptualised. We can only assume that internet 
memes are circulated by users.   
 
I’ll spill a lot of pixels in the chapters to come substantiating my claim that the 
internet meme must be thought in circulation—and that circulation must be 
reconstructed as a media-theoretical concept if the internet meme is to be 
thought at all. For now, I want to note that the assumption that the internet 
meme is circulated takes for granted that it can be circulated, treating it as self-
evident online media “content." As I argued in the introduction, this is 
                                                        
33  Patrick Davison.  “The Language of Internet Memes,” In The Social Media Reader, edited by 
Michael Mandiberg. 2012. 122-123. 
34  Shifman. Memes: In Digital Culture. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2014. 41. 
35  Bradley E. Wiggins and G. Bret Bowers. “Memes as Genre: A Structurational Analysis of the 
Memescape.” New Media & Society 17, no. 11 (2015): 1893. 
36  Dominik Maeder and Daniela Wentz. “Digital Seriality as Structure and Process.” Eludamos. 
Journal for Computer Game Culture 8, no. 1 (2014): 129–49. 
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problematic because it produces a tautology: media circulate because they’re 
content; what circulates online is content—and circulation is something that 
just happens online. As we’ll see in a later chapter on the platform, the 
assumed self-evidence of circulating content allows media to exercise an 
epistemological influence on our media concepts. In treating media as 
“content”, moreover, these approaches reproduce the biological meme 
concept’s focus on the “unit” of cultural propagation. Though the internet 
meme is not the same as the biological meme, Sampson’s critique of the latter 
is still applicable to the former. In its ambiguous double status as instance and 
plurality, we still might ask: Where is the internet meme?  
 
The approaches just glossed belong to what I’m identifying as the discipline of 
media studies. The the analytical work that they do is not wholly compatible 
with the theoretical work that I want to do with the internet meme, because it 
operates under different epistemological assumptions. By contrast, what I’m 
categorising as media theoretical approaches to the internet meme 
conceptualise the role of the user, to the politics of participation, and the 
media technologies that make online culture possible in different ways. 
Perhaps obviously, they also tend to embrace theoretical speculation. 
Alongside Fuller, Sampson and Parikka’s intermediate-phase analyses of the 
meme concept, I want to note a few other media-theoretical analyses that this 
thesis will draw upon.  
 
The media-theoretical work on internet memes I draw from most is Olga 
Goriunova’s. For Goriunova, internet memes aren’t just “content” that’s 
produced by participatory users, but are better described as a form of 
“behaviour” instantiated by what she calls “human-technical systems.”37 As will 
become apparent, the epistemological approach this thesis adopts differs from 
that underlying Goriunova’s proposition, that internet memes express a form 
of human-technical individuation. However, she also notes that they raise a 
“unique question” that’s not reducible to the rubric of participation—a question 
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“of the kind, scale and range of phenomena that unfold online”, which she says 
constitutes “a new aesthetic form that individuates through larger human-
technical assemblages and also individuates something through itself."38 This 
thesis is, similarly, occupied with the task of thinking at scale that’s opened up 
by the problem of thinking internet memes. It will also draw upon several 
studies of the technologies and aesthetics of internet memes, including Kate 
Brideau and Charles Berret’s analysis of the Impact font, which is recognisable 
as the standard font used by macros; Patrick Davison’s analysis of the 
influence of MS Paint on internet meme aesthetics; and Nick Douglas’s very 
interesting analysis of what he calls the “internet ugly” style.39 But whilst this 
thesis is indebted to Goriunova’s work and whilst these analyses are useful, it 
will ultimately adopt an alternate approach to theorising the internet meme: 
treating it as a problem that has to be worked through, rather than as an object 
of theorisation. Adopting this approach shifts our focus from the internet 
meme itself to the concept that we enrol in order to elide its ambiguous 
double status and to make it tractable in analyses of online culture: circulation. 
 
 
1.4 THE NEW 
This outline of the extant literature on the internet meme is brief because the 
field is still relatively new—there just aren’t that many studies out there. It’s 
also brief because the aim of this thesis is to open up an epistemological space 
which is both the field in which this thesis will be situated and the material it 
will use for further analysis and theorisation. I want to draw three points out of 
this brief engagement. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
37  Olga Goriunova. “The Force of Digital Aesthetics. On Memes, Hacking, and Individuation.” 
The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics 24, no. 47 (2016): 56. 
38  Goriunova. “The Force of Digital Aesthetics." 69-70. 
39  Brideau, Kate and Charles Berret. “A Brief Introduction to Impact:‘ the Meme Font’.” Journal 
of Visual Culture 13, no. 3 (2014): 307–13; Davison. “Because of the Pixels: On the History, 
Form, and Influence of Ms Paint.” Journal of Visual Culture 13, no. 3 (2014): 275–97; Nick 
Douglas. “It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit: The Internet Ugly Aesthetic.” Journal of Visual 
Culture 13, no. 3 (2014): 314–39. 
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First, the internet meme has a history. There’s an obvious component to this 
history that most engagements with the internet meme are compelled to note, 
if only in passing: this history begins with Dawkins’ approach to evolutionary 
biology. The less obvious component is that this history develops into distinct 
disciplinary domains as it’s taken up by a succession of scholars working in 
different domains of knowledge. For intermediate-phase media theorists, the 
meme concept isn’t specific to particular media, but describes the dynamics of 
media that proliferate. For more recent media scholars, the concept finds its 
articulation in online culture, presenting itself readymade and ready to use. 
These media scholars don’t typically refer to the media theorists that precede 
them, instead outlining a lineage that leads from Dawkins straight to online 
culture. The literature sorts itself into the distinct disciplines I outlined in my 
introduction.  
 
Second, recent literature on the internet meme fails to conceptualise it in 
circulation. This literature often describes it as circulating, or notes that it 
circulates, but fails to actually conceptualise circulation itself. The failure to 
conceptualise circulation is not limited to the literature on the internet meme. 
Circulation is a recurrent term in studies of media; yet, despite its centrality, it 
has arguably not been adequately theorised as a media-specific concept. This 
raises a two-sided question: What conceptual work is circulation doing in this 
literature? And, conversely, when circulation’s invoked, what constituent 
epistemological components of theories of the internet meme is it allowed to 
supervene upon? In Dawkins, memes survive and propagate because they 
replicate. The media theorists glossed above cite more theoretically-complex 
dynamics that favour concepts other than circulation. Because their concept of 
the meme is non-media specific, this isn’t an issue; they’re concerned with 
instances that propagate. But it also means that their path-breaking work can 
only contribute so much to our aim of formulating a theory of the internet 
meme. In more recent studies of the internet meme, “circulation” typically 
functions as a stand-in for “participation”: internet memes circulate because 
they’re circulated by users. Yet in adopting the concept of the internet meme 
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as it’s given online, these approaches overlook the media-technical contexts 
that make the massive-scale production of media like internet memes possible.  
 
Why does it matter that this literature fails to conceptualise circulation? In 
failing to conceptualise circulation itself, my claim is that this literature is 
apophatic. That is, it might allow us to work on internet memes by 
distinguishing them from what they are not, yet it doesn’t allow us to 
formulate a theory of what internet memes actually are. The two points above 
contribute to a third. The concept of the internet meme that’s in common 
currency, both online and in academic literature, is informed by a number of 
distinct epistemological assumptions. These assumptions concern not only 
what media do, but how they can be understood in their plurality. This latter 
question is key not only to the internet meme, in its ambiguous double status 
as instance-plural, but to the question of how we might theorise media today. 
Here, we return to the problem that organises and animates this thesis: my 
argument is that circulation is key to thinking the internet meme both as media 
and in the present. But this problem and its animating question, How do we 
think media in excess of themselves?, invokes a broader contemporary literature 
that is also tacitly or explicitly concerned with thinking media. I want to outline 
some of this literature now to better situation the approach I want to adopt.   
 
 
1.5 AN EXCESS OF MEDIA (THEORY) 
One way of positioning the internet meme and its attendant problem is to 
think of it as inviting us to theorise “media after media”, to adopt Bernhard 
Siegert’s formulation.40 After the advent of digital media, which are able to 
“comprehend all other media,” as Kittler puts it, media are supposed to have 
“converged” in our digital devices.41 And yet media’s massive distribution has 
                                                        
40  Bernhard Siegert. “Media After Media." In Ellen Ikoniadou and Scott Wilson, eds. Media 
After Kittler 2015. 79-89. 
41  Friedrich Kittler. “The History of Communication Media.” CTheory (1996): 
http://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/ctheory/article/view/14325/5101. 
 J. David Bolter and Richard Grusin make one version of this argument when they assert 
that new media are simply ‘remediations’ — convergences and recyclings — of old. But in 
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created the conditions in which media circulate in perpetual divergence. We are 
“after” media, according to Siegert, insofar as many media are internet-native, 
media exceed the discrete media-unit, and media are no longer necessarily 
compatible with media concepts derived from prior media types. But rather 
than do away with the media concept altogether, Siegert and a number of 
other media theorists have tried to adapt it to our media situation by 
expanding the object of media-theorisation. Siegert advocates decomposing 
media into the constituent “cultural techniques”—like writing, counting, or 
drawing—that they operationalise.42 For Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska, 
problems much like the one I’ve introduced here invite us to conceptualise 
media in vitalist process—by granting primacy to mediation.43 Dieter Mersch 
and Sybille Krämer each favour a concept they dub “mediality”, which focuses 
on medial processes in lieu of media artefacts, like media receding from use or 
transmission respectively.44 In Florian Cramer’s more tongue-in-cheek 
formulation, what we get after media is “[a]nti-media”, or a concept that is 
“what remains if one debunks the notion of media but can’t get rid of it."45   
 
Another set of approaches begins from the more specific premise that the 
internet demands new concepts of media, developing new concepts of media 
out of how media is used in the present. The concept of the postdigital, 
introduced above, is one of these. Others include Hito Steyerl’s various 
analyses of online media, culminating in her claim that “the internet is dead”—
                                                                                                                                                            
Friedrich Kittler’s version, the dissolution of the distinctions between media like the moving 
image, writing and sound occurs because the computer subject media to mathematisation. 
See:  J. David Bolter and Richard Grusin. Remediation: Understanding New Media. The MIT 
Press, 2000. 
42  Bernhard Siegert. “Cultural Techniques: Or the End of the Intellectual Postwar Era in 
German Media Theory.” Theory, Culture & Society 30, no. 6 (2013): 48–65. It must be noted 
that this concept has several distinct strands. For an overview, see: Bernard Dionysius. 
Geoghegan. “After Kittler: On the Cultural Techniques of Recent German Media Theory.” 
Theory, Culture & Society 30, no. 6 (2013): 66–82. 
43  Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska. Life After New Media: Mediation as a Vital Process. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2012. 
44  Dieter Mersch. “Meta/dia: Two Approaches to the Medial,” In Media Transatlantic: 
Developments in Media and Communication Studies Between North American and German-
Speaking Europe, edited by Norm Friesen. Dordrecht: Springer, 2016. 170. 
45  Florian Cramer. “Introduction." In Anti-Media: Ephemera on Speculative Arts. NAi Publishers, 
2013. 8. 
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not only because it has “crossed the screen”, but also because it can no longer 
be conceived of as a space in which we might formulate liberators ideologies, 
right or left.46 For the “post-internet” art movement and their theorists of our 
always-online existence, our labours—and, in particular, our aesthetic 
practices—come after the internet, whether because they work with it or, more 
subtly, because we now take it for granted.47 Or, our relationship to media has 
changed, according to another set of theorists, because media’s ubiquity forces 
us to adopt “post-media” practices that seek out media’s “unexploited qualities” 
in the pursuit of tactical or subversive-political goals.48 Though distinct, each of 
these approaches uses our novel contemporary media practices as the basis 
for new concepts of media themselves. 
 
For these media theorists, what I’m calling our indeterminate postdigital media 
situation necessitates the development of new theories of media. Some of 
these theorists begin with the media concept itself; some begin with concrete 
contemporary practices. Together, they constitute an ongoing dialogue about 
what media is and how we ought to theorise it to which this thesis responds. 
To riff on Siegert, we are also “after” media insofar as media like the internet 
meme demand to be thought in circulation. This concept must be added to our 
media-theoretical repertoire. Per claims that we are “post-internet”, “post-
digital”, or “post-media”, such revisions of our concepts of media can only 
proceed through engagements with concrete practices—like the production of 
internet memes.  Whilst I’ll engage with all of this work throughout this thesis, I 
want to flag two approaches in particular that are much more proximate to my 
                                                        
46  Steyerl, “Too Much World." 
47  Artie Vierkant. “The Image Object Post-Internet.” (2010): Accessed April 5, 2017. 
http://jstchillin.org/artie/pdf/The_Image_Object_Post-Internet_a4.pdf; Marisa Olson. 
“Postinternet: Art After the Internet.” Foam magazine 29 (2012): 59–63; Melissa Gronlund. 
Contemporary Art and Digital Culture. London: Routledge, 2016. 
48  Josephine Berry Slater and Anthony Iles. “Provocative Alloys: An Introduction,” In 
Provocative Alloys: A Post-Media Anthology, edited by Clemens Apprich, Josephine Berry 
Slater, Anthony Iles, and Oliver Lerone Schultz. London & Lüneberg: Post-Media Lab and 
Mute Books, 2013. 10. 
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interests: contagion theory, which is concerned with the dynamics of virality; 
and the mongrel movement known software studies.49  
 
The approach that perhaps resonates most closely with my object—the 
internet meme—and the concept I want to focus on in this thesis—circulation—
is the field of “contagion theory”. Particularly in the work of Sampson, 
contagion theory is explicitly concerned with the dynamics of virality, both 
online and as a more general social process. Drawing on the work of Gabriel 
Tarde, Sampson formulates a complex and incisive theory of contagious 
phenomena—including media—that is “established in complex intersection 
points that bring physical, biological, cultural, and political phenomena into 
social relation with each other.”50 What’s interesting about this theory is that it 
emphasises the role that “imitation” plays in spreading phenomena.51 
Contagion theory is underpinned by a detailed conception of relations that 
shifts the agency of virality from participating users or media technologies to 
“embedded network subjectivity” situated in “flows of contaminating influence 
and persuasive mood settings, all of which are transmitted through mostly 
unconscious topologies of social relation.”52 Media can only be made to spread 
through the cultivation of “active epidemiological spaces” “the production of 
sensory environments in which the contagions of a social medium can be 
encouraged.”53 As Sampson puts it, its objects are “not consequently reducible 
to a unit.”54 As Lisa Blackman concisely asserts, what spreads for contagion 
theory is “not just information as understood within traditional media theory, 
                                                        
49  Matthew Fuller. “Introduction: The Stuff of Software,” In Software Studies: A Lexicon. 
Cambridge, M.A.: The MIT Press, 2008. 1–13. 
50  Sampson. Virality. 87. 
51  For an overview of the interplay between contaigion and imitation, see: Christian Borch, ed. 
Imitation, Contagion, Suggestion: On Mimesis and Society London: Routledge, 2019. 
52  Sampson. Virality. 5. 
53  Sampson. Cosmic Topologies of Imitation: From the Horror of Digital Autotoxicus to the 
Auto-Toxicity of the Social.” Parallax 23, no. 1 (2017): 68. 
54  Sampson. Virality. 87. 
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or cybernetics”, but phenomena including “political rumours, fads, fashions, 
trends, gossip, hype, emotions, feelings, affects, sensations and moods”.55  
 
Contagion theory offers useful tools for apprehending virality at large scales. 
Yet for this very reason, it overshoots the particular object that concerns us—
the internet meme. To return to the language of this thesis, contagion theory 
thinks media in excess of themselves by dissolving media into the set of 
relations constituted by the couplet contagion-imitation. As we’ll see in 
Chapter 5, this gesture also effects the reduction of media to a set of 
ontological-theoretical predicates, which in Sampson’s case are drawn from 
Tarde. The question I want to ask is not, “What spreads?, but rather, What is 
the internet meme in circulation, as media? Put programmatically, the approach I 
want to adopt in this thesis is formulated in order to rescue the media concept 
from its dissolution into its constitutive relations, even as its gesture of 
contextualising media-theoretical practice institutes a reciprocal relationship 
between media and its concrete objects.  
 
The final approach I want to note here will play a much more guiding, though 
often tacit role in this thesis: software studies. Software studies emphasises 
computer software’s capacity to bring seemingly-disparate domains of 
knowledge and practice—from art to white-collar work, from pop culture to 
institutional politics, from abstraction to its material substrates—in to frame.56 
Its ambition to use software to articulate and analyse the interrelations 
between these domains is one that my approach shares. Where software 
studies proceeds through analyses of particular software, however, my 
approach will place a greater emphasis on epistemological modes of practicing 
theory and conducting analyses of media. In contradistinction to software 
studies’ focus on the technical—“grey”—57literature that outlines how 
epistemologies are operationalised, I want to focus on media theory itself. My 
                                                        
55  Lisa Blackman. Haunted Data: Affect, Transmedia, and Weird Science. London: Bloomsbury, 
2019. 184, f.n. 4. 
56  Fuller. “Software Studies Methods,” In The Routledge Companion to Media Studies and Digital 
Humanities, edited by Jentery Sayers. New York and London: Routledge, 2018. 250–57. 
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gambit is that this approach will allow us to think across theory, online 
practices, and our indeterminate postdigital media situation. Software studies is 
a key point of reference for this thesis for another reason again: it’s an 
example of recent media-theoretical work that emphasises the role that media 
play in formalising and operationalising epistemology. In software studies, 
software enables contemporary knowledge work.58  
 
But it also belongs to an occluded lineage of media theory that is concerned 
with the epistemological influence that media exercise over our theories of 
them. As outlined above, Kittler is a key thinker of this oftentimes torturously-
recursive relation. One of Kittler’s key influences, Harold A. Innis, also often 
theorised media in a tacitly-epistemological vein, particularly in his later work.59 
As we’ll see in Chapter 6, the American communications scholar James W. 
Carey—also influenced by Innis—likewise emphasised the impact that media 
have on media theory, particularly with his claim that the telegraph enacted 
the separation of media’s content from its material substrate.60 More recently, 
key thinkers in the German media theory tradition have also been adopting 
epistemological approaches to media theory. Joseph Vogel’s work on the 
telescope or Claus Pias’s work on simulation uses analyses of particular media 
as the frame for claims that our media concepts are historically-variable or that 
media shape our theories of them, respectively. I want to explicitly position this 
thesis in this occluded lineage. Like these thinkers, my aim is to both identify 
and to formalise the influence that media exercise over our theories of them. 
Yet I would also claim that media theory lacks the necessary epistemological 
tools to transform this claim into a workable methodology that we can apply to 
media themselves. So whilst my approach will be informed by each of these 
thinkers, it will also turn to historical epistemology to develop these 
epistemological tools.  
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1.6 AGAINST REDUNDANCY 
The literature on internet memes is most sensible when it’s parsed as a series 
of attempts at capturing a type of media and of translating a culture that are 
both subject to constant change. But to keep pace with the new, we don’t 
necessarily need to refresh our theories of media. More recent literature on 
the internet meme arguably falls in to the trap of attempting to apprehend 
these constantly-reinvented media in their recombinant novelty. What’s 
needed, instead, is an approach that tries to account for its own potential 
redundancy in the face of this change. The difference between the two is that 
the latter acknowledges that indeterminacy is not only an attribute of media, 
but a condition of theoretical practice. This review of the extant literature on 
the internet meme doesn’t allow us to adequately situate this thesis’s approach 
in relation to this problem, which exceeds the internet meme proper. My claim 
that circulation is absolutely necessary for thinking the internet meme no 
doubt invites scepticism. On the face of it, my further claim that it opens out 
on to the more general question of how we might think media in our 
indeterminate postdigital media situation is, perhaps, even harder to 
countenance. For this, we need to adopt other methods of positioning and 
repositioning. 
 
To help us understand the stakes of the problem that structures this thesis, I 
want to turn now to an analysis of an installation by Constant Dullaart called 
Jennifer in Paradise. This gesture might seem strange. Why use an analysis to 
position this thesis? Why, more importantly, analyse an artwork rather than an 
internet meme? This artwork thematises an image that Dullaart claims to be an 
example of a proton-internet meme. For our purposes, it’s interesting because 
it fails to produce the very thing that it claims to document: an actual meme 
and a real history. It provides us with material that we can use to test a 
speculative question: Is it possible to imagine an internet meme that is no longer in 
circulation? As this analysis will show, the answer to this question is no. More 
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crucially, this analysis will help us to understand why. The convoluted 
temporalities involved in Dullaart’s artwork and its—productive and ultimately 
interesting—failure can help us to think through the relationship between 
circulation and the present.  
 
Using this speculative exercise, I want to open circulation’s insufficiency out to 
our indeterminate postdigital media situation. If media inform the conditions in 
which they become objects of theorisation, we need to challenge what it 
means to theorise media in the present by interrogating what we mean by the 
“present” of media-theoretical practice. I’ll conclude this chapter by reflecting 
further on Peter Osborne’s critique of standard theoretical practice, which he 
construes—negatively—as operating in a “contemporary” mode. This critique 
will provide a bridge to the chapter that follows on from this one, which will 
adapt an historical epistemological approach from the history and philosophy 
of sciences to posit a method that we can use to apprehend the concrete-
epistemological influence that media exert on media theory itself.  
 
Jennifer in Paradise exposes the temporal dynamics that inform media and the 
theoretical practices we train on them alike. Circulation is the concept we 
invoke, in commonplace form, to bridge novel media and the present they 
occupy. By demonstrating its necessity to media and our theoretical practices, I 
want to demonstrate precisely why this thesis will spend so much time tarrying 
with this concept. We can think of this as an epistemological form of 
positioning, whereby the analysis of media helps us to sort which of our 
concepts are most central to the problem at hand and for a form of analysis 
that takes our theoretical practices as its material.
 




Is it possible to imagine an internet meme that is no longer in circulation? One that 
had spread and varied as it was collectively copied—or shared, sent, posted, 
forwarded, retweeted, uploaded, embedded, pinned— only to fall out of favour? 
That is, would a meme that is no longer in circulation still be a meme?  
 
It’s not hard to imagine the context in which a meme might stop circulating. The 
topology of the internet is full of dead pockets. Links break. Websites stop being 
maintained. Software is updated; features cease to function. Companies liquidate. 
In time, even those platforms that seem to define the entire media landscape, and 
our everyday reality, are replaced. After all, who remembers MySpace? Parts of the 
internet languish on forgotten servers. Online communities break apart as people’s 
interests drift. In time, whole subcultures are superseded by new ones. Can the 
internet meme survive the perpetual obsolescing of its environment? We can invert 
this question, too. If a meme had been taken up by a particular collective or 
community only to fade as the community faded or the collective fragmented, what 
would remain? What would its residue be?  
 
Say this hypothetical internet meme was an image. Out of circulation, this image 
wouldn’t be legible as an internet meme. Out of circulation, it might not even be 
legible as an internet meme’s residue: it would just be an image. When an internet 
meme stops circulating, it’s consigned to oblivion. 
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2.0 JENNIFER 
A photograph—a woman sits on the pale sand of a sunny, tropical beach with 
her back to us, leaning to one side and gazing at the water with what, her pose 
and this setting would lead us to believe, could only be wistfulness. This kind 
of image depicting this kind of subject and this kind of setting is hardly 
remarkable today. From digital platforms and webpages to print publications, 
online and offline media alike are populated with photographs of similarly-
nondescript scenes. These images might be user-generated, like the “poor” 
images that Hito Steyerl refers to.1 They’re just as likely to be stock images 
drawn from databases of glossy photographs, each tagged with a keyword and 
ready to be searched for and inserted into articles, social media posts or 
advertisements. This kind of banal, glossy “content” “circulate[s] in excess” on 
the ‘net, as Marissa Olson puts it,2 constituting one of its dominant visual 
languages and defining aesthetics. And our photograph, the woman on the 
beach? This particular image is invested with much more significance than a 
stock photo might otherwise be accorded. This image is the subject of 
Constant Dullaart’s mixed-media installation, Jennifer in Paradise.3 What 
differentiates this image from an excess of others is that it is presented as the 
residue of an early internet meme.  
 
Jennifer in Paradise provides us with an example that we can use to engage 
with the concept of circulation in a speculative mode. This installation presents 
its ostensible subject—an image of a woman, the eponymous Jennifer, on a 
beach—as a meme that is no longer in circulation. This installation uses digital 
and artistic techniques as speculative methods for engaging with, and 
representing, the history of our contemporary aesthetics. By presenting the 
                                                        
1  Hito Steyerl. “In Defense of the Poor Image,” In The Wretched of the Screen, 31–45. Berlin: 
Sternberg Press, 2012. 
2  Marissa Olson. “Lost Not Found: The Circulation of Images in Digital Visual Culture,” In 
Mass Effect: Art and the Internet in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Lauren Cornell and Ed 
Halter, 159–66. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2015. 
3  This work has been exhibited in multiple galleries and in various iterations. I saw the 
exhibition in Prague in 2015. Constant Dullaart. Jennifer in Paradise. 2013 - present. 
Exhibited at: Import Projects, Berlin, 2013; Future Gallery, Berlin, 2013; Carroll/Fletcher, 
London, 2014; Futura, Prague, 2015. 
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Jennifer image as an early example of a meme created and iterated in the 
Photoshop application, Jennifer in Paradise suggests that this image is a 
significant historical artefact from online culture’s developmental period. The 
way it does so is particularly interesting. As I’ll discuss below, Dullaart could 
only find the residue of this supposed meme. To present it in the gallery space, 
he had to recover it using reconstructive digital techniques. Or that’s how the 
installation’s accompanying documentation presents it. The story behind the 
original Jennifer image is actually much more convoluted than this 
documentation claims, because the idea that the Jennifer image actually was a 
meme is questionable. Later correspondence between the creator of the 
Jennifer image and Dullaart undermines many of the claims that this 
installation makes. But this correspondence also makes this work interesting 
for our purposes, because we can use it to expand upon the temporal 
dynamics of circulation—concept and process. 
 
This section will use these convolutions to think through the relationship 
between a meme and its supposed residue. Jennifer in Paradise is implicated in 
multiple real and supposed temporal regimes, some of which are real and some 
of which are not. If we treat Jennifer as a work of artistic speculation, its 
engagement with the Jennifer image provides us with a way to critique 
attempts to reduce internet memes to their genetic origin, or their past. We 
can also use this installation to question what it means for a meme to have a 
present. But this work also speculates about the possibility that an internet 
meme might have an afterlife, because it proposes that a digital artefact of an 
earlier age can be reconstituted and put back in to circulation. This gesture can 
be framed as an attempt to grant a meme a degree of futurity through the 
paradoxical temporality of the “as though." After Gilbert Simondon, this 
gesture operates “as though” the meme was always in circulation. This gesture 
initiates a leap that secures the present by also specifying—and so 
constituting—its lineage from several possibilities. The “as though” 
demonstrates that the predicated present-of—the meme, but also the concept 
of circulation—is only constituted in and through media’s concrete circulations. 
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More than this, it helps us to show how the present that circulations describe 
are different from the putative “present” in which our media-theoretical 
practices operate. By presenting a—speculative—example of a meme that is in 
and out of or that does or doesn’t circulate, Jennifer in Paradise can help us to 
establish why this concept is essential to the meme and why it needs to be 
theorised differently.  
 
 
2.1 PARADISE FOUND 
The premise of Jennifer in Paradise is that the Jennifer image isn’t just another 
stock image. Rather, Dullaart and his gallerists present this installation as a 
work of vernacular internet history. The installation’s eponymous Jennifer is 
the then-girlfriend, now-wife of Jeff Knoll, who co-created Photoshop in 1988. 
As Dullaart suggests, this image is supposed to have accompanied Photoshop’s 
first version to give new users something they could modify using its new 
tools. It’s not unreasonable to say that Photoshop is one of the most influential 
software applications ever developed.4 This application was the first fully-
featured digital image editing suite available to home consumers. In technical 
terms, Photoshop is a raster graphics editing application. Raster graphics, which 
are also referred to as “paint” graphics, are made up of a grid-like structure of 
discrete pixels. They’re contrasted to vector, or line, graphics, which are based 
on continuous forms, like curves and lines.5 Photoshop continues to be the 
industry-standard program for editing this graphic type. It’s so ubiquitous, in 
fact, that it has entered the contemporary lexicon. Like the verb “to google”, 
“to photoshop” is now commonly used to describe the act of modifying a 
raster-based digital image. Its association with the slick, high-definition 
aesthetic that characterises contemporary images has also made it one of 
contemporary online culture’s defining terms. As Dullaart puts it, the Jennifer 
                                                        
4  Matthew Kirschenbaum. “The 10 Most Influential Software Programs of All Time.” Slate, 
July 30 2013; Patrick Davison. “Because of the Pixels: On the History, Form, and Influence 
of Ms Paint.” Journal of Visual Culture 13, no. 3 (2014): 275–97. 
5  Alan Parker. Digital Imaging Primer. Berlin: Springer, 2016. 315. 
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image would once have been the “most photoshopped image” in circulation.6 
Jennifer in Paradise’s central claim is that the Jennifer image is a crucial artefact 
in the development of this software.  
 
On one level, his installation uses this artefact to produce an homage to the 
software application that launched a thousand airbrushed faces. Jennifer in 
Paradise makes a two further claims, however, that make it useful for thinking 
through the problem posed by the internet meme. Dullaart’s installation 
asserts that the Jennifer image as a significant artefact of the Photoshop 
application’s early years, because it’s an example of one of the earliest photo-
modified memes.7 Moreover, it claims that this image is all the more valuable 
as an artefact because it had all but disappeared from circulation.  
 
When Dullaart tried to trace the original photo of Jennifer online, all he could 
find was a low-resolution version of the original, which amounts to saying that 
it—as image or as meme—was no longer in circulation. But he had seen this 
image in at least one place: a video of Knoll recreating his early demonstrations 
of how the first versions of Photoshop worked. This video was released by 
Adobe on their Youtube channel in 2010 as a marketing ploy, giving 
Photoshop’s fans some insight in to their history. As a document, though, it’s 
also a vernacular record of software history. When Knoll demonstrates some 
of the early features of the software application, we can recognise the 
precursors to some of the features that we use today. In this video, Knoll 
introduces the application’s features by opening a file—the Jennifer image—
that’s clearly labeled “Jennifer in Paradise."8 In the video, Knoll is working on an 
old machine connected to a boxy Cathode Ray Tube monitor. The Jennifer 
image that does appear is filmed from the output of this screen. This is the 
                                                        
6  Constant Dullaart and Jeff Knoll. “Jennifer in Paradise: The Correspondence.” (2016): 
Accessed 1 November, 2016. http://carrollfletcheronscreen.com/2016/03/01/jennifer-in-
paradise-the-correspondence/. 
7  Futura Gallery. “Jennifer in Paradise Exhibition Documentation.” (2013): Accessed 1 
November, 2016. http://www.futuraproject.cz/en/futura/event/77-jennifer-in-paradise. 
8  Adobe Photoshop. “Photoshop: The First Demo [With John Knoll].” (2010). Accessed 3 
November, 2016.  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tda7jCwvSzg 
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source of Dullaart’s low-resolution image.9 Dullaart may have extracted this 
image by screen-shotting a still of this video directly, through a browser 
interface on his computer, or he may have transcoded the video to extract a 
clean raster. Either way, the quality would have been very poor. To reconstruct 
the image, he used a contemporary version of Photoshop. This gesture closes 
the loop: it situates this program, both at its inception and now, at the heart of 
contemporary online culture.  
 
His installation is an homage and a history, but it’s also an example of applied 
media archaeology.10 In his thorough overview of this approach, Jussi Parikka 
introduces media archaeology as “a way to investigate the new media cultures 
through insights from past new media” that emphasises “the forgotten, the 
quirky, the non-obvious apparatuses, practices, and inventions."11 We can see 
Dullaart’s artwork as adopting the media-archaeological strategy, as Parikka 
puts it, of “challeng[ing] the strategic amnesia of digital culture."12 In a media 
situation that values the recurrent forgetting of the old with each advent of 
the new, Dullaart’s artwork accords value to the acts of remembering and its 
aesthetic re-presentation. Dullaart used digital techniques to reconstitute an 
image from its residue. But Dullaart’s method is also speculative, drawing on a 
strand of media archaeology that emphasises that “the past is only a lost 
present."13 What’s of interest to Dullaart is how a we might use a dated 
vernacular digital culture’s aesthetic products to explore how that culture was 
produced—or in this case, processed—by its software. Extrapolating from this 
engagement to the present, Jennifer in Paradise’s implication is that the 
widespread access to digital modification that Photoshop provided is one of 
the causal drivers of contemporary online culture. By claiming that the Jennifer 
image became a meme, Dullaart also extends this implication to meme culture. 
                                                        
9  Dullaart and Knoll. “The Correspondence” 
10  Futura Gallery. Jennifer in Paradise. 
11  Jussi Parikka. What is Media Archaeology? London: Polity, 2012. 2. 
12  Parikka. What is Media Archaeology? 13. 
13  Parikka. What is Media Archaeology? 12. 
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Its conceit is that an artwork can restore a lost moment in the development of 
contemporary online culture by wresting one of its artefacts from oblivion.  
 
Or this is how the work is presented. Its story isn’t actually as straightforward 
as its accompanying documentation would suggest.   
 
 
2.2 PARADISE LOST 
Some of the claims that frame Jennifer in Paradise are apocryphal at best or 
disingenuous at worst. Knoll, prompted by a request for clarification by a 
journalist from the Wall Street Journal and after the installation had already 
been exhibited twice, entered into correspondence with Dullaart to correct 
some of the claims made in and around his installation. In this correspondence, 
Knoll contested some of the claims that Dullaart had made about the Jennifer 
image, including some that could only be considered foundational for the 
installation’s historical framing. According to Knoll, the reason why the Jennifer 
image was hard to find is that it was never actually distributed with the 
Photoshop software, nor made available in the public domain.14 It had made an 
appearance in the video that Dullaart had seen, but not as what we would 
recognise as a digital image, in the technical sense of a raster graphic stored in 
a common file format. Whilst the image was made available for peers to 
experiment on with very early embargoed copies of the Photoshop program, it 
was never circulated widely. If the Jennifer image wasn’t in circulation, then it 
likely wasn’t, couldn’t, have been a meme. We might wonder, then, why 
Dullaart was moved to claim that the Jennifer image had been a meme—or 
even how this particular image came to be used to demonstrate early versions 
of the Photoshop software application at all.  
 
The story of the Jennifer image’s digitisation can help us to explain why Knoll 
used this photograph in particular. In his correspondence with Dullaart, Knoll 
relates that this image was the “first good colour photograph” that he had on 
                                                        
14  Dullaart and Knoll. “The Correspondence” 
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file and that he could use to demonstrate Photoshop’s capabilities.15 Knoll took 
the original photograph whilst holidaying with the eponymous Jennifer, who he 
is now married to, in August, 1988. About a month later, he used a new image 
scanner in Apple’s Advanced Technology Group—a “Sharp JX-450 flatbed 
scanner”, he notes—to digitise a “4x6 [inch] print” of the photograph. This file 
was so large that he had to transport it home on multiple floppy disks and 
reassemble it into a high-quality 24-bit colour image. The kind of high-quality 
image that Knoll could use for demonstrations was actually quite rare. This 
image was one that Knoll considered to be personal, but the technical 
difficulties involved in producing a high-quality digital image in 1988 account 
for his use of this otherwise-personal photograph in his demonstrations. In a 
time before the high-bandwidth internet that we know it today, a file large 
enough to require multiple 1.44mb floppy disks to transport would hardly have 
been mobile. Why, then, did Dullaart claim that this image must have been a 
meme? We can probably trace this claim back to Knoll’s 2010 video 
demonstrating how the first version of Photoshop worked. Right at the start of 
the video, just as he’s opening the Jennifer image, Knoll says that this image 
“got around."16 There’s something slightly strange to this claim, given the 
intimate nature of this photograph. Regardless, it does imply that at one point, 
this image circulated. Dullaart’s installation does wrest the Jennifer image from 
oblivion—only, it’s not the kind of oblivion he imagined.  
  
If the Jennifer image isn’t a meme, what’s the point of analysing Jennifer in 
Paradise? Some of Dullaart’s claims are apocryphal, but it is for this very reason 
that they can also tell us something meaningful about the internet meme 
today. I claimed above that the image and the meme aren’t the same. Not only 
can the meme be types of media other than the image; unlike the image, which 
can be an instance, the meme is defined, in part, by constituting a plurality. As 
the Jennifer image’s provenance is contested by Dullaart and Knoll, it vacillates 
between the categories of meme and image. This vacillation can be expressed 
                                                        
15  All information about the photograph taken from: Dullaart and Knoll. “The 
Correspondence” 
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otherwise: between meme and not meme, circulation and non-circulation, 
oblivion and existence, and so on. In other words, it’s a vacillation between the 
concreteness and non-concreteness of circulation. Knoll does admit, at one 
point, that the Jennifer image was “ONE [sic] of the first images to be 
“photoshopped”."17 Dullaart also extracted the Jennifer image from a video 
that had 703,177 views at the time that this section was written. Do either of 
these kinds of circulations constitute a meme? As frustrated viral marketers will 
attest, it’s really hard to say what it is that makes something circulate, whether 
this something is a meme or any other kind of media. But this vacillation can be 
approached in another way.  
 
As an argument over a specific history and the cultural significance of a digital 
object, this disagreement has a lot to tell us about the role of causality and the 
status of genetic origins in the constitution of the internet meme. Dullaart’s 
speculative gesture operates through a peculiar temporal dynamic, the “as 
though”, that can be analysed to understand why historicising memes is beside 
the point. It can also be used to analyse how a meme constitutes its own 
mediating present. To engage with it in this way, we have to return to the 




If the intent behind Dullaart’s speculative restoration of the Jennifer image is 
apocryphal, we can no longer accept it as a vernacular ‘net history. But we can 
still understand it as a form of applied media archeology. Its a-historicality 
simply reroutes its effect. If one of the aims of media archeology is to interpret 
the past through the lens of the present, Dullaart’s restorative gesture turns 
the Jennifer image into an object of historical-archaeological desire. This desire 
can be coded as a desire for an origin, or the desire for an explanatory frame, 
or even the desire for a digital artefact that’s more than merely ephemeral. It’s 
                                                                                                                                                            
16  Adobe Photoshop. “Photoshop: The First Demo 
17  Dullaart and Knoll. “The Correspondence” 
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also, in this case, a desire to discover the origin of the internet meme in its 
offline, but nevertheless computational, pre-history. Whilst Dullaart’s attempt 
to disindividuate the Jennifer image might fail, it nevertheless reframes the 
conditions from which our contemporary online culture has emerged.  
 
Dullaart’s desire for origins is channeled through the desire for the Jennifer 
image to be an exemplary instance. Dullaart continuously refers to the Jennifer 
image in near reverential tones throughout his brief correspondence with 
Knoll. It’s clear that he thinks that this image might have been something 
altogether unique for digital culture. As he confesses: 
 
Due to its rarity it became a digital artifact [sic] to me, or even 
relic from a revolution in photography to only be found in 
traces left in a re-enacted demonstration video.18 
 
When Dullaart refers to this image as a relic, he construes it as the valuable 
residue of a past state of affairs. This claim positions his work as what he calls 
an “anthropological history on a global change in photography and aesthetics 
in general."19 But he also talks in his correspondence about the “beauty” of this 
residuary image, lending it an almost sacred undertone. Given that this image 
depicts a mostly-naked woman in a bikini on a beach, this claim is rather 
suspect. Dullaart’s desire has to be read, in gendered tones, as appropriative. 
We might be inclined to consider this aspect of Dullaart’s desiring as a 
performative complement to the installation proper. I would argue that if it is, 
it’s badly performed. Nevertheless, this desire for the origin merging with a 
desire for the female form is only one of the strands of desiring operative in 
Jennifer in Paradise. When Knoll writes in his final email to Dullaart that he not 
only “holds the copyright” for this image and that it is “special” to him as a 
token of a cherished holiday, we can understand why he might have found 
Dullaart’s whole project to be questionable. We can also read this exchange in 
                                                        
18  Dullaart and Knoll. “The Correspondence” 
19  Dullaart and Knoll. “The Correspondence” 
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another way: by thinking about the competing significance of the image for 
Dullaart and the photograph for Knoll, respectively.  
 
It’s tempting to frame this image’s significance and its purported status as an 
origin by according the Jennifer image what Walter Benjamin calls an “aura." 
As an attempt to wrest this image from the double oblivion of time and poor 
resolution, Dullaart’s correspondence seems to accord it what Benjamin calls a 
“unique phenomenon of distance."20 In this analysis, this image would be 
doubly limned by an auratic quality as both something that is rare in itself — as 
residue or as Knoll’s photograph—and as a digital image that might be 
reproducible, but that became rare with the passage of time. It makes more 
sense, however, to think of it in terms of what Vilém Flusser calls the image’s 
“magic." For Benjamin, mechanical reproduction destroys the image’s aura. For 
Flusser, technical reproduction simply works in a different way to auratic pre-
technical media: by “ritualis[ing] models known as programs."21 Flusser uses 
this word, program, to quite literally refer to the software that guides what the 
hardware of media does. He also extends this term beyond the literal program 
to encompass other kinds of programs, including the choices that inform how 
an image is originally captured as well as, in more general terms, the context(s) 
in which it will be used. If we read Dullaart’s reverence for the Jennifer image 
through Flusser, his obsession with origins takes on a different character: as a 
residuary artefact, it comes to exemplify the “program” of the early days of 
pioneering software.  
 
We can infer from his reverence for this particular image that he’d like to think 
that these early days were much more personal and much less commercial. 
This reverence reduces the program of the early days of software to a much 
more human scale. But Jennifer in Paradise’s historical-archaeological approach 
uses the Jennifer image to make another claim. By pinpointing the debut of the 
                                                        
20  Walter Benjamin. Illuminations. Translated by Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books, 
1968. 222. 
21  Vilém Flusser. Towards a Philosophy of Photography. Translated by Martin Chalmers. London: 
Reaktion Books, 2013. 16. 
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Photoshop software application and by excavating its history, the gesture of 
restoring the Jennifer image isolates the program—understood in all of its 
polyvalence—mobilised by the technique of digital image manipulation. This 
program is technical and mediatic, because it’s set in train by software like 
Photoshop. It’s also cultural. Through the Jennifer image, Dullaart highlights 
the programs and the attendant digital image manipulation techniques that 
underlie our banal, circulating contemporary online culture.  
 
The Jennifer image’s stock-photograph aesthetic and idealised setting convey a 
whole world. This world is at once desirable and recondite; or, both affective 
and, because of this kind of image’s circulation-in-excess, rather unremarkable. 
It’s slick: it belongs to what we might call a Photoshop aesthetic. If Photoshop 
is associated with slickness, Dullaart’s bluntly-applied filters betoken a wholly 
different, much more low-brow aesthetic: one that is often associated with the 
internet meme. Dullaart’s exhibition included printed and mounted versions of 
the Jennifer image installed on top of a barely recognisable, warped, 80’s style 
graffiti mural version of the same. Only, none of the prints show the original 
image. What we see displayed in Jennifer in Paradise is Jennifer’s paradise 
subjected to different manipulation techniques from the original Photoshop 
software suite: its colours inverted and displayed in negative; the image 
overlaid with a water drop effect; its raster grid spun in to a vortex; and so on. 
With Jennifer in Paradise, what Dullaart presents us with is a mash-up 




The funny thing about the verb, “to photoshop”, is that it betokens a set of 
image-manipulation techniques that produce both the slick aesthetic of the hi-
brow image and the “shit” aesthetic of the lo-brow image. Most internet 
memes participate in an aesthetic that Nick Douglas calls “internet ugly." They 
are typically created in a style, as he pithily puts it, that’s “supposed to look like 
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shit."22 A google search for “internet meme” will quickly demonstrate what 
Douglas means by this. Internet ugly’s major tenet is a garishness produced by 
using outdated image manipulation programs, in particular MS Paint. This 
program came bundled with previous editions of Microsoft’s Windows 
operating system. Its rudimentary tools, like a blocky, default paintbrush and a 
256-colour palette produce instantly-recognisable modifications that are 
garish, amateurish, or—for want of a better phrase—just a bit “shit." The 
aesthetics of the slick and the shit could not be more different. By colliding 
basic manipulation techniques with a history of the Photoshop program, 
Jennifer in Paradise places these aesthetics on a continuum. This gesture is 
central to its attempt to establish the Jennifer image as a meme.  
 
To return to Flusser, the Jennifer image’s “program”, as presented in Jennifer in 
Paradise and in the correspondence between Dullaart and Knoll, is exemplary 
in a number of ways. The circulation of slick and shit images online relies on 
digital images’ easy reproducibility. But the aesthetics that they betoken also 
rely on digital images’ easy manipulability. We can use Steyerl’s concept of the 
“poor image” to expand upon this claim. Dullaart’s extracted and reconstructed 
Jennifer image began as a poor image. A poor image is just that—one that’s 
bootlegged, lo-res, unoriginal, pixelated, fragmented, recuperated, and so on. 
This concept is interesting because it doesn’t exactly make an ontological claim 
about what images have become today. Rather, it provides us with a way of 
thinking through the status of the image in what I call our indeterminate 
postdigital media situation. As Steyerl argues, one of the characteristics that 
defines the poor image is its constitutive decoupling from any possible 
“originary original”—23or genetic precursor—rendering its content, including its 
meaning or its aesthetic qualities, epiphenomenal. Its phenomenal features are 
no longer what it’s literally “about."  What the poor image is about, instead, is 
its “own real conditions of existence."24 The poor image is an index of its own 
                                                        
22  Nick Douglas. “It’s Supposed to Look Like Shit: The Internet Ugly Aesthetic.” Journal of 
Visual Culture 13, no. 3 (2014): 314–39. 
23  Steyerl, Hito. “In Defense of the Poor Image." 44. 
24  Steyerl, Hito. “In Defense of the Poor Image." 44. 
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reality as media that is in circulation. It de-tautologises the relationship 
between circulation and thing circulated, making the concept of circulation 
conceptually tractable.  
 
The convoluted nature of the Jennifer image’s backstory is a product of a 
number of competing claims about what this image is and where it comes 
from. Jennifer in Paradise ostensibly fails to present a meme. Or: it’s true that 
Dullaart’s installation has been exhibited in numerous places and has, 
therefore, circulated in the art world and in publications online. Or: we might 
even consider the installation’s serial presentation of variations of an image 
manipulated using a dated program to be proto-memetic. Or: we could 
interpret Knoll’s claim that this image was one of the first to be 
“photoshopped” as a confirmation that it was, in fact, a meme. In the end, 
though, it doesn’t really matter. Manipulability might be one of the internet 
meme’s contributory technical conditions, but it’s not its cause—the 
manipulation of images has a long prehistory that precludes it being posited as 
the internet meme’s novel precondition. The isolation of a particular meme’s 
origin might provide its context, but it can’t be considered its cause either. In 
this installation, the internet meme’s origin in a particular image—the real 
Jennifer on the real beach in Bora Bora—is the efficient and material cause of 
the Jennifer image but is not, crucially, not the final cause of the purported 
internet meme. Jennifer in Paradise’s convolutions invite us to read the 
installation against the impulse to look for origins. As a failed, speculative 
attempt at vernacular history, it strips the meme of its essential quality: a 
present.   
 
 
2.5 POVERTY OF PRESENCE 
The Jennifer image is a meme that never was, either in fact or in history. Any 
putative before or after that gets ascribed to the internet meme must 
necessarily describe a time in which the meme is not yet or is no longer. Out of 
circulation, the Jennifer image is not legible as a meme’s residue: it is just an 
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image. The before of an internet meme can describe its preconditions; the 
after is never quite after, because it’s always open to restitution. Jennifer in 
Paradise shows us that the meme’s essential quality is synchronicity. This 
description might recall the idea of the “originary non-origin” of Jacques 
Derrida’s deconstructive approach to language. Derrida argues that the play of 
differences that constitutes language inscribes its origin with the “trace” of an 
“originary non-origin”,25 foreclosing its capacity to identify its determinate 
origin. I don’t mean to insert the internet meme into the discourse of the 
deconstruction of presence, however. The internet meme emerges with the 
massive distribution of material media systems. It isn’t differed and deferred in 
the margin between this couple. Rather, its what I’m calling its synchronous 
quality makes a claim about what makes the internet meme a concrete—i.e., 
present—entity. This quality introduces a distinction between its history, on the 
one hand, and the final cause and condition of its present, on the other. This 
distinction is analogous to that between how something is made and what it 
does. Jennifer in Paradise shows us that the Jennifer image is lacking the quality 
of synchronicity that makes a meme a meme. Or: the internet meme’s final 
cause and the condition of its present are its concrete circulations.  
 
The convergence of circulation and the present of the meme might seem 
tautological. This claim relies on a recursive moment in which one tautology—
circulation is the circulation of content—is substituted for another: the 
circulating internet meme is an internet meme because it circulates. As an 
empty concept, circulation’s reference point becomes the thing circulated; it 
succumbs to tautology. This is precisely why we need to conceptualise 
circulation differently. We need to start, however, by disaggregating the 
concept of circulation from the thing circulated.  
 
In her discussion of the poor image, Steyerl says that what the poor image 
indexes, amongst other things, are a set of “fractured and flexible 
                                                        
25  Derrida. Of Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1998. 66 and passim. 
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temporalities."26 We can understand these temporalities as constituting a 
disjunction mediated by the contingent circulation of an image in and through 
disparate contexts. We encounter all sorts of images from all sorts of times 
and places all over the ‘net; some of these are legible and can be 
contextualised, but some strike us with their utter contingency. The Jennifer 
image’s failure to have been or to become an internet meme specifies these 
temporal dynamics of circulation both positively and in the negative. As a poor 
image, it specifies them positively: Dullaart encountered the Jennifer image in 
the contingent circumstances of a re-staging of a demonstration of an early 
version of Photoshop on Youtube. Manipulability doesn’t make the meme. A 
poor image can be a fragment or residue. An internet meme, however, cannot. 
As a failed meme, Jennifer in Paradise also specifies the temporal dynamics of 
the emergence of an internet meme in the negative, rendering these temporal 
dynamics tractable to conceptualisation.  
 
Whist Jennifer in Paradise’s failed attempt to recover the Jennifer image from 
oblivion may index an concrete reality and a set of conditions, or a whole 
“program”, Dullaart’s restoration of the Jennifer image ends up positing a 
different temporal regime to the one in which an internet meme circulates and 
in which, therefore, it is. The poor image Dullaart resuscitates doesn’t have the 
same relationship to oblivion as the internet meme. The internet meme 
operates within a different temporal dynamic. We can use Dullaart’s failed, 
speculative positing of an internet meme to think the “present” of successful 




2.6 PASTS REFUTURED  
The circulating image traces a loop. In circulation, it necessarily returns to itself: 
as it travels between pages, feeds, platforms and apps, the image is 
deconstructed and reconstructed with little enough entropy to retain its 
                                                        
26  Steyerl. “In Defense of the Poor Image." 44. 
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consistency; but, this is more of a reconstitution. Its capacity to be copied and 
its circulating movement in and out of context generates the “flexible and 
fractured” times that Steyerl refers to. The Jennifer image works in this way: it 
conjoins the residue of a history that is in part true and that indexes its own 
manipulability with a speculative, posited history that is false. With little to 
ground it, the “poor” image accrues time and secretes its own provisional 
present. In Jennifer in Paradise, this recursive indexing operates as something 
like an archaeology of the future. This particular future is one in which the past 
it tried to posit wouldn’t be false. Here, it fails to constitute the Jennifer image 
as meme—in the past or in the future. This failed dynamic is nevertheless how 
the internet meme creates its present.  
 
The emergence of the internet meme from circulating media relies on some 
media—like an image—forming a plurality. Before this plurality exists, there is 
no meme. For this plurality to exist, there might have to be an intentional 
moment; but this intention doesn’t ensure that an internet meme will exist. 
Once this plurality does exist, other images that similarly instantiate the meme 
exist as though they were always a part of it. The meme emerges in circulation 
and through a moment in which it returns to itself, which is to say, in which it 
indexes not only its own circulation, but its plurality.  
 
This recurrent casualty explains the problem of the instance-plurality: to 
conceptualise the meme, we have to be able to think it, non-tautologically, in 
relation to itself. We also need to be able to understand the temporality of the 
“as though." The internet meme’s recurrent causality short-circuits its 
determinate relation to its own history. We can distinguish, finally, between 
the efficient and material causes of the meme—a particular image, a moment in 
time, a gesture of creativity—and its final cause: entering circulation. This final 
cause accounts for the limit of the participatory model of the internet meme. 
The user’s participation in the meme is at the centre of its cultural significance. 
But this participation is an epiphenomenon of its emergence as a plurality. 
Were the Jennifer image to be a meme, its determinate history is the 
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“program” that it would evoke: the development of Photoshop; the story of its 
restoration and the convergence of this software application’s prior form with 
its present form; its circulation as art; its invocation of an entire “slick” 
contemporary aesthetic. Its present, however, would be something else; it 
would be in circulation.  
 
This present of circulation is a condition of the internet meme’s emergence. 
Here, though, our speculations on the present open on to what it means to 
posit a present, in theory. In the end, this is what Dullaart does: in claiming that 
the Jennifer image is a meme, he claims that it occupies a present that’s 
(re)constituted using epistemological means—by positing that the 
manipulability of images brings them into compresence. The epistemological 
themes I broached when I characterised our postdigital media situation as 
indeterminate converge in this gesture. Manipulability is just one of the 
techniques that are partially automated and made easier to apply by 
applications like Photoshop. But it’s also a concept that’s mediated by the 
computational technologies that Photoshop represents. Invoking manipulability 
posits another kind of present: the present we ascribe to theoretical practice, a 
present that treats concepts as though they don’t have their own histories. 
Whilst Jennifer in Paradise produces a vernacular media archaeology of 
manipulability, it doesn’t reflect on what it means for the technique of 
manipulability to travel over time. To be able to think circulation in order to be 
able to think media in circulation, we arguably need to posit a concept of 
circulation—and to develop a media-theoretical practice—that avoids shearing 
theory from its concrete, mediated contexts.   
 
 
2.7 CONTEMPORANEITY AND MEDIA THEORY 
Media theory is something that is practiced. Minimally, it’s a set of techniques 
that we use to produce knowledge about media objects. However, the 
standard mode of practicing theory tacitly accords it its own temporal 
register—its own “present." What does it mean for a concept—like 
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manipulability or, more to the point, like circulation—to be in the present? One 
of the premises of this thesis is that in order to think media in our postdigital 
media situation, in order to be able to think in and think through its 
characterising indeterminacy, we need to develop a mode of practicing theory 
that’s able to account for the influence that media have on our theories of 
them. Such a practice would operate in media’s “present”, rather than its own.  
 
In his engagement with “theory” as practice penned in the wake of the “high 
theory” moment, Peter Osborne proposes a critique of a mode of theoretical 
practice that takes the “contemporary”, construed as a temporality and also as 
a concrete situation, to be its field. As Osborne puts it, theory that is addressed 
to the “contemporary” employs a “mode of address” that joins “the times of the 
spaces it addresses”—that is, its theoretical material, construed as having its 
own histories, as well as the objects it addresses with this material—together in 
a present.27 This is facilitated by the standard way in which we practice theory 
by adopting a theoretical framework—materialism, say—and using this 
framework to bring its objects into productive relation. This present isn’t just 
defined in distinction to what comes before. That is, it doesn’t operate in what 
Osborne identifies as a “modernist” mode, which would produce the present of 
theory as “a negation of the past."28 Rather, it’s instituted by the way in which 
we treat theory as a trans-disciplinary project that can travel between domains 
of knowledge.29 Theoretical practice flattens its own temporal field, 
constituting what Osborne calls an “illusory present of the space of the 
contemporary."30  
 
In media theory, this “contemporary” mode of practice informs circulation. We 
overlook circulation because we take it for granted that media circulate; that is, 
we take it for granted that media are put in to circulation by media 
                                                        
27  Peter Osborne. “Philosophy After Theory: Transdiciplinarity and the New,” In Theory After 
‘Theory’, edited by Jane Elliott and Derek Attridge. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. 
29. 
28  Osborne. “Philosophy After Theory." 29. 
29  See also Ian Hunter. “The History of Theory.” Critical Inquiry 33, no. 1 (2006): 78–112. 
30  Osborne. “Philosophy After Theory." 29. 
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technologies. The concept of circulation isn’t just a concept of media. When 
we examine the idea of the “present” that this approach evokes, we can begin 
to see how the concept of circulation emerges out of a practice of theorisation 
that is also of media. Extending Osborne’s claim, my argument that theoretical 
practice is informed by the media that it takes as its objects of theorisation. 
The present in which concepts circulate has informed circulation’s tautological 
character; but this concept’s mediation is simultaneously occluded by the act 
of positing a present that certain modes of theorisation demand. Our concept 
of circulation is without content because it fails to reflect on the influence that 
media have on the practice of theory.  
 
In cascade, the internet meme’s ambiguous double status as instance and 
plurality opens out on to media theory’s insufficient concept of circulation; in 
circulation, the problem posed by the internet meme implicates the 
epistemological question of how media might thought in our postdigital media 
situation; in its indeterminacy, this situation necessitates the development of 
media-theoretical approaches that are able to apprehend the influence that 
media themselves exercise on our media-theoretical practices. Or, it enjoins us 
to make theory present rather than treating it as contemporary. This requires a 
method that we can use to apprehend the concrete relationship between 
media theory and the media it takes as its objects of theorisation. As I want to 
outline in the next chapter, this method necessitates shifting the focus of our 
theoretical practices from positing theoretical frameworks to working with and 
analysing concepts. Treated both as determinate, concrete thing and as 
epistemological object, the concept provides us with a focus that we can use 
to do theory after media—or, to do what I’m calling “meme theory." 
 
3. THE CONCEPT IN ITSELF 
 
 
3.0 THEORY MADE CONCRETE 
Conceiving of the internet meme as a problem to be worked through rather 
than an object to be theorised anew implicates it in multiple domains. As I’ve 
outlined it thus far, this problem implicates circulation, which is necessary for 
thinking the internet meme; our postdigital media situation, whose 
indeterminacy is at once a product of circulating media—like the internet 
meme—and a condition of its theorisation; and theoretical practice itself. But 
to posit a problem is to imply that it has a solution. Each of these co-implicated 
domains hold this solution’s rudiments.  
 
This chapter will turn the propositions that I’ve made about the internet meme, 
circulation, and our indeterminate postdigital media situation in to a coherent 
method that we can use to think through our problem. This method will be 
derived from historical epistemology, a field that straddles science and 
technology studies and the history and philosophy of science—and in 
particular, its concept of the concept. Whereas we typically organise our 
theoretical practices around theoretical frameworks, like materialism or 
vitalism, philosophers including Georges Canguilhem, Gaston Bachelard, and—
more recently—Hans-Jörg Rheinberger posit the concept as a key site of 
theoretical practice and epistemological analysis. This approach historicises 
concepts whilst, simultaneously, arguing that they are concrete things, allowing 
us to apprehend how concepts develop as they’re applied and how their 
applications shape them in turn. More than this, it renders the influences that 
concepts carry out of such concrete contexts available for further 
epistemological enquiry. Historical epistemology gives us the means to practice 
theory as a form of analysis: by engaging with its concrete contexts and by 
situating theoretical practice differently, we can produce new concepts, which 
is to say, new forms of concrete knowledge.  
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Using historical epistemology to study of media allows us to focus on 
circulation as concept rather than as a derivative of one theoretical framework 
or another. Because this approach has been developed mostly by historians 
and philosophers of science, though, we would be going against its defining 
precepts if we were to bring it to bear on to media theory without adapting it 
to the discipline’s epistemological specificities. This chapter will frame and 
modify this approach to fit concepts of media and media studies’ disciplinary 
concerns. Media are, arguably, exceptional epistemological objects: they don’t 
just take on concepts, like circulation, but actively mediate them.  In the case 
of a concept like circulation, media play a double role: they inform this concept 
as it’s being formulated; but, they must also be taken as an object by this 
concept when it’s put to use. This role—which I’ll refer to as media’s anterior-
posterior relation to circulation—will inform what I’ll call a media-historical 
epistemological approach to concepts.  
 
Adopting a media-historical epistemological method shifts our key questions. 
Rather than asking how circulation might be thought, it enjoins us to consider 
two issues. First, how was circulation conceptualised under previous media-
theoretical regimes—thought, broadly, not just as a disciplinary practice, but as 
the practice of theorising media? Second, how do we think the concept of 
circulation today, when we apply it to our indeterminate postdigital media 
situation, and how should it be conceptualised to better suit online cultural 
production? I want to respond to these framing questions with a seemingly-
contradictory double assertion: circulation has always been underdetermined 
as a concept of media; and, because it has always been underdetermined, the 
concept of circulation is often used to do unacknowledged conceptual work. 
Using Lorraine Daston’s concept of the “commonplace”, my claim is that this 
double assertion can be treated as the basis of a method, rather than a 
contradiction, because it apprehends those components of theory that do 
epistemological work but that aren’t formalised in our theoretical frameworks. 
In brief, a commonplace is an epistemological component that’s faded in to 
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self-evidence. The method I want to posit in this chapter will use this concept 
as the basis for an enquiry into circulation.  
 
When concepts shade into self-evidence, the practice of theorising the new is 
susceptible to producing knowledge in forms that are no longer compatible 
with the present. Perhaps paradoxically, the tacit practice of treating theory as 
though concepts and frameworks are all contemporary with one another elides 
the persistence of its influences whilst, unwittingly, sanctioning their 
continuing influence on the production of knowledge. Historical epistemology 
gives us the concepts and the methods to do theory differently. Crucially, this 
approach expands the remit of media theory beyond what we would normally 
think of as the discipline proper. As our concepts cross disciplines and take 
different objects, their determinants change; conversely, for our concepts to 
be introduced to different domains of knowledge, we have to recognise the 
impact that the change in their objects has on the knowledge that they 
produce. If we treat the concept of circulation as a trans-disciplinary concept, 
to recall Osborne’s language, its prior influences don’t go away. They get 
elided, retained, and continue to work in what are, often, tacit ways. If media 
are to retain any specificity, I want to suggest, they need a media-specific 
epistemology. This doesn’t mean that media or circulation shouldn’t be thought 
of as disciplinary-specific concepts; rather, reordering our theoretical practices 
to take concepts as the objects of theorisation compels us to do what we 
might call interdisciplinary work at the level of epistemology itself.  
 
This chapter introduces a method. In the approach I want to develop here, 
theory neither precedes nor antecedes analysis, but is of it, is informed by it, 
and provides material that might be used to better understand media 
themselves and the cultures in which they operate. In passing through 
circulation, what I hope to assemble is not just a re-capitulated understanding 
of how we do media theory, but an epistemology that can be put to work in 
the analysis of online culture. My claim is that this approach constitutes both 
an alternate way of practicing theory and a mode of theorisation that are made 
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3.1 THE CONCEPT IN ITSELF 
 
The history of emergences abounds with the pleasures 
of the new and the counterintuitive. But we still lack a 
history of how novae fade into commonplaces: a 
history of self-evidence.1  
 
“Concept” is a standard word in theoretical work in the humanities and social 
sciences. Concepts are, typically, concepts-of: they describe objects or 
processes. Concepts are also often thought of as components of theoretical 
frameworks. So, how we think media follows not only from media themselves, 
but also from the ontological presuppositions we hold about the world, its 
constituents, and our capacity to know things in it. We’re likely to try to posit 
new concepts when either their objects or our theoretical frameworks change. 
The narrative of the practice of theory in a given discipline, like media theory, 
tends to be punctuated by those moments in which new concepts are posited 
in response to concrete or theoretical developments: new media being an 
example of the former, new media materialisms of the latter. Just as interesting 
and just as crucial, though, are those aspects of theoretical practice that persist 
through these changes. Often, what persists isn’t as easy to discern as what’s 
novel. We retain some concepts even as their objects and the theoretical 
frameworks to which they’re subordinated shift. In Daston’s language, they 
become theoretical knowledge production's “commonplaces”, sliding, through 
familiarity and through currency, into seeming self-evidence. We could say 
that this state of affairs is “natural”, but such a statement gives us no purchase 
on its mechanics. I want to posit a concept of the concept that we can use to 
                                                        
1  Lorraine Daston. “The History of Emergences’. Essay Review of Ian Hacking: The Emergence 
of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, Induction, and Statistical 
Inference. New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.” Isis 98, no. 4 (2007): 808. 
  78 
identify, analyse, and critique the self-evidence of our concepts. My argument 
is that this self-evidence can act as a vector for prior influences; that is, that 
this self-evidence allows concepts to recapitulate prior theoretical frameworks 
or to perpetuate prior conceptions of their objects. This argument relies on the 
contention that theory is not an abstract, a-historical mode of knowledge 
production, but that it’s always concrete and historicisable. To posit this 
concept of the concept, I want to draw on methods developed in the field of 
historical epistemology.  
 
Historical epistemology studies the development of ideas by situating them in 
their concrete contexts. In conventional philosophical terms, epistemology 
refers to the science of knowledge. Historical epistemology is premised on a 
markedly different conception of what knowledge is and how it can be studied. 
Historical epistemology was originally coined by Dominque Lecourt to describe 
Gaston Bachelard’s idiosyncratic approach to the philosophy of science.2 It has 
since become associated with a French lineage in the history and philosophy of 
science centred on the work of Bachelard and Canguilhem and, later on, with 
the work Michel Foucault—Canguilhem’s student—and some of the work of 
Louis Althusser.3 As Pierré-Oliver Methot succinctly explains, the term:  
 
…captures a certain style or method in philosophy of science 
where philosophical problems are inseparable from their 
historical milieu and the distinction between context of 
discovery and context of justification is at best illusory.4  
 
If epistemology can be described as the project of theorising knowledge, 
historical epistemology can be best described as the project of analysing the 
                                                        
2  Dominique Lecourt. Marxism and Epistemology: Bachelard, Canguilhem and Foucault. 
Translated by Ben Brewster. London: New Left Books, 1975. 
3  For an overview, see: Anastasios Brenner. “Epistemology Historicized: The French 
Tradition,” In New Directions in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Maria Carla Galavotti, 
Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Stephen Hartmann, Thomas Uebel, and Marcel 
Weber, 727–36. Cham: Springer, 2014. 
4  Pierre-Olivier Méthot. “On the Genealogy of Concepts and Experimental Practices: 
Rethinking Georges Canguilhem’s Historical Epistemology.” Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Science Part A 44, no. 1 (2013): 112. 
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conditions in which scientific knowledge is produced: it connects the means by 
which science is validated to the situated processes—the governing theoretical 
frameworks and the applied techniques—by which scientific discoveries 
emerge. As Methot’s ambiguous locution — “style or method” — suggests, 
however, the term doesn’t describe a single, coherent project. As it’s practiced 
today, historical epistemology is best described as a fractured field held in 
frame by its key term, epistemology, and the modifier, historical.5 For some 
critics, this diversity shatters the coherency and the utility of the term itself.6 
Nor is historical epistemology the only theoretical approach to emerge from 
the related fields of history and philosophy of science and science and 
technology studies to offer powerful methods for engaging with knowledge as 
a product of its contexts, instruments, and institutions.7 What makes it so 
useful for my project, though, is that it offers us a means of reconceptualising 
theoretical practice itself. We can adopt one of the methodological strands of 
historical epistemology to substantiate, and so to engage with, the concept of 
circulation and the problems it generates. But we can only do so if we adapt 
the approach to media and their epistemological specificities. 
 
The particular version of historical epistemology that I want to adopt 
specifically focuses on the role that concepts play in knowledge production. 
The field of historical epistemology offers a number of rich methodologies 
centred on concepts, most notably in the work of one of the field’s key figures, 
Daston, as particularly developed through her analyses of the concept of 
                                                        
5  For a partisan but nevertheless useful introduction to the field, its precursors, and its 
contemporary factions, see: Uljana Feest and Thomas Sturm. “What (Good) is Historical 
Epistemology? Editors’ Introduction.” Erkenntnis 75, no. 3 (2011): 285–302. 
6  For a scathing critique of the contemporary field that reduces its claims to a kind of 
institutional-strategic positioning employed by its main contemporary hub, the Max Planck 
institute for the History of Science, and its directors, Lorraine Daston, Jürgen Renn, and 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, see: Yves Gingras. Naming Without Necessity: On the Genealogy and 
Uses of the Label “Historical Epistemology." Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche sur la 
Science et la Technologie, 2010. 
7  Other hugely influential figures include Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers. See, for 
instance: Latour. The Pasteurization of France. Translated by Alan Sheridan and John Law. 
Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1988; Stengers. Cosmopolitics I. Translated by Robert 
Bononno. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010. 
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objectivity formulated with Peter Galison.8 The version of historical 
epistemology that is, arguably, best suited to the concept of circulation and to 
media theory is that developed by Canguilhem and elaborated by Daston’s 
contemporaries and colleagues, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger. As Methot puts it, an 
historical epistemology derived from Canguilhem “consists primarily in tracking 
scientific concepts over space and time, and across disciplinary boundaries, in 
order to locate significant shifts regarding meaning, reference, and domains of 
application."9 Whilst Canguilhem certainly puts this methodological precept 
into practice in his work, his approach nevertheless confronts us with a 
problem: he arguably never clearly articulates his concept of the concept.10 
The approach I want to adopt is informed by Canguilhem, but draws heavily on 
Rheinberger’s reconstruction of Canguilhem’s theory of concepts and his 
consequent articulation of an historical epistemological methodology. 
Rheinberger supplements Canguilhem’s—tacit—conceptualisation of concepts 
with a set of methodological precepts that we can use to study the concept of 
circulation. In the Anglophone world, however, Canguilhem’s work has found 
more purchase in the humanities and social sciences than in the history and 
philosophy of science. Christina Chimisso argues that this is because 
Canguilhem tends to be retroactively read by humanists and social scientists 
through the work of Michel Foucault,11 whom he supervised and who 
provided the forward to the English translation of Canguilhem’s best-known 
                                                        
8  Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison. Objectivity. New York: Zone Books, 2007. 
9  Methot. “On the Genealogy of Concepts and Experimental Practices." 114. 
 It’s worth noting that Canguilhem preferred to use the term “epistemological history” to 
describe his own approach, in part to distinguish his work from Gaston Bachelard’s, which 
he thought of as historical epistemology. The distinction is functionally minor, but important 
to illustrate the distinctions that define the field. I’m taking a more inclusive approach in this 
chapter; through Rheinberger’s idiosyncratic take on historical epistemology, Canguilhem 
and Bachelard become commensurable. For a discussion of this, see: Jean Gayon. “The 
Concept of Individuality in Canguilhem’s Philosophy of Biology.” Journal of the History of 
Biology 31, no. 3 (1998): 307, f.n. 8. 
10  Henning Schmidgen. “The Life of Concepts.” History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 36, 
no. 2 (2014): 234. 
11  Christina Chimisso. “Aspects of Current History of Philosophy of Science in the French 
Tradition,” In The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Springer, 2010. 
53-54, esp. f.n. 44. 
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work in English.12 The prevalent, Foucauldian Canguilhem is concerned with 
norms. The Canguilhem I want to use is the Canguilhem developed by 
Rheinberger, and others, to study the history and philosophy of science. I want 
to translate this Canguilhem into the disciplinary domain of media and its 
concepts; but to do this, we must disentangle his work from its Foucauldian 
reception in the humanities and social sciences.  
 
The most prevalent forms of the historical epistemological approach in 
Anglophone humanities and social sciences are those derived from Foucault’s 
work. One influential example is Arnold I. Davidson’s study of sexuality, which 
conceives of “the task of epistemology”, through a retroactive reading of 
Canguilhem through Foucault, “as that of finding the internal conditions of 
possibility for the production of a given domain of scientific statements."13 
Another is Nikolas Rose’s adoption of Canguilhem, which reads his conception 
of the historicity of science as a contribution to the Foucauldian project of 
historicising the sciences with the aim of “making possible other presents and 
other futures."14 Indeed, such is Foucault’s influence on our conceptions of the 
history of epistemological practice in the Anglophone world that my riff on 
Daston’s notion of “commonplaces” above no doubt evoked Foucault’s double 
emphasis on historical change and historical continuity.15 The approach I want 
to adopt belongs to the particular lineage of French epistemology with which 
Foucault identifies,16 but it doesn’t share his precepts about the contexts 
concepts inhabit or the methods that we ought to use to study them. We can 
identify Davidson’s and Rose’s versions of Canguilhem as retroactive re-
                                                        
12  Michel Foucault. “Introduction." In Canguilhem. On the Normal and the Pathological. 
Translated by Carolyn R. Fawcett in collaboration with Robert S. Cohen. New York: Zone 
Books, 1989. 7-24. 
13  Arnold I. Davidson. The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of 
Concepts. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2004. 198. 
14  Nikolas Rose. “Life, Reason and History: Reading Georges Canguilhem Today.” Economy and 
Society 27, no. 2-3 (1998): 165-6. 
15  Foucault. The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language. Translated by A. M. 
Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972. 8-9. 
16  Famously, Foucault identifies his work with an epistemological tradition of French 
philosophy that includes Bachelard, Canguilhem, and Jean Cavaillès, in contradistinction to 
the phenomenological and existentialist work of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty. See Foucault. “Introduction." In Canguilhem. The Normal and the Pathological. 8. 
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readings of him as a proponent, respectively, of Foucault’s archeological or 
genealogical methods. For Davidson, Canguilhem contributes to the 
archaeological study of the discursive practices that structure science and that 
constitute epistemic orders.17 For Rose, he contributes to a genealogical 
history of the present that demonstrates the continuing influence of the past 
so as to think the present otherwise.18 In Rheinberger, we find an alternate 
Canguilhem: one focused on concepts, rather than norms and conditions. This 
Canguilhem is invested with normativity, but not the normativity that might be 
attributed to him via Foucault. His normativity pertains to concepts and our 
methods of studying them; the concept itself becomes capable of harbouring 
normative conceptions that masquerade as commonplace claims about what 
the objects they conceptualise are and what they do. It also opens alternate 
methodological possibilities that we can use to study of circulation.  
 
Despite the name, then, applying an historical epistemological approach to 
circulation would not amount to producing history of the concept or a history 
of media. The “historical” part of the appellation, historical epistemology, is 
somewhat misleading: it doesn’t present a history of concepts, but rather 
historicises concepts themselves by reentering them into history. The historical 
epistemological approach I want to adopt is not wholly commensurable with 
other—theoretically-astute and undeniably rich—engagements with media’s 
histories, such as media archaeology and its variants; genealogies of media; or 
histories that actively draw on media’s conceptualisations.19 In the field of 
media studies, the most influential contemporary variants of theoretically-
inflected media history tend to be influenced by Foucault. Instead, I want to 
                                                        
17  On archaeology: Foucault. The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language. 
Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972. 191-5. 
18  On genealogy, see: Foucault. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” translated by Donald F. 
Bouchard and Sherry Simon, In The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow, New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1984. 76-100; David Garland. “What is a “History of the Present”? On 
Foucault’s Genealogies and Their Critical Preconditions.” Punishment & Society 16, no. 4 
(2014): 371-2. 
19  For instance: Erikki Huhtamo and Jussi Parikka. Media Archaeology: Approaches, Applications, 
and Implications. California: University of California Press, 2011; Wolfgang Ernst. “From 
Media History to Zeitkritik.” Theory, Culture & Society (2013): 132-146; Jonathan Crary. 
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align the approach I want to adopt here with two other applied social sciences 
example of historical epistemology: Mary Poovey’s study of the 
epistemological unit of the fact and Ian Hacking’s “historical ontology” 
approach.  
 
For Poovey, Foucault-inspired analyses are often restricted to one domain of 
knowledge, such as politics, and one regime of epistemological organisation: 
discourse.20 In focusing on the unit of the fact, her study analyses what she 
describes as the “categories by which knowledge can be organised”, adopting 
historical epistemology to study such categories’ “determinations and 
effects."21 Poovey’s claim echoes another that Ian Hacking makes in his 
influential articulation of his own approach to the history and philosophy of 
science. Early on, Hacking used the appellation “historical epistemology”, but 
he would go on to define his own work—in proximity to and in subtle 
opposition with historical epistemology—as “historical ontology."22 
Commenting on historical epistemology, Hacking notes that, “[t]he ideas 
examined by historical epistemology are the ones we use to organize the field 
of knowledge and inquiry. They are, often despite appearances, historical and 
"situated.””23 I mention these approaches as touchstones. Whilst rich, Poovey’s 
work is more historical than theoretical and doesn’t engage with historical 
epistemology itself in as much depth as I’d like to develop here. The methods 
I’m developing in this chapter depart from her work and its alternative example 
of how we might do things with concepts and how we might historicise 
                                                                                                                                                            
Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT press, 1992. 
20  Mary Poovey. A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth 
and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 17-18. 
21  Poovey. A History of the Modern Fact. 7. 
22  The similarities and distinctions between these two fields are beyond the scope of the 
present discussion. Daston, for instance, is heavily indebted to Hacking’s work; Hacking 
himself was instrumental in the term historical epistemology’s uptake in the early 1990’s.  
 See: Hacking. “Historical Ontology [Revised Version],” In Historical Ontology, 1–26. London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002; Daston. “The History of Emergences’. Essay Review of Ian 
Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas About Probability, 
Induction, and Statistical Inference.” New York: Cambridge University Press 2006. Isis 98, no. 
4 (2007): 801–8. 
23  Hacking. “Historical Ontology." 8. 
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epistemology. Whilst Hacking’s work remains heavily indebted to Foucault, I 
nevertheless want to draw on his compelling concept of the “organising 
concept." For Hacking, some concepts exercise an outsize influence on 
disciplinary knowledge production. For the social sciences, according to 
Poovey, these include the fact. For the sciences, according to Hacking, these 
include concepts like probability.24 For media studies, I want to assert, these 
concepts include circulation. What I want to demonstrate is how circulation—
despite operating as a commonplace—tacitly organises the knowledge we 
produce about media. To turn this in to a method, I want to turn now to 
Canguilhem’s concept of the concept as interpreted by Rheinberger. 
 
 
3.2 HOW TO DO THINGS WITH CONCEPTS 
Rheinberger’s version of historical epistemology is premised on two 
foundational methodological claims derived from the non-Foucauldian 
Canguilhem. First, it encourages us to enquire into “the historical conditions 
under which, and the means with which, things are made into objects of 
knowledge."25 That is, its focus is not on our knowledge of a thing, but on how 
a thing comes to be known. Second, it posits that epistemology is “historically 
variable”: rather than treating epistemology as though it were “based in some 
transcendental presupposition or a priori norm”—26or on its conditions of 
possibility—it treats it as both historically contingent and mutable. In 
Rheinberger’s work, these precepts form the basis for a powerful series of 
studies of scientific objects, particularly in the field of molecular biology. What 
makes it so useful for my project, though, is that it offers us a powerful 
conceptualisation of the concept that we can use to inform our analyses of 
circulation: it treats concepts as determinate, historicisable things that can be 
analysed apart from their theoretical frameworks—or, indeed, apart from what 
Foucault calls, at different stages, episteme or discourse. For Rheinberger, 
                                                        
24  See: Daston. “The History of Emergences." 801–8. 
25  Hans-Jörg Rheinberger On Historicizing Epistemology: An Essay. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2010. 2. Emphasis original. 
26  Rheinberger. On Historicising Epistemology. 3. 
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concepts can both inform and be informed by the contexts in which they’re 
used. He treats this characteristic as a defining property of concepts 
themselves, arguing, after Canguilhem, that the “[a]pplication” of a concept to 
an object of knowledge “is not extrinsic to modern knowledge” but, rather, 
“produces effects at the level of concept formation itself."27 Put otherwise, we 
might say that in using concepts, we can modify them; but because concepts 
are modifiable, we have to remain cognisant of the fact that they might retain 
determinations and that these determinations have effects on the knowledge 
we produce. Because concepts have a mediate role, they can be studied in and 
through their concrete applications.  
 
Earlier, I used the word “overdetermination” to capture the range of 
connotations associated with the concept of circulation and to begin to 
suggest that these determinations generate effects that we might not always 
anticipate. This claim might suggest that we should be studying concepts of 
circulation—in the plural—and that we should orient our analysis around a 
study of this plurality. Or, it suggests an approach that differentiates between 
these concepts, plural, by assuming that each must supervene on a theoretical 
framework and that each of these theoretical frameworks can and should be 
taken as the objects of epistemological analysis and critique. If we’re to take 
concepts seriously as historicisable things, however, we need think these 
determinations as a property of concepts rather than always conceiving of the 
concept as a derivative of a particular theoretical framework. Returning to 
Canguilhem’s reflections on concepts provides us with the epistemological 
means of doing this. For Canguilhem, one of concepts’ defining traits is that 
they’re “theoretically polyvalent."28 Rather than thinking of a concept as a 
multiplicity of different versions derived from different theories, Canguilhem 
inverts this relation: he argues that concepts themselves take on relations to 
different theoretical frameworks. The concept is neither unchangeable nor 
                                                        
27  Rheinberger. An Epistemology of the Concrete: Twentieth-Century Histories of Life. Durham, 
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2010. 34. 
28  Georges Canguilhem. A Vital Rationalist: Selected Writings From Georges Canguilhem. New 
York: Zone Books, 2000. 181. 
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simply discrete: its relations are also concrete things that inform it and that can 
be analysed. Canguilhem refers to these relations as a concept’s “filiations."29  
 
We might think of filiations as epistemic components, in the archaic sense of 
elements that actively put other elements together. As an epistemic 
component, a filiation is not just the impression left by the influence of a 
theory on a concept; it’s also, itself, a determinate and historicisable thing. As 
abstractions, our epistemic objects need not be conceived of as 
“contemporary” with one another to forge relations that cut across time. 
Rather, as abstractions, our concepts create peculiar relations in and to time. 
Problems arise not simply because we treat theoretical practice as though it’s 
all “contemporary”, but because we’re neither cognisant of nor able to 
articulate the situatedness of concepts’ filiations in particular contexts, in 
relation to theoretical frameworks, or, finally, as a part of a history of 
theoretical practices. The notion of the filiation points to the untimeliness of 
theoretical practice and its consequences. Positing a concept as a determinate 
and historicisable thing allows it to become the focus of an historical 
epistemological analysis. When a concept becomes the focus, we don’t need 
to think it through the theories that define it. Rather, we can think it as a nexus 
of relations; relations that may or may not be salient, but that might continue 
to inform knowledge production by retaining—untimely or incongruent—
filiations.  
 
We’re now in a position to posit a concept of the concept after Canguilhem—
and to distinguish it from other compelling conceptions posited by other 
theorists and philosophers. Henning Schmidgen suggests that Canguilhem 
conceptualises concepts as “dynamic and complex entities comprising three 
components: a phenomenon, a word, and a definition."30 This 
conceptualisation is perhaps a little too basic, merely reiterating a conventional 
definition of the concept as an abstraction of a thing. Canguilhem’s concept of 
                                                        
29  Canguilhem. A Vital Rationalist. 181. 
30  Schmidgen. “The Life of Concepts." 245. 
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filiations complicates this basic definition. A concept is an abstraction that 
articulates the relationship between theoretical frameworks—or ontologies—
and things, objects, or processes. Its capacity to take on filiations lends it a 
capaciousness that exceeds phenomenon plus word plus definition: through it, 
definitions multiply, confuse, blur. This notion of filiations perhaps recalls the 
work of Bruno Latour, who conceives of relations as real things.31 It differs 
from Latour’s work, however, in that it doesn’t reduce something like a 
concept to the sum of its relations. The concept is not its network, but an 
epistemic object; its relations are apprehensible, but nevertheless separable 
from it. It exceeds Latour’s formula—that what is real is what “resists."32 In 
Canguilhem’s conceptualisation, concepts are determinate and historicisable 
because we can study this capaciousness.  
 
Here, Canguilhem perhaps prefigures Reinhart Koselleck’s “history of 
concepts” approach, which conceives of concepts from within language by 
arguing that concepts are “the concentrate of several substantial meanings."33 
It exceeds Koselleck’s linguistic concept however, in that it thinks these 
epistemic objects beyond language alone and in their situated, concrete 
production. It also prefigures Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s powerful 
reflections on the concept in their late work.34 For Deleuze and Guattari, the 
concept is “absolutely deterritorialised”, or immanent to itself and not pre-
structured; as they put it, to create a concept is to “connect internal, 
inseparable components to the point of closure or saturation."35 For them, this 
closure means that the concept “abandons all reference so as to retain only the 
conjugations and connections that constitute its consistency” whilst 
nevertheless—here strongly echoing Canguilhem—remaining “plurivocal” in its 
                                                        
31  E.g. in: Bruno Latour. We Have Never Been Modern. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 
1993. 
32  Latour. “Irreductions,” In The Pasteurization of France, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1988. 158. 
33  Reinhart Koselleck. Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time. Translated by Keith 
Tribe. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. 85. 
34  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. What is Philosophy? Translated by Hugh Tomlinson, and 
Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 
35  Deleuze and Guattari. What is Philosophy? 88; 90. 
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capacity to link to what they describe as other “neighbourhoods."36 But 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of concepts is embedded in a 
radically different philosophical approach. Their distinction between 
philosophy, which creates concepts, and science, which creates functions, 
attributes to philosophical concepts the role of mapping “becomings” and 
“affects” and to science the role of articulating the concrete functions of 
things.37 For Canguilhem, philosophy and science aren’t so separable. Each 
produces concepts; they differ in that their practices of producing knowledge 
differ. Canguilhem’s conceptualisation of concepts may need to be 
reconstructed before it can be used, but it informs a powerful and distinctive 
approach to their study.38 It allows us to analyse their filiations, their effects, 
and their misappropriations. It also gestures towards a powerful mode of doing 
theoretical work, because we can also use its methods of analysing concepts to 
conceive of them otherwise.  
 
Rheinberger neatly articulates how we can use Canguilhem’s concept of the 
concept as the basis for theoretical practice when he reflects on another key 
concept in historical epistemology: the notion of the problem. This term 
captures the complexity of the set of relations between concept, context, and 
theoretical framework. Rheinberger demonstrates how when he notes that, 
“Canguilhem represented a form of conceptual history that can also be 
understood as a history of the displacement of problems which must be 
reconstructed in their historic context."39 Filiations lead us to problems, some 
of which concepts resolve and some of which they displace, mobilise, and 
carry with them. A filiation is a problem, where the latter is understood in and 
as the relations that it inhabits. We can use this term to formalise what I’ve 
been calling circulation’s persistent epistemological influences with more 
epistemological rigour. The filiation substantiates the continuing influence that 
                                                        
36  Deleuze and Guattari. What is Philosophy? 90-91. 
37  Deleuze and Guattari. What is Philosophy? 117. 
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seemingly-past—or, at least, seeming-absent—theoretical frameworks exercise 
in, or through, our present concepts.40 What I want to analyse is neither the 
theoretical frameworks from which circulation is derived, nor the concept itself 
in isolation, but the web of relations—between concept, context, framework, 
and, crucially, media—in which it is imbricated, as apprehended through the 
problems that it carries into media theory’s present.  
 
To recall the phrase of Daston’s that I used as an epigraph to this chapter—and 
to recast this opposition in terms that are perhaps more palatable to our post-
post-structuralist theoretical present—those components of theory that are 
“commonplace” are just as crucial to media theoretical practice as those that 
are strikingly “counterintuitive." Rheinberger’s two precepts—that we need to 
focus on the objects that knowledge takes and that epistemology is historically 
variable—provide us with a foundation that we can use to organise the project 
of this series of chapters. We can study the concept of circulation by 
identifying and analysing the contexts in which it’s produced or used. These 
contexts include situations; but, they also include the very objects, processes, 
places that circulation is enlisted to think. The media-theoretical manoeuvre 
typically consists of thinking media and their contexts through concepts. I want 
to use historical epistemology to rearrange the hierarchy of these terms: I want 
to think the concept of circulation through the media and the contexts in 
which it’s produced and reproduced. If we treat circulation as what Hacking 
calls an organising concept, this mode of analysis becomes even more incisive: 
it provides us with the means to articulate why circulation is crucial, how it 
operates, and how it might be thought otherwise. What makes historical 
epistemology so useful to this project is that it opens up the concept to 
mediation by media themselves. Media are commonplace. However, they’re 
                                                        
40  We can hear Canguilhem’s claim echoed, in different ways, in Paul Feyerabend’s statement 
that “observation languages may become tied to older layers of speculation which effect… 
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Feyerabend. Against Method. London: Verso, 1993. 51. 
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also exceptional objects of conceptualisation: they make epistemologies 
commonplace by putting them in to operation. If we’re to apply historical 
epistemology to media theory, we need to adapt its precepts to these 
exceptional objects.  
 
 
3.3 MEDIA-HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
It’s not at all clear that media, their concepts, or their contexts fall within the 
remit of historical epistemology for the simple reason that the modes of 
knowledge production that define the sciences are not necessarily 
commensurate with those that define media theory. The work of Rheinberger, 
for instance, focuses on the “epistemic thing”: that is, the object of scientific 
research whose materiality is always in excess of the knowledge that can be 
produced about it and which actively delimits the knowledge that might be 
claimed of it.41 I want to ground a conceptualisation of concepts drawn from 
Canguilhem via Rheinberger, and their capacity to circulate, be determined, 
and to mediate, in one further claim: that media have distinct and exceptional 
epistemological effects. To substantiate this claim and to develop what I want 
to call a media-historical epistemology, I want to focus on some of the recent 
media-theoretical work that has emerged out of the German media studies 
tradition.42 Some of this work is particularly theoretically astute. Crucially, 
some of this work also evinces curious homologies with historical epistemology 
that indicate how a media-historical epistemology might draw upon, but also 
diverge from, historical epistemology proper. If we pick bower-bird like 
through the disparate strands that constitute German media theory, we can 
find work that echoes each of Rheinberger’s two historical epistemological 
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precepts. I want to use this material as catalytic agents to synthesise media 
theory and historical epistemology.  
 
In an essay on the integrity of the field of German media theory, Claus Pias 
notes that media theory has always exceeded its own disciplinary boundaries 
for a quite simple historical reason: media theory is a modern discipline, which 
makes it relatively young, yet we’ve been theorising about media before 
naming them as such for millennia.43 By its very nature, historically-engaged 
media theory is interdisciplinary. The implication Pias draws from his 
historically-oriented media-theoretical perspective is that media studies must 
draw upon a range of material from a range of different disciplinary domains to 
think its objects, not only historically but also in the present. We might add 
two more. First, our media concepts are constitutively exposed to 
overdetermination by dint of the discipline’s own inescapably-interdisciplinary 
heritage. This suggests that even if we don’t adopt an historical approach to 
media theory, the theories of media that we inherit are likely to retain filiations 
from different disciplinary domains and theoretical frameworks. Second and 
conversely, once media theory is historicised, media can only be theorised if 
we first ask how media themselves become objects of theoretical knowledge 
across disciplines, in different domains of knowledge, and over time. Media 
change along with our theories of them. Given media theory’s lineage, it is 
even more likely to have retained filiations. Pias’s version of German media 
theory evinces an homology with historical epistemology’s first precept, which 
analyses how objects become objects of knowledge in particular contexts. 
 
We can find the second precept echoed in an essay by Joseph Vogl on 
Galileo’s telescope. This essay exemplifies one strain of German media theory 
in which historical analysis forms the basis for reflecting upon and 
reconceptualising the media concept. For Vogl, Galileo’s telescope is an 
example of how something that we might otherwise treat as a technology or as 
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a scientific instrument might be productively conceived of as media. Galileo’s 
telescope makes more of the heavens visible; but, it can only throw more of 
the stars into relief by intensifying the absence that surrounds them. This 
instrument produces knowledge by making visible both particular objects—
stars—and by suggesting, through the limits it places on perception, that there 
is even more to be known. It mediates knowledge, in one of mediation’s 
fundamental senses: by emphasising some aspects of sense at the expense of 
others. For Vogl, these reflections form the basis of his argument that we 
ought not to specify things as media based on particular technical qualities, 
instead identifying what he calls the “emergence of a medial function” from a 
“confluence of various factors”, like the use of the telescope’s mediation of 
perception to produce knowledge.44 The implication Vogl draws from these 
reflections is that the wide array of things, objects, and processes that media 
theory analyses as media undermines the idea that we could posit “generally 
valid concept of media."45 Here, we find a claim that’s homologous with 
historical epistemology’s second precept: the converse of the claim that we 
ought not to posit a generally valid concept of media is that our epistemologies 
of media are historically variable.   
 
As both Pias’s and Vogl’s work demonstrates, some strains of contemporary 
media theory put historical epistemological precepts in to practice, even if they 
don’t articulate their approaches as such. I’d like to suggest that they 
demonstrate that historical epistemology could be compatible with media 
theory. However, I also want to argue that we can only apply historical 
epistemology to media theory if we modify it. Elsewhere, Pias actually notes 
that his version of media theory, which interrogates media’s relationship to 
knowledge by historicising this relationship, could be considered to be “a kind 
of historical epistemology."46 The hesitancy of this “kind of” is crucial, because 
it indexes the inherent difficulty of applying historical epistemology to media. 
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Media play a distinct role in epistemology that’s not wholly commensurate with 
the role that historical epistemology accords to scientific instruments. 
Historical epistemology treats scientific instruments as technology.47 Media 
aren’t reducible to technology: we distinguish them from other types of 
technology because they mediate. Analogously, I want to argue that media are 
exceptional epistemological objects. They don’t just inform the production of 
knowledge; they also mediate it. We need to account for this quality if we’re to 
posit what I’m calling a media-historical epistemology. There’s also a challenge 
in thinking of media in this way. By asserting that media mediate knowledge 
production, we risk re-instituting either a version of the medial a priori, which 
we encountered in Kittler; or, a version of the Foucauldian episteme, whereby 
media would be posited as thought’s conditions. We risk, that is, reducing 
media theory to the media it takes as its objects.  
 
Pias makes this mistake in his work on the development of simulation when he 
defines the role and scope of media theory as investigating “the media-
historical conditions pertaining to knowledge and cognition."48 This claim 
echoes an insight of Kittler’s that has acted as a touchstone in the introduction. 
As Sybille Krämer perceptively notes, the gesture of establishing media as a 
priori conditions can be read as the apotheosis and the “breakdown” of an 
earlier, poststructuralist explanation for the shaping of thought by its 
conditions: the “linguistic a priori."49 My aim is not to reestablish media as the 
“phenomenal domain”, in Krämer’s formulation, that would act as “the prior 
matrix of our being-in-the-world."50 Positing media as an a priori would defeat 
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the purpose of an historical epistemological analysis. One consequence of this 
positing might be something like Kittler’s version of the critique of the subject, 
as templated by his oft-repeated phrase, “so-called man."51 Another is a kind of 
epistemological paralysis: if knowledge is posited as a “direct function of 
technological thresholds”, as Kittler claims in another early essay,52 there’s no 
need for historical epistemological analysis, because the answer to the 
question of how knowledge is constituted would always redound to media. 
However, Kittler’s claim that media mediate thought is still a necessary 
component of a media-historical epistemology—if treated not as thought’s a 
priori, but as a concrete condition.  
 
In our postdigital media situation, the conditioning of knowledge production by 
media is evident everywhere. This postdigital media situation has arisen 
because media have become commonplace. To echo Daston again, this must 
also mean that media become commonplace influences on epistemology. 
Though we might be cognisant of media’s effects on knowledge production, 
we lack an epistemology that we might use to analyse media’s effects on our 
concepts. This is the role that a media-historical epistemology must play. We 
can rescue the observation that media mediate knowledge from a priori 
postulation, whilst also making it the basis of a media-historical epistemology, if 
we formalise the concrete role that media play the production of our concepts.  
  
If concepts are historically variable and they’re informed by their contexts, as 
historical epistemology suggests, media occupy a double relationship to 
concepts: they are both anterior and posterior to our concepts of them. That is, 
media are part of the conditions of the practices of theorisation through which 
contexts are produced; but, they also play the role of the objects that these 
concepts are concepts-of. Circulation is always the circulation-of; that is, it 
always takes an object. For instance, we talk about the circulation of internet 
memes. The objects it takes—in the case that interests us, kinds of media or 
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what we call content; but also, as we’ll see, objects like bodies, railways, 
environments, alchemical practices—actively inform this concept in as many 
different ways as it has been applied to different contexts. For historical 
epistemology, the concept is informed by its objects because these objects 
create filiations. In Canguilhem’s study of the inner milieu in biology, the 
confluence of particular scientific practices, techniques, and anatomical 
knowledge allows us to conceive of our bodies as possessing an interior 
space.53 In the language media studies, we might rearticulate this claim. Media 
also mediate our concepts of them. They do this in part as objects whose 
development and change initiates changes in our concepts; but, they also do 
this because they produce and operationalise epistemology itself. This, I want 
to argue in more detail in the next chapter, is why circulation can be taken for 
the circulation of content: because the platforms that enable cultural 
production generate an epistemological category, content, that media theory 
then takes for circulation’s object. The claim that media mediate our concepts 
of them is neither recursive nor reductive. Rather, it describes a concrete 
situation in which media invest our concepts of them with filiations.  
 
It’s commonplace to claim that media recede in the act of mediating,54 but we 
rarely acknowledge that media also recede from epistemology. What Michel 
Serres calls the “third man”, or the noise in the channel that communication 
must exclude for it to be possible,55 has an media-epistemic parallel. In analogy 
to media, we could say that the filiation is the media concept’s missing middle. 
The filiation allows us to claim that media play an anterior-posterior role in 
knowledge production without reducing media theory to its conditions. It 
allows us to understand how media’s conditions, its contexts, and our 
theoretical frameworks inform our media concepts. Without any conception of 
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the historicisable nature of our practices of theorisation, the claim that media 
mediate knowledge doesn’t mean much. With it, we can propose a media-
historical epistemological method. 
 
 
3.4 A METHOD 
The epistemological claims outlined in this chapter were originally formulated 
to study the development of science: both how knowledge of the world 
advances with the techniques that we use to know it, and how these 
techniques and the objects they’re applied to inform knowledge’s advance. 
Extrapolated from the domain of science to the domain of media, these claims 
help us to apprehend media theory as a concrete practice and as 
epistemological material for novel propositions about media. With a little 
modification, historical epistemology allows us to better articulate the 
indeterminacy that characterises our postdigital media situation—whilst also 
providing us with a method that we can use to resolve our problem and to 
formulate a theory of the internet meme. 
 
In Rheinberger’s formulation, historical epistemology is underpinned by two 
core precepts: it studies the conditions under which objects become objects of 
knowledge, and it acknowledges that epistemology is historically variable. 
These precepts can be applied to media—with a caveat. Media are exceptional 
epistemological objects. The anterior-posterior role they play in epistemology 
changes their epistemological status, because media are at once a part of the 
conditions which they themselves become object of knowledge; and the 
historical variability of epistemology is informed by media themselves, insofar as 
they mediate its production. Media intercede in each of these processes. So, I 
want to propose a third precept to take account of this exceptional 
epistemological status and to adapt historical epistemology to the study of 
media: that media are implicated in the production of knowledge about media. 
This claim extends those that I made about media’s relationship to thought in 
the introduction to this thesis. It allows us to refine my proposition that our 
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postdigital media situation is indeterminate. This indeterminacy is 
epistemological inasmuch as the concrete ubiquity and massive distribution of 
media constitute the conditions in which we practice theory, in which media 
must be theorised, and in which media inform our concepts of them. This 
constitutes what I want to call media-historical epistemology. 
 
This claim perhaps flirts with a paralysing recursivity. After all, to claim that 
media inform our concepts of them risks positing that media think themselves. 
Here, it resonates with another recent approach to historicising media posited 
by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, by way of Kittler’s late work, which explicitly 
thematises recursions over vast historical distances.56 Kittler derives the term 
“recursion” from computation, where it denotes a process that “involve[s] 
repetitive instances of self-processing that nonetheless result in something 
different”.57 Following Kittler, Winthrop-Young argues that particular media 
also recur across time. Rather than focusing on media artefacts, though, this 
approach studies the recursion of mediatic processes and techniques, 
analysing how their repetitions link distinct historical periods even as their 
recursions in these distinct periods changes their nature.58 Yet in its focus on 
“recursions through time and analogies through time and space”, this approach 
is essentially concerned with producing histories that cut across superficial 
“temporal and conceptual distance”.59 In contrast, what I’m calling media-
historical epistemology is concerned not with recurrences that act as “short 
circuits that are outside the provenance of time”,60 but with much more 
modest persistences that are carried to us in our epistemologies. Moreover, it 
takes concepts as its objects rather than mediatic processes. In the applications 
I want to use it for in this thesis, media-historical epistemology doesn’t treat 
the con-fusion of temporal registers as a condition of practice, as Winthrop-
Young does, but conceives of it as constituted by epistemology’s concrete 
                                                        
56  Winthrop-Young. “Siren Recursions,” In Kittler Now: Current Perspectives in Kittler Studies, 
edited by Stephen Sale and Laura Salisbury, 71–94. London: Polity, 2015. 
57  Winthrop-Young. “Siren Recursions.” 75. 
58  Winthrop-Young. “Siren Recursions.” 91. 
59  Winthrop-Young. “Siren Recursions.” 88. 
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operations. By making epistemology concrete, this approach transforms such 
conditions from determining abstractions into thought’s constituent materials. 
This gesture makes them available to be studied and to be reworked—using a 
method also derived from historical epistemology and repurposed to study 
media by analysing our concepts of them.  
 
Following Canguilhem and Rheinberger, this method takes the relationship 
between media and our concepts of them as its field. Positing concepts as 
determinate, historicisable things changes not only their epistemological status, 
but the kinds of epistemological work we can do with them. Concepts aren’t 
just derivatives of particular theoretical frameworks; they circulate, carrying 
filiations with them. These filiations realise the shaping influence that particular 
contexts, theoretical frameworks, or objects can have on concepts and that 
concepts can carry with them as they’re taken up in new contexts, adapted to 
alternate theoretical frameworks, or applied to different objects. This concept 
of the concepts re-inserts them in to history and makes them available for a 
form of analysis that unpacks their epistemological implications and that, in 
doing so, necessarily produces new epistemological knowledge. The method I 
want to adopt works on and through concepts by reconstructing their filiations 
to understand more precisely what kind of epistemological work they do.  
 
Filiations are relations, but they’re also determinate things. They’re informed 
and inform in turn. They constrain concepts: they suggest that the act of 
positing concepts can’t be conceived in separation from the context in which 
such a gesture is made, drastically reducing theory’s capacity to be practiced in 
a “contemporary” mode. They introduce an element of risk into the act of 
positing concepts: we can posit concepts whilst remaining wholly or partially 
unaware of the concrete influence that theoretical frameworks, contexts, or 
objects exercise over this act, but doing so risks reproducing the filiations that 
prevail in a particular concrete-historical conjuncture. They also allow 
epistemological enquiry to make different kinds of propositions about the 
                                                                                                                                                            
60  Winthrop-Young. “Siren Recursions.” 77. 
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world—or, to conduct a different kind of theoretical practice. Filiations suggest 
that to posit a concept, we need to be able to reflexively incorporate an 
understanding of a concept’s concrete conditions and its associated filiations 
into our conceptualisations. They allow us to both identify tacit forms of 
epistemological work carried out by concepts and to make concepts adequate 
to their contexts, theoretical frameworks, and objects by filiating them 
differently. Guided by the problem that structures this thesis, I want to apply 
this method to circulation and to its seemingly-contradictory status as 
underdetermined concept that is, nevertheless, both commonplace and 
essential to our understanding of media.  
 
To posit a concept of circulation that we can use to theorise the internet 
meme, we need to avoid asking what it means for the internet meme to 
circulate. Rather, we need to ask questions that predicate theorisation’s 
concrete, mediated conditions: What is the circulation of the internet meme? 
What is circulation for media theory? What is circulation, finally, after the 
excess of circulating media that constitutes our postdigital media situation? 
Our concepts of circulation are caught up in the concrete circulations of 
media. Why, we must ask, is circulation under-conceptualised in media theory? 
This is the starting point for the method I want to apply to this concept. This 
method is “inventive”, in the sense outlined by Celia Lury and Nina Wakefield: 
it addresses a method—media-historical epistemology—to a problem—in our 
case, the concept of circulation and the question of how we might think media 
in excess of themselves—and allows “the capacity of what emerges in the use 
of that method to change the problem."61 Only, the object of this method is 
both concrete and epistemological. Sifting through what emerges allows us to 
posit a concept, circulation, that’s adequate to this problem. The three 
chapters that follow this one will use the notion of the filiation to identify 
some of the epistemological ramifications that the polyvalent concept of 
circulation has for media theory.  
                                                        
61  Celia Lury, and Nina Wakeford. Inventive Methods: The Happening of the Social. London and 
New York: Routledge, 2012. 7. 
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Part of what media-historical epistemology argues is that we never come to 
the practice of theorising media from a standing start. We use circulation, as a 
commonplace; media circulate; their circulation informs the epistemological 
indeterminacy that is the—concrete—condition of thinking media in the 
present. As a commonplace, circulation burgeons with connotations, 
overspilling disciplinary domains and theoretical frameworks. As a concept, 
circulation takes multiple objects. It transects multiple domains of knowledge, 
regularly recurring across the humanities and social sciences. It’s informed, 
then, by numerous theoretical filiations, both in media theory and beyond. As a 
result, media theory acts as something like a tributary: a moving body into 
which all of the filiations attached to circulation and its objects—or drawn from 
other domains of knowledge or theoretical frameworks—flow. The method I 
want to use to think through this thesis’s problem assumes that in circulation, 
we find many conceptual answers to the problem of how we ought to think 
media in excess of themselves—often without even posing the questions they 
entail. Put more schematically, this method works on the disjuncture between 
epistemological solutions and the problems they entail to identify both what 
conceptual work circulation does for media theory in its role as a commonplace 
and whether this conceptual work it helps or hinders our attempts to theorise 
media in the present. Some of this tacit work is crucial to how we 
conceptualise media. Some betrays the persistence of prior filiations that 
actively hamper our capacity to apprehend media. Working in this disjuncture 
will allow us to posit a concept that reflects the foundational role it plays in 
media theory; that’s filiated to our indeterminate postdigital media situation; 
and, crucially, that we can use to formulate a theory of the internet meme.  
 
Adopting this method immediately confronts us with another kind of problem: 
circulation is in common currency across the humanities and social sciences, 
which means that it takes innumerable filiations. Positing it as a commonplace 
and suggesting that it also does tacit conceptual work multiplies these filiations 
again. Identifying, cataloguing, and analysing each of the filiations that inform 
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circulation is beyond the scope of this thesis—or, to hazard a guess, an entire 
thesis or book. But not all of these filiations are necessarily relevant to our aim. 
For all that circulation’s media-theoretical usages are informed by multiple 
objects, filiations, and historical contexts, the particular filiations we’re 
interested in respond to and are shaped by a particular, recurrent problem: 
how we might think media when the media concept is no longer adequate to 
this task; or, how we might theorise media in excess of themselves. This problem 
makes circulation tractable to media-historical epistemological methods by 
narrowing the scope of our enquiry. The following three chapters will each 
focus on one filiation in particular: the platform, which I’ll present as the key 
media-technical context in which internet memes are circulated; the anatomical 
body, which continues to inform circulation as one of its key early objects; and 
the ontological category of materiality, as perhaps the most important 
contemporary theoretical framework that—oftentimes tacitly and at the level of 
the discipline of media theory itself—shapes how circulation is conceived.  
 
Before proceeding to these analyses, it has to be noted that the concept of the 
filiation is potentially problematic. This concept and the attendant method I’m 
proposing risk reducing media theory to a set of historical determinants, 
because they risk inflating the filiation to the status of yet another a priori. This 
a priori would function by positing particular historical precursors as particular 
concepts’ explanatory keys. We can imagine a concept of media, for example, 
so relativised by its reflexive relation to the media it takes as its objects that it 
ceases to give us any analytical purchase. My contention is that we can avoid 
this inflation and its concomitant reductive effects by insisting that though 
concepts are concrete, their status as abstractions both invests them with a 
particular kind of epistemological agency and allows them to carry out 
particular kinds of epistemological work. What I mean to produce using this 
method is not a history, per se. That is, I don’t mean to use history to explain 
theory. Nor do I mean to posit this concept as an alternative to other historical 
approaches to media, like media archaeology, Foucauldian genealogy, 
Winthrop-Young’s recursion, or more conventional media histories. The 
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method I’m proposing suits our particular problem, the concept we’re 
interested in, and our contemporary context. These demand an epistemological 
approach to practicing media theory that I have not found elsewhere. I’ve tried 
to head off this risk by situating this method within a number of constraints; 
whilst also acknowledging that constraint can often encourage thought.  
 
It also has to be noted that adopting this method and its attendant theoretical 
practice enables some forms of producing theory whilst heavily constraining 
others. Circulation’s unlike the concepts studied by historical epistemology, 
which usually refer to a specific—usually scientific—object. For Rheinberger, 
historical epistemology studies “epistemic things”, like test tubes, that “embody 
concepts” in science and so shift as concepts shift.62 This concept operates in 
a field as broad as our media situation itself, introducing the risk that our 
propositions might lose coherence. Nor does it fit the model of the “trans-
disciplinary concept” posited by Peter Osborne. Such concepts, like “the text”, 
are able to transect disciplines and addresses variable ranges of objects: the 
text is of language language; language lends the text this capacity, whilst the 
text renders ever-drifting language apprehensible.63 Circulation is a 
commonplace, but what concerns us is how this concept can be made to fit 
the demands of thinking media in excess of themselves. So, our approach to 
conceptualising it differently has to avoid the temptation to elevate circulation 
to the status of a concept like the text, even as this concept leads our analyses 
into fields far beyond media theory proper. Following the problem posed by 
the internet meme and analysing it using this method will take us far afield of 
the domain of knowledge circumscribed by “media theory." The method I’m 
proposing requires us to do forms of interdisciplinary work that weighs what’s 
                                                        
62  Hans-Jörg Rheinberger. Toward a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing Proteins in the Test 
Tube. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. 8. 
 Interestingly, Sybille Krämer also applies the concept of the “epistemic thing” in her 
discussion of maps as media. In this appropriation of the concept, though, she refers to 
what maps depict as “epistemic things”: that is, as objects that shift with techniques of 
mapping. See: Krämer, Medium, Messenger, Transmission: An Approach to Media Philosophy. 
Amsterdam University Press, 2015. 200-201. 
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common across disciplines with what’s not. We can think of it as conducting 
media theory in an expanded field—which requires us to acknowledge that 
expanding media theory’s field expands the risk of leaving our problem far 
behind.  
 
The indeterminacy of our postdigital media situation is more profound than its 
concrete conditions—the massive distribution of the internet and the ubiquity 
of media—might already suggest. What’s driving this series of chapters’—and 
this thesis’s—obsession with circulation is the question not only of what, but 
where media are after the internet meme. When we take a media concept and 
analyse its filiations, the contexts, conditions, and theoretical frameworks it 
emerges from, what objects it takes, and, additionally, how media inform it, we 
might also ask whether media’s occluded role in theorisation occludes 
something else. What gets accorded the role of media, under what conditions, 
and at what particular historical junctures? What mediates? Where is 
mediation located? How do we think mediation when media, in their ubiquity 
and through the internet’s massive distribution, seem to break down—when, 
that is, our postdigital present is also seemingly one in which we are “after” 
media?64 We might dismiss what I’m calling indeterminacy as the product of 
the proliferation of clickbait and social media posts and memes and cat gifs, as 
though it’s only its content that makes this media situation overwhelm our 
capacity to think it. But media theory adds its own dose of indeterminacy to 
this mix. If we conceive of the problem posed by the concept of circulation in 
media-historical epistemological terms, it ramifies, taking us from the internet 
meme right through to the question of how one might think media when 
media inform our concepts of them. The gambit of this thesis is this: in the 
admonitory internet meme, we can find the resources for a media theory that 
is adequate to the present—in indeterminacy. 
                                                                                                                                                            
63  Roland Barthes articulates this quality most clearly in this essay: “Theory of the Text,” In 
Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, edited by Robert Young, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul Boston, 1981. 
64  Bernhard Siegert. “Media After Media,” In Media After Kittler, edited by Eleni Ikoniadou, and 
Scott Wilson, 79–89. 2015. 
 
II. — IN CIRCULATION 
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4. MEDIA IN EXCESS OF THEMSELVES 
 
 
4.0 CIRCULATION, TODAY 
Circulation is a standard term in media theory’s lexicon. We use it to describe 
how print moves from hand-to-hand or from eye-to-eye; how information is 
transmitted through wires, cables, circuits, or even waves and/or particles; how 
mass-media broadcasts broach the space-times of populations and territories; 
or how data is downloaded, stored, manipulated, uploaded, and shared via the 
internet’s constitutive apps, platforms, services, and infrastructures. The term 
itself connotes processes as varied as sending, receiving, returning, circuiting, 
encircling, producing, reproducing, sustaining, creating, iterating, or even 
transforming. Circulation is deeply embedded in the theoretical language we 
use to conceptualise media. From the media-historical epistemological 
approach introduced in the previous chapter, we can identify it as a 
commonplace. Each time it’s invoked to describe how media move, or to 
substantiate the mediatic processes by which media generate effects, 
circulation does a kind of conceptual work. These movements and processes 
contribute to our understanding of what media are and what they do. They are 
particularly essential to our conception of how media constitute pluralities, and 
how these pluralities produce effects. And yet despite the contributions that 
circulation makes to our conceptual understanding of media, it’s a term that’s 
typically taken for granted.  
 
Media theory arguably lacks a concept of circulation that is specific to media. 
What we mean by “circulation” varies each time it’s invoked, both denotatively 
and epistemologically. This term occurs in so many distinct domains of 
knowledge across the humanities and social sciences that it is overdetermined 
with meaning. Because it’s underdetermined as a media-theoretical concept, its 
uses in discussions of media run the risk of reproducing filiations from other 
domains of knowledge and introducing them to our conceptions of what media 
are and what they do. Circulation’s status as a commonplace that bristles with 
non-media-theoretical filiations adds an extra layer of epistemological 
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complexity to the problem that this thesis is attempting to resolve. That media 
circulate today is all too obvious. The indeterminacy that characterises our 
postdigital media situation is generated, in no small part, by an excess of 
circulating media. But what media are in circulation remains a pressing 
question. This question is essential to our task of formulating a theory of the 
internet meme. It’s arguably essential to media theory itself. What circulation 
is—in the present, for media, and for the internet meme—has yet to be 
articulated.  
 
This chapter is the first in a series that will respond to this question using 
media-historical epistemological methods. Circulation is a particularly apt 
epistemological object for a media-historical epistemological analysis. Its status 
as a term that is at once an underdetermined media-theoretical commonplace 
and an overdetermined concept in the humanities and social sciences confronts 
us with something of a media-theoretical paradox. Given this overdeterminacy 
and the media-historical epistemological propositions introduced in the 
previous chapter, the act of positing a new concept of circulation as part of a 
theoretical practice that treats this concept as though it’s “contemporary” risks 
reproducing filiations from other domains of knowledge. This concept’s 
epistemological history weighs too heavily. As the litany used to introduce this 
chapter shows us, circulation shelters epistemological multitudes. The risk is 
that this purportedly-“new” concept of circulation would reproduce 
conceptualisations of media from incongruous contexts, or tacitly re-introduce 
other, conflicting theoretical assumptions in to our theoretical practices, or 
freight our understanding of media’s circulations with those of another object 
entirely. Media-historical epistemology helps us to avoid this possibility by 
providing us with epistemological tools we can use to identify, analyse, and 
sort these filiations, turning this paradox into a point of departure for a 
productive theoretical engagement.  
 
Yet this method presents us with a different kind of paradox. If circulation is as 
overdetermined as I’ve claimed, where does this theoretical practice even 
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begin? Positing the history of concepts as conditions of their 
reconceptualisation in the present introduces the entire, overwhelming 
inventory of their prior applications into theoretical practice. Media-historical 
epistemology also provides us with the means of narrowing this inventory 
enough to make it workable. The “historical” moniker aside, media-historical 
epistemology also provides us with alternate ways of apprehending and 
engaging with concepts in their present. What’s at stake in circulation’s 
commonplace status today is our capacity to think media in the present. We 
can parse this statement further using the language of the problem: what’s at 
stake is our capacity to think media in excess of themselves. What the concept 
of the problem provides us with is an epistemological heuristic that we can use 
to reduce circulation’s inventory of prior uses to the few that particularly 
concern us. In this chapter and the two that follow, I want to examine precisely 
how circulation has been used to conceptualise media in excess of themselves. 
This chapter will begin this analysis in the present and with the internet 
meme’s specific context: the technical ensembles that make the circulation of 
online media possible.  
 
In brief, my argument is this: when we invoke circulation to describe what 
online media are and what they do, its commonplace status tacitly allow 
circulation to supervene on the technical ensembles that put media in to 
circulation. That is, because we treat circulation as a self-evident process, we 
allow these technical ensembles to dictate what circulation is—and, so, to 
exercise an epistemological influence on media theory itself. Per the media-
historical epistemological approach I’ve outlined, the analysis that I want to 
present in this chapter isn’t concerned with a general epistemology of the 
internet itself, conceived of as a technical ensemble. The internet’s too 
complex to subject it to this kind of analysis. Rather, it’s concerned with the 
specific and concrete mechanisms that allow circulation to be informed by—or 
filiated to—particular technical ensembles. With this in mind, it will focus on 
the platform.  
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Over the past half-decade or so, platforms have emerged as the main sites of 
contemporary online cultural production. Platforms include the media-technical 
ensembles that most define online culture, like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, 
many of Google’s services, and so on. Platforms are not the only ensembles 
where culture is produced—bulletin boards are also key—but they’re significant 
enough for its circulation to be the subject of the analysis I want to conduct in 
this chapter. Importantly, the platform has also become a central concept in 
media-theoretical analyses of both online and the internet more broadly. I 
want to argue that we invoke circulation as a commonplace in our discussions 
of online media, we assume that media are in circulation because they have 
been put in to circulation by platforms. As we’ll see, our extant concept of the 
platform can help us to understand how they make the circulation of media 
possible. But they also overlook the epistemological influence that concrete 
platforms exercise over our media theoretical practices. Using media-historical 
epistemological methods to identify and analyse this influence, this chapter will 
argue that our commonplace usages of circulation in discussions of online 
media tacitly posit media as derivative products of platforms. They do this by 
construing media as “content."  
 
This tacit conceptual work provides us with one response to the question of 
how circulation is used to think media in excess of themselves: by reducing 
media to content, it empties circulation of its conceptual content. But it also 
provides us with two insights that I want to carry forward in to later chapters. 
First, this analysis demonstrates the key role that media-technical ensembles 
play in for both media’s concrete circulations and for the conceptual work that 
we enlist circulation to do. This suggests that a concept of circulation that’s 
adequate to the internet meme will need to account for and to articulate this 
role overtly. Second, this analysis also demonstrates precisely how circulation 
operates as an organising concept. When we allow circulation to supervene on 
platforms, we allow platforms to inform the conceptual work that circulation 
does. More fundamentally, though, we also allow platforms to inform the media 
concept itself. In circulation, this particular commonplace usage construes 
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media as “content." This conceptualisation of media is only thinkable because 
we accept that media are in circulation. The conclusion that I want to draw 
from this claim is that circulation is as foundational to media theory as its two 
basic concepts: the media concept and the concept of mediation. Expanding 
upon this claim will become increasingly important as this thesis progresses.  
 
Adopting a method derived from media-historical epistemology provides us 
with an alternative path for the positing of new concepts. When concepts are 
weighed down by a sprawling epistemological history that proliferates 
filiations, the gesture of positing a new concept becomes fraught. But by 
working through a concept’s commonplace usages, we can separate the 
filiation—and whatever detrimental effects it might have—from the conceptual 
work that we invoke it to do. This work constitutes the core of a concept that 
would be adequate to a given object and its attendant problem. Rather than 
positing concepts anew, media-historical epistemology provides us with the 
means to reconstruct these concepts out of this work. The trick lies in 
reconciling this work with their context—for the internet meme, our 
indeterminate postdigital media situation—and with the specificities of the 
objects we want to use a particular concept to think. The aim of adopting this 
approach is to produce a concept of circulation that’s flexible enough to think 
with the new; not to think what’s novel, as indicated by concepts like “new 
media”, but to think with our changing media situation as it institutes new 
commonplaces, new banalities, and subtly different variations on what we 
think of as everyday.  
 
In perhaps a more far-reaching sense than I’ve previously intimated, this is why 
the concept of circulation is so necessary for thinking our indeterminate 
postdigital media situation. I’ve claimed that circulation is a key, yet under 
articulated, media-theoretical concept. I’ve claimed that its usages are defined, 
reciprocally, by the problems to which they respond. Placed in the context of 
the present and phrased in the interrogative, our problem is this: How are we 
to think media in excess of themselves, when media’s concrete circulations 
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outstrip our capacity to think them? To set this analysis in motion, we might 
ask another question in response: Where else would we find a way to resolve 




4.1 CIRCULATION AND MEDIA 
I want to begin this analysis by identifying a few of the more notable, 
commonplace usages of circulation in recent media-theoretical scholarship. In 
each of these instances, we’ll see that circulation isn’t posited as a discrete 
concept, or overtly accorded what I would call an organising, media-theoretical 
role. Instead, it’s often introduced to subordinate our conception of circulating 
media to other processes. These fall in to four main categories: political-
economic; infrastructural; linguistic; and cultural. In each of these instances, 
circulation is taken to be self-evident. In the absence of a clearly-articulated 
conceptualisation of what the circulation of media is, each of these instances 
defaults to filiating this term to epistemologies drawn from theoretical 
frameworks, contexts, or objects outside of media theory. My argument is that 
none addresses the circulation of media, per se. They provide us with the 
outlines of an epistemological in which circulation ends up supervening on 
platforms.  
 
We can find exemplary instances of the influence of political-economic 
conceptions of circulation in Jodi Dean’s seminal concept of “communicative 
capitalism” and in David B. Nieborg and Thomas Poell’s recent work on cultural 
production. The core of Dean’s argument is that the dynamics of online 
cultural production revalue the contributions that individual users might make 
to a “pool” of already-circulating “content."1 Dean posits circulation as 
something more than a process: for her, it constitutes “the context, the 
                                                        
1  Jodi Dean. “Communicative Capitalism: Circulation and the Foreclosure of Politics.” Cultural 
Politics 1, no. 1 (2005): 58. 
  111 
condition for the acceptance or rejection of a contribution”—2or, in the 
language I’m using, of a media-instance. She draws this distinction to comment 
on how the act of putting “content” into circulation can be used as a tactic to 
distract political constituencies from pressing political issues. For Nieborg and 
Poell, the increasing “platformatization”—which I’ll substitute for 
“platformisation”, to remain consistent with other scholarship—of the ‘net, or, 
the increasing emergence of programmable, platform-based computational 
architectures, enacts a “reorganisation of cultural production and circulation."3 
They make an argument that resonates with the one I’ll expand upon below. 
For them, platformisation has the effect of making media “contingent”,4 
transforming them from discrete objects into iteratable constructs. But their 
focus, like Dean’s, is not on media themselves. The work of Dean and of 
Nieborg and Poell exemplifies the media-theoretical tendency to pattern 
media’s circulations after political-economic phenomena: capital and and the 
commodity form.  
 
Dean’s use of the term circulation is drawn from Karl Marx’s conception of the 
role that circulation plays for capital. For Marx, capital is accumulated through 
ongoing processes that translate money in to capital and capital back in to a 
larger amount of money. Its accumulation is predicated exploiting a surplus-
value from the labour that produces commodities.5 In Capital Vol. II, Marx 
argues that “capital… does not just comprise class relations… it is a movement, 
a circulatory process through different stages."6 He goes on to observe that 
“industrial capital in the continuity of its circuit is simultaneously in all of its 
stages."7 What Dean calls circulation replicates the epistemological claim that 
underpins this observation. Online, “content” is as capital: it can be grasped as 
                                                        
2  Dean. “Communicative Capitalism." 59. 
3  David B. Nieborg, and Thomas Poell. “The Platformatization of Cultural Production.” new 
media & society Pre-print (2018): 15. 
4  Nieborg and Poell, “The Platformatization of Cultural Production”, 15. 
5  Karl Marx. Capital Vol. 1. Translated by Ben Fowkes and David Fernbach. London: Penguin, 
1990. 
6  Marx. Capital Vol. 2. Translated by David Fernbach. London: Penguin, 1992. 185. 
7  Marx. Capital Vol. 2. Translated by David Fernbach. London: Penguin, 1992. 182. 
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a whole; it generates effects as a whole; but, it subsumes media instances to 
this whole. Nieborg and Poell draw a much more overt line between online 
cultural production and Marxian political economy. They conceive of 
contingent media as “cultural commodities." What’s interesting about 
platformisation for them is not what it means for media, nor what it says about 
how media circulate, but what it tells us about “the structure and nature of the 
commodity form."8 This claim blurs media’s circulations with those of 
commodities. Platformisation might transform the former, but their emphasis 
on media’s role as commodity subordinates the operations of media to its 
consumption. In each case, the concrete circulations of media are subordinated 
to non-mediatic processes. In each case, circulation remains underdetermined 
as a concept of media.  
 
Other, recent media-theoretical attempts to conceptualise the circulation of 
media unintentionally perpetrate a different epistemological bait-and-switch: 
they try to explain media’s circulations by invoking its infrastructures, only to 
end up valorising these infrastructures at circulation’s epistemological expense. 
In his recent book-length study of the constitutive role that circulation plays 
for media and popular culture, David Beer argues that we need to think 
media’s circulations through their enabling infrastructures and the algorithms 
that process them.9 His argument, that “in order to understand culture we 
need to understand the circulations of data that are now central to it”,10 is 
particularly compelling. Somewhat surprisingly, however, Beer’s extended 
study of how media circulates never actually specifies what circulation is. 
Throughout, he treats it as a commonplace. The editor’s introduction to a 
recent special issue on “digital circulation” written by Gabriele Balbi, 
                                                        
8  David B. Nieborg, and Thomas Poell. “The Platformatization of Cultural Production.” new 
media & society Pre-print (2018): 15. 
9  David Beer. Popular Culture and New Media: The Politics of Circulation. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013. See esp. 
10  Beer. Popular Culture. 170. 
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Alessandro Delfanti, and Paolo Magaudda evinces a similar problem.11 This 
short introduction is, ostensibly, about how media circulate online. Balbi, 
Delfanti, and Magaudda identify the central role played by circulation in the 
constitution of online cultural production. They also identify the need to 
connect the circulation of media to the infrastructures that make it possible. 
Yet in trying to discuss the circulation of what they call “media content”, they 
end up reaching beyond media itself to talk about the conditions it inhabits: 
not only its infrastructures, but the global circulations of culture or the 
constitution of cultures in circulation.12 In each of these studies, the circulation 
of media merges with its infrastructural conditions. Each produces a picture of 
a whole constituted by the concrete circulations of media, but each is 
remarkable for the absence of a concept of what media are in circulation. Their 
tendency to draw on multiple theoretical and analytical resources to try to 
think circulation is symptomatic of the term’s conceptual underdeterminacy in 
media theory: as theoretical frameworks multiply around it, its commonplace 
status is brought further into relief.  
 
An older media-theoretical usage of circulation that has fallen out of favour, 
but that nevertheless persists in some strains of contemporary media theory, 
recuperates the concrete circulations of media to language. One of the most 
influential examples of this in media theory’s ad hoc canon can be found in 
Stuart Hall’s essay, “Encoding/Decoding." Following Marx, Hall argues that we 
can best apprehend media by analysing the “circuits” they constitute in and 
through their circulation.13 This “structure” of “connected practices” includes 
the “linked but distinctive moments” of the “production, circulation, 
distribution/consumption, [and] reproduction” of media.14 For our purposes, 
                                                        
11  Gabriele Balbi, Alessandro Delfanti, and Paolo Magaudda. “Digital Circulation: Media, 
Materiality, Infrastructures. An Introduction.” TECNOSCIENZA: Italian Journal of Science & 
Technology Studies 7, no. 1 (2016): 7–16. 
12  Balbi, Delfanti, and Magaudda, “Digital Circulation”, 8-9. 
13  Stuart Hall. “Encoding/Decoding,” In Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural 
Studies, 1972-79, edited by Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, and Paul Willis,. 
London and New York: Routledge in association with The Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, 1980. 117. 
14  Hall. “Encoding/Decoding,” 117. 
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what’s noteworthy about Hall’s model is that he uses it to recast media as 
“discursive form[s]”: he argues that the “apparatuses, relations and practices” 
constitutive of media’s circuits produce “symbolic vehicles constituted within 
the rules of “language”."15 Hall uses this model to propose a subtle and useful 
methodology for analysing media. But his adoption of Marx’s insistence on 
thinking processes in all of the stages of their circulation substitutes capital for 
another distributed form, language, which becomes the medium of media’s 
concrete circulations. So, he argues that, “it is in the discursive form that the 
circulation of the product takes place as well as its distribution to different 
audiences."16  
 
We might periodise this piece by arguing that it betrays the influence of then-
prevalent linguistic epistemologies; or, that it pre-dates media theory’s 
contemporary emphasis on the material differences that distinguish media 
types. This recuperation of circulation to language persists today in concepts 
like the “remix”, which treat the media productions of online culture as 
“texts."17 It’s also indicative of another kind of persistent influence—one that’s 
more occluded and that surfaces in our media-theoretical practices, rather than 
our media-theoretical claims. We may no longer posit media as “texts” or reach 
for discourse to explain the medium of media’s concrete circulations. Our 
commonplace invocations of circulation are, nonetheless, still often patterned 
after language. This influence becomes most evident when we equate media’s 
capacity to circulate with their capacity to transform. At these moments, 
there’s a risk that we might inadvertently recapitulate linguistic epistemologies 
by assuming that media are “iterable”, like language;18 or, that they’re 
transformed when we iterate them in new contexts. In these moments, we risk 
treating media like text—and overlooking the occluded computational 
processes that make their circulations possible.  
                                                        
15  Hall. “Encoding/Decoding,” 117. 
16  Hall. “Encoding/Decoding,” 117. 
17  E.g. in Graham Meikle. Social Media: Communication, Sharing and Visibility. New York and 
London: Routledge, 2016. 50. 
18  Jacques Derrida. Limited Inc. Translated by Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman. Evanston, 
Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1988. 
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The final filiation I want to identify invokes circulation to subordinate the 
concrete circulations of media to the cultures that enact them. This filiation is 
most visible in media theory’s less-theoretically-inflected sibling, what I’m 
calling “media studies." Admittedly, these two disciplines are animated by 
disparate and, at times, antagonistic values and epistemological assumptions. 
They nevertheless share two key features: perhaps obviously, both disciplines 
discuss media; and, both disciplines tend to treat circulation as a commonplace. 
Crucially, most of the extant research on internet memes has been produced 
by scholars working in media studies. I want to briefly look at this work to 
illustrate how circulation is most often enlisted in studies of internet memes. 
As we’ll see, this term is usually invoked to valorise the users who produce 
internet memes at the expense of the technical processes that afford their 
production. Curiously, media studies’ commonplace usages of circulation 
betray one further similarity between it and media theory: both tacitly accord it 
an organising role in their respective epistemologies. 
 
This tendency is most clear in Limor Shifman’s influential work on the internet 
meme. Shifman’s work is a border case: it clearly falls within media studies’ 
disciplinary boundaries, yet it offers the earliest and most influential working 
theory of the internet meme. In practice, it theorises. Her theory has three key 
components: in summary, it defines the internet meme as a type of media that 
is collectively produced; that mutates as it’s shared or spread; and that 
circulates.19 What’s noteworthy about this definition is that the first two 
characteristics are underwritten by the third—just not overtly. The internet 
meme can only be produced by more than one user if it’s able to circulate 
between them. It can only mutate as it’s interacted with, copied, reiterated, 
and shared if it’s able to be circulated. Yet Shifman never substantiates how 
circulation ought to be understood.  
 
                                                        
19  Limor Shifman. Memes in Digital Culture. The MIT Press, 2013, 41. 
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Shifman’s commonplace usage of circulation is symptomatic of how the term is 
treated in media studies. It’s clearly influenced by the work of Henry Jenkins. 
In Jenkins’ more recent, collaboratively-written work, he and his co-writers, 
Sam Ford and Joshua Green, posit the concept of “spreadability” to explain 
how media circulate online.20 What’s noteworthy about this concept for us is 
that Jenkins, Ford and Green differentiate between what they call 
“circulation”—or how media is spread by users—and what they call 
“distribution”—or the institutional and infrastructural supports for the 
circulation of media.21 Spreadability—which can be read as a rearticulation of 
the concept Jenkins’ earlier concept of “participatory media”—22accords the 
capacity to produce and circulate media to users. Insofar as memes circulate 
for Shifman, we can say—after Jenkins—that they’re not distributed, but that 
they spread. Shifman’s invocatory recourse to circulation echoes Jenkins and is 
echoed, in turn, by numerous other influential media studies analyses of online 
cultural production in general and internet memes in particular. The work of 
Ryan Milner—whose research on internet memes is almost as influential as 
Shifman’s—adopts Jenkins’ concepts to argue that internet memes are 
exemplary participatory media forms. As he puts it, “the participatory world is 
made—brought into existence and sustained—through messy memetic 
relationships."23 This “world”, moreover, is fashioned by what users do, or 
“through the proliferation of individual decisions."24 In media studies, people 
make media circulate; in circulation, media mediate emergent cultures; and, 
cultures are constituted by the decisions of people. What’s curiously absent 
from this circuit is a clear sense of how media are made to be able to 
circulate—and what media are, in circulation.  
 
                                                        
20  Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford, and Joshua Green. Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning 
in a Networked Culture. NYU press, 2013. 
21  Jenkins, Ford and Green. Spreadable Media. 5-10. 
22  Henry Jenkins. Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide. NYU press, 2006 
23  Ryan M. Milner. The World Made Meme: Public Conversations and Participatory Media. 
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2016. 2. 
24  Milner, The World Made Meme, 38. 
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I don’t mean to introduce these studies, or their governing concepts, to 
critique them—other media theorists have already critiqued Jenkins and his key 
concepts at length.25 What concerns us here is how circulation is enlisted to 
think media in general and the internet meme in particular. In valorising 
participatory communities and media’s capacity to be spread, Shifman, Milner, 
and Jenkins, alongside other media studies scholars working under these 
epistemological premises, delegate the capacity for media to circulate to users. 
In the process, they take the technical processes that enable media’s 
circulations for granted. Yet what’s most striking about their commonplace 
usages of circulation is that they reproduce an epistemological tendency 
evident in the media-theoretical works I’ve just surveyed. In each instance, 
circulation is underdetermined as a concept of media. Yet in each instance, 
circulation is enlisted to play an organising media-theoretical role. In these 
media-theoretical and media studies examples alike, media’s concrete 
circulations are enlisted to recast circulation as a political-economic, 
infrastructural, linguistic, or cultural process. We might think of each of these 
as crucial aspects or effects of circulating media. In the next chapter, I’ll 
contextualise these epistemological filiations and discuss one of them in more 
detail; they are crucial material for the reconstructed concept of circulation I 
want to introduce later. But none of these usages conceptualises the circulation 
of media. Each takes the circulation of media for granted. Each can because 
each takes media’s concrete circulations as already given. 
 
Is the role of media theory to theorise media? After media-historical 
epistemology, it might be more accurate to say that media theory theorises 
media as it’s given. In our postdigital media situation, media circulates in excess. 
It’s easy to recognise these concrete circulations and to use them as material 
for media theory. But as I argued in the previous chapter, it’s less easy to 
recognise the role these media play in establishing the epistemological 
conditions in which we apprehend them as objects of theorisation.  
                                                        
25  See this special issue on the topic in particular: James Hay and Nick Couldry, eds. 
“Rethinking Convergence/culture.” Cultural Studies 25, no. 4-5 (2011). 
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Circulation’s underdeterminacy as media-theoretical concept means that it gets 
taken up as a commonplace, or else filiated to other theoretical frameworks, 
contexts, or objects—here, political-economic; infrastructural; linguistic; and 
cultural. These usages and these filiations overlook how media are given as 
objects of theorisation. Whether it’s invoked as a commonplace or whether it’s 
deliberately subordinated to other processes, circulation doubles. Circulation is 
both as it’s invoked—a term we use to describe or to subordinate media’s 
concrete circulations—and something else. In taking media’s concrete 
circulations as already given, the usages of circulation surveyed here outline 
the conditions in which it supervenes on platforms.  
 
In specifying the platform as the key epistemological influence on our media-
theoretical engagements with media’s concrete online circulations, I don’t 
mean to elevate it to the status of an epistemological condition of possibility 
for thinking circulating online media in the present. Nor do I mean to identify 
the platform as the only computational architecture that puts media in to 
circulation. The platform is crucial to this discussion because it plays a major 
shaping role for contemporary online culture; because it’s crucial to thinking 
the internet meme in circulation; and, most of all, because it captures the 
stakes of thinking media in circulation in our postdigital media situation. Whilst 
focusing on the platform at the expense of other computational architectures 
or processes risks reifying it as online media’s explanatory key, it also 
articulates the broader mediatic context in which media circulate online today. 
I mean this in both concrete and epistemological senses: the platform 
foregrounds the concrete processes by which online media are made available 
as objects of theorisation. It’s important to note that if we were positing a 
concept of circulation that’s supposed to be adequate to another kind of 
media, we might tie it to another kind of process, infrastructure, or even 
institution. My focus on the platform responds to the concrete-epistemological 
specificity of the internet meme and its problem, how we might think media in 
excess of themselves. 
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The question, What are media in circulation?, has to be accompanied by 
another: What are media that can be circulated? Online, the media that we’re 
given in circulating excess are not only technically-produced, they’re processed 
and put in to circulation by computational infrastructures—for the internet 
meme, this means the platform. Platforms’ capacity to put media in to 
circulation is not without agency or mediation. In putting media in to 
circulation, platforms process them; in processing media, they also process 
media theory. By holding media’s concrete circulations to be self-evident, 
these examples of circulation’s usages treat media as media that can be 
circulated; or, after platforms, as “content." “Content” acts as what I want to 




4.2 CONTENT, EPISTEMOLOGICAL FORM 
Content has accrued a series of meanings in discussions of media, but it’s not 
commonly invoked as a formalised media-theoretical concept. Media studies 
scholars often distinguish between “media content” and particular media types. 
Some key media studies methods take “media content” as their object(s) of 
analysis.26 For other media studies scholars, most famously Dallas Smythe, the 
role that the discipline accords to media content is misleading: he argues, 
rather, that media content is offered to audiences to capture their attention, 
because they’re the commodity being bought and sold.27 In broader 
discussions of online cultural production, content takes on another series of 
meanings again. In contemporary academic, technology industry, and popular-
cultural discussions of the internet, digital media, and online culture,28 content 
                                                        
26  For an overview of the term that extends it to analyses of webpage content, see: Susan C. 
Herring “Web Content Analysis: Expanding the Paradigm,” In International Handbook of 
Internet Research, 233–49. Springer, 2009. 
27  Dallas W. Smythe. “Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism.” Canadian Journal of 
Political and Social Theory 1, no. 3 (1977): 1–27. 
28  See, for instance: Bharat Anand. The Content Trap: A Strategist’s Guide to Digital Change. 
Gurgaon, India: Random House Group, 2016. 
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has come to refer to that which is contained by media platforms. Content 
might be digital media: images, text, videos, or advertisements. It could be 
“contingent” products, to recall Poell and Nieborg: streaming TV shows, music, 
clickbait. Digital creative industries are populated by people who labour with 
content: content producers, content moderators, content managers, content 
curators, and so on. Content’s what we purportedly download, interact with, 
edit, share, and, ultimately, consume online. What I want to call content is 
derived from these discussions. In popular parlance and—as we saw earlier—in 
some scholarly analyses, content has become a substitute for media. This 
substitution might seem minor, but it arguably has significant epistemological 
implications for media theory.  
 
Content operates as what I want to call an epistemological form. It’s an 
example of what media-historical epistemology allows us to identify as media 
informing the conditions in which they become objects of theorisation. Online, 
the media that do this are platforms. What we call content is media that’s been 
processed by platforms so that it can be put in to circulation. Like content, the 
platform has a lot of commonplace currency in academic and non-academic 
discussions of digital media and contemporary online culture.29 Like content, 
the platform is also, originally, a tech-industry term.30 Unlike content, it’s a 
well-developed media-theoretical concept that’s become indispensable for 
media-theoretical analyses of the internet and online cultural production. 
Platforms are also, arguably, one of the key constituents of the contemporary 
internet. They organise the relations between the constitutive components of 
online culture, like users, media, data, advertisers, or capital.31 Moreover, they 
structure how these components interact, making them material for the 
creation of social relations, the production of labour, the capture of data, and 
                                                        
29  The best overview of the platform’s semantic richness and its use across multiple domains 
of knowledge is Tarleton Gillespie’s seminal early essay on the term. See: “The Politics of 
‘ ˜platforms’.” New Media & Society 12, no. 3 (2010): 347–64. 
30  For a seminal early technology-industry outline of the term, see: Tim O’Reily. “What is Web 
2.0?” O’Reilly Media (2005): http://www.oreilly.com/pub/a/web2/archive/what-is-web-
20.html. 
31  Paul Langley and Andrew Leyshon. “Platform Capitalism: The Intermediation and 
Capitalisation of Digital Economic Circulation.” Finance and Society 3, no. 1 (2017): 11-31. 
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the expropriation of value.32 Platforms are able to do this because they put 
media into circulation.33 When we take media’s concrete circulations as already 
given, though, we risk allowing platforms to process media theory; or, to 
reproduce the epistemologies that platforms themselves produce in their 
handling of media. That is, we risk tacitly or overtly adopting content’s 
epistemological form. 
 
To understand how platforms exercise this influence over media theory, we 
need to understand how they put media in to circulation in more detail. Anne 
Helmond accords this capacity to what she calls their “programmability."34 
Platforms are designed to exploit the asymmetrical distribution of the means of 
producing and aggregating data.35 To generalise, platforms provide users with 
the means of producing and accessing certain forms of data by providing them 
with the means of inputing information, interacting with other users, uploading, 
editing, creating and/or sharing media media, or responding to other users’ 
posts—amongst numerous other actions. In Helmond’s terminology, platforms 
“decentralise” the means of data production.36 At the same time, they 
“recentralise” the means of collecting, aggregating, and processing the data 
produced by users.37 They then make some of this data available to other 
parties who want to process it further through Application Programming 
Interfaces, which provide varying levels of access to platform data for use in 
                                                        
32  Jean-Christophe Plantin, Carl Lagoze, Paul N. Edwards, and Christian Sandvig. 
“Infrastructure Studies Meet Platform Studies in the Age of Google and Facebook.” New 
Media and Society 20, no. 1 (2018): 293–310. 
33  On this point and on the role of platforms in making labour available to expropriation, see: 
Scott Wark and McKenzie Wark. “Circulation and Its Discontents,” In Post Memes: Seizing 
the Memes of Production, edited by Alfie Brown and Francis Russell, Forthcoming. Santa 
Barbara: punctum books, 2019. 
34  Anne Helmond. “The Platformization of the Web: Making Web Data Platform Ready.” Social 
Media + Society 1, no. 2 (2015). 
35  Langley and Leyshon, “Platform Capitalism." See also: Hector Postigo. “The Socio-Technical 
Architecture of Digital Labor: Converting Play Into Youtube Money.” New Media & Society 
18, no. 2 (2016): 332–49. 
36  Helmond. “The Platformization of the Web." 5. See also: Carolin Gerlitz and Anne Helmond. 
“The Like Economy: Social Buttons and the Data-Intensive Web.” New Media & Society 15, 
no. 8 (2013): 1348–65. 
37  Helmond. “The Platformization of the Web." 5. 
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the production of other applications or services.38 To mediate the production 
and circulation of media, platforms are constituted by what Helmond refers to 
as “modular elements."39 We would recognise these elements as the 
constituents of the interfaces we use to access platforms: as, for instance, their 
“feeds” or as the other compartments that platforms fill with data. These 
compartments are dynamic and they’re populated by what we call content.  
 
For users, the modular elements that constitute platforms’ interfaces are 
where media are accessed online. But platforms process media differently. The 
function of modular elements can be traced to the use of markup languages—
like CSS or Ajax—to split media content from the parameters of their 
presentation in coded environments, like webpages.40 These elements institute 
a distinction between what media are and how they’re supposed to be 
presented in order to facilitate machine-to-machine communication and, so, to 
ease and automate the circulation of media between distinct computational 
environments: as, for instance, when a webpage allows you to share media 
content to social media. As Alan Liu argues, this feature has made online media 
“autonomously mobile”, helping to create the platform-based internet we know 
today.41 But it also has the effect of introducing a specific, intermediary layer 
between media and users.  
 
We could parse this feature by saying that platforms institute these 
parameters to make media circulatable. However, to do so would be to mistake 
media for what platforms present, because the means they use to put media 
into circulation invite the obverse claim: to make media presentable, platforms 
fit media to the parameters of the modular compartments that they occupy.42 
This process of intermediation allows us to draw an epistemological distinction 
                                                        
38  Plantin et. al., “Infrastructure Studies Meet Platform Studies." 303. 
39  Anne Helmond. “The Platformization of the Web." 6. 
40  Jack Jamieson. “Many (to Platform) to Many: Web 2.0 Application Infrastructures.” First 
Monday 21(6) (2016): http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/6792/5522 
41  Alan Liu. “Transcendental Data: Toward a Cultural History and Aesthetics of the New 
Encoded Discourse.” Critical inquiry 31, no. 1 (2004): 57. Emphasis original. 
42  Liu. “Transcendental Data." 59. 
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between what users access as media and what I’m calling content. As Aden 
Evens puts it, the modular compartments that constitute platforms are “neutral 
with respect to content."43 Content can be anything that fits the parameters of 
a given platform. Content is apprehensible, then, neither as thing—media—nor 
as concept. Content can only enter circulation because it’s subject to the 
parameters of a given platform. What we indicate when we invoke “content” is 
not the content of these compartments, but the parameters that allow these 
compartments to be filled. Marshall McLuhan infamously said that “the 
“content” of any medium is always another medium”,44 but the discourse 
surrounding platforms and online cultural production might invite us to 
rephrase this claim: the media of content, it would seem, is simply “content”—
an epistemological form.  
 
Platforms imbricate the technical and the epistemological. Platforms put media 
into circulation by facilitating their presentation. In the process, they enact a 
particular epistemology: the content of content is secondary to the actions and 
relations that can be produced from its production and its circulation. 
Apprehended individually, the reconstitution of particular media instances as 
content by platforms is of little epistemological significance; in the aggregate 
and in circulation, though, it has epistemological consequences for our capacity 
to theorise media in circulation.  
 
 
4.3 MEDIA IN CIRCULATION 
We can identify the epistemological form of content as another filiation. 
Canguilhem conceived of filiations as determinate, historicisable components 
of concepts that explain how they can be “theoretically polyvalent”,45 or how 
they can be informed by different theoretical frameworks, contexts, and 
                                                        
43  Aden Evens. “Dreams of a New Medium.” Fibreculture Journal 14 (2009): online. 
44  Marshall McLuhan. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
Press, 1994. 8. 
45  Georges Canguilhem. A Vital Rationalist: Selected Writings From Georges Canguilhem. New 
York: Zone Books, 2000. 181. 
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objects. The “historical” part of historical epistemology notwithstanding, we 
have to recognise that our contemporary concepts have their filiations, too. 
With the epistemological form of content, I mean to specify a filiation that’s 
produced by platforms and that, in turn, exercises an organising influence on 
media theory: by informing both our concepts of circulation and of media 
themselves. To depart from Canguilhem, this filiation isn’t a historicisable 
residue; it’s reproduced as it’s produced because it’s instituted by a 
computational process that runs. It’s the means by which platforms process 
media theory, transforming the media concept into something that’s 
perpetually updated and refreshed, and so perpetually “contemporary."  
 
Online and after the platform, media circulate in excess. Because circulation is 
underdetermined as a media-theoretical concept, this circulation goes under-
conceptualised. Circulation’s underdeterminacy means that the concept must 
supervene on the platform, the computational architecture that puts media in 
to circulation, because this is the only way that media’s concrete circulations 
could be taken as already given. Platforms are able to exercise an 
epistemological influence over media theory because in taking the concrete 
circulations of media as already given, we take the computational-
infrastructural role in putting media in to circulation for granted. Whether or 
not we identify media as content explicitly, our lack of a media-theoretical 
concept of content generates the same result. Circulation is tacitly accorded an 
organising role in media theory: online and after the platform, media circulate 
in excess—insofar as they’re enacted as content. The problem with the 
epistemological form of content is that it produces a media-theoretical 
tautology. Its conflation of media with content conflates media with the 
parameters which put them in to circulation, effectively assuming that media 
are able to circulate because they’re media that can be circulated. In practice, 
this means that our commonplace invocations of circulation both respond to, 
and yet defer, the problem of how we might think media in excess of 
themselves.  
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The epistemological form of content provides us with a means of further 
substantiating this problem. In the work surveyed above, what links the 
processes invoked to try to think circulation—or, as I argued, to subordinate 
media’s circulations—is that each grasps for an abstraction that might explain 
how media are able to enter circulation at all. Political economy offers the 
analogue of the universal equivalent, money;46 infrastructures lend materiality 
to processes that threaten to recede into stubborn abstraction; linguistic 
epistemologies are predicated on topological relations that smooth over 
intermediations;47 media are melted into the totality of users’ decisions by the 
solvent of participatory culture. What each ends up producing, arguably, is an 
analogue of the media-theoretical concept of convergence. In Friedrich 
Kittler’s phrasing, and as numerous other scholars similarly argue, the advent of 
digitalisation allowed “any medium to be translated into any other."48 Media 
can converge once they can be digitised. By bringing media—that is, the motley 
array of technical apparatuses that constitute the category—together, 
convergence provides the epistemological validation for the gesture that would 
apprehend media in their circulations, because it provides a condition—the 
digital—on which they’re able to supervene. The platform offers a similar 
abstraction. It would even seem to represent the apotheosis of media’s 
convergence: after all, the platform’s parameters are designed to put many 
kinds of media in to circulation. Neither are fit for purpose, because neither 
offers us the epistemological means to think media in circulation. The mutating, 
collectively produced, circulating internet meme isn’t converged; in circulation, 
as I’ve claimed, the internet meme is in perpetual divergence. They circulate; 
more importantly, they are in circulation. The epistemological form of content 
                                                        
46  See also Shaviro, 2002: 284, which uses Kittler’s essay on Dracula from Literature, Media, 
Information Systems to describe “information systems” as universal equivalents. 
47  This is particularly evident in Roland Barthes’ concept of the text. See: Barthes. “Theory of 
the Text,” In Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, edited by Robert Young, Routledge 
& Kegan Paul Boston, 1981; 
48  Friedrich Kittler. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Translated by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and 
Michael Wutz. Stanford University Press, 1999. 2. Convergence is also a key theme in Lev 
Manovich’s seminal work of media theory: The Language of New Media. Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT press, 2001. For a more recent take on the concept, see: Graham Meikle and Sherman 
Young. Media Convergence: Networked Digital Media in Everyday Life. Basingstoke and New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
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doesn’t offer us the theoretical means to credit the distinction between media 
that circulate in excess and media that circulate in excess of themselves.  
 
These reflections allow us to lend a deeper significance to what Helmond calls 
“platformization." For Helmond, platformisation names a process by which 
sociality is increasingly organised by platforms’ programmability. Plantin and his 
co-authors take up this concept to name a process whereby infrastructures 
become platforms and platforms are rendered as globally-significant 
infrastructures. But we can also use this term to identify the influence 
platforms exercise over media theory. Platforms don’t reorganise and 
reprocess an increasingly large number of our cultural, social, economic, 
political, or technical relations without also influencing how we’re able to 
conceptualise them and the processes they make possible. Media theory has 
been platformised, too. Platforms institute the epistemological conditions of 
possibility for media-theoretical discussions of online cultural production. In its 
underdeterminacy, these conditions generate a filiation that informs how we 
think circulation; how we think media that are able to circulate; and, in the end, 
how we think media themselves.  
 
Drawing on media-historical epistemology, these conditions aren’t 
metaphysical or abstract. They’re concrete. In a recent article extending 
Helmond’s concept of platformisation, Adrian Mackenzie argues that this 
concept has to be understood beyond the limits of API-based programmability. 
Because of the scales at which platforms operate, they encounter what 
Mackenzie calls “the problem of the opacity of what takes place on or around 
the platform."49 This opacity is not a part of platforms’ business models, but a 
product of their technical complexity. In response, engineers use artificial 
intelligence and machine learning techniques to try to automate the 
management of platforms’ opacity. For Mackenzie, the increasing use of 
artificial intelligence and forms of machine learning turns the platform into 
                                                        
49  Adrian Mackenzie. “From API to AI: Platforms and Their Opacities.” Information, 
Communication & Society (2018): 2. 
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“experimental system for observing the world and testing how the world 
responds to changes in the platform on many different scales."50 The 
perpetual, semi-automated, and recursive self-refashioning undergone by 
platforms finesses what it means for them to institute the epistemological 
conditions of possibility for our discussions of online cultural production. In 
perpetually refashioning themselves, they remain contemporary; in acting as a 
filiation for the concepts we use to think online cultural production, they 
fashion media theory as “contemporary”, too. This is the other side of the 
contemporaneity I accorded to media-theoretical practices that ignore the role 
that media play in constituting the conditions by which they’re taken as objects 
of theory: online and after platforms, to be contemporary is to risk reproducing 
the epistemologies produced by media themselves—and to ignore the 
capriciousness that characterises their organising opacities, allowing them to 
become blind spots that organise the problems that shape our concepts. 
 
Online and after the platform, then, media have to be thought in circulation. I 
mean this in a more profound sense than I’ve perhaps intimated until this 
point. This chapter has demonstrated how circulation acts as an organising 
concept in media theory by demonstrating the constitutive role it plays in our 
conceptualisations of media themselves. I want to extend this argument 
further. Circulation isn’t a secondary quality of media. Circulation is, arguably, 
fundamental to media theory itself. Media’s concrete circulations validate this 
statement in the present, but I want to extend it beyond our historical-
epistemological juncture. The concrete circulations of media—abetted, in our 
postdigital media situation, by platforms—inform our conceptualisations of 
media. But media-historical epistemology teaches us that this problem is not 
new. It’s an iteration of a recurrent problem: the problem of how we might 
think media in excess of themselves. We not only need to reconstruct the 
concept of circulation; we need to reconstruct it differently and anew.  
 
                                                        
50  Mackenzie. “From API to AI." 15. 
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The work analysed above provides a clue as to how this reconstruction might 
proceed. Each process—political-economic; infrastructural; linguistic; cultural—
attempted to provide a means of accounting for how it is that media circulate. 
Though each example ended up deferring the problem of how we might think 
media in excess of themselves, they nevertheless play an indicative role. They 
identify those aspects of media that can’t be encompassed by the media 
concept; or, they identify moments in which media exceed themselves, but in 
which circulation seems to provide the conceptual means for escaping the 
theoretical impasse that media produce. These examples indicate what 
circulation is invoked to think. So, they indicate what we need to focus on in 
order to reconstruct this concept. The next two chapters will extend the 
analyses presented here by engaging with two of circulation’s recurrent, key 
filiations. They will investigate their continuing influence on media theory by 
probing their governing theoretical frameworks, the historical contexts they 
emerge from, and the influence that the objects they original took continue to 
exercise over their contemporary usages. Separately, each filiation operates in 
markedly different ways. But treated as aspects of a recurrent problem, they 
help us to identify how else we invoke circulation to think media in excess of 
themselves—and why these invocations fall short.
5. OF BODIES, OF BLOOD  
 
 
5.0 DOING THEORY 
A key component of what I’m calling media-historical epistemology is its 
concept of the concept. The method I’ve derived from this framework presents 
concepts as a key site of knowledge production. So far, we’ve used it to 
apprehend concepts as determinate, historicisable things and to treat theory as 
a concrete practice that can be studied. Through circulation, this thesis’s 
theoretical propositions revolve around the concept. Yet whilst concepts are 
essential components of theory, it’s unusual to accord them such a central role 
in theoretical practice.  
 
Contemporary theoretical practice favours the theoretical framework. In the 
wake of the high theory moment—and1 its poststructuralist epistemologies, 
which were united in their variance by the privilege they accorded to 
language—we’ve2 seen the flowering of a number of distinct theoretical 
frameworks across the humanities and social sciences. In lieu of language, 
these frameworks privilege alternate categories: materiality, cognition, the 
posthuman, speculation, objects, affect, and so on.3 But whilst the 
epistemological content of our theoretical frameworks might have changed, 
our theoretical practices have remained more or less the same. To 
conceptualise the objects of our theoretical practices differently, we tend to 
change the theoretical frameworks that govern them: if one doesn’t offer 
                                                        
1  Jane Elliott and Derek Attridge. “Introduction: Theory’s Nine Lives,” In Theory After ‘Theory’, 
edited by Jane Elliott, and Derek Attridge London and New York: Routledge, 2011. 1–16. 
2  For accounts of this shift from theoretical frameworks emphasising language to those 
emphasising other categories, see: Ian James. The New French Philosophy. London: Polity, 
2012; Richard Grusin. “Introduction,” In The Nonhuman Turn, edited by Richard Grusin, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015. vii-xxix. 
3  See, respectively: Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, eds. New Materialisms: Ontology, 
Agency, and Politics Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2010; N. Katherine Hayles. “The 
Cognitive Nonconscious: Enlarging the Mind of the Humanities.” Critical Inquiry 42 (2016): 
783–808; Stefan Herbrechter. Posthumanism: A Critical Analysis. London: Bloomsbury, 
2013; Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman, eds. The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism Melbourne: re. Press, 2011; Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. 
Siegworth, eds. The Affect Theory Reader Durham: Duke University Press, 2010. 
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enough purchase on the present, it can be substituted for another—and a 
given concept will be reformulated accordingly. This theoretical conjuncture 
reflects the contemporary prominence accorded to “ontology." Contemporary 
theory’s less likely to traffic in the proper names of—mostly dead—French or 
German philosophers, as it did at capital-tee theory’s height, than basic 
categories4: matter, the real, the object, the thing, the relation, etcetera. 
Theoretical practice typically treats concepts as hooks on which to hang basic 
ontological categories that, as their basic status suggests, are granted 
explanatory purchase over a wide range of things.  
 
This traffic in theoretical frameworks and basic categories contribute to the 
“contemporary” nature of contemporary theoretical practice, to recall Peter 
Osborne’s term. The alternative I’ve adopted in this thesis uses the concept as 
the fulcrum for a way of doing theory, eschewing “contemporaneity” in favour 
of a concrete mode of epistemology. It changes the relative status of the 
theoretical framework. If we posit the concept at the point of contact between 
theory, context, and object, theoretical frameworks aren’t components that 
can be switched out or discarded, as though to purify concepts of that which 
subordinates and, so, determines them. Concepts can’t be treated as hooks on 
which to hang basic ontological categories. This approach treats concepts as 
subordinate to is their attendant problems. If their problems remain the same, 
what changes over time is not concepts, but the theoretical frameworks that 
concepts take. That is, what changes over time are theoretical frameworks 
themselves. Positing the concept as the focus of our analysis recapitulates the 
theoretical framework as a filiation.  
 
Outside of media theory, circulation is particularly polyvalent: it is 
overdetermined as a general concept. It operates in numerous of disciplinary 
domains across the humanities and social sciences, and beyond; it’s associated 
                                                        
4  Peter Osborne makes this point in “Philosophy After Theory." See also Bryant, Harman, and 
Srnicek’s proclamation that, post-“theory”, “[n]o dominant hero now strides along the 
beach, as the phase of subservient commentary on the history of philosophy seems to have 
ended." “Towards a Speculative Philosophy,” In The Speculative Turn. 1. 
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with a broad range of theoretical frameworks, contexts, and objects; and, 
crucially, it articulates a number of different complementary problems. Because 
circulation is underdetermined as a concept of media, its uses in media-
theoretical practice are often informed by filiations drawn from these other 
disciplinary domains, recapitulating epistemologies that originate elsewhere—
from theoretical frameworks. In this chapter and the one to follow, I want to 
focus on the influence that two key theoretical frameworks continue to 
exercise over our media-theoretical usages of circulation. These filiations 
broadly map on to vitalist or biological and materialist theoretical frameworks, 
respectively: what I want to call the anatomical filiation in this chapter and the 
infrastructural filiation in the next. As with the platform, the influence 
exercised by these filiations doesn’t need to be overt. What I want to establish 
is how these filiations carry the influence of particular theoretical frameworks 
into the present, shaping what it means for media to be in circulation—what it 
means to think media in excess of themselves—today. 
 
This chapter focuses on what might seem to be an incongruous theoretical 
lineage: anatomy. Its argument is that we can trace our present-day concepts 
of circuits and networks to the discovery of the circulation of blood by the 
seventeenth century anatomist William Harvey and the persistent influence of 
anatomical epistemologies. This claim might imply a form of epistemological 
determinacy. But what I want to establish is how the theoretical framework 
that once shaped these concepts persists in some of their epistemological 
mechanisms. We can then trace this particular epistemology from early 
anatomical practices, through concepts of the body politic, money’s currency, 
and the circulation of print media, to concepts—like the network, viral media, 
or the internet meme itself—in use in media theory today. This influence 
operates by tying circulation to a particular epistemological claim. In early 
anatomy, circulation was posited as operating for the sake of the anatomical 
body. Using a media-historical epistemological method, I want to establish how 
this epistemology and the theoretical framework it’s derived from continue to 
operate in the present, through our underdetermined usages of circulation. The 
  132 
net effect of this persistent influence is that usages of circulation that remain 
filiated to the anatomical body end up subordinating media to that in which 
they circulate, as the blood is subordinated to the body in Harvey, inflecting 
media theory with a residual, epistemological form of vitalism. I want to call 
this circulation’s tendency to body media. 
 
This analysis of the anatomical filiation concerns circulation, but it also opens 
up on to another foundational media-theoretical concept: mediation. 
Mediation accounts, in the most basic terms, for what media do. I want to use 
this analysis of the anatomical filiation to show that the question of how media 
in circulation mediate often supervenes on ontological categories: in particular, 
vitality and materiality. When mediation is conceived of as an ontological 
property of the biological or the material, it loses its specificity as a media-
theoretical concept, subordinating the concept of circulation, once more, to its 
theoretical filiations. But this analysis also presents us with another quality of 
media that our reconstructed concept must address. The discovery of the 
circulation of the blood marks the emergence of an epistemology that lets us 
think circuits. We can think these circuits because this filiation posits a—
sometimes tacit, sometimes overt—interchangeability between the vital and 
the mechanical. This interchangeability is problematic; but if we strip the 
anatomical filiation of the residual influence of the anatomical body, we can 
use it as epistemological material. After the anatomical filiation, as we’ll see, we 
might ask, If media don’t circulate for the sake of a body or it’s epistemological 
substitute, what do they circulate for? This question concerns how we think 
circulation both as mediatic process and in its capacity to institute circuits—or 
apprehensible, concrete circulations—that seem to have the capacity to 
overwhelm and envelop us. Later chapters will use this insight as the basis for 
a proposition about circulation: that it can be used to articulate plural media’s 
capacity to generate place. 
 
Media-historical epistemology might seem to introduce another risk in to 
theoretical practice: if epistemology is subject to a recursive relation to its 
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concrete objects, is it not reduced to these objects? We can undo this 
recursion if we treat theoretical frameworks as one kind of epistemological 
material amongst others. The media-historical epistemological approach 
doesn’t circumscribe our capacity to posit new theoretical frameworks, or to 
use alternate theoretical frameworks to think our concepts differently. By 
insisting that media constitute the conditions in which they can be taken as 
objects of theorisation, rather, it insists that the practice of positing theories or 
concepts is also concrete and conditioned. It strips away theoretical practices’ 
contemporaneity, transforming the reconceptualisation of concepts into 
concrete-epistemological acts of reconstruction that posit concepts anew by 
filating them, differently. Media-historical epistemology helps us to find 
operative components of prevailing media-theoretical epistemologies in and at 
work through the concrete objects, processes, and relations in which the 
circulation of media is enacted. Concepts can only be filiated to different 
theoretical frameworks if we understand how their extant filiations inform our 
theoretical practices. Moreover, new theoretical filiations can only be 
introduced to concepts if they’re reconciled with its contexts and objects. In 
practice, this recursion unspools into a concept that’s either adequate to its 
problem—or, it doesn’t. Media-historical epistemology renders the recursive 
relation between concepts and their concrete conditions itself into a concrete 
condition of theoretical practice.  
 
 
5.1 THE ANATOMICAL FILIATION 
In a short section on the concept of circulation in his wide-ranging study of the 
development of the concept of communication, Armand Mattelart notes that, 
 
“…we owe to the discovery of blood circulation the paradigm 
of bodily mechanics, with its law of functional physiological 
necessity from which discourses on communication and 
society would never cease to draw metaphors."5 
 
                                                        
5  Armand Mattelart. The Invention of Communication. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1996. 17. 
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For Matterlart, anatomical practice offers up an analogy—between body and 
what media circulates within—that consistently informs the language we use to 
discuss circulation. As I want to argue, the circulation of the blood operates as 
more than an analogy. It institutes a filiation that continues to inform media-
theoretical practice by patterning what circulates after this filiation’s object: the 
body. We can trace what I’m calling the anatomical filiation to 1628, when the 
English anatomist and physician, William Harvey, published a short book 
detailing the circulation of the blood through the human body.6 The under-
appreciated significance of Harvey’s discovery is too broad and too complex to 
detail in this short treatment.7 To outline the persistent influence of this 
filiation, I will briefly reconstruct the intellectual context for its emergence out 
of anatomical practices.  
 
From roughly the third century up until the turn of the eighteenth, our 
understanding of human anatomy in the west was heavily informed by the 
writings of the Greek physician and philosopher, Galen.8 The historical 
peculiarities of Galen’s long influence are complex; in part, they can be 
explained by the fact that his writings survived—and then, only partially—when 
the documented or inferred writings of other physicians and anatomists did 
not.9 What’s crucial to note is that Galen developed his insights into human 
physiognomy by performing dissections on human bodies and vivisections, or 
live experiments, on animals, whilst new anatomical experiments after Galen 
were hampered by Christian prohibitions on dissecting—or, defiling—the bodies 
                                                        
6  William Harvey. On the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals: A New Edition of William 
Harvey’s Exercitatio Anatomica De Motu Cordis Et Sanguinis in Animalibus. Translated by 
Robert Willis. Eugene, OR: Resource Publications, 2016. 
7  For a popular-scientific overview that’s accessible, if over-dramatised, see: Thomas Wright. 
Circulation: William Harvey’s Revolutionary Idea. London: Chatto & Windus, 2012. 
8  The historical peculiarities of Galen’s long influence are too detailed to go in to here. They 
include the Christian church’s prohibition on dissecting live bodies and the fact that his 
writings survived — and only partially — when the presumed writings of other physicians 
and anatomists did not. See: Andrew Cunningham. The Anatomical Renaissance: The 
Resurrection of the Anatomical Projects of the Ancients. Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1997. esp. 
25-32 
 For an influential study of Harvey’s context and precursors, see: Walter Pagel. New Light on 
William Harvey. Basel: S. Karger, 1976. 
9  Nancy G. Siraisi. Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine: An Introduction to Knowledge and 
Practice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. 3-5. 
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of the dead.10 In 1315, Mondino de Liuzzi—or Mundinus—inaugurated the 
return of the practice in the western world by performing the first church-
sanctioned public dissection of a human body in Bologna.11 These dissections 
did little to advance anatomical knowledge; the dissections themselves would 
be performed by a surgeon, the body’s features would be indicated be an 
"ostensor”, whilst a professor—Mundinius himself—would narrate them from a 
chair situated above, reading from a text containing ancient, often incorrect 
material.12 The field of modern anatomy properly emerged with the 
development of anatomical practices of dissection by the Flemish anatomist, 
Andries van Wesel—or Vesalius—at the University of Padua in the sixteenth 
century.13 Vesalius published a seminal text in 1543, De Humani Corporis 
Fabrica, which successfully made what Benjamin Goldberg describes as a 
“powerful exhortation” for physicians to “begin performing actual anatomies."14 
Harvey’s own anatomical practices emerged in this context: under Galen’s 
continuing influence; after Vesalius’s call for physicians to return to dissection; 
and at a moment when the human body was still being assembled, as an 
abstraction that could generate further knowledge, by anatomy. 
 
Harvey was moved to conduct the dissections and vivisections that would lead 
to the discovery of circulation by first becoming interested in the heart. The 
heart was the one key organ that his teacher at the university at Padua, 
Girolamo Fabrizi d'Acquapendente—or Fabricius, who was himself a student of 
Vesalius—failed to address in his expansive work of anatomy, A Theatre of the 
Whole Animal Fabric.15 Before Harvey, physicians and anatomists didn’t 
conceive of the blood as a substance that circulated through the body. In the 
Galenic conception of the body, the veins and arteries were believed to 
                                                        
10  Cunningham. The Anatomical Renaissance. 42-3. 
11  Luke Wilson. “William Harvey’s Prelectiones: The Performance of the Body in the 
Renaissance Theater of Anatomy.” Representations 17 (1987): 63-4. Wilson also notes that 
this was likely to have been performed on the body of a female criminal. 
12  Cunningham. The Anatomical Renaissance. 44. 
13  Siraisi. Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine. 191-3. 
14  Benjamin Goldberg. “William Harvey on Anatomy and Experience.” Perspectives on Science 
24, no. 3 (2016): 307. 
15  Harvey, On the Motion, 18; Cunningham. The Anatomical Renaissance. 183. 
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contain two substances: both blood and air, which were conceived of as 
carriers of the “vital spirits” and “animal spirits”, respectively.16 Harvey’s first 
innovation was to demonstrate that the arteries and veins were filled by 
“[b]lood and blood alone."17 His second was to overturn the contemporaneous 
misconception that the heart’s diastole—or the moment it becomes 
distended—corresponds to it being empty, whilst its systole—the moment it 
contracts—corresponds to it being full. Some anatomists thought the heart’s 
contraction corresponded to it being full of blood, because it could be felt 
beating against the breast. He argued, rather, that the diastole corresponds to 
the moment that the heart is full of blood, and its contraction, or systole, 
corresponds to the moment that it contracts and forces blood through the left 
ventricle.18 His most crucial innovation was to realise, after observing the 
motions of the heart and arteries, that the contemporaneous belief—that blood 
was produced by the body and expended as it was pumped outward—had to 
be false.  
 
At the time, anatomists believed that the blood was replenished each time the 
body ingested food.19 In a crucial passage, Harvey argued that this couldn’t be 
the case, “unless the blood somehow finds its way from the arteries into the 
veins and returns to the right side of the heart."20 In response, he notes, “I 
began to think whether there might not be a sort of motion in a circle."21 This 
led him to describe its path:  
 
“…the blood, forced by the action of the left ventricle 
into the arteries, was distributed to the whole body and 
its many parts, just as it is sent through the lungs: 
impelled by the right ventricle into the pulmonary 
artery, it then passes through the veins and along the 
                                                        
16  Harvey, On the Motion, . 
17  Harvey, On the Motion, 9. 
18  Harvey, On the Motion, 20-21. 
19  For context, see: Wright. William Harvey. 32; Pagel. New Light. 3. 
20  Harvey, On the Motion, 48. 
21  Harvey, On the Motion, 48. 
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vena cava, and back to the left ventricle in the way 
already indicated."22 
 
This passage outlines Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood. To 
explicate both Harvey’s experiments themselves and their media-historical 
epistemological significance for media theory, however, it’s crucial to note that 
his method doesn’t resemble what we’d think of as modern scientific practice. 
Its practitioners described themselves as “natural philosophers”, and this 
practice was guided as much by the eponymous practices of philosophy as it 
was by newly-developed anatomical techniques.  
 
In following Vesalius’s call to perform anatomies, Harvey performed “ocular 
experiments” on bodies by observing the structures and functions of the dead 
bodies of humans and the live bodies of animals.23 But he did so in line with 
the Aristotelian project, inherited from Fabricius, of explicating the “final 
cause”—the purpose—of the organ under investigation.24 After Fabricius, this 
approach would begin with an historia, or a description of the structure of an 
organ gleaned from conducting multiple anatomies, which would provide 
material for a process of inductive inference whose aim was to discover an 
organ’s final cause:25 neither just what it does or what it’s use is, but to answer 
the question—“For the sake of what?”—within the body considered as a 
whole.26 However, Harvey never established a satisfactory answer to this 
question. The closest he comes to doing so is when he describes the action of 
circulation as renewing the blood’s “natural heat”, turning it into a “kind of 
                                                        
22  Harvey, On the Motion, 48. 
23  Marjorie Grene and David Depew. The Philosophy of Biology: An Episodic History. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 58. 
24  There’s some disagreement in the literature on this point. Roger French, for instance, 
argues that Harvey posits a novel epistemology based on evidence observed with the 
senses. Goldberg argues, contra French, that Harvey should be understood as an 
Aristotelian philosopher who employed sensory techniques. Cunningham, meanwhile, 
places Harvey in an Aristotelian tradition after Fabricius. I’m inclined to agree with 
Goldberg and Cunningham’s interpretation.  
 See: French. William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006; Goldberg.. “William Harvey." 319; Cunningham. The Anatomical Renaissance. 183. 
25  Goldberg. “William Harvey." 314-6. 
26  Cunningham. The Anatomical Renaissance. 40. 
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treasury of life."27 The circulation of the blood can only be understood through 
the action of “its sovereign, the heart”, which Harvey posits as “the foundation 
of life and the source of all action."28 One lesson we might draw from Harvey’s 
Aristotelianism—one that, seemingly, runs counter to the project of this 
analysis—is that concepts developed through historically-distinct 
epistemological frameworks, like his form of natural philosophy, can’t be 
transposed into contemporary epistemological terms. Harvey’s practice 
contributed to modern science, but not in the epistemological terms that 
modern science itself establishes. But it’s precisely this point that’s salient for 
our media-historical epistemological purposes.  
 
Harvey helps us to think circuits. When we think circulation in the way that 
Harvey establishes—or, by tying what circulates to that which it circulates for 
the sake of—we replicate the Aristotelian, vitalist epistemology that informed 
his particular anatomical practice. That is, we replicate an epistemology that 
remains filiated to an anatomical body. It’s this particular epistemology that I 
want to trace through to contemporary media theory. The body animated by 
the circulation of the blood acts as one of the key epistemological templates 
for the circuits articulated by circulating media. Harvey’s natural philosophy is 
also a forerunner to what we’d now refer to as vitalism. Though perhaps not 
aware of the concept’s media-historical epistemological filiations, some media 
theorists explicitly use circulation to accord media in circulation with a vital, 
animating force. After Harvey, this epistemological constellation constitutes 
one of circulation’s major filiations; and, it begins with an anatomical object, the 
body.   
 
To trace this filiation and its effects, though, we have to establish how it’s able 
to jump from taking bodies as its objects to taking media—and, more generally, 
technology—as its objects. Harvey made this discovery on the cusp of the 
emergence of an antagonistic epistemological approach to anatomy: 
                                                        
27  Harvey, On the Motion, 49. 
28  Harvey, On the Motion, 49. 
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mechanism. For mechanists, anatomy isn’t guided by a vital purpose. It’s best 
explained by analogy to machines. Ironically, the concept of circulation gained 
wider acceptance in mechanistic conceptualisations of biology, beginning with 
the work of Harvey’s contemporary and interlocutor, René Descartes. 
Contemporaneous debates between vitalists and mechanists in the wake of 
Harvey’s discovery of circulation established an epistemological antagonism 
that dissolves, over time, into a persistent epistemological interchangeability 
between concepts of the body and concepts of technology that continues to 
influence contemporary media theory. As I want to argue, this 
interchangeability comes with an often-occluded epistemological cost.  
 
 
5.2 HARVEY IN CIRCULATION 
Beyond its scientific significance, the discovery of circulation has 
epistemological implications for our conception of the body. As Andrew 
Cunningham notes, the discoveries enabled by the practice of anatomia, or 
cutting up in to parts, gradually allowed the body to “persist in existence as a 
whole."29 Cunningham argues that each anatomical study constitutes a 
“project” that makes “different bodies visible."30 In his cultural study of torture 
and anatomy, Jonathan Sawday articulates this point in terms that more clearly 
posit anatomy as a concrete-epistemological practice: “as the physical body is 
fragmented”, he argues, “so the body of understanding is held to be shaped 
and formed."31 Each of these analyses of anatomy and Harvey’s discovery treat 
the body as what Rheinberger calls an “epistemic thing”; or an object whose 
concept emerges in and through the material practices that make it 
apprehensible. Beyond anatomy, the decomposition of the body effects the 
recomposition of epistemology. Sawday argues that it is through anatomy that 
we discovered a sense of our own physiological interiority—and, more 
                                                        
29  Cunningham. The Anatomical Renaissance. x. 
30  Cunningham. The Anatomical Renaissance. 7-8. 
31  Jonathan Sawday. The Body Emblazoned. Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance 
Culture. London: Routledge, 1995. 2. 
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generally, of interiority as a property of other things and other systems.32 
Canguilhem articulates the general epistemological import of Harvey’s 
discovery more forcefully again. With it, he claims, “the idea of a closed circuit 
is born."33 
 
After Harvey, circulation entails a circuit, that for the sake of which circulation 
is. For anatomy, this circuit is the vital, active body. Canguilhem notes that 
Harvey’s vital concept of the circulation of the blood displaced an already-
extant concept that had been “imported into biology from the domain of 
human technique”, which conceived of the blood in analogy to agricultural 
“irrigation."34 Circulation had the benefit of allowing each of the anatomical 
processes Harvey observed to “cohere”, as Canguilhem puts it,35 in an 
organism driven by a purpose—to live. But just as circulation displaced one 
technical concept in aid of thinking it through its purpose, it quickly came to be 
absorbed into an altogether different theoretical framework: a mechanistic 
epistemology that posited the body as machine. Ironically, the general uptake 
of Harvey’s concept of the circulation of the blood was made possible by the 
mechanist concept of the body developed by René Descartes in A Discourse on 
Method, published 9 years later.36 For Descartes, circulation becomes a 
mechanical “driving belt” and a system of “regulatory feedback” that is 
“explicable on a purely physical level."37 After Descartes, Harvey’s circulation 
of the blood was understood not in Aristotelian terms—or for the sake of the 
organism as a whole—but in mechanistic terms, as machine. In the context of 
the philosophy of biology, Grene and Depew note that the filtering of 
circulation through mechanism is indicative of a “paradox” in which, 
 
                                                        
32  Sawday. The Body Emblazoned. 6. 
33  Canguilhem,. “Experimentation in Animal Biology,” In Knowledge of Life, 3–22. Fordham 
University Press, 2008. 8. 
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…the reduction of animals to machines clearly facilitated the 
acceptance of a doctrine that had been first put forward in 
what was philosophically a much more conservative, 
fundamentally Aristotelian spirit.38 
 
This distinction between antagonistic epistemologies is a recurrent theme in 
the philosophy of biology, as Grene and Depew map in their work.39 What’s 
crucial to our understanding of the anatomical filiation is that its uptake 
beyond the bounds of this historical epistemological—vital or mechanical—
body converts what’s originally an antagonism into an interchangeability. As 
we’ll see, it also, in some cases, retains its Aristotelian epistemology, construing 
circulation as a process that is for the sake of something else: a body, a circuit.  
 
Canguilhem argues that when Descartes draws upon machines to provide the 
epistemic material for his conceptions, he becomes “a tributary, intellectually 
speaking, of the technical forms of his age."40 For Canguilhem himself, this 
interplay leads him to conclude that machines can be described “neither 
without purpose nor without man."41 That is, it underwrites a vitalism that 
“inscribe[s] the mechanical within the organic” as a phenomenon that can only 
be explained, and conceptualised, through human culture.42 For all that I’ve 
drawn upon Canguilhem in this thesis, I don’t want to ratify this claim itself or 
its attendant vitalist ontology. Instead, what we see in his explication of 
circulation is the emergence of a filiation that allows vital processes to be 
explicated in mechanist terms, and vice versa. We see this at work in Dalia 
Judovitz’s more recent commentary on Harvey’s discovery. Echoing Sawday 
and Canguilhem, Judovitz argues that the discovery of the circulation of the 
blood produced the epistemological justification for conceiving of the body as 
a “system” that, in turn, “defines the self-enclosure of the body."43 This 
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discovery has a double implication: it makes the body a thing that can be 
apprehended apart from the world; but, it also “autonomises” the “logic” of the 
body itself, “enabl[ing] its schematic and figurative representation as a virtual 
ground-plan."44 This commentary is, ostensibly, presented in aid of a critique of 
Descartes’ mechanistic philosophy; Judovitz credits circulation for contributing 
to a “Cartesian model for the human body."45 Yet the terms in which it’s 
conducted traffic heavily in the interchangeability of the vital and mechanical 
that Descartes made possible. When she describes the circulation of the blood 
as having a “network character”,46 her critique unwittingly reproduces 
Descartes’ mechanistic gesture of making the body a “tributary” for the 
technology of her—our—age. This gesture is exemplary. In returning to 
Harvey’s anatomical practices, Judovitz retains the interchangeability between 
the technical and the biological that Descartes set in train. In the process, this 
gesture also reproduces this filiation’s Aristotelian purpose: circulation defines 
the body’s interiority because it construes the body as a “system” for the sake 
of which it is.  
 
As the concept of circulation develops, the anatomical body that it once 
implied falls away. But the influence this anatomical body exercises over 
circulation still persists in the form of a filiation. To substantiate this claim, I 
want to briefly demonstrate how the anatomical concept of circulation 
travelled from Harvey’s practices of dissection and vivisection to media theory, 
via conceptions of the circulation of money, people, goods and, finally, print 
media. When it gets taken up in contemporary media theory, this filiation 
patterns media’s concrete circulations after Harvey’s anatomical circulations—
not by treating media’s circuits as bodies, but by reproducing the 
interchangeability of the technical and biological and by articulating circulation 
within an Aristotelian epistemology. After Harvey, one version of circulation 
construes it as a motive force that animates the body—rather, the circuit—for 
the sake of which it is. 
                                                        
44  Judovitz. The Culture of the Body. 70. 
45  Judovitz. The Culture of the Body. 76. 
  143 
 
 
5.3 BLOOD MONEY CITY NEWS 
If one of Harvey’s contemporaries, Descartes, is responsible for making the 
circulation of the blood palatable by transposing it into a mechanist philosophy, 
another of his contemporaries is responsible for adopting the concept from 
natural philosophy and applying it to another field. That other person is 
Thomas Hobbes, who drew on Harvey’s concept of circulation to formulate his 
political epistemology—setting in train an epistemological journey that we can 
trace through to contemporary media theory. 
 
Hobbes is best known for his political theory, but he also wrote—
unsuccessfully—on anatomy.47 He was both an admirer of Harvey’s work and a 
mechanist critic of Harvey’s natural philosophical epistemology.48 Despite their 
philosophical differences, Hobbes adopted Harvey’s concept of circulation in 
his seminal political writings on sovereignty. In his book on circulation, Harvey 
draws an analogy between the organising role that the heart plays in the 
organism and the role that the sovereign plays for the nation, describing the 
heart as “the sovereign” of the body.49 In the dedicatory proem to his book, he 
extends this analogy to the political realm, declaiming the king as “the heart of 
the republic, the fountain from which all power and all grace flows."50 Hobbes 
translates this analogy into a key epistemological component of his political 
theory by recasting the state as the “body politic."51 Like Harvey’s human body, 
this body politic is sustained and nourished by circulations. Only, the role of 
blood is played by something else: money, which Hobbes refers to as the 
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“Bloud of a Commonwealth."52 This translation is crucial: after Hobbes, this 
idea would eventually gain a much wider currency, extending beyond its 
relationship to a body politic to describe the movements of money, per se.53 In 
a reflection on Harvey’s influence on Hobbes in his early, archaeological work, 
Michel Foucault suggests that this analogy was able to take hold once it 
became “one of the fundamental categories of analysis” within a burgeoning 
mercantile episteme.54 For our purposes, the role that the body plays in 
Hobbes is just as crucial. Leonie Ansems De Vrie and Jorg Spieker make 
Hobbes’ debt to Harvey clear when they argue that his concept of the body 
politic “can be understood best by looking at the workings of the human 
body."55 Despite his mechanism, Hobbes reproduces the Harveian anatomical 
filiation when he adopts Harvey’s concept of circulation, because his body 
politic retains the role as that for the sake of which money circulates.  
 
Hobbes’ use of Harvey demonstrates quite directly how the concept of 
circulation and its final cause—the body—can inform the conceptualisation of 
an entirely other domain—here, the nation. With Hobbes, money doesn’t just 
circulate; it circulates for the sake of a body and, in circulation, it animates that 
body. After Hobbes, this Harveian anatomical filiation would extend beyond 
the anatomical body and its body-political counterpart to other domains. The 
Harveian anatomical concept of circulation was also transposed to conceptions 
of cities. As Richard Sennett notes, Harvey’s circulation directly inspired the 
idea—which persists today—that cities’ passages were as a body’s “arteries and 
veins”, recasting urban planning as a practice of maintaining the circulation of 
goods and people through cities in order to maintain theirs, and cities’, 
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health.56 This usage recasts the city as a body for the sake of which goods and 
people must circulate, constituting it as another kind of interiority. Crucially for 
us, Hobbes’ appropriation of Harvey’s concept of circulation and these broader 
applications cleared the epistemological ground for it to be applied to the 
movements of media.  
 
Early on, circulation gets applied to media in two key ways. First, print media 
were said to circulate from hand to hand; later, following on from this usage, 
newspapers were said to have a circulation. Though these usages are 
commonplace in media theory, neither these usages themselves nor their 
media-historical epistemologies have been satisfactorily addressed in any 
academic studies that I’m aware of. The dictionary definition of circulation 
draws a line from the idea that money circulates to the idea that media 
circulate, ascribing this consonance to money’s capacity, as “specie”, to be 
passed from hand to hand, which was then taken up to describe how letters, 
notes, and later newspapers circulated.57 In his brief discussion of circulation 
after Harvey, Erik Swyngedouw makes the connection between Harvey’s 
concept and media when he argues that circulation “…becomes a dominant 
metaphor after the French Revolution: ideas, newspapers, gossip and—after 
1880—traffic, air, and power “circulate”."58 I want to return to “traffic, air, and 
power” later. For now, I want to note that circulation undergoes a denotative 
mutation as it passes from explaining the movement of blood to the movement 
of money to the movements of print media—and conversation and ideas. As 
with money for Hobbes, this broad adoption of circulation isn’t metaphorical. 
My argument is that it retains an anatomical epistemological filiation to the 
body across these mutations, displacing Harvey’s question—For the sake of 
what?—on to media, transforming circulation’s motive subject from heart to 
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hand or from heart to mouth. This becomes evident if we trace the 
development of the anatomical filiation’s underlying epistemology. 
 
Despite their respective investments in Aristotelianism and mechanism and 
despite the different objects they take as the focus of their analysis, Ansems 
De Vrie and Speiker note that circulation is the “centre of life” for both Harvey 
and Hobbes: in the heart and in the sovereign, respectively, “circulation 
becomes ontological."59 Tim Cresswell explains this ontology through the 
rubric of “mobility." Harvey’s and Hobbes’ conceptualisations of bodies and 
states—and, he adds, Galileo Galilei’s studies of the motion of celestial bodies—
made it possible to conceive of the world as an “infinite, restless entanglement 
of persistent movement."60 We might characterise this ontology by describing 
it as processual, materialist, or vitalist. But what’s noteworthy for us is that this 
ontology expresses an epistemology; what Cresswell refers to as a “single 
logic” that’s able to “jump scales” and that can be adopted to think diverse 
objects and processes.61 If we set the specificities of the imbricated 
philosophical terms governing this discussion aside, what we see is the 
emergence of an epistemology that allows circulation to be abstracted from 
bodies and applied to other processes. The implication of Cresswell’s argument 
is that circulation can be sloughed of its filiation to its original object, the 
anatomical body. Creswell’s argument is indicative for another reason: it 
reproduces the assumption—glossed above—that the concept of circulation 
can be abstracted from its origin in anatomical practice and applied to 
mechanical—or technological—processes.  
 
My media-historical epistemological argument is that this version of circulation 
can never fully expunge the body’s reciprocal shaping influence. One version 
of circulation that’s invoked to describe media’s concrete circulations draws on 
this Harveian anatomical filiation to animate that for the sake of which media 
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circulate—media’s circuits, constituted by this invocation as an interiority. As I 
want to argue, the persistence of this filiation hampers our capacity to think 
media in excess of themselves. 
 
 
5.4 MEDIA’S BODIES 
We can articulate the impact of the Harveian anatomical filiation on 
contemporary media theory by transposing it in to the language of the 
problem. Earlier, I argued that we invoke circulation to think media in excess of 
themselves. When our commonplace usages of circulation remain filiated to a 
Harveian anatomical epistemology, this problem is displaced by the latent 
problem that informs this filiation: the question of what circulation is for the 
sake of. This filiation invests media theory with a residual biologism. It informs 
the claim that print media—particularly newspapers—have a circulation. It 
informs overtly vitalist theories of media. But, it also informs a number of 
correlated media-theoretical concepts that shape, support, and substitute for 
how we think the circulation of media in practice. These concepts include the 
network, flow, viral media, and biopolitics, where each is cast in relation to 
their circuits.  
 
After travelling from Harvey to Hobbes, or from the body to money, circulation 
ends up being adopted to describe the movements of newspapers. Recent 
media-theoretical studies of the medium of print emphasise the materiality of 
media’s concrete circulations. Ted Striphas’s work, for instance, combines 
bibliographic and book history approaches with media theory to address 
circulation as a set of concrete “everyday practices” that can be decomposed 
into constituent techniques, institutions, trades, and production processes.62 
Such usages of circulation correspond to the idea that books are passed from 
hand to hand, but they are relatively new in media studies. Circulation is much 
more commonly associated with print media’s—and in particular, the 
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newspaper’s—role as the industrial age’s most dominant form of “mass 
media."63 Both older and more recent discussions of the newspaper’s role 
allows us to identify the extension of circulation from money to print media as 
more than a semantic mutation. It also, tacitly, reproduces the Harveian 
anatomical filiation. The circulation of print media has long been conceived for 
the sake of something else: an entity that occupies the epistemological role of 
the body in Harvey’s anatomy.  
 
In Swyngedouw’s brief genealogy of circulation, the circulatory movements of 
newspapers are bookended by those of “ideas” and “gossip." The implied 
consonance between these material and immaterial things isn’t accidental: 
newspapers and print media circulate as concrete media, but they also have a 
circulation. This consonance is made most clear in a seminal essay Gabriel 
Tarde wrote a little over a century ago, at the height of the newspaper’s 
industrial-modern ascendancy as mass media. In this essay, Tarde argues that 
the newspaper “will”—the future tense is deliberate—“create an immense, 
abstract, and sovereign crowd, which it will name opinion."64 For Tarde, this 
abstract entity emerges in the newspaper’s fusion of “personal opinions in to 
local opinions, and this into national and world opinion, the grandiose 
unification of the public mind."65 He makes the link between conversation and 
print media explicit when he argues that newspapers will finish “the work that 
conversation began."66 The consonance between ideas, gossip, and print would 
seem to undermine the media-historical epistemological claim that I’m positing. 
The theoretical framework that Tarde adopts here is clearly not natural-
philosophical, nor does he discuss biological entities. The epistemological 
influence that I want to trace to discussions of newspapers and print media 
doesn’t displace or overcode the overt, operative epistemologies that govern 
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particular theoretical engagements. Rather, it informs how they think media in 
circulation. My argument is that Tarde institutes a cause, “opinion”, for the sake 
of which print—and its abstract consonants, ideas and gossip—circulates. 
Sloughed of the concrete anatomical body, this filiation operates by 
substituting the body for something else. 
 
The effects of this occluded epistemological filiation recur in more recent 
media-theoretical examples. One seminal example is Benedict Anderson’s 
concept of “imagined communities." This concept is premised on the idea that 
the “mass ceremony” of reading a daily, wide-circulation newspaper creates an 
“imagined world”—the nation.67 Anderson argues that circulating newspapers 
constitute a nation; reciprocally, the circulation of newspapers is defined by 
the nation, that for the sake of which they are. Similarly, David Crowley and 
Paul Heyer argue that the circulation of “books, journals, and especially forms 
of news” allows what they describe as an “information society” to emerge by 
the end of the eighteenth century.68 In his recent study of the medium of 
paper, Luthar Müller articulates the persistent influence of the anatomical 
filiation on our conceptions of the circulation of newspapers when he notes 
that the “circulation” of the newspaper allowed “newsprint” to be “fed to the 
social organism on a daily basis."69 This articulation exceeds analogy and it 
helps us to see how the anatomical filiation tacitly operates in Anderson and 
Crowley and Heyer. As with Tarde, these uses of circulation are patterned by a 
filiation that recurs in and through their use of this term. Circulation entails a 
body; or, if not a body, an interiority: a state, a nation, a mass, a city—a circuit.   
 
After Harvey, the circulations of blood, money, people, goods, and, eventually, 
print could now be conceived that for the sake of which they circulate. Yet 
what I’m presenting here is not a genealogy of Harvey’s natural philosophical 
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epistemology. Instead, I’m presenting an analysis of the ways in which a 
particular filiation can inflect the conceptual work that circulation does. These 
examples of media-theoretical discussions of the circulation of print don’t 
reproduce Harvey’s epistemologies. They don’t even posit circulation as a 
coherent concept, instead treating it as a commonplace. The media-historical 
epistemological work I’ve presented has allowed us to identify this filiation and 
to outline its effects. If we recall that this filiation is a determinate thing, and if 
we understand that circulation’s underdeterminacy in media theory means that 
its commonplace usages can inadvertently reproduce this and other filiations, 
we can identify its persistent influence on how we think the circulation of 
online media. In some instances, this influence is overt and deliberate; in 
others, it’s tacit or unintentional. In either case, it subsumes media in 
circulation to that for the sake of which they circulate—if not a body, then an 
epistemological substitute.  
 
The most direct example of this influence can be found in Grant Bollmer’s 
recent, explicitly vitalist work. Bollmer shares Cresswell’s gesture of identifying 
Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of the blood as a precursor for his own 
theoretical framework. But where Cresswell’s organising concept is “mobility”, 
Bollmer’s is the network. In a paradigmatic passage, he succinctly translates the 
media-historical epistemological filiation that I outlined above into a 
propositional claim—that networks are as the body’s circulatory systems: 
 
“[w]ith Harvey, the management of the body’s fluids no longer 
possesses the goals of stasis and immobility. Instead, the blood 
must move, flowing and circulating throughout the body. The 
body must move, flowing and circulating throughout the city. 
Capital must circulate. On each and every scale, there must be 
movement through the circulation of flows… Blood, people, and 
capital do not simply flow. They flow through the relatively 
closed structures of networks as they appear to describe the 
veins, arteries, and nerves."70 
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This passage overtly reproduces the anatomical filiation: what circulates, must 
circulate—for the sake of a body or an epistemological substitute. Its scaling 
analogical chains, which shift from blood and body up to capital—and, 
presumably, the world entire—posits the network as that for the sake of which 
media circulate. What’s interesting about it this passage is that by instituting a 
recursion between the body and its “networks” of “veins, arteries, and nerves”, 
it reproduces the mechanist substitution made by Descartes and Judovitz and 
critiqued by Canguilhem. This friction between the biological and the technical 
points to the subsidiary epistemological significance accorded to what actually 
circulates. Under the sign of the anatomical filiation, media’s concrete 
circulations animate a body; but, we get no closer to understanding what 
media are in circulation—as media. 
 
Bollmer’s work usefully draws a line between Harvey and contemporary 
media-theoretical vitalisms. It also clarifies the epistemological influences at 
work in like studies that deploy different theoretical frameworks and 
organising concepts, but that nevertheless invoke circulation to do the same 
kind of conceptual work. This passage from Bollmer draws our attention most 
immediately to a cognate of circulation’s that’s just as widespread, but much 
more clearly determined: “flow." This concept is widespread in contemporary 
media theory and across the humanities and social sciences more generally. 
Curiously, circulation and flow are often treated as though they’re 
interchangeable.71 Flow is in such common usage that we might speculate that 
its theoretical primacy has exacerbated circulation’s underdeterminacy. But 
more so even than circulation, flow is bound up in what Thomas Sutherland 
calls “the metaphysics of flux”, or to variations on the theoretical framework 
introduced by both Cresswell and Bollmer.72 As a cognate of circulation, flow’s 
vagueness reproduces the anatomical filiation in abstract form. This is evident 
in the passage from Bollmer above; here, flow construes media as circulating 
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for the sake of the network. In works like Manuel Castells’ highly-influential 
study of the network society, media’s flows are, similarly, constitutive of the 
network form that reorders global society.73 Flow represents a particularly 
direct reproduction of an epistemological filiation that subsumes media’s 
circulations to what they circulate in—or, to epistemological substitutes for the 
body.  
 
We see a much subtler reproduction of the anatomical filiation in a concept 
that’s in much closer proximity to the internet meme: virality. As a quality, 
virality is much more easily abstracted from media’s concrete circulations, as 
we can see in the work of Anna Munster. Munster’s discussion of viral videos 
draws on a multifaceted theoretical framework informed by Deleuze, Tarde 
and others to try to compass what she describes as a “not quite quantifiable” 
quality that’s “generated when [viral] videos are uploaded and then circulate 
through networks."74 What’s interesting about this treatment is the tacit role 
circulation plays in explaining how this quality can come to be. At times, 
Munster describes this quality as one of a number of “vitalities” on which 
“networks parasitically feed” and which networks must “sustain and nurture."75 
At other times, she draws on Tarde to describe it as “a plastic, dynamic, and 
sticky communicability, a relational force…in which process, movement, and 
circulation take precedence."76 Virality, vitality, communicability, and force 
stand in as cognate epistemological substitutes for a body; or, that for the sake 
of which viral circulations are. By contrast, Sampson’s discussion of virality—
arguably the other major point of reference for this concept in media theory—
doesn’t reproduce this filiation because it adopts in an alternate—but 
nevertheless heterodoxly-vitalist—theoretical framework. Likewise drawing on 
Tarde, Sampson’s characterisation of the intra-bodily space in which virality 
operates as a “continuous, localized, and indirect epidemiological space where 
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social inventions are always in passage, spreading out, contaminating, and 
varying in size”77 explicitly critiques the concept of a “social body”, conceiving 
of media’s propagation using alternate epidemiological epistemology. Neither 
Munster’s nor Sampson’s treatments of virality invoke bodies; but in invoking 
circulation to describe media’s movements, they demonstrate media-
theoretical attempts to body media. In Munster, this attempt reproduces the 
Harveian anatomical filiation at different scales and different levels of 
abstraction. In Sampson, this “body” is constituted by the epidemiological 
space constituted by social relations themselves.  
 
The final example I want to analyse is Tiziana Terranova’s work. Terranova 
draws on Foucault’s later work on biopolitics to recast social networking sites 
as architectures for the control of circulations. Biopolitics is most often 
associated with a collection of lectures entitled The Birth of Biopolitics.78 In 
Security, Territory, Population, the collection that precedes it, Foucault begins to 
articulate his theory of governance via the control of circulations. Foucault 
uses circulation “in the very broad sense” to encompass the “movement, 
exchange, and contact” and the “dispersion” and “distribution”79 of people, 
goods, and things through territories. The emergence of techniques of 
“allowing circulations to take place” whilst nevertheless “controlling them” 
marks a crucial shift from governing territories to governing populations by 
influencing concerns like health, labour, or consumption; or, from paradigms of 
“safety” to “security."80 For us, what’s crucial to note is that in Foucault’s 
discussions, distinct circulations—relating to blood, or health; money, or goods; 
people, or states; and, finally, the spaces they occupy, or cities—converge. In a 
chapter on social media, Terranova explicitly draws on and extends this 
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Foucaldian concept of circulation to conceptualise social media.81 For 
Terranova, the internet operates according to Foucault’s tendency to 
securitise: “it integrates more and more elements that both maximize 
circulation and minimize, without eliminating completely, error or loss."82 Social 
media adds another element to this tendency, what Terranova calls “the social 
relation."83 From within Foucault’s biopolitical conception of governance, social 
media has the role of  “ensuring an overall expansive stability” in the social 
relation by securing “an indefinite homeostasis able to withstand and re-absorb 
the uncertain and aleatory event of social subjectivation."84 In Foucault, the 
distinct, concrete circulations he discusses are arguably subsumed to a motive-
force-cum-epistemological-principle, their abstract governance. Through social 
media, Terranova extends this principle to what she calls the social relation. In 
both, we find a subtle reproduction of the anatomical filiation. What can be 
governed through its circulations is governed as though it’s a body for the sake 
of which distinct circulations are.  
 
 
5.5 BODYING MEDIA 
This section has explicated the development, spread, and influence of 
circulation’s anatomical filiation in order to demonstrate the influence it 
exercises over contemporary media theory. What brings its seemingly-
disparate examples together is that they express a media-theoretical tendency 
to body media. To substantiate this tendency, we need to distinguish between 
a media-historical epistemological approach to theoretical practice, which is 
premised on concepts, and the classificatory schemes that underscore our 
standard approaches to doing theory. 
 
                                                        
81  Tiziana Terranova. “Securing the Social: Foucault and Social Networks,” In Foucault and the 
History of Our Present, edited by Sophie Fuggle, Yari Lanci, and Martina Tazzioli. Springer, 
2015. 114. 
82  Terranova. “Securing the Social." 114. 
83  Terranova. “Securing the Social." 114. 
84  Terranova. “Securing the Social." 124. 
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Standard theoretical practice might categorise the examples analysed above 
according to the differences between their theoretical frameworks, as 
expressed by the concepts or thinkers they adopt. In the work analysed above, 
these concepts include the network, flow, virality, vitality, and biopolitical 
circulation. In media theory more broadly, they include other, prevalent 
concepts, like infrastructure, materiality, archeology, process, the posthuman, 
affect, postphenomenology, and so on. Their thinkers include Harvey, Tarde, 
Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault. At one level of generality, these examples 
express one or both of a pair of prevalent media-theoretical tendencies: they 
employ theoretical frameworks to either materialise media or to link media to 
embodiment. At another level of generality again, we might tie these concepts, 
frameworks, general tendencies to the theoretical paradigms currently 
ascendant across the humanities and social sciences: what’s been variously 
called new materialism, the nonhuman turn, or the speculative turn; or, a mode 
of theoretical practice that combines a renewed interest in realism and 
materialism with the license to once again include ontological speculation in 
theoretical practice.85 Combined, we might typically categorise the examples 
analysed above by saying they express this broader ontological tendency in 
one or both of the more specific, media-theoretical tendencies to materialise 
or embody media—which, themselves, cross over and sometimes merge into 
theoretical frameworks that think materiality as vital and processual and/or 
that think the biological through its materiality.86 What I’m identifying as the 
tendency to body media cuts across this classificatory scheme. This tendency 
operates through the concept—circulation—and in an epistemological register, 
invoking circulation to reorder media theory—and, ultimately, to reduce media 
to ontology. 
 
                                                        
85  Iris Van der Tuin and Rick Dolphijn. New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies. Ann Arbor, 
Mich.: Open Humanities Press, 2012; Richard Grusin, ed. The Nonhuman Turn Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2015; Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman, eds. 
The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism Melbourne: re. Press, 2011. 
86  This is most clearly articulated in the work of Jane Bennett, but it also emerges out of the 
lineage of thinkers—“Democritus-Epicurus-Spinoza-Diderot-Deleuze”—that she claims for 
her own work and that recur as key influences on recent media theory. See: Vibrant Matter: 
A Political Ecology of Things. Duke: Duke University Press, 2009. xiii and passim. 
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I’m claiming that this tendency expressed by the anatomical filiation is 
epistemological, because it doesn’t directly—or, genealogically—reproduce 
Harvey’s natural philosophical theoretical framework. Nor does this filiation 
directly invoke a body or an anatomical practice. It operates by tacitly filiating 
circulation to the epistemological object of Harvey’s anatomical practices: the 
body—or its epistemological substitute—as circumscribed by the role it plays as 
that for the sake of which media circulate. The examples analysed above can 
be corralled into this general tendency, because they take it for granted that 
circulation can be applied to biological and technological domains 
interchangeably. This residual historical-epistemological aspect of the 
anatomical filiation allows circulation to be elevated from the status of 
concrete process—for instance, blood circulates—to the status of a principle. 
This is one cause of circulation’s media-theoretical underdeterminacy. More 
crucially, this gesture inhibits our capacity to think the concrete specificities of 
media’s circulations. In lieu of thinking media in circulation, it invokes 
circulation to subsume media’s circulations to a body, or an epistemological 
substitute—the network, or flows, or virality, or vitality, etcetera—for the sake 
of which they are posited as circulating. The media-historical epistemological 
approach allows us to push this claim further and to cut across the categories 
that standard theoretical practice imposes. When media’s circulations are 
informed by the anatomical filiation, media—not just media in circulation, but 
media themselves—end up subordinated to, and ultimately expressed as, 
constituent parts of these epistemological bodies. In the examples analysed 
above, the clandestine influence of the anatomical filiation leads, through a 
series of subsumptions, to the subordination of the media concept to the 
categories and, finally, to the ontologies that underlie these bodies. This 
filiation recasts the body for the sake of which media circulate as an 
ontological absolute: circulating media become body, reduced to an expression 
of vital and/or processual materiality or to materialised vitality. Media 
themselves recede.  
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We can express the effects of this filiation-cum-tendency in terms of 
circulation’s organising problem: in order to think media in excess of 
themselves, this filiation subsumes their excessive circulations to that which 
circulation is invoked to body—ontology itself. My interest in identifying this 
tendency lies only partly in critiquing it. The effects of the filiation that I’ve 
outlined above might seem simple, or even reductive. Yet as we’ve seen, the 
epistemological residue of the anatomical body precipitates a wide range of 
media-theoretical practices that draw on numerous theoretical approaches and 
take a variety of—overt—objects. It represents one of the major forms of 
conceptual work that circulation does in media theory. Identifying this 
tendency contributes to my two-fold aim: of reconstructing circulation; and, of 
using these reconstructions as epistemological resources to reconstruct the 
concept differently. Moreover, this tendency is noteworthy because it 
exercises an organising influence on media theory akin to that exercised by 
platforms. We’ve seen how invoking circulation to body media subsumes 
media to ontology. I want to extend this analysis to media theory’s other 
foundational concept: mediation. As I want to argue, the task of reconstructing 
circulation necessitates sorting through its distinction from, and tendency to 
overlap with, mediation.   
 
This tactic of taking recourse to ontology to reconceive media as process and 
becoming—or, in the active tense, as mediation—is made clear by Sarah 
Kember and Joanna Zylinska in their work on the vitality of media. Kember and 
Zylinska’s work doesn’t necessarily reproduce the filiation we’ve been 
analysing, because it’s not concerned with circulation. The premise of their 
approach is that “media need to be perceived as…temporary “fixings” of 
technological and other forms of becoming”;87 so, they argue, it’s “impossible 
to speak about media in isolation without considering the process of mediation 
that enables such “fixings."88 Drawing on Henri Bergson’s vitalism—tempered 
by Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive emphasis on “cuts”—they posit both that 
                                                        
87  Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska. Life After New Media: Mediation as a Vital Process. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2012. 21. 
  158 
media need to be apprehended through mediation, and that mediation ought 
to be “seen as another term for “life”, for being-in and emerging-with the 
world."89 What they call “mediation”, then, is at once the process by which 
media are “fixed”, or become, and a more general, vitalist ontological principle 
of becoming. This work is useful, for our purposes, because it helps us to 
understand what’s at stake in the media-theoretical tendency to body media. 
The invocation of circulation serves as a means to subsume media to body. 
Once media is bodied, it becomes something else: an expression of mediation 
rendered ontological by its prevailing theoretical framework. This subsumption 
transforms into another principle—mediation, the process by which discrete 
media come to be.  
 
This filiation doesn’t help us to think media in excess of themselves because it, 
arguably, doesn’t think media at all. I don’t want to end this analysis on a 
wholly critical note, however. For all that I’ve critiqued its subsumption of 
media to body, the anatomical filiation and the tendency that coheres around it 
identifies a crucial characteristic of media in our postdigital media situation: in 
circulation, they do constitute something like bodies or interiorities; that is, 
there is a sense in which media circulate for the sake of—something. What I’m 
calling the anatomical filiation has provided us with an epistemological means 
to identify, circumscribe, and critique the media-theoretical tendency to body 
media. Yet its widespread influence in media theory suggests that this 
characteristic is crucial to thinking media’s online circulations. My contention is 
that this filiation tells us something crucial about media in circulation that we 
need to take account of in our reconstructed concept of circulation. If we’re to 
use this characteristic as a component of a reconstructed concept of 
circulation, we need to return to media its missing middle. To do so, we need 
to make an ontological intervention.  
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My argument is that we need to posit our reconstructed concept of circulation 
using an explicitly-technical ontology. This approach allows us to recast that 
for the sake of which media circulates as something other than an anatomical 
body—or its epistemological substitute. What media circulate for, what they 
are in circulation, and what they do through circulation need not be conceived 
of as properties of absolute ontological categories. They can be conceived of 
as properties of media themselves. To untangle this seemingly-tautological 
proposition, I want to draw on recent philosophies of technology and a strand 
of media theory that conceives of media not just as “middle”, but as “middle 
place”—or, as milieu. What media circulate for the sake of is not a body, or its 
epistemological substitute, but their own capacity to constitute an enveloping, 
technical milieu.  
 
Before proceeding to this reconstruction, however, I want to engage with and 
analyse one more filiation. Neither the platform nor the anatomical filiation 
exhaust the commonplace conceptual work that circulation does for media 
theory. In the next chapter, I want to analyse the role that the concept of 
infrastructure play in our media-theoretical uses of circulation. It’s arguably no 
longer possible to think media’s circulations without making reference to the 
concept of infrastructure. Yet this concept also over-codes our problem, how 
we might think media in excess of themselves, with another: whether or how 
media ought to be materialised. Infrastructure institutes a filiation that persists 
at the level of the epistemologies that order media theory itself, but that 
operates through a basic category: materiality. As I want to argue, thinking 
media in circulation necessitates thinking matter after media themselves. 
 
6. THE INFRASTRUCTURAL TURN 
 
 
6.0 THE FIELD OF ITS OWN REINVENTION 
According to Alexander R. Galloway, media theory is in the midst of an 
“infrastructural turn."1 Infrastructure is a relatively recent concept for the 
humanities and social sciences, having really only come to prominence over 
the past few decades, butt has already established itself as a key media-
theoretical concept. Media theorists use it to analyse media’s large-scale 
effects; to draw our attention to the often-overlooked systems that support 
media; to highlight media’s political, material, or environmental consequences; 
and to formulate new conceptions of how culture is produced and distributed. 
Christian Sandvig goes so far as to claim that the concept of infrastructure is 
“the new “network””; that is, that it’s an “at times inchoate as a concept” that 
holds “many, sometimes inconsistent meanings for different researchers”, but 
that it’s nevertheless “galvanising” a new media-theoretical tendency.2 Crucially 
for us, this concept has also exercised a major shaping influence on what we 
mean when we claim that media circulate. 
 
The concept of infrastructure institutes the final filiation that I want to analyse 
in this series of chapters. I take Galloway’s and Sandvig’s assessments of 
infrastructure’s status in media theory to mean that it has established itself as a 
new organising concept. Media theorists use this concept to make specific 
infrastructures available for study. But, it’s also an agent of a broader, 
discipline-wide epistemological shift. Infrastructure expresses the prevalent 
theoretical tendency in the humanities and social sciences to adopt materialist 
and theoretical frameworks. More importantly, infrastructure has spurred more 
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capacious—distributed and concrete—conceptualisations of media themselves. 
In its underdeterminacy as a media-theoretical concept, circulation has been 
caught up in this re-organising “turn." It’s very difficult to discuss media’s 
concrete circulations without also making reference to the infrastructures that 
make these circulations possible. Moreover, it’s very difficult to invoke 
circulation without drawing on infrastructural epistemologies that help us to 
think media at scale. In media-theoretical analogue to concrete infrastructures, 
the infrastructure concept has established itself as the discipline’s putative 
epistemological skeleton, framing and bolstering commonplace claims that 
media systems are distributed—and that media circulate.  
 
The standard theoretical approach to a tendency like the “infrastructural turn” 
privileges the theoretical framework as the key rubric by which we make sense 
of concepts—and by which we demarcate theory itself as a set of practices. As 
I’ve already claimed, adopting a method derived from media-historical 
epistemology provides us with alternate means for positing concepts. It also 
allows us to question the privilege we accord to the theoretical framework. In 
the last chapter, I argued that treating the theoretical framework as the focus 
of theoretical practices risks allowing concepts to reproduce epistemological 
influences to prior theoretical practices, in the form of filiations. In this chapter, 
I want to explore the higher-order epistemological consequences of this 
approach to theoretical practice by asking how a concept like infrastructure fits 
in to the epistemologies that hold media theory together, as discipline and in 
practice. By privileging the theoretical framework, we treat the discipline as the 
field of its own reinvention: theory’s contemporaneity invests new theoretical 
frameworks with the capacity to renew theoretical practices. The media-
historical epistemological approach I’ve adopted reorders the relationship 
between theory and discipline. Disciplines also have a concrete history. What I 
want to ask is this: How does this history tacitly shape the formulation and use 
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of concepts? What are its effects on the concept that concerns us most—
circulation? 
 
In this chapter, I want to argue that the concept of infrastructure institutes a 
filiation that operates at the level of the discipline itself. It’s not possible to 
think media’s circulations online without taking account of the infrastructures 
that scale these circulations. But it’s also insufficient, because it subsumes 
circulation to an epistemological complex that enlists the term in an altogether 
different problem. The concept of infrastructure institutes a filiation that enlists 
circulation as an expression of the problem of whether or how media ought to 
be materialised, overwriting the problem that concerns us: how we might think 
media in excess of themselves.  This claim isn’t premised on the theoretical 
frameworks we use to conceptualise infrastructure; that is, it’s not premised on 
a claim that this concept is an expression of broader materialist theoretical 
tendencies. The concept of infrastructure is not a materialist concept, per se. 
Many examples of this concept are explicitly posited in opposition to new and 
prior forms of materialism. It’s underwritten by a set of theoretical frameworks 
that are premised on ontological categories—matter, reality, relations, and so 
on—that cut across disciplinary domains of knowledge. But within media 
theory, infrastructure can’t be extricated from prior discussions about media’s 
materiality or immateriality. This is because infrastructure belongs to an 
epistemological lineage of concepts that attempts to materialise media. 
Whether or not a particular concept of infrastructure is materialist, its entry 
into pre-existing disciplinary debates frames it, in partisan terms, around the 
problem of whether or how media ought to be materialised—and informs our 
conception of circulation. Using media-historical epistemology, what I want to 
demonstrate is that disciplines institute filiations that must be acknowledged and 
worked through if we’re to think circulation differently.  
 
To explicate the filiation that infrastructure institutes, I want to link it to a 
salutary moment in media history: the emergence of telegraphy. With 
telegraphy, messages no longer needed to be carried by mail coaches, railways, 
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ships, or people, on foot or on horseback; with telegraphy, or so the official 
narrative goes, media supposedly leaves its material substrate behind. Through 
the influence of a seminal essay on the topic by James W. Carey that seems to 
have found its moment in the wake of the “infrastructural turn”, the 
emergence of telegraphy has become a key touchstone for proponents of 
media-theoretical materialisms—whilst also acting as a representative example 
of a dematerialising media-theoretical epistemology.3 Beyond its avowed 
theoretical commitments, Carey’s essay exemplifies a persistent media-
theoretical-disciplinary epistemology that’s premised on a foundational 
distinction between media and its material substrate, after which media’s 
immateriality or materiality can only be thought in opposition to their 
correlated term. Crucially, this epistemology doesn’t inhere in the theoretical 
frameworks we use to theorise media. In this case, this epistemology and its 
resultant filiation are expressed in practice, as products of the collision between 
the concept of infrastructure and extant disciplinary epistemologies. To 
repurpose a concept of Gilbert Simondon’s, I want to argue that this 
epistemology is “hylomorphic."4 In materialising media, this epistemology isn’t 
materialist. Rather, it subsumes circulation to a—hylomorphic—problem: 
whether or how media might be materialised; which is to say, how we might 
use circulation to think the materiality or immateriality of media in opposition 
to the prior concepts in this chain.  
 
This chapter will analyse this filiation with three aims in mind. First, it will 
establish its epistemological status in order to explicate the influence it 
exercises over circulation—focusing, specifically, on online media. Second, it 
will use this analysis to establish one final characteristic that we need to 
address in our reconstructed concept of circulation. If infrastructures institute 
a new media-theoretical epistemology that allows us to account for media’s 
concrete circulations at scale, a reconstructed concept of circulation must, 
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arguably, incorporate this new epistemology in order to be able to apprehend 
media’s concrete online circulations—and, to conceptualise media in excess of 
themselves. Third, I want to use this media-historical epistemological analysis 
of infrastructure to explicate and to critique the more general epistemological 
role that materiality plays in media theory. As per the discussions of media-
historical epistemology in Chapter 3, what follows will mix techniques of 
reviewing literature with techniques of analysing theory to produce 
epistemological material for further conceptual work. Starting with studies of 
infrastructure, it will move through analyses of Carey’s telegraph essay, 
discussions of hylomorphism, and outlines of media materialisms.  
 
The engagements in this chapter will provide the epistemological material for a 
key component of the reconstructed concept of circulation I want to present 
in the following one. Repurposing infrastructure to reconstruct the concept of 
circulation necessitates asking concrete media-historical epistemological 
questions. How does the filiation this concept institutes inform our 
commonplace usages of circulation? How might we identify and, so, avoid the 
higher-order disciplinary epistemologies that inform our media-theoretical 
practices? What would it mean for infrastructure to be for circulation, rather 
than one of its—materialist—predicates? Most crucially, my claim is that we 
need to ask questions that are much more abstract, but that have significant 
effects on our concrete media-theoretical practices: What is materiality—as 
framework, concept, category—for media theory? What is matter for media? 
The claim I want to make on the basis of the analysis in this chapter is this: if 
we want to think media in circulation, we have to think matter after media. If 
we are able to posit matter after media, its hylomorphism can be conceived of 
differently. We can treat it as a product of media that is at once concrete and 
epistemological; or, as a means that media themselves institute for 
distinguishing and positing distinctions and, so, for mediating the reality of 
matter for us.  
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After all, what would a materialism adequate to the circulation of media be if 




6.1 AN INFRASTRUCTURE OF WHAT? SOME PRELIMINARIES 
Before preceding with an analysis of the concept of infrastructure, we have to 
establish some media-historical epistemological preliminaries. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the primary infrastructure that concerns media theorists is the 
internet. This is also the primary infrastructure that concerns us. Media 
theorists use the concept of infrastructure to identify and apprehend those 
qualities of the internet—its scale, distribution, complexity, and its occluded 
consequences—that are otherwise belied by its everyday uses. At the same 
time, these very qualities make the internet a difficult object to apprehend as 
an infrastructure. The internet is not a thing, but many. “Internet” is shorthand 
for “inter-network”, referring to the internet’s status as a “network of 
networks”, or a network that connects a multitude of disparate, “Local Area 
Networks." Media-theoretical studies that conceptualise the internet as an 
infrastructure reflect this complexity—and would seem to contradict my claim 
that infrastructure belongs to an epistemological lineage of concepts that 
materialise media. To pursue this analysis further, we first need to disengage 
the concept of infrastructure from the usual categories that we’d employ to 
frame and categorise its permutations: the objects it takes; the discipline it 
belongs to; the theoretical frameworks that govern it. Or: what I’m calling the 
higher-order epistemologies that we use to organise the “infrastructural turn” 
and the discipline of media theory itself.  
 
Media theorists that posit the internet as an infrastructure adopt a range of 
approaches that stretch the concept across scales and epistemological 
registers. Some media theorists focus on components that better reflect what 
we typically mean when we use infrastructure as a commonplace term. As 
  166 
Susan Leigh Star notes in a seminal early essay on infrastructure, we typically 
use this term to refer to any “system of substrates—railroad lines, pipes and 
plumbing, electrical power plants, and wires” that are “part of the background 
for other kinds of work."5 In this vein, some scholars treat the internet’s 
physical substrates as its infrastructural components, applying the concept to 
the undersea cables that, quite literally, substantiate the internet; or, to the 
data centres that store this data and facilitate massively-distributed online 
services.6 A related approach focuses on the internet’s physical infrastructures 
to outline the unwanted and often-overlooked products and consequences of 
its infrastructures—like waste, pollution, extraction, exploitation, and the 
entrenchment of inequality.7 For these theorists, infrastructures are in space, 
howsoever that might be—theoretically—parsed. 
 
For other media theorists, the internet’s status as a “network of networks” 
introduces other—computational—components that can be identified as its 
infrastructures. Some scholars focus on protocols, or the globally-negotiated 
and standardised codes that govern internet-facilitated inter-networking.8 Yet 
others treat the software and services it distributes as its infrastructures, 
because they constitute the interfaces we use to access the internet and 
because they exert a significant influence on everyday practices, spanning both 
online cultural production and the “grey media”—like organisational software—
that enable contemporary forms of organised labour.9 Some scholars identify 
the internet’s computational architectures as its key infrastructures. As noted 
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earlier, Jean-Christophe Plantin and his co-authors argue that platforms 
constitute a key contemporary infrastructure, proposing that their 
programmability has an iterative shaping effect on the internet’s very 
organisation.10 Others identify the computational form known as “the stack” as 
the internet’s key infrastructure. The stack is a model for the inter-related 
hierarchy of layers that govern inter-networked communication, offering a 
heuristic for the movement of data through its components.11 But it’s also 
realised by the protocols and the programmes that enact both the internet 
itself and software more generally.12 By articulating inter-networking, these 
theorists argue, the stack articulates the internet itself. In his recent work, 
Benjamin H. Bratton adopts the stack as a concept that expresses the 
internet’s facilitation of what he calls “planetary scale” computational 
processing, whose global effects rival those of the nation-state or the 
market.13 In Bratton, these tendencies—loosely, focusing on physical or 
computational infrastructures, respectively—converge: the hard distinctions we 
might draw between them look less certain at planetary scale and in their 
scaling from micro-scale process to global-scale effect.  
 
This brief overview prompts a few observations. First, the objects that media 
theorists take as the internet’s infrastructure vary wildly in kind and, more 
importantly, in scale. Some of these objects are mutually-exclusive, but others 
articulate different aspects of the massively-distributed internet and its multi-
scalar operations. In lieu of identifying the internet—or some component of it, 
taken as an object—as an infrastructure, it’s perhaps more appropriate to refer 
to these components as different infrastructural aspects of its complex whole 
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in order to retain this sense of scale-dependency and the internet’s 
hierarchical, layer-based organisation. Second, as Sandvig argues in his useful 
discussion of how the internet has been conceptualised as an infrastructure, 
the infrastructure concept is enmeshed in a “multi-disciplinary body of 
scholarship."14 The internet exceeds usual disciplinary domains of knowledge, 
opening media theory out into adjacent fields to deal with the internet’s global, 
local, and/or geo- politics; its social or geographical impacts; its technical 
complexity; its institutions; its cultures and the cultures it facilitates; and so on. 
We might recapitulate this in one of two ways. To substitute Sandvig’s term 
for the cognate I’ve been using, media-theoretical studies of the internet’s 
infrastructural effects tend to be interdisciplinary, tending to implicate multiple 
disciplinary domains of knowledge. Or, to frame these studies differently, 
infrastructure is a trans-disciplinary concept that cuts across disciplinary 
boundaries. We might articulate this another way again: infrastructure is 
interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary, at the different epistemological levels at 
which we might order scholarly knowledge production. Finally—and most 
crucially for the purposes of my argument—concepts of infrastructure are not 
easily circumscribed according to the particular theoretical frameworks that we 
use to posit them.  
 
And yet, the standard approach to articulating the emergence and impact of a 
media-theoretical tendency like the “infrastructural turn” is to try to parse it 
using the theoretical framework as a higher-order organising epistemology. To 
try to make sense of the profusion of concepts that constitutes the 
“infrastructural turn”, Sandvig divides this tendency into two major schools of 
thought. The first of these schools is characterised by its use of overtly-
materialist theoretical frameworks to conceptualise the internet’s 
infrastructures: the approaches that constitute it explicitly claim that these 
infrastructures are the matter of the internet.15 The second, which Sandvig 
describes as “relationalist”, uses the concept of infrastructure to “materialize 
                                                        
14  Sandvig. “The Internet as Infrastructure." 91. 
15  Sandvig. “The Internet as Infrastructure." 100. 
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the ephemera of [the] norms and organizations” in which the internet’s 
enmeshed.16 The division Sandvig posits provides us with a useful baseline, 
because it ascribes two further distinctions to these schools. First, Sandvig 
argues that they correspond to two distinct disciplines: that the materialist 
school corresponds to media theoretical concepts of infrastructure; the 
relationalist, to science and technology studies concepts. Second, Sandvig 
suggests that the materialism-relationalism distinction reflects emergent 
divisions within contemporary theory more broadly. So, media-theoretical 
concepts of infrastructure are representative of new—ontological—
materialisms that have displaced older, dialectical materialisms within media 
theory; whilst science and technology studies concepts adopt realist 
theoretical frameworks that are premised on relations rather than ontological-
materialist claims. What Sandvig presents, then, is a higher-order epistemology 
that categorises concepts of infrastructure according to theoretical 
frameworks they adopt and the general theoretical tendencies that they 
express in turn.  
 
In one sense, these divisions are arbitrary. Rather than critiquing them, the 
more pertinent question we might ask is, Why adopt them? Sandvig’s overview 
is strategic. As with most divisions, those that Sandvig adopts are loose at best. 
But that’s the point this kind of theoretical overview: it draws tendencies out 
of a confusing profusion of concepts to both make these tendencies manifest 
and to spur further conceptualisation and analysis. These ordering 
epistemologies make our theoretical practices available for critique and for use. 
Rather than critiquing these divisions, then, the pertinent question we might 
ask is, What are they for? These epistemologies arguably typify the methods we 
often use to carve up and categorise theoretical practices. In claiming that this 
kind of higher-order organising epistemology is conventional, the point I want 
to make is that the shape they give to our theoretical practices shapes the 
kinds of conceptual work we can do with theory in turn. At the point at which 
theory makes contact with media, these divisions directly inform what theory is 
                                                        
16  Sandvig. “The Internet as Infrastructure." 100. 
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for by shaping what it can be for. When we ask higher-order questions of 
theory, though, these divisions shape the kinds of questions we can ask of 
theory itself. By privileging the theoretical framework as the key category we 
use to order our theoretical practices, these divisions impose it as the standard 
frame for epistemological analyses of media theory itself, in practice. Without 
identifying or questioning this higher-order epistemology, it’s difficult to 
extricate these epistemological analyses from the categories they privilege: in 
my brief analysis above, the objects concepts like infrastructure take; for 
Sandvig, the theoretical frameworks that inform concepts, the broader 
theoretical tendencies they express, or the disciplines in which they can be 
located.  
 
It follows that my—media-historical epistemological—claim that concepts of 
infrastructure belong to an epistemological lineage of concepts that attempt to 
materialise media would typically be read as a claim that all media-theoretical 
concepts of infrastructure are premised on materialist theoretical frameworks, 
regardless of the objects they take. The implication would be that they also 
express broader, materialist theoretical tendencies. This is, in fact, the claim 
that Sandvig makes. And yet, the range of objects this concept takes and the 
interdisciplinary domains of knowledge that it engages eschew easy 
correlations between theoretical framework, discipline, and general theoretical 
tendency. If these concepts aren’t easily circumscribed according to the 
theoretical frameworks they adopt, it follows that the concept of infrastructure 
resists being characterised as materialist, tout court. But we can look at this 
problem in another way. The concept of infrastructure resists being 
characterised as materialist, tout court, if we adopt the theoretical framework 
as the key higher-order epistemological category by which such a claim could 
be made. If the internet can’t be conceptualised as an infrastructure, if the 
concept of infrastructure isn’t circumscribable within a discipline, and if 
conceptualisations of infrastructure don’t adopt particular theoretical 
infrastructures; if, that is, the concept of infrastructure eschews typical, higher-
order epistemological forms of categorising media-theoretical practices, then 
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my claim that this concept materialises media operates in a different higher-
order epistemological register altogether.  
 
With the concept of infrastructure, what I want to identify is a media-
theoretical epistemology that’s expressed in the relationship between our 
media-theoretical practices and the discipline of media theory itself—where 
this discipline is understood as a collection of media-theoretical practices. Put 
otherwise: rather than seeing the discipline of media theory as frame we use to 
order practices according to the theoretical frameworks they adopt, I want to 
posit it, in media-historical epistemological terms, as both ordering category 
and concrete collection of practices. Within disciplines, other kinds of 
epistemologies take hold and develop, in practice. My claim that concepts of 
infrastructure materialise media expresses a concrete-disciplinary epistemology 
that’s neither reducible to the theoretical framework, nor able to be 
demarcated using materialist ontologies.  
 
To make this epistemology available for media-historical epistemological 
analysis, I want to adopt a different higher-order distinction: between concepts 
that overtly valorise materiality and those that have a more uneasy or overtly-
critical relationship to materiality. This distinction is premised not on a 
particular theoretical framework, but on a much broader—and strategically-
looser—organising frame: the category of materiality. To recall a discussion 
from an earlier chapter on historical epistemology, this distinction isn’t a priori, 
or ontological; that is, it doesn’t treat the category of materiality as that upon 
which concepts of infrastructure supervene. Instead, I want to identify how 
disciplinary debates frame materiality as a constituent component of media, of 
media infrastructures, and—most crucially—of media in circulation, situating the 
concept of infrastructure within an already-established media-theoretical 
epistemology that shapes this concept’s relationship to materiality. This 
epistemology locks the media-theoretical work we do with materiality in to a 
pre-formed distinction: for or against materiality. It tacitly posits this category 
as the epistemological basis on which infrastructure can be conceptualised at 
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all. Moreover, it operates in spite of the overtly-anti-hylomorphic theoretical 
frameworks that many concepts of infrastructure adopt. So in practice and, we 
might say, a posteriori, concepts of infrastructure end up materialising media. 
This is what I’m calling the infrastructural filiation. 
 
This alternate, disciplinary epistemology has its own lineage. This lineage 
expresses a different sort of temporality to that normally accorded to the 
theoretical framework—one that’s also characterised by the emergence of 
novel, epistemological claims which inform burgeoning practices, but which 
also shade into the disciplinary background and become commonplaces. As 
commonplaces, or as what Lorraine Daston identifies as that which becomes 
self-evident, these claims become the epistemological skein that holds 
disciplines together. We might invoke a novel theoretical framework to 
formulate a novel media-theoretical practice, treating the discipline as the field 
of its own reinvention; but this gesture is always tempered by another: the 
gesture that recalls the media-theoretical practices that came before and that 
constitute that which lends the new theoretical framework its novelty. It’s in 
this second gesture that we find the ordering epistemology that I want to 
analyse—the one that materialises media, in spite of the theoretical frameworks 
we might care to invoke. Media theorists are no doubt aware of the 
disciplining gestures they make when they introduce new theories. My claim is 
that they hold more epistemological weight than we might normally admit. We 
can use these gestures as the basis of a media-historical epistemological 




6.2 INFRASTRUCTURE MATTERS 
Media-theoretical concepts of infrastructure fall quite neatly into the 
distinction I’ve posited between those that valorise materiality and those that 
don’t. In part, this reflects the looseness of this distinction, which deliberately 
avoids presenting materiality in any particularly-partisan theoretical frame. In 
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part, it also reflects the looseness with which materiality is used as a category 
by media theorists. Media theorists aren’t philosophers; the uses to which 
materiality is put by media theorists aren’t always informed by the kind of 
epistemological precision or the ontological specificity that we might associate 
with the broader theoretical trends they express. Adopting an epistemological 
method that privileges precision as the criterion by which we might categorise 
and/or judge these uses is counter-productive, because it’s in their looseness 
that the filiation we want to identify takes root—and that media-theoretical 
practices cut the epistemological furrows that give sense and context to trans-
disciplinary categories, like materiality, when they’re introduced in to media 
theory. To draw out this metaphor a little more, these kinds of epistemological 
furrows turn what seem like hard distinctions into cleavages, connecting what 
they divide. In disciplinary context, concepts of infrastructure are for or against 
materiality because materiality already means something specific to media 
theory. In disciplinary context, we’re positioned on one side of an extant 
epistemology rather than, and in contradistinction to, another. To show what 
this means in practice, I want to address concepts of infrastructure that fall on 
either side of this distinction. 
 
In the introduction to their collection of essays surveying the applications of 
the infrastructure concept to media, Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski noted a 
series of themes that define the media-theoretical “infrastructural turn." One 
of these—conceptualising and analysing what they call “the materialities of 
media distribution—17neatly summaries the motivating interest of those 
concepts that valorise infrastructures’ materiality. One particularly-influential 
tranche of these focuses on what we could think of as the internet’s physical 
components. A representative example—which is also, perhaps, the most 
influential—is Starosielski’s personal research of the trans-oceanic cable 
networks that, quite literally, network the internet. Starosielski’s study of these 
infrastructures articulates the internet’s large-scale, geopolitical effects on the 
                                                        
17  Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski. “Introduction,” In Signal Traffic: Critical Studies of Media 
Infrastructures, edited by Lisa Parks, and Nicole Starosielski. University of Illinois Press, 
2015. 5, emphasis removed. 
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nations that it passes through. For our media-historical epistemological 
purposes, what’s particularly noteworthy about Starosielski’s study is that it 
argues that these undersea cables manifest “the physicality of the virtual."18 
Another is Robert Sumrell and Kazys Varnelis’s analysis of the One Wilshire 
data centre in downtown Los Angeles. In this study, Sumrell and Varnelis adopt 
a similar theoretical framework to emphasise the foundational importance of 
the hubs that store, switch, and send the data that constitutes the internet’s 
traffic. For Sumrell and Varnelis, data centres “undermine the concept of an 
autonomous virtual reality, revealing instead the simultaneous importance and 
abandonment of the physical world."19 Work by scholars like Mél Hogan takes 
this focus on the physical even further. In a study of high-security data centres 
located in desert locations, Hogan adopts a new materialist theoretical 
approach to argue that these complexes are deeply enmeshed in their local 
environments, because they require a large amount of water to operate.20 For 
Hogan, water is a literal material constituent of data’s flows, providing a means 
to environmentalise the internet and to expose it to political-environmental 
critique and activism. Starosielski, Sumrell and Varnelis and Hogan represent a 
use of the concept of infrastructure that analyses the objects or sites that, 
quite literally, materialise the internet. They’re representative of a major theme 
of the “infrastructural turn”: to draw our attention to the systems and services 
that make inter-networking possible, thereby making them both apprehensible 
and available for study and critique.  
 
If these approaches use the infrastructure concept to physicalise the internet 
and, so, to highlight the large scale material effects created by piping, routing, 
and powering its operations, another set of approaches focuses on this scale’s 
other extreme by using the infrastructure concept to posit the materiality of 
data. For Paul Dourish, “the brute infrastructural materialities that we 
encounter in places like One Wilshire” have a complement in the protocols 
                                                        
18  Starosielski. The Undersea Network. 15. 
19  Sumrell and Varnelis. Blue Monday. 66. 
20  Mél Hogan. “Data Flows and Water Woes: The Utah Data Centre." Big Data & Society July-
December (2015): 1–12. 
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that “route” data, or that transmit it to and from such centres—and through the 
internet in general.21 Drawing on and extending Alexander R. Galloway’s 
concept of “protocol”,22 Dourish argues that the physical properties of cables, 
the effects of signal degradation, and the capacity constraints of routing itself 
constitute the routing of data as a material process.23 By adopting a materialist 
approach, Dourish shows how the wide distribution of a seemingly small-scale 
object—data—generates large-scale politics. Even something as innocuous as 
assigning IP addresses—the numerical codes that allow inter-networked data to 
find its destinations—is caught up in institutional politics that reflect global 
inequalities.24 Where Dourish focuses on how data is routed, Jean-François 
Blanchette’s influential work on bits—the basic computational unit of 
information, expressed as either a 0 or a 1 in binary code—adopts a small-scale 
object to argue that it’s profoundly shaped by its—infrastructural—materiality. 
For Blanchette, computational infrastructures might be “precisely tasked with 
relieving users from the specific constraints of the material resources of 
computation”; but “this abstraction from the material can never fully 
succeed."25 This claim is predicated on another: that bits are never just 
abstractions: they must be understood as “physical quantities”—fundamentally, 
“magnetic polarities, electrical voltages, or radio waves”—that are “abstracted 
as bits” by computational processes.26 This conceptualisation leads Blanchette 
to claim that computational infrastructures “are suffused through and through 
with the constraints of their materiality."27 We can read these smaller-scale 
approaches as friendly correctives to the approaches adopted by scholars like 
Starosielski and Sumrell and Varnelis: the material implications of the internet 
and of computation, they argue, aren’t just to be found at scale, because 
                                                        
21  Dourish. “Protocols, Packets, and Proximity." 184. 
22  See: Galloway. Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization. Cambridge, Mass.: The 
MIT Press, 2004. 
23  Dourish. “Protocols, Packets, and Proximity." 197. 
24  Dourish. “Protocols, Packets, and Proximity." 197. 
25  Jean Blanchette. “A Material History of Bits." Journal of the American Society for Information 
Science and Technology 62, no. 6 (2011): 1043. 
26  Blanchette. “A Material History of Bits." 1055. 
27  Blanchette. “A Material History of Bits." 1043. 
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they’re premised on infrastructural technologies—routing; bits—that allow them 
to scale in the first place. 
 
Each of these influential conceptualisations of the internet as a kind of 
infrastructure is posited as a means of opening media theory up to some 
broader process or analytical frame—whether it be political, institutional, or 
technical. For each, though, the act of positing the materiality of infrastructure 
draws its value, in part, from the act of positing the materiality of infrastructure 
in contradistinction to what this category negates. Before media theorists were 
extolling the internet’s materiality, a lot of pixels were spilled extolling its 
immateriality—through concepts like “the virtual." Many concepts of 
infrastructure explicitly critique this once-prevalent category. But what’s 
noteworthy about this gesture is not this critique itself. My claim is that this 
framing disciplinary context establishes an epistemology that has the force of a 
filiation. In theory, these materialist concepts of infrastructure push against the 
idea that media is immaterial. But in practice, they introduce a higher-order 
identity with the category that they nominally oppose. As I want to argue, the 
categories they negate—the virtual, immateriality—are less opposites than the 
obverse side of a persistent epistemology. 
 
At its most extreme, the concept of the virtual opposed digital media to its 
material substrate. In his study of this concept, Rob Shields notes that what he 
calls the “first-generation theorists” of the internet promulgated this idea by 
mapping “the virtuality of digital communications media on to a dichotomy of 
spirit and matter, with matter fixed firmly in the familiar world of the body."28 
Matthew Fuller’s overview of the field of software studies is also indicative: he 
notes how its approaches emerged “from a background of bemused frustration 
at the ways in which “high level” media theory would tend toward subsumptive 
generalisation about the “virtual”, or about “cyberspace.""29 Pierre Lévy’s 
                                                        
28  Rob Shields. The Virtual. London: Routledge, 2005. 78. 
29  Matthew Fuller. “Software Studies Methods,” In The Routledge Companion to Media Studies 
and Digital Humanities, edited by Jentery Sayers, 250–57. New York and London: 
Routledge, 2018. 250. 
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influential, pre-millennial work on virtuality fits in to this lineage. Drawing on 
Gilles Deleuze, Lévy complexifies the distinction between virtual and actual—
where actual is treated, here, as a cognate for material or concrete—by 
reframing the virtual as a process—“virtualisation."30 This process, he claims, is 
best understood as a “mode of being” which always inflects our relationship to 
the actual;31 only, what’s different about his contemporary moment—the 
moment in which he was writing, 1998—was that “[t]he speed and force of 
contemporary virtualisation are so great that they exile beings and their 
attendant knowledge, alienate them from their identity, skills, and homeland."32 
In practice, Lévy exemplifies the valorisation of virtuality at scale, positing it as 
an emergent category that liquidates materiality even as it liquidates 
subjectivity. Jean Baudrillard’s once-influential work on simulation is also a key 
part of this concept’s theoretical backdrop.33 What these specific instances 
point to is that around two decades ago, virtuality and immateriality once 
attained the status of commonplaces in media theory and in related, more 
populist discussions.  
 
To recall Daston’s formulation again, commonplaces are terms that become 
self-evident. The materialising epistemology I’m attempting to identify persists 
in this epistemological register, or in the reciprocal proliferation and withering 
of disciplinary commonplaces that shapes what we mean by “materiality” in 
contemporary media theory. Starosielski and Sumrell and Varnelis push back 
against the looser, yet more widespread use of the term “virtuality” when they 
claim, respectively, that undersea cables and data centres materialise the 
virtual. This claim still hones their concepts’ critical edges because it’s still 
recalcitrantly present in the form of an absence where a once-discipline-
shaping commonplace used to be, even if the concept itself hasn’t had that 
much purchase for a decade or more. This is how commonplaces form the 
                                                        
30  Pierre Lévy. Becoming Virtual: Reality in the Digital Age. Translated by Roberto Bonnono. Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996. “Introduction” and passim. 
31  Lévy. Becoming Virtual. “Introduction” and passim. 
32  Lévy. Becoming Virtual. 186. 
33  Jean Baudrillard. Simulacra and Simulation. Translated by Sheila Glaser. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994. 
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skein that holds disciplines together: beyond theoretical precision, terms like 
materiality displace and replace the commonplaces that precede them. Dourish 
and Blanchette’s work isn’t as overtly critical of the concept of “the virtual” 
that precedes their own materialisms. But it can also be located in this 
particularly lineage, because materiality now enjoys the status of media-
theoretical commonplace. This is not to say that media are self-evidently 
materialist; rather, it’s to say that materiality has become a category that’s self-
evidently central to media-theoretical discussions. By critiquing the 
commonplace categories that precede them, Starosielski and Sumrell and 
Varnelis uphold the very distinction they’re supposed to resolve. Dourish and 
Blanchette uphold this distinction in another way, by assuming that materiality 
is a category that can be treated as a commonplace. Materiality defines how 
we think infrastructure: either because it’s valorised or because concepts of 
infrastructure have to define their non- or anti-materialist theoretical 
approaches in relation to it. We can see this at work in concepts of 
infrastructure that fall on the other side of the higher-order epistemological 
distinction I’ve proposed. 
 
Media-theoretical concepts of infrastructure that eschew materialism are more 
clearly defined by their negative relationship to materiality than they are by the 
alternate, realist, “relationalist”—to recall Sandvig’s term—or processual 
theoretical frameworks they adopt. Blanchette’s object, the bit, operates at a 
scale—and in a theoretical register—that’s one step back from that brink 
beyond which Kittler infamously declared, “there is no software."34 Or it would 
be, if it wasn’t governed by the abstract, computational logic of “the stack." 
This concept provides us with a bridge between materialist and relationalist 
approaches to infrastructure. What Blanchette calls “resource stacks” organise 
the circulation of material bits. For Till Straube and Rory Solomon, the 
computational architecture of the stack articulates a different infrastructural 
concept of the internet—one that’s predicated on relations that are 
                                                        
34  Friedrich Kittler. “There is No Software." CTheory ao32 (1995): 
http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=74. 
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materialised, but that can’t be straightforwardly articulated using a materialist 
theoretical framework.  
 
The transmission of data that constitutes internet-based networking is 
governed by a layered hierarchy of protocols that handles the routing of data 
from users’ devices, via intermediate networks, to the target devices that 
they’re attempting to query—that is, by what computer scientists refer to as a 
stack. The idea of this model was to establish an agreed-upon set of of 
protocols to facilitate communication between what Straube describes as “a 
diverse set of parallel (and often proprietary and competing) networking 
technologies."35 The model we use today dates back to the “Open Systems 
Interconnection” model, which was first developed in the 1970’s to enable the 
design and implementation of distributed telecommunication networks in 
disparate contexts.36 Originally, this model specified seven layers. The model 
that’s most important to the contemporary internet is the Internet Protocol 
Suite, which is commonly substituted for, but not reducible to, TCP/IP, or the 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol.37 For both Straube and 
Solomon, the stack is both a model that organises how computation is 
designed and implemented, and a computational architecture that’s made 
operative by specific programs, protocols, and systems. Both use it as 
something like an analytic: as a way of conceptualising infrastructures both 
through what they do and through what they organise—or, we could say, 
“relationally."  
 
This—computational—concept of the stack allows Straube and Solomon to 
articulate the internet, at scale, by focusing on the computational processes 
that allow it to scale. As Straube puts it, the stack’s “hierarchy of layers is real” 
and allows us to “trace a gradual translation… through a series of descending 
                                                        
35  Sträube. “Stacked Spaces." 5. 
36  Sträube. “Stacked Spaces." 5; Keller Easterling. Extrastatecraft: The Power of Infrastructure 
Space. Londo: Verso Books, 2014. 
37  R. Braden “RFC1122: Requirements for Internet Hosts - Communication Layers." Internet 
Engineering Task Force (October 1989): https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1122. Accessed May 
16, 2017. 
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levels of abstraction all the way ‘down’ to the material handling of bits."38 But 
these layers are in computational process: “[i]mportantly”, Straube continues, 
“the stack is not simply an enumeration of different elements that constitute a 
whole”, because “each of its layers is an articulation of a specific logic that 
already encompasses the entire system."39 They can’t be thought in overtly-
materialist terms. What Solomon outlines as the “recursivity” of the stack leads 
him to argue that this approach to computational systems—in contradistinction 
to the media-archaeological approach of scholars like Wolfgang Ernst, whom 
he draws upon and reworks—“problematises the materialist approach” by 
adding further “lower” layers of materiality, whilst re-capitulating lower, 
infrastructural layers in higher-order levels of processing.40 In effect, it 
problematises the ontological primacy of the category of materiality. Drawing 
on the work of Karen Barad, Straube argues, in a slightly different theoretical 
register, that what he calls the “time-spaces of digital infrastructures” are “built 
in to the very materiality of stack-like configurations”, but are “performative of 
and performed by” the devices enrolled in these configurations.41 In both 
Straube and Solomon, the concept of the stack incorporates materiality into its 
operative modelling of the internet. What they intimate is closer to a practice 
of diagramming—or a form of processual modelling that’s materialised, but not 
materialist—than it is to any overtly-theoretical materialism. Put otherwise, 
these approaches think infrastructures both relationally and in terms that 
question the efficacy of materialist theoretical frameworks. Nevertheless, this 
relationality can’t expunge the continuing shaping influence of the category of 
materiality on their claims. These theorists might be uneasy with materiality, 
but they still posit their conceptualisations of infrastructure in contradistinction 
to it.  
 
This uneasiness is shared by Tung-Hui Hu in his excellent study of cloud 
computing infrastructure. Hu argues that to apprehend the internet—or what 
                                                        
38  Sträube. “Stacked Spaces." 6. 
39  Sträube. “Stacked Spaces." 6. 
40  Solomon. “Last In, First Out." 
41  Sträube. “Stacked Spaces." 8, emphasis original. 
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he refers to as “the digital network”—as infrastructure, we have to “think about 
the network in the absence of individual technologies."42 That is, the internet 
only makes sense as infrastructure if it’s apprehended in epistemological terms 
that sit uneasily with technologies and their materialities. In a passage 
commenting on his analysis of the cloud in relation to other, overtly-materialist 
approaches to infrastructure, Hu notes that,  
 
…to lose sight of the cloud’s infrastructure is to forget about 
the literal stream of waste that the cloud produces: the 
pollution from coal-fired power plants used to feed the data 
centers; the stream of electronic waste that accompanies cloud 
providers’ need to constantly upgrade computers. But the 
same could be said about the many other infrastructures that 
we choose to ignore.43 
 
Hu identifies a tendency in media-theoretical studies of infrastructure to tie 
materiality to what I think of as its indexical quality. He goes on to argue that 
“[m]erely obtaining more knowledge about digital culture’s materiality may not 
address the root problem."44 We can restate this as an admonishment: it’s not 
enough to say that infrastructures are here—which seems, at times, to be the 
driving impulse, if not the epistemological result, of materialist concepts of 
infrastructure. In his magisterial study of the elements that extends media’s 
infrastructural qualities to the environment itself, John Durham Peters makes a 
similar point. In a play on structuralism and poststructuralism, he labels his own 
approach “infrastructuralism” and characterises it by saying that “[i]ts 
fascination is for the basic, the boring, the mundane, and all the mischievous 
work done behind the scenes."45 But “media”, he also ruminates, “are perhaps 
more interesting when they reveal what defies materialisation."46  
                                                        
42  Tung-Hui Hu. A Prehistory of the Cloud. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2015. 33. 
43  Hu. A Prehistory of the Cloud. 67. 
44  Hu. A Prehistory of the Cloud. 67. 
45  John Durham Peters. The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. 33. 
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For Hu, what’s crucial for understanding such infrastructures is what he calls 
“the heuristic that we use to imagine how information is organized, whether in 
physical space or in digital space."47 Hu’s “cloud” is another kind of diagram: a 
means of modelling and apprehending and, so, understanding the internet as 
an object that has emergent effects and that can be critiqued. For Peters, 
what’s interesting about infrastructures is that they accrue their status “only 
insofar as they are normalized into taken-for-granteds”, which means that they 
“have social as well as technical components."48 Starosielski, Sumrell and 
Varnelis, Hogan, Dourish and Blanchette would hardly argue with this point—
but there’s something else at stake in their respective valorisations or 
admonishments of materiality. When Fuller claims that “[w]e are in the 
amusing position where the emphasis on materiality is elevating technical 
content to the same kind of generalizations that, say, the more banal 
pronouncements of postmodernity suffered from in their heyday”,49 we can 
read this as an affirmation: materiality is the point of origin for a lot of bad 
theory—and a lot of good—because it’s become a commonplace, in the sense 
that Daston establishes. More than this, because it’s become an 
epistemological fulcrum around which theoretical pronouncements turn. In 
being for or against materiality, concepts of infrastructure affirm its status as a 
commonplace—and are shaped by it even as they negate it.  
 
In higher-order epistemological terms, this status establishes an identity 
between approaches that valorise materiality and approaches that eschew it 
that I want to characterise as hylomorphic. In practice, these seemingly-
opposed approaches express an underlying media-theoretical epistemology 
that’s unified precisely by their antagonism. It’s this epistemology that 
constitutes what I’m calling the infrastructural filiation. Moreover, it’s by this 
epistemology that concepts of infrastructure materialise media. To explicate 
                                                        
47  Hu. A Prehistory of the Cloud. 67. 
48  Peters. The Marvelous Clouds. 33. 
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what I mean by this, I want to turn now to Simondon’s concept and to Carey’s 
seminal essay on telegraphy. 
 
 
6.3 HISTORY AS ONTOLOGY: THE CASE OF THE TELEGRAPH 
Theory establishes its own precursors. These include theoretical frameworks 
or specific theorists; but outside of the formalised adoption of a theoretical 
framework, other kinds of precursors can be invoked to demarcate a particular 
theoretical practice. Above, I argued that materiality displaced the concept of 
the virtual as a discipline-shaping commonplace. The virtual and the category it 
represents, immateriality, are precursor commonplaces—though their effects 
are often felt in absentia. Particularly-idiosyncratic theorists or thinkers often 
fulfil this role, too, as do prior theoretical movements that are hard to fit in to 
normal theoretical categories. To formalise the claims I’ve been making about 
infrastructure and the materialising epistemology it expresses, this section will 
present an analysis of an essay Carey wrote on telegraphy, which is not only 
profoundly influential, but will also help us to apprehend the higher-order 
epistemology that I’m outlining in this chapter: that the category of materiality 
institutes an epistemological identity between it and its opposite in media-
theoretical practice. 
 
In 1989, James W. Carey published an essay on the relationship between the 
telegraph and ideology. Influenced as much by Harold A. Innis and Marshall 
McLuhan as the American pragmatists—particularly John Dewey—and the 
emergence of what would come to be known as cultural studies, Carey is best 
known for his “ritual” model of communication.50 But the essay on the 
                                                        
50  On ritual, see: Carey. “A Cultural Approach to Communication,” In Communication as 
Culture, Revised Edition: Essays on Media and Society. New York and London: Routledge, 
2008. 11–28; on Carey’s indebtedness to the Canadian school, see e.g.: Carey. “Harold 
Adams Innis and Marshall Mcluhan." The Antioch Review 27, no. 1 (1967): 5–39; on Carey’s 
relationship to the American Pragmatists, see: Jeremy Packer and Stephen B. Crofts Wiley. 
“Becoming Mollusk: A Conversation With John Durham Peters About Media, Materiality, 
and Matters of History,” In Communication Matters: Materialist Approaches to Media, Mobility, 
and Networks, edited by Jeremy Packer, and Stephen B. Crofts Wiley. London: Routledge, 
2011. 35–50. 
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telegraph became seminal for an entirely different set of reasons. In this essay, 
Carey makes a pair of assertions that continue to play a key epistemological 
role in media theory. In part, Carey’s essay was written in response to what he 
saw as an oversight in broader discussions of media and communications: too 
few scholars, he argued, had studied the broad-scale social and technical 
changes wrought by the introduction of telegraphy.51 Carey’s study had much 
broader implications for media history and media theory.52 The dynamics of 
citation are such that the simple act of referencing this essay identifies it with 
Carey, the author and theorist. But it’s not Carey’s work as a whole that I want 
to talk about. By the same token, the dynamics of citation are such that 
groundbreaking claims can sometimes outgrow the names to which we attach 
them. Carey’s essay on telegraphy provides us with a particularly idiosyncratic 
precursor, because it’s come to stand in for the defining role that a particular 
moment in media history plays for media theory as a whole.  
 
The titular “ideology” addressed by Carey’s essay dealt with a more wide-
reaching process than the Marxist usages of the term usually denote: by it, he 
meant to identify the telegraph as “a thing to think with, an agency for the 
alteration of ideas."53 The telegraph is significant, he argues, because “it 
opened up new ways of thinking about communication within both the formal 
practice of theory and the practical consciousness of everyday life."54 Before 
the advent of the telegraph, Carey notes that “communication” referred to 
“transportation as well as message transmittal”, because messages could only 
be moved by carriers on foot, on horseback, or by rail.55 He goes on to assert 
that the telegraph “ended that identity” by allowing “symbols to move 
independently of geography and independently and faster than transport."56 
This double claim is salutary for a number of reasons. It prefigured concepts, 
                                                        
51  Carey. “Technology and Ideology." 158. 
52  Benjamin Peters. “And Lead Us Not in to Thinking the New is New: A Bibliographic Case 
for New Media History." new media & society 11, no. 1&2 (2009): 13–30. 
53  Carey. “Technology and Ideology." 157. 
54  Carey. “Technology and Ideology." 157. 
55  Carey. “Technology and Ideology." 157. 
56  Carey. “Technology and Ideology." 164-5. 
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like “the virtual”, that would proliferate half a decade later. His reading of the 
telegraph explicitly identifies this technology as a precursor to the internet and 
its systems of “control”: its “great theoretical significance”, he claimed, lay not 
only in separating communication from transport and geography, but in “the 
use of the telegraph as both a model of and a mechanism for control of the 
physical movement of things."57 So, Carey’s study prefigures later media-
historical readings of the telegraph as the internet’s predecessor, by scholars 
like Tom Standage,58 or is used as a key example of theoretically-inflected 
media history, by scholars like Graham Murdoch and Michael Pickering.59 
Carey’s claim that the telegraph brought about the “annihilation of space and 
time”—this phrase is, originally, Alexander Pope’s—resonates60 with Paul 
Virilio’s writings on speed and acceleration and David Harvey’s analyses of 
capitalism.61 But this double claim is salutary for another reason, because it 
both delimits and helps us to explicate the epistemological lineage of concepts 
into which infrastructure slips.  
 
Taken as written, the influence of Carey’s essay on media theory—or, on the set 
of practices that I’m demarcating from “media studies”, the broader, mostly 
Anglo-American field of which Carey was more properly a part—hasn’t been 
particularly large.62 As Peters outlines in a comparison of the work of Carey 
and Kittler, the former never really found much of an audience outside of 
North America because of his normative commitments to democratic politics, 
oral traditions, journalistic practices, and modes of cultural studies that now 
                                                        
57  Carey. “Technology and Ideology." 165; see also 176. 
58  See: Tom Standage. The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and the 
Nineteenth Century’s on-Line Pioneers. London: Walker & Company, 1998; for a 
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History, edited by Michael Balley. London and New York: Routledge, 2009. 173. 
60  Rod Giblett. Sublime Communication Technologies. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 50. 
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seem idealist.63 That is, its influence hasn’t been particularly large until 
recently. Carey’s work remains relatively-under-cited in media theory, but his 
essay on telegraphy seems to have belatedly found its moment with the 
“infrastructural turn." As we might expect, this essay crops up in the work of 
North American media theorists like Peters and Jonathan Sterne, who claim 
Carey as an influence. More surprisingly, it’s also cited as a precursor in a range 
of other recent studies of infrastructure and related concepts. What’s 
particularly curious about its belated influence is that Carey is invoked as a 
precursor for overtly-materialist concepts of infrastructure and as a 
representative of anti-materialist approaches to media theory.  
 
In his typically-incisive reading of the essay on telegraphy, Peters argues that 
Carey “seems to hold to the theoretical possibility at least of symbols without a 
material anchor besides electricity, of communication free of transportation."64 
This reading of Carey is shared by Leah A. Lievrouw, who associates him with 
what she calls an idealist trend in media theory—confusingly containing Peters’ 
earlier, philosophically-inflected study of the concept of communication.65 In 
his critical analysis of Carey’s essay, Sterne argues that Carey’s reading of 
telegraphy could only elevate the category of the “symbolic” to privilege once 
it had “severed” the relationship between communication and transportation.66 
For his part, Ned Rossiter’s recent conceptualisation of logistical 
infrastructures explicitly critiques Carey’s claim that the telegraph instituted 
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the separation of communication and geography.67 For each, Carey’s essay on 
telegraphy represents a key precursor for the privileging of the immaterial—
understood as the symbolic, the ideal, or the cultural—at the expense of 
materiality. What’s curious about this essay is that another set of media 
theorists invoke Carey as a precursor for their overtly-materialist approaches. 
David Morley summarises this trend when he suggests that Carey’s telegraph 
essay has recently “come to be seen as something of a potential “keystone” for 
a whole new thread of historically inflected, materialist work in 
communications studies.68 Mimi Sheller evokes Carey as materialist precursors 
in her studies of infrastructure.69 In an essay on telegraphy that emphasises 
the embodied role of its operators, Kate Maddalena and Jeremy Packer 
present a nuanced re-reading of Carey’s work that draws it in to a materialist 
lineage, noting that “trains and telegraph wires” play the role of “materials” in 
his analysis.70 In Carey, we seem to find a representative of two opposite 
tendencies—or, rather, one whose identity is secured by this very divergence. 
 
In an interview with Jeremy Packer, Peters helps us to clarify what’s at stake in 
this seemingly-contradictory set of readings of Carey’s essay. For Peters, 
Carey’s work managed a “balancing act” between a form of “idealism”, 
represented by his theorisation of the telegraph, and a form of “materialism”, 
expressed in his sociology.71 Likening Carey’s work to William James’s, Peters 
argues that it manages to “wiggle out” between these two poles.72 This reading 
of Carey allows Peters to claim that, “[s]ociologically, electrical telegraphy 
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might have separate communication and transportation, but cosmologically”—
that is, at a larger scale of analysis—“it married them."73 It allows Sterne to read 
Carey’s distinction between transport and communication back against itself: 
 
By linking communication to movement, we leave open the 
relationship between mind and body, mental and physical 
labour, and content and means. These become questions 
we have to answer in each particular case that we study.74 
 
As precursor, what Carey’s work arguably represents is the identity of 
materiality and its obverse in their duality. What’s crucial to note about its role 
as precursor, moreover, is that most theorists treat Carey’s essay as though it 
pitted communication—as the immaterial symbolic—against materiality. Yet the 
specific terms Carey uses, and which he makes sure to distinguish, are 
“transport” and “geography." This retroactive subsumption is telling in and of 
itself. What was a more complex pair of bifurcations—media loses its identity 
with transport and with geography—becomes a simple distinction. The 
conflation of these terms in materiality marks out the peculiar epistemological 
dynamic at play here. Carey’s essay isn’t a precursor of this particular 
theoretical framework or that. Rather, it’s able to act as a precursor for a 
media-theoretical epistemology that’s elevated materiality to the status of a 
category that encompasses movement, space, and speed, if only by claiming 
that the emergence of telegraphy heralds their diminished role in what media 
do. It reflects the role that materiality would come to play as a commonplace, 
but in the negative. It reflects, then, the commonplace role that materiality 
would later attain as a category that must either be valorised or eschewed. 
What Carey’s essay provides us with is a historical-epistemological precedent, 
in two senses.  
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My interest is less in what Carey’s essay explicitly does than what it is 
indicative uses it’s put to. Carey’s essay might be profitably read as an example 
of what I’m calling media-historical epistemology. By returning to the 
emergence of telegraphy, Carey identifies the emergence of an epistemology 
that would shape what media could be used to do in their time and what uses 
they might be put to later, drawing a line from the telegraph to computational 
forms of control. But this is neither the kind of use that I want to put this essay 
to nor the kind of use that its put to by contemporary media theorists. That it 
can be cited as an exemplar of either idealist or materialist media-theoretical 
approaches indicates the interconvertability of these terms in media-
theoretical practice. By linking this claim to a concrete media-historical 
moment, Carey’s essay does double-precursive-duty: it comes before, from 
1989; but what it theorises, telegraphy, comes before, too. In taking this essay 
as a precursor, media theorists arguably make a mistake that Carey himself 
avoids. By treating the emergence of telegraphy as a salutary moment for 
media history and for media theory itself, they also elevate the theorisation of 
the emergence of telegraphy to exemplary status, conflating media’s concrete 
conditions with the conditions of possibility in which media’s materiality might 
be discussed. As precursor, this essay rolls history, epistemology, and media-
theoretical debate together. As a gesture, it expresses how the identity of 
materiality and what it negates can be maintained by referencing what came 
before—in media theory and in media history alike. Historicisation merges with 
theorisation to effect their ontologisation. The result is a practical-
epistemological form of what Simondon calls “hylomorphism."  
 
In the prefatory material for his own philosophy of individuation, Simondon 
introduces “hylomorphism” to characterise materialist ontologies of being. 
Whereas ontologies of substance—he cites Spinoza’s—posit a single ontological 
category to explain being, materialist ontologies posit two: what he identifies, 
after Aristotle, as matter—or hyle—and form—or morphe.75 Simondon uses 
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hylomorphism as a means of categorising distinct metaphysics, which I’ve been 
generalising as theoretical frameworks. I want to adopt hylomorphism as an 
epistemological heuristic. Simondon’s concept establishes a reciprocity 
between the categories of matter and form. In conversation with Bruno Latour, 
Michel Serres makes a claim that helps us to understand what’s at stake with 
this reciprocity: “[a]n idea opposed to another idea”, he says, “is always the 
same idea, albeit affected by the negative sign. The more you oppose one 
another, the more you remain in the same framework of thought."76 By 
privileging materiality, media-theoretical concepts of infrastructure might 
adopt theoretical frameworks that critique antecedent media-theoretical 
tendencies, like virtuality—but in practice, they’re premised on the same media-
theoretical epistemologies as this tendency because they reproduce the same 
dichotomies. Materiality is not immateriality; reciprocally, immateriality is not 
materiality—and through this distinction, a higher-order, disciplinary 
epistemology takes shape, in the practices that cite its precursors and, so, that 
reproduce it.  
 
Theory, I said, makes its own precursors. For this media-historical 
epistemological analysis of infrastructure, Carey is one of ours. More than how 
telegraphy can be theorised or how media’s history might be used, what his 
essay represents is how a discipline-level epistemology emerges both in 
practice and through the proliferation and reproduction of theoretical 
commonplaces—materiality—and their own predecessors. What it 
demonstrates is how varied the role of the precursor can be in media-
theoretical practice. The concept of infrastructure fits in to a lineage of 
concepts for which Carey’s essay gives us the outlines—neither in form nor 
content, but in the identity of the seemingly-contradictory media-theoretical 
uses to which it can be put. In claiming that concepts of infrastructure 
materialise media, what I mean is that these concepts reproduce a practical-
epistemological form of hylomorphism that establishes materiality as the self-
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evident category against which our concepts must push or with which they 
must hew. So, they’re not materialist, per se; rather, in treating materiality as, 
self-evidently, commonplace, they materialise media-theoretical epistemology, 
at the level of the discipline of media-theory; they materialise infrastructure, as 
concept operating, in practice, within this epistemology; and they materialise 
infrastructure’s objects, by positing materiality as a category that must be 
valorised or eschewed. In Simondon’s terms, then, this epistemology is 
materialist in effect, if not in theory—epistemologically, we might say, rather 
than ontologically.  
 
This effect recedes when a moment like the emergence of telegraphy is held 
to have general media-theoretical significance. By rolling together history, 
epistemology, and media-theoretical debate, it mistakes epistemology’s history 
for what’s “contemporary." This is not to critique historical approaches to doing 
media theory; only to note that between history and its ontologisation sit 
disciplinary epistemologies that have a habit of making something else out of 
the theoretical material—the precursors—they’re given. This is what I’m calling 
the infrastructural filiation. In effect, the concepts of infrastructure caught up 
in this epistemology materialise circulation, recapitulating it as a term that 
expresses whether or how media and their infrastructures are materialised, 
rather than how we might think media in excess of themselves.  
 
 
6.4 CIRCULATIONS MATERIALISED 
To return to the issue at hand—the conceptual work that circulation does, in 
practice and in our media-theoretical present—the infrastructural filiation 
constitutes one of the major influences on our commonplace usages of 
circulation. Concepts of infrastructure are peppered with invocations of 
media’s circulations. This concept provides us with a crucial means of thinking 
media’s circulations, at scale and as they scale, and in their scaling complexity; 
as processes with concrete—political, environmental—consequences; with 
technical nuance; and, of course, in their materiality. In the introduction to this 
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chapter, I claimed that the “infrastructural turn” instituted a higher-order 
epistemology that had an organising effect on how we conceptualised media 
and, by extension, media in circulation. At scale, concepts of infrastructure 
materialise media and their circulations: they recapitulate media’s relationship 
to infrastructure as a hylomorphic one, but they also shift the epistemological 
value of the media concept itself. After infrastructure, media’s circulations only 
matter insofar as they express theirs’ and infrastructure’s materiality.  
 
This hylomorphic epistemology is straightforward in Starosielski and Vernelis. 
Starosielski asserts that studying the internet’s physical instantiation in cables 
“reveal[s] the environments that shape contemporary media circulation”77, 
reinstituting a distinction between material-infrastructural substrate and 
circulating media, at higher levels of abstraction. Vernelis likewise sets up a 
distinction between the circulating data that we access and the material 
infrastructures, like data centres, that make this access possible. If the desire to 
be “plugged in” colloquially expresses a desire for this data and the virtuality it 
occasions, for the data centre “[b]eing plugged in is their literal need”; here, the 
language of virtuality is opposed to a literal physicality, drawing a critical edge 
from the privileging of the latter in contradistinction to the former.78 
Blanchette’s bits are subject to the material constraints of storage, bandwidth, 
processing, and noise as they’re “circulated up and down the resource stacks, 
the layered chains of modules that obtain between applications and 
resources."79 This materiality is premised on a dualist distinction between the 
material aspects of bits and the abstract nature of the computational spaces in 
which they circulate, positing circulation in contradistinction to infrastructure. 
Dourish’s expression of this epistemology is a little more complex. Dourish’s 
technical-material object of analysis is “routing”, which he characterises as “the 
protocols and mechanisms that…allow digital data to traverse a complex, 
heterogeneous, and dynamic internet."80 Media’s circulations are not at all the 
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topic of Dourish’s study and I don’t mean to critique his work for not 
addressing a process that’s outside its remit. What’s not said here is 
nevertheless telling. “Traverse” stands in for circulation in this statement, but 
what traverses the “dynamic internet” is not media, but their materialised 
basis—data. Scaling infrastructure down splits the materialising hylomorphic 
epistemology across scales, too, allowing what’s left out to limn what’s 
materialised as its opposite, what’s transmitted. 
 
Using hylomorphism as an epistemological heuristic, we can ascribe this 
materialising influence on the conceptual work that circulation does to 
concepts of infrastructure that are uneasy with, or outrightly critical of, 
materiality. Straube, Solomon, Hu, and Peters don’t talk about circulation 
explicitly, but we find expressions of hylomorphism-in-practice in other, not-
so-clearly materialist concepts of infrastructure. In his work on the 
environmental impacts of media infrastructures, Sy Taffel argues that the 
materiality of our media infrastructures is bound up in what he calls the “flows 
of materials, energy, and capital that comprise contemporary global 
capitalism."81 These infrastructures’ need for rare minerals like coltan and 
tantalum generates a correlate: waste, pollution, even war. Taffel invokes a 
cognate of circulation—flow—that’s often developed in antagonism with just 
the kind of hylomorphic materiality I’ve been discussing. Taffel’s claim that 
infrastructures are material is premised on Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
concept of a “plane of immanence”, which construes category of materiality in 
explicitly univocal, and therefore non-hylomorphic, terms.82 But to illustrate 
how these flows instantiate the circulation of media, Taffel offers an example—
the constituent material processes that are enlisted when we stream a 
Youtube video—that recapitulates this hylomorphism in practice.83 These flows 
explain how media arrive at our screens, but not how media operate as media. 
This aspect of media is left as the unaddressed other side of these material 
processes; the complementary form, in practice, to streaming’s materiality. 
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Taffel’s claim that “[t]he microscopic scale at which [] data exists is thoroughly 
alien to humans”, but “there is nothing virtual or dematerialised about it”,84 
becomes unintentionally salutary, indicating the higher-order epistemological 
hylomorphism that his arguments institute in practice even as they disavow 
them in theory.   
 
We can also use this heuristic to re-interpret the epistemological status of 
Keller Easterling’s influential relationalist account of infrastructures and what 
she calls “extrastatecraft." Easterling’s large-scale look at infrastructural 
spaces—which include broadband alongside spatial distributions like free trade 
zones—adopts a theoretical framework that’s heavily influenced by the work of 
relationalist theorists, like Bruno Latour, alongside theorists and philosophers 
who are less commonly cited in media theory, like the analytic philosopher 
Gilbert Ryle. Easterling introduces a powerful concept in her work: what she 
calls infrastructure’s “dispositions." Easterling likens dispositions to latent 
effects. “Spaces and urban organisations are usually treated, not as actors, but 
as collections of objects or volumes”, she says, yet just as a simple object—her 
example is a ball—“does not have to roll down the incline to have the capacity 
to do so”, so, too, do “physical objects in spatial arrangements…possess an 
agency that resides in relative position."85 Infrastructures are able to affect 
other things because they possess a disposition that’s “immanent, not in the 
moving parts, but in the relationship between the components."86  
 
So far, this approach has clear resonances with Latour’s early work on relations 
and “force”—and, like Latour, they don’t use materiality as a key category.87 In 
fact, it reads as an exception to the higher-order epistemological distinction 
that I introduced earlier. Easterling goes on to argue that infrastructures adopt 
these dispositions through the influence of what she calls “active forms” that, 
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like “sequences of code”—she lists “spatial products and repeatable formulas 
like zones, suburbs, highways, resorts, malls, or golf courses”—construe 
infrastructures as something akin to “operating systems."88 But what’s crucial 
to her conceptualisation of what infrastructure does and how we might 
critique them is that they express their dispositional politics through the 
“circulation of…active forms within it."89 It’s this use of circulation the language 
of form that I want to focus on.  
 
An uncharitable reading of Easterling’s work might argue that this claim is 
essentially hylomorphic; that, in adopting the metaphor of the “operating 
system” and in valorising the circulation of form, it adopts form as the principle 
term that shapes its substratal, material supports: buildings, zones, cables—
infrastructure. A more charitable reading would point out that though 
Easterling talks at length about broadband infrastructure, she’s more of an 
urban theorist or theorist of architecture than a media theorist. What her work 
points to is the subtlety of the epistemological form of hylomorphism that 
media theorists express, in practice. Easterling’s work particularly recalls an 
early tenet of Latour’s Actor-Network Theory: “what resists is real."90 This 
tenet is key to Latour’s theory of “irreductionism”, or the set of principles that 
he used to fashion his wildly influential theory of relations.91 More recently, 
philosophers with quite different investments—Graham Harman and Ray 
Brassier—have both argued that Latour’s theory relies on a tacit form of 
hylomorphism.92 Without assuming the generative capacity of something like a 
material substrate, Latour can’t explain how his networks assemble in the first 
place—so, as Harman points out, his later work introduces the concept of 
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“plasma” to specify the outside from which networks spring.93 A reading of 
Easterling’s work that’s a little less than uncharitable might point out that it 
can’t escape positing space in these plasmic terms—tacitly, in theory. Easterling 
barely even mentions the term “materiality." Taken together, we could use 
these readings to present Easterling’s work as an edge case in which 
circulation is presented in the conceptual language of form—if, admittedly, in a 
form that’s not entirely congruent with media. It’s premised, arguably, on a 
conception of space as potential that recapitulates materialist ontologies: form 
might be ascendant, but it falls back on the latent, dispositional force of the 
spaces it “formats." This approach materialises circulation from the other side 
of the form-matter dyad—in practice, again, if not in theory. But what’s most 
interesting about this work, for our purposes, is that it draws our attention to 
materiality’s quality of resistance. 
 
In media theory, materiality’s what resists. We posit this resistance as the 
source of its ontological force. Its resistance to subsumption by precursor 
concepts—like the virtual or immateriality—is what gives it traction in 
contemporary media theory. In combination, it’s what’s established materiality 
as a media-theoretical commonplace. But this quality has also established what 
we might identify, at a higher-order epistemological level and with apologies to 
William Morris, as something like a “resistance in the material."94 Materials 
resist, but the category of materiality is also a resistant shaping constituent of 
our media-theoretical epistemologies. It’s something that concepts like 
infrastructure have to deal with, because it’s something that we assume to be 
there—before what’s made of it or in and alongside what’s made through it, but 
always resistantly and irreducibly present. To riff on Latour, materiality has an 
epistemological reality because it resists. This status shapes Easterling’s work 
when it’s drawn in to media-theoretical discussions: materiality is that which is 
                                                        
93  Graham Harman. Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics. Melbourne: re:Press, 
2009. 132-3; the relevant place to find this concept in Latour’s work is: Reassembling the 
Social: An Introduciton to Actor-Network Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
244-5. 
94  Quoted in Jerome J. McGann, Black Riders: The Visible Language of Modernism (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993) p. xiii. 
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resistantly primary. It’s also what shapes the other concepts of infrastructure 
that I’ve engaged with: materiality can’t be done away with, and so is 
incorporated in to, and shapes, how infrastructures—and through them, 
media—are conceptualised. And circulation? After infrastructure, one of the 
main uses to which we put circulation is to express the materiality of media or 
of their infrastructures. We valorise media’s materiality, or we eschew it. Either 
way, infrastructure implicates media in a particular problem: whether or how 
materiality ought to be materialised.  
 
This is how the infrastructural filiation expresses its hylomorphism and, in turn, 
shapes circulation. It institutes materiality as a resistant epistemological 
material that shapes how we think media and their circulations in practice. This 
undermines our capacity to think media in excess of themselves, because it 
subordinates this problem and its related questions to materiality. These 
questions aren’t quite the same. Media doesn’t just exceed itself because 
materiality resists; it’s not reducible, in circulation, to a category that we tacitly 
posit as primary to it. Media can’t be conceptualised in circulation if they’re 
subordinated to tis problem. This problem simply leaves us with no room to 
ask what media are when they are in circulation. This is not to say that 
circulating media need be conceptualised in wholly non-materialist terms. 
Rather, it’s to parse media’s materiality through another question: What is 
materiality for media?  
 
 
6.5 DISCIPLINARITY AND MATERIALITY 
This question opens our discussion of infrastructure back out to a more 
general discussion of the higher-order epistemologies we use to shape our 
media-theoretical practices. This discussion is not separate from the applied 
question of what kind of conceptual work we can do when we adopt a 
particular concept, theoretical framework, or media-theoretical tendency. 
Adopting the concept of infrastructure as the focal point for a more general 
discussion of the role that the category of materiality plays in media theory 
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raises a pair of basic questions: Why organise this discussion around 
infrastructure, rather than materialist theoretical frameworks? and, What do 
we mean by “materiality” in media theory? As concept, as progenitor of a range 
of theoretical frameworks and as ontological category, materiality and its 
cognates—matter, materialism—have been undergoing a resurgence in recent 
media theory. To further situate this chapters arguments, I want to present a 
brief outline of recent materialist media-theoretical approaches. 
 
Recent materialist media-theoretical approaches are influenced by broader 
theoretical trends in the humanities and social sciences, including the renewed 
focus on materialist and realist ontological categories. A catalogue of these 
approaches might begin with seminal media-theoretical studies by Lev 
Manovich, N. Katherine Hayles, or the German media theorists collected in 
Materialities of Communication, each of which, respectively, established 
trajectories for the study of software, embodiment, or media’s materiality that 
still shape media theory today.95 More recent work following in their stead 
addresses media’s materiality using a number of productive theoretical 
approaches. These include the nuanced discussions of media’s materiality 
developed in what’s known, in the Anglophone world at least, as the German 
media theory tradition.96 From Kittler’s work on discourse networks to more 
recent approaches, like the media archaeology of Wolfgang Ernst or Jussi 
Parikka or Bernhard Siegert’s studies of “cultural techniques”, this tradition has 
developed numerous, equally-compelling materialist concepts of media 
systems, discrete media, and media’s constituent techniques.97 They include 
                                                        
95  Lev Manovich. The Language of New Media. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT press, 2001; N. 
Katherine. Hayles. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and 
Informatics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999; Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and 
Ludwig Pfeiffer, eds. Materialities of Communication Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1988. 
96  See: Eva Horn. “Editor’s Introduction: “ œthere Are No Media."" Grey Room 29 (2007): 6–
13; Geoffrey Winthrop-Young. “Krautrock, Heidegger, Bogeyman: Kittler in the 
Anglosphere." Thesis Eleven 107, no. 1 (2011): 6–20. 
97  Umbrecht and Pfeiffer. Materialities; Kittler. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Translated by 
Geoffrey WInthrop-Young and Michael Wutz. Stanford University Press, 1999; Wolfgang 
Ernst. Digital Memory and the Archive. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013; 
Parikka. What is Media Archaeology? London: Polity, 2012; Bernhard Siegert. Cultural 
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concepts of materiality developed by literary scholars who work on media, 
from N. Katherine Hayles’ seminal essay on print and code to Matthew 
Kirschenbaum’s concept of forensic materiality, through to more-distantly 
related fields, like the history of the book.98 They include a range of new 
Marxist conceptualisations of digital culture, including the more orthodox-
Marxist work by Christian Fuchs through to the post-autonomist work of 
scholars like Nick Dyer-Witherford.99 They include work that adopts new 
materialist theoretical frameworks, by scholars like Anna Munster or Parikka.100 
They also include studies of media and embodiment that adopt more recent 
concepts from the universe of materialism, like Patricia Ticento Clough’s 
analyses of media and affect or Mark Hansen’s post-phenomenological studies 
of new media.101 We must also note earlier, Marxist materialist analyses of 
media, including the influential work of Smythe, mentioned earlier; studies by 
or influenced by the Frankfurt School and their concept of “culture industries”; 
or the singular work of Walter Benjamin.102 Each of these approaches is 
influential. Some are particularly compelling. Taken together, they a 
representative what’s more-or-less loosely meant by materialist media theory. 
For the purposes of this argument, what I want to note about this—necessarily 
incomplete—overview is that it’s also representative of how we normally carve 
up and categorise a media-theoretical tendency, like materialist media theory. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Techniques: Grids, Filters, Doors, and Other Articulations of the Real. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015. 
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Today 25, no. 1 (2004): 67–90; Matthew Kirschenbaum. Mechanisms: New Media and the 
Forensic Imagination. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2007. 
99  Christian Fuchs. Digital Labour and Karl Marx. London: Routledge, 2014; Nick Dyer-
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100 Anna Munster. An Aesthesia of Networks: Conjunctive Experience in Art and Technology. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2013; Parikka. “New Materialism and Media Theory." 
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York: Schocken Books, 1968. 
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What Sandvig does for the concept of infrastructure, this kind of outline does 
for media theory itself.  
 
Recent surveys of materialist media-theoretical approaches by Holger Pötzsch, 
Nathalie Casemajor, and Jeremy Packer and Stephen B. Crofts Wiley are 
indicative of this higher-order epistemological exercise and the assumptions 
that typify it.103 Each of these surveys sorts materialist media-theoretical 
approaches into a number of different categories. These categories might be 
ordered according to the variety of materialism a particular approach 
expresses; the objects they take; their—historical and/or concrete—context; or 
their organising concepts. What’s crucial about the epistemology that this 
ordering expresses is that they privilege the theoretical framework. Appellations 
like “German media theory”, “affect” or “Marxist digital culture” express extant 
media-theoretical practices, making them available for critique and, more 
importantly, for use. So whilst Pötzsch, Casemajor, and Packer and Wiley might 
argue over extant categories—they adopt four, six, and five distinct ordering 
categories, respectively—each essentially adopts the same epistemology to 
represent materialist media-theoretical approaches as constituents of an 
overarching materialist media-theoretical tendency. This method reflects not 
just how we constitute theoretical tendencies, but how we apprehend, judge, 
and work with the media-theoretical epistemologies they index. 
 
My claim that the infrastructural filiation materialises commonplace usages of 
circulation doesn’t map on to this higher-order epistemology. Materialist 
theoretical frameworks—“literary media theory”; “new materialism”; “post-
phenomenology”—neither reflect nor begin to exhaust the epistemological role 
that “materiality” plays in media theory. Whilst acknowledging, for instance, 
that this thesis is particularly indebted to the German media theory tradition, 
both overtly—in its critical use of Kittler—and tacitly—through the influence 
                                                        
103 Holger Pötzsch. “Media Matter." TripleC 15, no. 1 (2017): 148–70; Nathalie Casemajor. 
“Digital Materialisms: Frameworks for Digital Media Studies." Westminster Papers in 
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and the historical focus of its promulgators, like Parikka—the media-historical 
epistemological approach I’ve adopted is concerned with a chain of concepts—
materiality, infrastructure, circulation—that intimate a different ordering 
epistemology. This epistemology is expressed by concrete media-theoretical 
practices, exposing the arbitrariness of the catalogue of categories broached 
above. Privileging a concept rather than a theoretical framework allows us to 
ask a crucial media-historical epistemological question: Beyond their avowed 
theoretical approaches, what kinds of conceptual work do our concepts 
actually do? Conversely, we might also ask of extant materialist media-
theoretical approaches: How would they contribute to helping us think media 
in excess of themselves?  
 
To answer the second of these questions first, the materialist media-
theoretical approaches briefly outlined above don’t bear directly on circulation 
or its attendant epistemological problem. The German media theory tradition’s 
varied foci—discrete media, in Kittler; the materialities of specific media and 
the consequent, "ownmost" temporalities they produce, in Ernst; or the 
deconstruction of media into their constituent techniques which are, 
recursively, used to think media otherwise, in Siegert—provide104 rigorous 
conceptualisations of media’s materiality, but they’re arguably informed by a 
different set of media-historical epistemological problems. The literary 
approach opens up on to considerations the distribution of literary media 
online, particularly in the work of Hayles;105 but, its abiding concern with 
literature’s constituent, language, works in a different epistemological register. I 
want to address the new materialist approach advocated by Parikka and others 
in the next chapter; for now, we can note that it deals more properly with 
questions of whether or how media envelop, rather than how we might think 
them in circulation. This thesis’s object, media in circulation, doesn’t concern 
                                                                                                                                                            
Wiley. “Strategies for Materializing Communication." Communication and Critical/Cultural 
Studies 9, no. 1 (2012): 107–13. 
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embodiment—at least in the registers adopted by Clough or Hansen. Or, the 
Marxist approaches of both Fuchs and Dyer-Witherford do conceptualise 
circulation directly, but they do so in a Marxist register, which understands it as 
the existence of capital in each of its stages, simultaneously rather than as a 
concept that allows us to conceptualise media in excess of themselves.106 
Lastly, to be able to answer the first question I asked above, we have to shift 
not only how we do theory. We also have to shift how we conceive of theory’s 
role for media: both in our media-theoretical practices and, at a higher level of 
epistemological abstraction, in those moments in which we carve out and 
catalogue new media-theoretical approaches to make them available for use 
and critique.  
 
 
6.6 MATTER AFTER MEDIA 
My claim that infrastructure belongs to an epistemological lineage of concepts 
that attempt to materialise media doesn’t fit the standard theoretical approach 
that operates under the aegis of this higher-order epistemology. In standard 
theoretical terms, the infrastructure concept isn’t a materialist concept, per se. 
In fact, it’s caught up in broader theoretical developments across the 
humanities and social sciences: this concept overtly expresses a range of 
theoretical frameworks—new materialist, realist, processual, vital—that are 
often incompatible with, or inimical to, the kind of materialism that I am 
arguing that it expresses, in practice. But if we unburden our theoretical 
practices of the primacy normally accorded to the theoretical framework, we 
needn’t establish that all concepts of infrastructure are avowedly materialist in 
order to substantiate the claim that this concept materialises media. This 
question is displaced by another: in practice, how does the infrastructure 
concept construe this relation? To make a proposition in light of this 
discussion, I would argue that the organising concept—as I’ve adopted and 
adapted it from Ian Hacking—gives us better epistemological traction on what 
                                                        
106 As cited above, Ch. 3: Marx. Capital Vol. 2. Translated by David Fernbach. London: Penguin, 
1992. 182-185. 
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it means for a concept like infrastructure to initiate a discipline-wide “turn." 
Privileging theoretical frameworks arguably overlooks the epistemological drag 
that disciplines exert on “new” theoretical claims. Here, the term “discipline” 
operates as a category, too. As categories construed in practice, disciplines 
exert their own, higher-order, epistemological influences on our media-
theoretical practices.  
 
To ask what materiality is for media is to ask a different kind of higher-order 
epistemological question altogether: not what media-theoretical tendency best 
circumscribes this term, but what conceptual work it’s put to and what 
epistemological value it holds for a particular concept and/or problem. A 
media-historical epistemological analysis implicates the category of the 
discipline, from practice up, as a higher-order site of analysis, but also as an 
irreducible frame in which something like our reconstructed concept of 
circulation must be posited.  
 
The gesture of invoking precursors, like Carey, uses the framing invocation of a 
specific media moment—the emergence of telegraphy—to perpetuate 
materiality’s resistant status as shaping commonplace media-theoretical term. 
At the level of the discipline itself, we might tie this gesture to the higher-order 
epistemologies that shape media theory in practice. At the level of the 
concept, infrastructure, we can identify how this gesture institutes what I’m 
calling the infrastructural filiation, shifting the epistemological value we assign 
to both infrastructure and media and subsuming the latter to the problem of 
whether or how media are materialised. For the concept that concerns us, 
circulation, we see how the infrastructural filiation materialises media’s 
circulations by subordinating them to this problem. I called this an 
epistemological complex because each of its parts are articulations of 
materiality’s epistemological resistance: its persistence in media theory as a 
category that contours our media-theoretical practices, whether or not it’s 
incorporated in to the theoretical frameworks we adopt. Our attempts to 
reconstruct circulation can’t avoid this epistemological terrain. If it’s necessary 
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to think media’s online circulations after infrastructure, we have to be able to 
acknowledge infrastructure’s epistemological influence on media theory itself. 
This means eschewing its role in perpetuating materiality’s status as a 
commonplace category around which theoretical practice shapes itself and 
through which our commonplace usages of circulation are materialised. Our 
challenge is to lever materiality out of its role as disciplinary-epistemological 
precursor. In excess of themselves, I want to argue that we have to think 
matter after media: neither before, as substrate; nor with, in process or 
immanently; but, epistemologically a posteriori.  
 
The next chapter will bring us full circle. This chapter and the two that 
preceded it presented analyses of what I take to be the three main filiations 
that inform our media-theoretical usages of circulation. Each of these analyses 
argued that these filiations foreclosed our capacity to conceptualise media in 
excess of themselves. Yet each also presented epistemological materials that 
we can use to reconstruct a concept of circulation that’s adequate to the 
internet meme and that can be used to formulate a theory of it. They 
produced these materials by demonstrating the different characteristics of 
media that we invoke circulation to think. In the next chapter, I want to use 
these characteristics as the basis for a reconstructed concept of circulation. As 
I’ve outlined here, this concept will have to posit an alternate relationship to 
materiality and to the higher-order disciplinary epistemology that it expresses. 
This concept will have to take account of my claims that media’s online 
circulations supervening on platforms. It will also have to take account of the 
influence that the anatomical body continues to exert over our concepts of 
circulation. To frame this reconstructive effort, I want to rearticulate these 
parameters in the interrogative: How might we think circulation after platforms, 
as bodied, and before materiality? What are media in circulation, sloughed of 
these framing and filiating predicates? Perhaps most crucially—What can we use 
circulation for? 
 
III. THE MEME IS/IN CIRCULATION 
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7. CIRCULATION, BEFORE AND AFTER 
 
 
7.0 WRIGGLE ROOM 
After all, what is circulation? Or, what is circulation for media theory, for our 
indeterminate postdigital media situation, and as the pivot around which a 
media-theoretical practice might be articulated? To recall the introduction to 
this thesis, circulation must be a concept that’s capable of conceptualising 
media in excess of themselves. For a concept of circulation to be able to 
respond to our postdigital media situation—we might say to be filiated to it—it 
would also have to be in indeterminacy. This construction deliberately flirts with 
paradox. The indeterminacy of our postdigital media situation is both a 
concrete product of media’s circulations and the context in which circulation 
becomes a problematic media-theoretical concept. We could take this to be a 
prohibition against certain kinds of media-theoretical gestures, but it can also 
be articulated as a premise. If we posit a concept of circulation in 
indeterminacy, it wouldn’t be indeterminate. Rather, it would be formulated to 
hold the media it takes as its objects in productive tension with the 
epistemological effects these media have on our theoretical practices. It would 
be supple enough to incorporate indeterminacy as a constituent component of 
what it does, yet incisive enough to give us purchase on the concrete 
indeterminacy that constitutes the field in which it works.   
 
The preceding chapters adopted a media-historical epistemological approach 
to analyse our extant media-theoretical usages of the concept of circulation. 
These chapters adapted the concepts of the problem, the commonplace, and 
the filiation to identify circulation’s underdeterminacy, to identify its 
commonplace usages, to outline some of the effects of its overdeterminacy, 
and to apprehend the organising conceptual work that circulation does when 
it’s invoked to think media. They claimed that in taking media’s online 
circulations to be already given, our commonplace invocations of circulation 
tacitly allow the term to supervene on the technical ensembles that put media 
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in to circulation, reducing media to “content." They claimed that when we treat 
circulation as a principle that we can invoke to claim that media circulate for 
the sake of something else, we reproduce its filiation to the anatomical body—
or the anatomical body’s epistemological substitute, reducing media to their 
ontological predicates. They claimed that circulation’s tacit relationship to 
media theory’s higher-order epistemologies drew it in to a disciplinary 
tendency to materialise media, substituting this problem for the problem of 
how we might think media in excess of themselves. We might characterise the 
analyses posited by these chapters, in the negative, as assertions of what a 
concept of circulation adequate to our postdigital media situation is not. Whilst 
they identify the characteristics of media that we typically use circulation to 
address, they stop short of making propositions about what circulation ought 
to be.  
 
But these chapters didn’t fail to make any propositions at all. In identifying 
circulation’s complementary problem, establishing circulation’s role as a 
commonplace media-theoretical term, and mapping the persistent influence of 
circulation’s filiations, these chapters made propositions about what it means 
to practice media theory in the present. Their overt aim was to outline the 
characteristics of media that we typically use circulation to address. In the 
process, they addressed the ways in which circulation’s under- and 
overdeterminacy impacts our capacity to think media in excess of themselves. 
But they also provided an—admittedly-limited—overview of the conditions in 
which circulation was able to become an under- and over-determined media-
theoretical concept. These analyses double, that is, as a mapping of the 
epistemological effects that media have on our media-theoretical practices. 
These analyses delimited the epistemological indeterminacy that a 
reconstructed concept of circulation must be able to incorporate. What they 
produced was a set of epistemological materials that we can use to reconstruct 
this concept under these conditions.  
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We can articulate what these chapters have set out to do in another way. We 
allow the media concept to supervene on platforms because we treat 
circulation as a commonplace; we body media because we don’t ask why we 
treat circulation as a principle, or recognise that we use it to posit something 
for the sake of which media circulate; we materialise media because the 
emphasis we place on the higher-order epistemological category of the 
theoretical framework obscures the epistemological drag that disciplines exert 
on our theoretical practices. These are the concrete-epistemological conditions 
in which the concept of circulation might be reconstructed. These are—at least 
some of—the prerequisites for the concept of circulation I want to posit in this 
chapter. The concept of circulation I want to posit works in and works with the 
wriggle room that media-historical epistemology establishes between concrete 
and epistemological. If media don’t determine our situation but nevertheless 
inform our theories of them, circulation’s necessity inheres in its potential to 
be situated precisely in this recursion without being paralysed by it. 
 
This recursive relation shifts circulation’s role within the clutch of concepts 
that define media theory. It’s not another concept of the middle, the 
characteristic which we can identify, by elimination, as that which most 
concisely defines the media concept.1 Nor does it articulate a process or a set 
of relations, which are terms we might otherwise use to express the concept of 
mediation.2 Rather, my assertion is that characteristic that we can most 
concisely use to conceptualise circulation is that it is before and after media. It’s 
before media, because media’s concrete circulations constitute the conditions 
in which media present themselves as objects of theorisation. It’s after media, 
because circulation takes media as its object. It’s before media, because 
                                                        
1  This notion is not universal, but it’s perhaps the best extant minimal definition of media. I’ll 
expand upon the differences between these later, but examples of media theorists that 
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Media: Descartes’ Sticks, Naked Communication, and Immediacy.” Cultural Studies 30, no. 4 
(2016): 630–49; John Durham. Peters, “Mass Media,” In Critical Terms for Media Studies, 
edited by W.J.T. Mitchell, and Mark B.N. Hansen, 266–79. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2010. 
2  Galloway, Alexander R. “Love of the Middle,” In Excommunication: Three Inquiries in Media 
and Mediation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. 25–75. 
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circulation has a reciprocal, organising effect on the media concept and the 
concept of meditation. It’s after media, because it articulates media in excess of 
themselves. It’s before media, because it’s their concrete-epistemological 
frame; but it’s after media, because it’s not an ontological principle by which 
we can extrapolate a trans-historical, “contemporary” concept of media. The in 
of in circulation captures this before and after. In circulation, media are in 
excess of themselves—conditioning and conditioned in turn. This in also 
captures the in of in indeterminacy. Circulation is a concept whose utility only 
lies in circulation, or in modes of analysis that shade in to modes of 
theorisation and in epistemologies that are reciprocally assembled in and by 
their concrete applications.  
 
This chapter represents the culmination of the after, tying the epistemological 
materials assembled by the previous three chapters into a concept of 
circulation. These analyses respectively claimed that we we need to think 
circulation after platforms, as bodied, and before materiality. Following on from 
these claims, the propositions I want to make in this chapter are these: after 
platforms, circulation is technical; in circulation, media’s materiality is a 
technical-epistemological product rather than an ontological predicate; 
circulation bodies media as milieu; and that in circulation, media can be 
expressed as instance and/or plurality. To make these propositions, this 
chapter will introduce further theoretical resources drawn, in particular, from 
the philosophy of technology and from media theory. To avoid recapitulating a 
“contemporary” theoretical practice, I will translate these resources from an 
ontological register into an epistemological one, using them to further finesse 
the role that media play in constituting the conditions in which they present 
themselves as objects of theorisation. I’ll also deal with these propositions in a 
different order to the respective chapters in which they were broached, in 
order to capitalise on different conceptual connections. What draws these 
propositions together into a coherent whole is that they respond to the 
problem that has organised this thesis and that has provided its refrain: How 
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do we think media in excess of themselves? In the form of a concept, I finally 
want to respond—in circulation.  
 
Circulation isn’t a method; it’s a concept. Media-historical epistemology 
provided us with a method, but it operates in too specific and yet too 
generalising a conceptual key to give us much purchase on the banality and 
extremity of online culture. With the concept of circulation and in the wriggle 
room we can force between the recursively-related concrete and 
epistemological, we find what I’m calling “meme theory."  
 
“Meme theory” is the media-theoretical practice that complements the media-
historical method I used to analyse circulation and the concept of circulation I 
will posit here. This practice will use the concept of circulation and the method 
of media-historical epistemology to inform a media theory that’s never 
“contemporary”, but always concretised. Rather than proposing a concept of 
circulation that would be universally applicable to media, it affirms that this 
concept must be fitted to the media that it is used to think in excess of 
themselves. It recognises that circulation plays an organising role for media 
theory, but it also acknowledges that a media theory that’s aware of media’s 
capacity to inform our theories of them must necessarily be reassembled in 
and through its application to novel media. It recognises, finally, that this 
reassembly will only be successful if our media-theoretical practices eschew 
“contemporaneity” in lieu of remaining responsive to the relationship between 
its own concrete-epistemological contexts—and, sometimes, their occluded, 
often-convoluted histories. If this chapter thinks circulation after media, the 
one that follows it will handle the before; or, the task of thinking circulation 
through the internet meme and, so, articulating what I’m calling “meme theory." 
It will do so by using circulation to frame an analysis of a particularly defining 
moment for the internet meme and for online culture: its uptake in the new 
online culture wars. For now, though, I want to note that what I’m calling 
“meme theory” is a media theory tailored to be practiced in our indeterminate 
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postdigital media situation—or, we might say, in circulation. After all, to be in 
circulation is to be in indeterminacy, in the present. 
 
 
7.1 CIRCULATION AFTER THE PLATFORM 
This thesis’s analyses of circulation began in the present, with media’s concrete 
online circulations and with the computational architecture that makes them 
possible—the platform. In my analysis of the platform, I argued that it exercised 
an epistemological influence on media theory. Because circulation is 
underdetermined as a media-theoretical concept, we typically invoke it as a 
commonplace term, taking for granted that online media have to be put in to 
circulation by computational architectures or processes. The effect, I argued, 
was that our commonplace invocations of circulation reduce media to 
“content”—or to the epistemological form of that which can be circulated 
online by platforms—and conflate media with the parameters of the platforms 
that make their circulations possible. Platforms inform media theory by 
reproducing media as the empty form of “content." I used this analysis to argue 
that circulation plays an organising role in media theory in spite of its 
underdeterminacy because it informs our conceptualisations of media—tacitly 
and in practice, if not overtly. The question this analysis raised is this: How can 
we think circulation after the platform? That is, how can we think circulation in 
ways that not only account for the concrete and epistemological influences the 
platform exerts on media theory, but that make these influences available as 
epistemological resources for circulation’s reconceptualisation? 
 
My first proposition is this: after the platform, circulation has to be 
conceptualised in technical terms. Earlier, I argued that our alternate concept 
of circulation could be reconstructed out of the conceptual work that the term 
already does for media theory. Concrete platforms, we might say, process 
media theory as they make media available for theorisation. Rather than 
focusing on the platform, the abstract concept, I want to focus on this active 
influence by returning to what several scholars refer to as “platformisation”, or 
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the process by which platforms increasingly organise the contemporary 
internet and by which they recursively organise themselves—and, so, process 
media theory. The media-theoretical concept of circulation is technical insofar 
as its capacity to put in to circulation has concrete-epistemological effects. To 
formalise this influence, I want to conceptualise platforms as technical 
ensembles.   
 
For Anne Helmond, platformisation names a process by which sociality is 
increasingly organised by the platform’s “programmability." By recentralising 
data collection in the platform and decentralising of data production to users, 
platforms become recursive and self-fashioning, or “programmable”: what 
users produce in their “modular” compartments has the capacity to reorganise 
what platforms serve to users, on both small and large scales.3 For Helmond, 
“[p]latformization [sic] entails the extension of social media platforms into the 
rest of the web and their drive to make external web data “platform ready””, 
informing how the web is organised by informing how data is produced and 
made circulatable.4 In a recent article on programmability, Adrian Mackenzie 
extends this idea further. For Mackenzie, platformisation is also a process that 
exerts an organising, gravitational influence on the internet. Only, this process 
is at once extensive and intensive: platformisation is “the process of 
constructing a somewhat lifted-out or well-bounded domain as a relational 
intersection for different groups."5 Moreover, Mackenzie argues that what 
Helmond and others call “programmability” has undergone a significant shift. 
Because platforms are increasingly facilitated by artificial intelligence and other 
forms of machine learning, he suggests that programmability has shifted from a 
mode “focused on linking systems” to a mode “centred on prediction."6 This 
mode employs predictive systems—he focuses on four Facebook projects—that 
employ artificial intelligence and other forms of machine learning to 
                                                        
3  Anne Helmond. “The Platformization of the Web: Making Web Data Platform Ready.” Social 
Media + Society 1, no. 2 (2015): 1–11. 
4  Helmond. “The Platformization of the Web." 7. 
5  Adrian Mackenzie. “From API to AI: Platforms and Their Opacities.” Information, 
Communication & Society (2018): 7. 
6  Mackenzie. “From API to AI ." 2. 
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reconstitute platforms as sites of experimental, recursive refashioning. In media 
theory, it’s commonplace to point out the proprietary, “black boxed” nature of 
platforms’ algorithms.7 That is, it’s commonplace to note that platforms are 
“opaque."8 For Mackenzie, platforms’ opacity has a specific technical basis. 
Because platforms process data at massive scales, they employ higher-order 
experimental models to try to control the way they organise the relations they 
make possible and exploit. What Mackenzie calls “opacity” corresponds to 
what I’ve been referring to as epistemological indeterminacy. Only, my 
argument is that this indeterminacy is not only a product of platforms, but that 
it informs our media-theoretical practices. 
 
Platformisation is both extensive and intensive. That is, it names a process by 
which platforms’ programmability is increasingly organising the internet and by 
which they constitute themselves as experimental sites for recursive self-
refashioning. Platforms are, obviously, technical. So are processes of 
platformisation. In claiming that circulation has to be conceptualised in 
technical terms, I mean to posit it as a concept that sits in indeterminacy. 
Circulation has to conceptualise media in circulation by acknowledging that 
concrete platforms—or another, more appropriate technical process—inform 
how media are presented to us as objects of theorisation, using the influence 
they exert as epistemological material for media-theoretical work. The 
“technical” part of this formulation is crucial, because it’s often assumed, but 
not usually accorded a theoretical stature that matches its epistemological 
import. Crucially, this formulation can also help us to lend more specificity to 
my claim that our postdigital media situation is indeterminate. If circulation is 
                                                        
7  Taina Bucher. “Neither Black Nor Box: Ways of Knowing Algorithms,” In Innovative Methods 
in Media and Communication Research, edited by Sebastian Kubitschko, and Anne Kaun, 81–
98. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016; Tarleton Gillespie. “Algorithmically Recognizable: Santorum’s 
Google Problem, and Google’s Santorum Problem.” Information, Communication & Society 
20, no. 1 (2017): 63–80. See also my forthcoming co-authored chapter with McKenzie 
Wark, which picks up on this idea in the context of thinking circulation: “Circulation and Its 
Discontents,” In Post Memes: Seizing the Memes of Production, edited by Alfie Brown, and 
Francis Russell, Forthcoming. Santa Barbara: punctum books, 2019. 
8  Jean-Christophe Plantin, Carl Lagoze, Paul N. Edwards, and Christian Sandvig. 
“Infrastructure Studies Meet Platform Studies in the Age of Google and Facebook.” New 
Media and Society 20, no. 1 (2018): 293–310. 
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technical, we can construe this indeterminacy as a concrete-epistemological 
condition. 
 
Mackenzie uses the concept of platformisation to claim that platforms are 
“sites of ongoing engineering research” that are designed “to negotiate an 
opacity or indeterminacy generated in the process of platformisation or in the 
grouping together of technical elements in an ensemble."9 He draws the 
concept of the ensemble from Gilbert Simondon, for whom it denotes a 
higher-order technical form: neither a tool nor a machine, but a collection of 
technical elements that’s organised by a “margin of indeterminacy."10 This 
concept captures the irreducible degree to which complex technical ensembles 
are defined by their openness—their inextricability from their relations; their 
capacity for change within the limits they impose upon themselves; and the 
paradoxical way in which what’s indefinable about them is what distinguishes 
them as coherent and identifiable technical entities.11 I want to draw on this 
notion of the “technical” nature of the platform to frame my concept of 
circulation—with a crucial caveat.  
 
In Simondon’s conceptual language, the technical ensemble has a specific 
valence: it’s part of a philosophy of technology that attempts to posit 
technology as a “third mode of being” that’s irreducible to either materiality or 
life.12 This claim is recapitulated as one of the foundational premises of 
Bernard Stiegler’s recent philosophy of technology, when he argues that 
philosophy treats technological beings as “nothing but a hybrid” of 
“mechanics”—or materiality—and “biology” and that they continue to have “no 
                                                        
9  Mackenzie. “From API to AI." 15. 
10  Gilbert Simondon. On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects. Translated by Cecile 
Malaspina and John Rogrove. Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2017; see also Brian 
Massumi in conversation with Arne De Boever, Alex Murray, and Jon Roffe. “”Technical 
Mentality” Revisited: Brian Massumi on Gilbert Simondon.” Parrhesia 7 (2009): 36–45. 
11  Pascal Chabot. The Philosophy of Simondon: Between Technology and Individuation. Translated 
by Aliza Krefetz with the participation of Graeme Kirkpatrick. London and New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2013. 15-17. 
12  Simondon. On the Mode of Existence. 43. 
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more ontological status than they did in ancient philosophy."13 We could make 
a standard-theoretical move, here, and posit platforms as technical beings that 
inform our media-theoretical practices, using the claim that circulation is a 
technical process, in the strong, ontological sense, as the basis for further 
theorisation. I want to draw on a similar claim made by Friedrich Kittler in a late 
essay on media and ontology. “Metaphysics”, Kittler claimed, “always already 
forgets technical media, from writing itself up to the written book, its own 
precondition."14 Following Kittler, theory and philosophy—and, by extension, 
the standard theoretical approach—have a media-theoretical problem that can 
be construed as epistemological in nature. What we forget is that our practices 
of theorisation are informed by media—and that these media are technical. In 
claiming that the concept of circulation is technical, I want to disentangle it 
from the foundational claims that Simondon and Stiegler make of technology.  
 
This is not to say that ontological postulation is invalid or unnecessary. Rather, 
it’s to claim that the ontological question of what media are is superseded by 
the epistemological question of how they’re presented to us as objects of 
theorisation when they’re thought in circulation. In circulation, media generate 
their own ontologies too quickly for theory to keep pace. If the concept of 
circulation does exert an organising influence on media theory and on the 
media concept, the question of what media are has to be resolved after we 
establish what they are, in circulation. What Kittler identifies—perhaps 
inadvertently—is an epistemological gap. By claiming that circulation is 
technical, we can posit epistemological indeterminacy as the point of departure 
for our concept of circulation.  
 
One extrapolation we might make from my earlier analyses of the platform is 
that its modularity and programmability make the circulation of media like the 
internet meme possible. When they’re taken for granted, they reduce media to 
                                                        
13  Bernard Stiegler. Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus. Translated by Richard 
Beardsworth, and George Collins. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1998. 2. 
14  Friedrich Kittler. “Towards an Ontology of Media.” Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 2-3 
(2009): 27. 
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“content." More than this, concrete platforms produce indeterminacy by 
contributing to media’s concrete contemporary ubiquity. This is crucial for 
thinking contemporary online media—like the internet meme—in circulation. 
But we might make another extrapolation. The process of platformisation 
provides us with the epistemological means to further specify my claim that 
our postdigital media situation is indeterminate. This situation is indeterminate, 
in part, because media circulate in excess—their ubiquity overwhelms. But it’s 
also indeterminate because epistemological indeterminacy is an operative 
component of the technical ensembles—like the platform—that put media in to 
circulation online. The epistemological indeterminacy of our postdigital media 
situation isn’t a condition; it’s a concrete product of platformisation.  
 
What I meant to convey when I claimed that the concept of circulation has to 
be posited in indeterminacy is that it has to be able to articulate a media-
theoretical practice that would remain responsive to indeterminacy—
understood as a concrete-epistemological condition of theorisation and as the 
operative means by which media inform the conditions in which they become 
objects of theorisation. Circulation is a technical concept because it provides 
us with the conceptual means to work in and work with this indeterminacy; or, 
to think media after circulation and circulation after the platform. A media-
theoretical practice that thinks with the concept of circulation in the present 
has to think through its technicity. Our capacity to conceptualise media 
themselves depends on it.  
 
 
7.2 CIRCULATION BEFORE MATERIALITY 
The chapter after my analysis of platforms turned to another of circulation’s 
filiations: the anatomical body. Before dealing with that chapter and explicating 
my proposition that circulation bodies media as what I want to call “milieu”, I 
want to circle ahead and to pick up the thread of the chapter after that one 
and before this, which analysed what I called the infrastructural filiation. 
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A little rehearsal is necessary to outline this chapter and the proposition I want 
to posit in response. The aim of the analysis presented in the last chapter was 
to demonstrate the epistemological role that the discipline—and its ad hoc 
canons of already-existing research—plays in shaping our media-theoretical 
practices. The premise of this chapter was its claim that the concept of 
infrastructure belongs to an epistemological lineage of concepts that attempts 
to materialise media; that is, that in practice, concepts of infrastructure get 
caught up in a persistent disciplinary question of whether or how media are 
materialised. It explored this premise by identifying and analysing what I called 
the higher-order epistemologies that inform and shape our media-theoretical 
practices. This chapter made two key claims: first, that materiality shapes 
media theory because of its epistemological persistence, rather than its 
ontological resistance; and second, that the gesture of invoking theoretical 
precursors extends to key media-historical moments, and that we have a 
tendency to glean ontological claims from otherwise concrete, historically-
specific media.  
 
I want to take a cue here from an assertion that John Durham Peters makes in 
his recent conceptualisation of the elements as media. In his discussion of 
what he labels “infrastructuralism”—his term for the “infrastructural turn”—
Peters suggests that “[o]ntology, whatever it is, is usually just forgotten 
infrastructure."15 This assertion might be presented as a wry witticism, but—
like most of Peters’ seemingly-offhand assertions—it demands to be treated 
programmatically. After Peters, we might say that the media-historical moment 
of telegraphy’s emergence shades into ontology once we forget the 
telegraph’s status as infrastructure. This claim is subtly different to the 
Heideggerian-phenomenological idea most famously promulgated by Susan 
Leigh Star: that “[t]he normally invisible quality of working infrastructure 
becomes visible when it breaks."16 Peters’ claim addresses infrastructure and 
                                                        
15  Peters. The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2015. 38. 
16  Susan Leigh Star. “The Ethnography of Infrastructure.” American Behavioral Scientist 43 
(1999): 382. 
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ontology, but it has epistemological implications. My take on it is that at the 
higher-order epistemological level of the discipline, the emergence of 
telegraphy can only institute an ontology when we allow its concrete effects to 
be subordinated to the epistemological significance it’s accorded within the 
discipline of media theory as a putatively-key media-historical moment.17 In 
effect, treating Carey as precursor subsumes the concrete, infrastructural 
specificity of the telegraph to its status within the discipline of media theory 
and the development of its epistemologies. When Carey’s essay is invoked as a 
precursor, it’s often invoked as the representative of a particular media-
historical conjuncture after which what media are is no longer the same. Its 
precursive role is not historical, but is rather doubly disciplinary-
epistemological and ontological. It’s posited as a key historical moment so that 
media theorists can glean media-theoretical ontological propositions from 
concrete media situations.  
 
Insofar as our media-theoretical epistemologies are historically variable, we 
ought to question whether media’s histories are able to bear this kind of 
ontological burden. This question is particularly apposite to the present 
chapter. It opens up the disciplinary question of what materiality is, for media. 
More crucially, it opens up the specific question that has occupied this thesis 
as a whole: How might we think media in excess of themselves? In response to 
this infrastructural filiation, the prior chapter made a two-part argument: first, 
infrastructure is necessary for thinking media in circulation in our postdigital 
media situation, because it helps us to account for media’s concrete 
circulations at scale; but second, it’s insufficient, insofar as it subsumes 
circulation to a wholly different epistemological problem. My assertion is that 
the latter forecloses our ability to articulate a concept of circulation that’s 
adequate to the former. I argued that in order to posit media’s infrastructures 
as a constituent part of media’s circulations, we need to disengage the concept 
                                                        
17  It has to be noted that Peters is guilty of just this bait and switch in his essay on Carey’s 
essay on the telegraph. See: Peters. “Technology and Ideology: The Case of the Telegraph 
Revisited,” In Thinking With James Carey: Essays on Communications, Transportation, History, 
edited by Jeremy Packer and Craig Robertson. New York: Peter Lang, 2007. 137–57. 
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of infrastructure from this materialising lineage: by thinking materiality after 
media. This—admittedly rather gnomic—postulation is the point of departure 
for my second proposition about the concept of circulation: in circulation, 
media’s materiality is a technical-epistemological product rather than an 
ontological predicate.  
 
This second proposition is contingent upon the one I just introduced above—
that after platforms, circulation is technical. But the infrastructural filiation 
could be conceived of as the reciprocal near-inverse of the platform filiation. 
Overlooking the role that the platform plays in putting media in to circulation 
allows our commonplace usages of circulation to supervene on the platform. 
The infrastructural filiation, by contrast, is informed by a higher-order 
epistemology that’s expressed at the level of the discipline itself. It doesn’t 
overlook the influence of media on our theories of them; rather it inflates this 
influence, occluding the historical variability of our media-theoretical 
epistemologies in the process. In response, my proposition is that we need to 
treat materiality as a historically-specific constituent of media. This approach is 
not critical of the ontological uses to which the category of materiality are put, 
per se. Rather, it responds to the precursive role accorded to historically-
specific, concrete media by media theory’s higher-order disciplinary uses of the 
category of materiality. This higher-order epistemology renders materiality 
hylomorphic. I want to further examine the interrelation of the media-historical 
moment, media-theoretical practice, and the ontological claim to argue that 
hylomorphism—as epistemology and as putative ontology—is, in fact, a product 
of media.  
 
Per Peters, that infrastructure gets forgotten isn’t simply natural. Peters notes 
that infrastructures “are” only “insofar as they are normalized into taken-for-
granteds."18 In his overview of what he calls “infrastructuralism”, he leaves the 
agent of this forgetting unnamed. In a recent essay, Alexander R. Galloway 
puts a further spin on the commonplace claim that infrastructures only become 
                                                        
18  Peters. The Marvelous Clouds. 33. 
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visible when they break that’s particularly apposite to our present discussion. 
Galloway notes, in reference to what I’ve been referring to as our postdigital 
media situation, that “we live within the cybernetic universe without 
necessarily being conscious of it and we use these digital tools without 
necessarily reflecting on them."19 This claim echoes Star’s. But he goes on to 
say not only that “the naturalization of technology has reached unprecedented 
levels with the advent of digital machines”, but that “[n]ature likes to hide itself, 
and it’s no different with computers."20 This claim echoes the claim I made of 
platforms, but its consequences for media theory are quite different. For some 
media theorists, platforms are a kind of infrastructure.21 Where the forgetting 
of platforms allows our commonplace invocations of circulation to supervene 
on them and, so, to organise the media concept, the proposition that 
infrastructures are defined by being forgotten is bound up in a related, but 
nevertheless distinct, ontological presupposition: that infrastructures persist. 
Under the influence of the higher-order epistemology expressed in the 
practices that constitute media theory as a discipline, this persistence is 
accorded to infrastructures’ resistant materiality. In recapitulating 
infrastructure as a hylomorphic concept in practice, this higher-order 
epistemology uses the infrastructure concept to construe materiality as a 
component of media, which is to say, as coincident with it; or, as a condition of 
media, and so precedent to it. My claim is this: that infrastructure gets 
forgotten presents it as analogous to nature, but that it gets forgotten is not 
“natural”; it’s technical.  
 
To pluck at a stray thread of Galloway’s argument, computers like to hide 
themselves. This claim has epistemological consequences for media theory’s 
treatment of the category of materiality. In our postdigital media situation, 
computers’ self-obfuscation is best expressed by the logic of the interface. 
Computational systems organised as stacks facilitate the relation between their 
layers with interfaces that, as Florian Cramer and Matthew Fuller put it, 
                                                        
19  Alexander R.Galloway. “The Cybernetic Hypothesis.” differences 25, no. 1 (2014): 127. 
20  Galloway. “The Cybernetic Hypothesis." 127. 
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“describe, hide, and condition the asymmetry between the elements 
conjoined."22 So, we typically access our computational devices using 
keyboards, mice, screens, or touch-sensitive panels; but at other levels, 
interfaces facilitate the access of, for instance, automated processes to 
machine-readable data. As Christian Ulrik Andersen and Søren Bro Pold argue 
in a recent book, the interface could be considered one of the defining 
computational logics of our indeterminate postdigital media situation; as logic, 
this constitutes what they call the “metainterface."23 They present the 
interface as representative of a more general, computational tendency, 
recapitulating the version of the media concept that claims operative media 
recede from notice for an age in which computation is massively distributed. 
Another response to the interface and to the media-theoretical claim it 
recapitulates might change its terms. In mediating their capacity to recede from 
notice, media arguably present the category of materiality to us as an 
epistemological means by which they might be apprehended, in theory. That is, 
that media mediate undermines the category of materiality’s capacity to 
explain media ontologically. This argument isn’t idealist so much as it 
concretises our media-theoretical epistemologies: that media are there must be 
filtered through their capacity to frame “there” in its obdurateness and 
resistance.  
 
One of Kittler’s late essays provides us with the means to formalise this 
approach to materiality. In a reflection on the general absence of technology 
from philosophy—which echoes the framing claims of Stiegler’s own 
philosophy of technology—Kittler24 argues that the categories of form and 
matter that constitute Aristotle’s hylomorphic doctrine “are categories 
stemming originally from technical things and more or less forcibly transferred 
                                                                                                                                                            
21  Plantin et. al. “Infrastructure Studies meets Platform Studies." 
22  Florian Cramer and Matthew Fuller. “Interface,” In Software Studies: A Lexicon, 149–52. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008. 150. 
23  Christian Ulrik Andersen and Søren Bro Pold. The Metainterface: The Art of Platforms, Cities, 
and Clouds. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2018. 
24  Stiegler. Technics and Time. 3. 
  222 
also to natural ones."25 He uses this argument to claim that “[i]t is precisely 
because the opposition of form and matter stems from technology…that 
ontology systematically excluded media technologies from its domain."26 I am 
less concerned with this—ontological—argument than I am with its 
epistemological implications. Kittler means to establish technical media as 
philosophy’s a priori conditions of possibility, as per the discussion of an earlier 
essay of his in Chapter 3. But he also ties this a prioretic status to hylomorphic 
doctrines. Noting my earlier arguments against his positing of media as a priori, 
we can use Kittler’s claims to make a media-historical epistemological 
proposition: media’s materiality is a technical-epistemological product rather 
than an ontological predicate, because media constitute the—concrete-
epistemological—conditions in which their own materiality becomes available 
as a category for theorisation. This puts another spin on his claim, cited above, 
that metaphysics “forgets technical media, from writing itself up to the written 
book, its own precondition."27 This forgetting is by design. More than this, 
Kittler implies that the idea that nature likes to hide itself, qua Galloway, is an 
epistemological product of the kinds of hylomorphic distinctions that media 
technologies produce. Because it’s by design, the specificities of this forgetting 
varies with media—and so, too, do the specificities of materiality itself.  
 
In the convolution of media theory’s higher-order disciplinary epistemologies—
which shape how the materiality of media can be thought; and concrete 
media—which shape materiality for thought, the media-historical 
epistemological analysis I’ve presented doesn’t claim that media are not 
material. Within the context of media theory, making this claim would 
necessarily posit them as being immaterial—or would, at least, open this claim 
up to this critique. Rather, the basic claim I mean to make is this: that media 
present materiality to us—that media mediate—renders ontology secondary 
and epistemology primary. By historicising the materiality of media with the 
claim that our media-theoretical epistemologies are historically variable, this 
                                                        
25  Kittler. “Towards an Ontology." 25. 
26  Kittler. “Towards an Ontology." 25. 
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analysis renders materiality as doubly recursive. Positing materiality as a 
predicate of media—that is, as before  or coincident with media—might help us 
to specify their materiality, but it does not help us to think media in excess of 
themselves. This positing is caught up in media’s own presentation of their 
materiality and in higher-order, media-theoretical-disciplinary epistemologies. 
Moreover, it’s not enough to simply posit matter after media.  
 
Bernhard Siegert’s recent conceptualisations of “media after media” help us to 
understand why this gesture is potentially problematic. In response to what he 
identifies as the “becoming-inauthentic of media” in what I call our 
indeterminate postdigital media situation, Siegert argues for an approach that 
thinks what he describes as “the concrete ontic operations and practices that 
produce first of all ontological distinctions."28 His approach to thinking these 
operations is to identify the constituent “cultural techniques” that media 
formalise. I’ve mentioned this concept in this thesis already; what makes it 
relevant to this discussion is the way it posits what’s before and after media. 
For Siegert, using concrete cultural techniques to think ontology places 
media—and the media concept—in the position of being after mediatic 
operations. But it also introduces a recursion: what’s after cultural techniques 
is the media that have been dissolved into cultural techniques. Cultural 
techniques might gain recursive purchase on the operative production of 
ontological distinctions, but would not be able to tell us more about media 
than that if they are material, their materiality is specific. Geoffrey Winthrop-
Young describes this method as a “deconstructive manoeuvre” that we can use 
to “disentangle acts, series, techniques and technologies”; tellingly, he ascribes 
it the capacity to identify “the materialities of ontologization."29 What escapes 
this recursion is what media are in excess of themselves. The same goes for a 
media-theoretical method we might construe from Kittler’s assertion that 
                                                                                                                                                            
27  Kittler. “Towards an Ontology." 27. 
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media produce hylomorphisms. In positing that materiality ought to be thought 
after media, what I’m trying to propose is an approach that rescues the media 
concept by positing its perpetual inauthenticity, as grounded by its concrete-
epistemological specificity.   
 
Instead, I want to take a cue from another of Matthew Fuller’s articulations of 
software studies. In an approach that resonates with the subsection above on 
platforms, Fuller argues that recent software studies methods add a fourth 
term to Kittler’s infamous tripartite conceptualisation of media. To foreshadow 
the next subsection, Kittler infamously asserts that “the most elementary 
definition of media” is that they “record, transmit, and process information."30 
Fuller suggests that insofar as media “have in many cases become a subset of 
computational systems”—or inauthentic—they’re also defined by what he calls 
“analysis”: “the breaking down of complex entities into what, at a certain scale, 
can be read as nominally fundamental units, and working out their immanent, 
potential, or emergent relationships."31 Media that defined by their own 
capacity for reinvention are also subject to perpetual analysis. At a certain 
scale—the scale of media’s constitutive operations—the concept of cultural 
techniques analyses media. At the scale at which the internet meme operates, 
what analysis means is contingent. After Fuller, analysis is contingent on our 
media situation. Analysis is an epistemological operation. Once media become 
inauthentic—which is to say, once they’re constituent parts of our 
indeterminate postdigital media situation and are, in turn, informed by this 
situation—these epistemological operations express the need to think media in 
excess of themselves. For Fuller, this operation is akin to Siegert’s cultural 
techniques, seeking a given scale’s—provisional—“fundamental unit”; but it also 
assumes that media already are in excess of themselves. Here, materiality is 
tacitly posited as coming after media because it’s framed by analysis’s scale.  
 
                                                        
30  Kittler,. “The City is a Medium.” New Literary History 27, no. 4 (1996): 722. 
31  Fuller. “Software Studies Methods." 254. 
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To think the internet meme or media like it, the next step is to ask how media 
that are already in excess of themselves might also already be plural. The 
infrastructures that enable media’s massive distribution and help us to 
apprehend their circulations are material—but their materiality is expressed 
after media and, in chain, after circulation. This gesture neither relativises 
materiality nor claims its obdurate resistance is not a constituent part of media. 
Rather, it emphasises the epistemological need to specify what materiality is, in 
its historical concreteness and for media.   
 
When we practice theory as though it’s contemporary and when we treat the 
discipline of media theory as the field of its own reinvention, we treat the past 
as a component of the present. This is made possible by the forgetting of 
media or of infrastructure—and by the concomitant establishment of 
materiality as predicate that this forgetting facilitates. In this sense, we might 
say that by forgetting materiality, we can re-member infrastructure. The 
precursive role accorded to the category of materiality by media theory’s 
higher-order disciplinary epistemologies would have to be revised. Instead of 
predicating the concrete—or coming before, materiality would give us a means 
of apprehending media’s instantiated resistiveness in medias res and after 
we’ve established what media are in circulation. More than this, it enjoins us to 
reconsider the status of infrastructure itself within media theory. Thinking 
materiality after media amounts to a double gesture: it would allow media to 
express their specific, concrete materiality; but it would also draw upon the 
first media-historical epistemological precept, that media inform the conditions 
in which they become objects of theorisation, to reorder the relationship 
between the category of materiality and the media it instantiates. With this 
claim, the first media-historical epistemological precept converges with the 
second—that media-theoretical epistemologies are historically variable. In 
combination, what Kittler, Peters, and Fuller suggest is that concrete 
infrastructure doubles as the infrastructure of thought: not as its a priori, but as 
the large-scale, manifest concrete conditions in which theorisation is practiced 
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and in which the excessiveness of concrete circulating media can be analysed, 
which is to say, specified.   
 
 
7.3 CIRCULATION AS BODY 
Thought after the platform, the concept of circulation that I’m positing places 
the media concept in suspension. If media are in circulation, part of the task of 
thinking them is specifying what media are in excess of themselves; or, to put 
this another way—in excess of themselves, what media are. But this claim runs 
the risk of reproducing what I earlier identified as circulation’s anatomical 
filiation.  
 
In an earlier chapter, I used an analysis of William Harvey’s anatomical 
experiments and his natural philosophical epistemology to identify what I 
called a tendency to body media. The anatomical filiation operates by 
reproducing the role that the body plays in Harvey’s anatomical practices. As a 
natural philosopher, rather than what we’d now consider a scientist, Harvey’s 
discovery was informed by an epistemology that attributed a final cause to the 
circulation of the blood, positing that it had to circulate for the sake of 
something: the vital body. Through a series of analyses of Harvey’s influence 
on subsequent philosophical and commonplace usages of circulation, I argued 
that the term retains an anatomical filiation that reproduces the role that the 
body plays in Harvey’s natural-philosophical epistemology and that this filiation 
persists in contemporary media theory. The persistence of this filiation is 
attributable, in part, to the epistemological interchangeability that we often 
accord to biological and technical processes, which allows circulation to be 
posited for an epistemological equivalent to Harvey’s body—as in newspapers’ 
circulation, the network, flows, vitality, or biopolitical circuits. Where Harvey 
elevates circulation to the body’s organising principle, the persistence of this 
filiation subsumes media’s concrete circulations to the “body” for the sake of 
which they circulate, ultimately reducing media to the ontological principles 
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that govern this “body” in contemporary media theory: vital and/or processual 
materialisms or materialised vitalisms.  
 
Claiming that circulation is a technical concept runs the risk of reproducing this 
filiation’s epistemological gesture; or, of positing the technical ensemble—here, 
the platform—as that for the sake of which media circulate, reducing media’s 
circulations to expressions of a technical ontology. This is partly why I 
disengaged my claim that circulation is a technical concept from any specific 
technical ontology. At the same time, I also argued at the end of my analysis of 
circulation’s anatomical filiation that circulation’s tendency to body media 
actually expresses a crucial characteristic of media that we have to incorporate 
into our reconstruction of this concept. Insofar as media articulate something 
like a circuit, or something seemingly greater than the sum of their circulating 
whole, I suggested that media do constitute something like a body. There is a 
sense, that is, in which media circulate for the sake of something; or, to further 
freight this claim with meaning, that media circulate in excess of themselves. 
That is, there’s a sense in which media constitute pluralities and in which these 
pluralities generate emergent or large-scale effects.  
 
Media theory obviously has a number of concepts that articulate this 
characteristic. Aside from those I focused on in my analysis of the anatomical 
filiation, which was explicitly concerned with circulation, we might list concepts 
like media ecology, media system, atmosphere, environment, the stack, or even 
media sphere. The third proposition I want to make is that this characteristic is 
crucial to thinking media in our postdigital media situation, but that it’s 
expressed in and by media’s concrete circulations. That is, rather than 
proposing that this characteristic emerges because media circulate for the sake 
of a body—or its epistemological equivalent, my argument is that this 
characteristic emerges because media circulate for the sake of themselves. In 
circulation, media body themselves.  
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My argument that the concept of circulation places the media concept in 
suspension clears the ground for this proposition. This proposition is tailored 
to articulate media’s capacity to constitute something like a body, whilst 
avoiding reducing media to expressions of underlying ontologies. If media are 
after circulation, what media circulate for the sake of emerges in media’s 
circulations. Posited in ontological terms, this claim flirts with tautology: media 
circulate for the sake of media circulate… Posited in concrete-epistemological 
terms, though, this proposition can help us to grasp not only how media 
exceed themselves, but also how in exceeding themselves, media seem to 
constitute provisional, concrete wholes—pluralities that envelop. To qualify this 
proposition, though, we have to address a double-sided question: in 
circulation, how do media body themselves?  
 
The question of what media are in excess of themselves opens up a 
fundamental media-theoretical question that this thesis has worried at, but 
perhaps not ruminated on directly: What are media? We could list any number 
of responses to this question. Canonically, we might invoke one of the polar 
extremes represented by Marshall McLuhan’s infamous claim that “the medium 
is the message” and Raymond Williams’ equally-infamous retort, that media’s 
status as “intermediate substance” has to be understood in the context of the 
broader “social practices” of which it forms a part.32 That is, we might answer 
this question by positing a media concept in the lineages of technological 
determinism or social constructivism. Recent media theory seems to have 
moved beyond this reductive dichotomy, however. Media theorists are more 
likely to define media by highlighting other basic qualities, like media’s 
functions. Some point out ways in which media might be thought in excess of 
themselves—if not in circulation. Yet others follow an alternate lineage of the 
media concept that I want to draw on to support my proposition that media 
body themselves. The approach I want to adopt posits that media can also be 
conceptualised as milieu, or as a middle place. I want to use this concept to 
                                                        
32  Marshall McLuhan. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
Press, 1994, 7; Raymond Williams. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977. 159; 163-4. 
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argue that media are able to body themselves because in circulating for the 
sake of themselves, they constitute emergent, enveloping milieus. This quality 
is not ontological. Because it emerges after circulation, it’s concrete. Its 
capacity to envelop has epistemological effects. We can use it to articulate and 
to apprehend what circulating media body: online culture’s seeming capacity to 
envelop and to overwhelm. 
 
Before we can adopt the claim that media are conceptualisable as milieu, we 
have to contextualise it. This claim hinges on the idea that the media concept 
has two lineages: the dominant one, whereby media are conceived of as some 
variation on a “middle”; and an alternate one, which returns to the source of 
the media concept to identify a series of concepts that treat media as place. To 
recuperate this alternate lineage, both John Durham Peters and Antonio 
Somaini argue that the emergence of the media concept out of the Latin word 
medium is the result of a mistranslation. The source of medium is the Greek 
word metaxy, which Aristotle used to describe the intermediary substances 
that constitute our capacity to perceive things in the world. In a key passage in 
On the Soul, Aristotle argues that, “[s]eeing is due to an affection or change of 
what has the perceptive faculty, and it cannot be affected by the seen colour 
itself; it remains that it must be affected by what comes between.”33 He names 
this substance the diaphanes. This intermediary is one of many metaxy that 
Aristotle develops and which Somaini describes as the general category of 
those “necessary, intermediary entities that make sensory experience possible 
by transmitting the forms of external objects to the sensory organs.”34 This 
word would later be transposed into medium by Michael Scotus, who 
translated Averroes’ commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul—the first source of 
this text in the Western world—into Latin.35 Michael Scotus’s translation could 
                                                        
33  Aristotle. On the Soul. In Jonathan Barnes, Jonathan, ed. Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 
1: The Revised Oxford Translation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014. §7, 419a. 
34  Antonio Somaini. “Walter Benjamin’s Media Theory: The Medium and the Apparat.” Grey 
Room 62 (2016): 30. 
35  Somaini. “Walter Benjamin’s Media Theory.” 30. 
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be charitably described as infelicitous: the Greek cognate for the Latin medium 
is not metaxy, but méson, the middle or the medium. If the medium and the 
méson are things, the metaxy is a place: a middle ground. Peters argues, 
consequently, that “[m]edium has always meant an element, environment, or 
vehicle in the middle of things."36 So, media always already include—or, indeed, 
For Peters and Somaini, are, in the ontological sense—environments, spaces, 
atmospheres, even the elements themselves.  
 
In this vision, media studies would be irreducible to object, technology, or 
means. It encapsulates the tendency for media to be conceived of as medium 
or the occluded tendency to think media beyond mere means: recovering the 
connotations of medium from its translation into French, as what Peters calls 
milieu.37 I want to use this concept to substantiate my proposition that media 
body themselves. However, rather than positing the milieu as an ontological 
quality of media, I want to posit it as an effect of media’s concrete circulations. 
Moreover, I want to argue that media express the oscillating capacity to act as 
both middles and middle places. This argument is made possible by my claim 
that media are after circulation. To make it, we need to provisionally answer 
that fundamental media-theoretical question: What are media—at least 
minimally? 
 
Contemporary media theorists provide one answer to this question by defining 
media using their basic functions. The conception of media that’s proven to be 
one of the most influential—and, perhaps, the most parsimonious—is Kittler’s: 
as noted above, that media record, transmit, and process information. We can 
think of this as a technical conception of media: it conceptualises and 
categorises what media are through the basic technical functions of storing, 
                                                                                                                                                            
 The translation of metaxy as medium is occasionally attributed to Aquinas, as by Peters in 
the Marvelous Clouds (46). However, Somaini favours the claim that Averroes was the likely 
source, citing an influential Aristotle scholar—Emmanuele Coccia—as his authority. I follow 
Somaini and Coccia in this lineage. See:Coccia. Sensible Life: A Micro-Ontology of the Image. 
Translated by Scott Alan Stuart. New York: Fordham University Press, 2017. 
36  Peters. The Marvellous Clouds. 47. 
37  Peters. The Marvellous Clouds. 47. 
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transmitting, and processing, all of which converge in the computer.38 For 
another clutch of media theorists, what most defines media is their capacity to 
recede from perception when they mediate. For Florian Sprenger, this quality 
means that media are “only relationally observable[] in other media, in 
associations and in differences."39 Sprenger argues, in terms that resonate with 
the arguments that I made in an earlier chapter on media-historical 
epistemology and the concept, that media must be conceptualised “not as 
fixed entities, but rather by historical circumstances in which something 
becomes a medium”, or that they are historically variable.40 Sybille Krämer 
pushes media’s tendency to recede from perception even further in her recent 
reconceptualisation of media. Krämer argues that “a medium’s success… 
depends on its disappearance, and mediation is designed to make what is 
mediated appear unmediated."41 When media function, they institute a split 
between perceivable surface and physical medium: they are, she asserts, 
“bodies that can be disembodied."42 If Sprenger’s approach is historical, 
Krämer’s might be best described as Platonic. Its objects are the media that lie 
beyond their perceivable surfaces of mediation. One other noteworthy 
approach emphasises the role that media play as intermediaries. For John 
Guillory, media are middles; but rather than simply occupy places in between, 
they actively produce spaces between sender and receiver even as they 
overcome these spaces in mediation. Guillory identifies this process with the 
verb “distanciation.”43 This echoes Michel Serres’ concept of the “parasite”, or 
the intermediary that establishes relations between whilst using its role to 
                                                        
38  Kittler. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Translated by Geoffrey WInthrop-Young and Michael 
Wutz. Stanford University Press, 1999. See also: Kittler. “The History of Communication 
Media.” CTheory (1996): 
http://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/ctheory/article/view/14325/5101. 
39  Sprenger. “The Metaphysics of Media." 645. 
40  Sprenger. “The Metaphysics of Media." 645. 
41  Sybille Krämer. Medium, Messenger, Transmission: An Approach to Media Philosophy. 
Amsterdam University Press, 2015. 31. 
42  Krämer. Medium, Messenger, Transmision. 34. 
43  Guillory. “Genesis of the Media Concept." 257. 
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exploit those relations.44 Whether conceived in spatial or abstract terms, this 
“middle” inter-mediates.  
 
What unites each of these concepts is that they begin in the middle by 
positing a middle, construed as technical, recessive, absent, spatialised, or 
parasitic. Each also elaborates what we might think of as an ontology of media: 
because media is or does x, media is. I want to briefly mention one final media 
concept that fits in to this category of defining media using their basic 
qualities. This concept has the advantage of doubling as an epistemological 
heuristic that we can use to establish what’s at stake in asking the question, 
What are media?, in our postdigital present. Elsewhere, Peters argues that the 
media concept has three basic components: the message, the means itself, and 
the agents it involves.45 This claim has the advantage of being able to stand in 
for similar conceptions in fields as varied as cybernetics, semiotics, cultural 
studies, and philosophy; in fact, it might lay claim to being the most exhaustive 
of its kind.46 Interestingly, it also places the McLuhan and Williams approaches 
on a continuum. After Peters, we can argue that media theorists near the 
McLuhan pole focus explicitly on one component of this triad—the means, 
whilst those at the Williams pole think media across the triad of message, 
means, and agents.47 As a basic concept of media, Peters’ triad helps us to 
understand why all of the concepts I glossed above fit in to the middle-medium 
lineage. Each pivots around the idea that media are means. More than this, 
Peters’ triad helps us to understand why concepts in this lineage struggle to 
respond to the problem of thinking media in excess of themselves. 
 
                                                        
44  Serres, The Parasite 
45  Peters. “Mass Media." 267. 
46  Michel Serres. The Parasite. Translated by Lawrence R. Schehr. Minneapolis: Minnesota 
University Press, 2007. 
47  Peters. “Mass Media." 267. Here, Peters distinguishes between the medium treated by 
media theory and the medium treated by art history: if the former is usually considered as 
means, the latter is conventionally conceived, after Clement Greenberg, as the material 
support for a work of art. ⁠ 
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In a brief recent commentary on the media concept, Florian Cramer notes that 
what we call media now seems to include one, some, or all of the apices of 
Peters’ triad, from “TV sets and record players”, which are “receivers”; to 
networked electronic devices, which are “senders and receivers at once”; or 
even “the contents received and played back by them, such as music and video 
too."48 As Cramer puts it, the media concept has undergone a “tumorous 
expansion” so that it now encompasses any or all of these particular 
referents.49 As a result, he argues that the media concept has become 
troublingly ambiguous. For Cramer, the solution to the question, What are 
media?, lies in ignoring it altogether. He responds to this situation by—at least 
half-ironically—adopting the term “anti-media”, noting that despite the media 
concept’s seeming lack of utility, “[w]e can’t rid ourselves of the word “media” 
simply because of its wide use and great impact on contemporary culture and 
politics."50 But we might glean another meaning from Cramer’s insouciant 
claim: a media concept that focuses on basic functions struggles to gain 
purchase on our indeterminate contemporary media situation and its massively 
distributed, constituent circulations. 
 
A number of media theorists respond to this situation’s excess of circulating 
media in conceptual kind. I’ve already dealt with a number of their concepts 
throughout the course of this thesis: in the introduction, the concepts of “post-
media” or “post-internet”; in the chapter on the platform, several concepts that 
employ concepts of circulation drawn from other domains of knowledge, 
including political economy, the study of infrastructures, linguistics, or the 
sociological study of culture; in the chapter on the anatomical filiation, 
concepts that elevate circulation to the status of a principle and so reduce 
media’s concrete circulations to the—network, flow, viral, vital, or bio-political—
bodies for the sake of which they’re posited as circulating; or in the previous 
chapter, the various media, literary, new materialist, affective, or political 
economic materialisms that either overlook circulation or else recuperate 
                                                        
48  Cramer. “Introduction." Anti-Media: Ephemera on Speculative Arts. NAi Publishers, 2013. 13. 
49  Cramer. “Introduction." 13-14. 
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circulation to the problem of whether or how media are materialised. Each of 
these sets of concepts deals, in some way, with the question of how we might 
think excesses of circulating media. However, each of these sets of concepts 
posits an approach to media that draws support from beyond the media 
concept itself.  
 
My proposition that media body themselves accords this capacity to the media 
concept. It’s premised on the—perhaps quixotic—idea that we can retain the 
media concept in the face of its tumescent expansion, which is to say, its 
contemporary dissolution. The question, What are media?, is shadowed by 
another: How might we retain the media concept today? My attempts to think 
media in circulation are certainly informed by this qualifying question. What I 
want to claim is that thinking media after circulation and as body requires that 
we posit an alternate, minimal media concept. Here, my proposition that 
circulation bodies media as milieu converges with the problem of media’s 
ambiguous double status as instance and plurality and its concomitant 




7.4 INSTANCE AND PLURALITY—OF CIRCULATION 
To contextualise this fourth proposition, I want to differentiate it from a set of 
media-theoretical approaches that I’ve yet to address in this thesis. There are a 
number of different concepts of media that posit media as enveloping wholes, 
but that don’t employ the “milieu” concept that Peters and Somaini develop. 
These approaches resonate with other contemporary theoretical frameworks 
that think enveloping wholes—I’m thinking of the work of Simondon on 
individuation and technology’s “associated milieu”, or Félix Guattari’s “three 
ecologies”, or Peter Sloterdjik’s work on “spheres” as conditions for 
contemporary life, or Jacques Rancière’s concept of the “distribution of the 
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sensible51.” However, they often theorise this capacity by drawing on 
theoretical frameworks from outside of media proper.  
 
In the introduction to their edited collection of essays on media theory’s key 
critical terms, Mark Hansen and W. J. T. Mitchell tease the following 
proposition out of media’s capacity to be used to refer to singular or plural 
objects: the media concept opens out “the notion of a form of life, of a general 
environment for living—for thinking, perceiving, sensing, feeling—as such."52 
For them, the media concept refers to devices, but it also encompasses 
environments. Similarly, recent reconceptualisations of the concept of “media 
ecology” emphasise the need to conceptualise media in and through their 
situated, material heterogeneity. Going beyond Neil Postman’s informational 
concept of media ecology, which treats media in their totality as the 
constituents of “a complex message system which imposes on human beings 
certain ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving”,53 or Marshall McLuhan’s 
conception of media as “the extensions of man” that institute “new ratios” 
which “interact among themselves”,54 these concepts posit media in their 
dynamic processuality. In his influential treatment of the concept, Matthew 
Fuller explains that he adopts the term “ecology” because “it is one of the most 
expressive language currently has to indicate the massive and dynamic 
interrelation of processes and objects, beings and things, patterns and 
matter."55 Extrapolating from Fuller’s concept, Jussi Parikka argues that 
“[m]edia function as an ecology in the sense that they are formed through 
circulations of energies, functions and so on”, which opens the media concept 
                                                        
51  Simondon. On the Mode of Existence; Félix Guattari. The Three Ecologies. Translated by Ian 
Pindar and Paul Sutton. London and New Jersey: The Athlone Press, 2000; Peter Sloterdjik. 
Bubbles: Spheres Volume 1. Translated by Wieland Hoban. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
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Translated by Gabriel Rockhill. London: Verso, 2004. 
52  W. J. T. Mitchell and Mark B. N. Hansen. “Introduction,” In Critical Terms for Media Studies, 
edited by W. J. T. Mitchell and Mark B. N. Hansen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2010. xii. 
53  Neil Postman. “The Reformed English Curriculum,” In The Shape of the Future of American 
Secondary Education, edited by A. C. Eurich, 161. 
54  McLuhan. Understanding Media. 53. 
55  Fuller. Media Ecologies. 2. 
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to the way that media “redistribute the forces that are not only technological in 
their existence but also aesthetic, economic, and chemical."56 These concepts 
open our media-theoretical imaginaries to the possibility of apprehending how 
media exceed and, so, envelop us by constituting environments that we 
inhabit—but I want to take a different tack. 
 
For Mitchell and Hansen, media’s plural-environmental nature informs the 
nature of the human itself. Drawing on Stiegler’s concept of “hominsation”—
the idea that technology constitutes the human’s interiority by first allowing it 
to exteriorise themselves by producing memory supports—Hansen and 
Mitchell argue that “[b]efore it becomes available to designate any technically 
specific form of mediation, linked to a concrete medium, media names an 
ontological condition of humanisation."57 Their approach bodies media by 
embodying its purpose in the remembering human. For Fuller and for Parikka, 
the media concept is distributed into its ecologies. This concept captures 
media’s dynamism by situating it in place; it’s interesting and it’s useful, but it’s 
arguably not relevant to our particular problem because it stretches the media 
concept beyond media, per se, by adopting ontological principles of the sort 
that I want to avoid ascribing to circulation. Another tendency finds its 
representative in Alexander R. Galloway’s work, which invites us to critique 
what he calls—also at least half-ironically—“media-centric” media concepts that 
coincide with the technical apparatuses that instantiate media and, in response, 
to focus on processes of “mediation."58 This echoes Sarah Kember and Joanna 
Zylinska, but instead of arguing that we need to adopt vitalist theoretical 
frameworks to think mediation, Galloway argues that we need to develop 
alternate methods of apprehending media. In response to what I’ve been 
calling our postdigital media situation, Galloway calls for what he calls “furious” 
methods that are able to respond to the digital network in its expansiveness, or 
                                                        
56  Jussi Parikka. “Media Ecologies and Imaginary Media: Transversal Expansions, Contractions, 
and Foldings.” The Fibreculture Journal 17: unnatural ecologies (2011): 37. 
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as “an ecosystem, a swarm, a cloud."59 Whilst Galloway’s approach is 
compelling, it arguably doesn’t successfully substantiate what “furious” media 
might be or how they might be apprehended.  
 
Instead, I want to draw on Peters’ and Somaini’s respective conceptualisations 
of media as milieu. For Peters, this concept offers a means of thinking the 
elements and our physical environments themselves as media. As he argues, 
the media concept has “always stepped in to fill the environmental gaps to 
explain contact at a distance."60 Somaini uses detailed reengagements with 
Walter Benjamin’s body of work to introduce a distinction between the media 
apparatus—for Benjamin, the “Apparate”—and the “Medium”, which for 
Benjamin constitutes “the spatially extended environment, the milieu, the 
atmosphere, the Umwelt in which perception occurs."61 After Benjamin, 
Somaini argues, the analysis of media constitutes an “aesthetics” that “studies 
the historical transformations of a sensory experience that is always somehow 
technically mediated."62 I want to use their approaches as a point of departure 
for a media concept that we can use to substantiate my claim that media body 
themselves—with one caveat. Rather than positing a distinction between media 
conceived as “middle” and media conceived as “milieu”, my proposition is that 
these mediatic modes are not ontological, but concrete. That is, I want to 
propose that they emerge after circulation, as bodied media.  
 
Earlier, I said that Cramer’s concept of “anti-media” demonstrated that the 
media concept struggles to gain purchase on our contemporary media 
situation. We might glean one more meaning from his claim that the media 
concept has undergone a “tumescent expansion”: that if we’re to retain this 
concept and if it’s to have any purchase on our postdigital media situation, it 
needs to be able to address media in a plurality of spatial configurations. That 
is, it needs to be able to address media as middles and as milieus; or, in their 
                                                        
59  Galloway. “Love of the Middle." 58. 
60  Peters. The Marvelous Clouds. 47. 
61  Somaini. “Walter Benjamin’s Media Theory.” 7. 
62  Somaini. “Walter Benjamin’s Media Theory.” 8. Emphasis original. 
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capacity to expand and, conversely, to contract. By proposing that media are 
after circulation, the approach that I’ve introduced here arguably provides us 
with the epistemological means to introduce such a revised concept of media. 
My claim that media body themselves is posited in response, to think two 
contradistinctive characteristics of contemporary media: first, what Benjamin 
H. Bratton has called massively-distributed media’s quality of “placefulness”;63 
and second, what art historian David Joselit notes—in a different theoretical 
register—as media’s paradoxical “status of being everywhere at once rather 
than belonging to a single place”—or, what we might call “everywhereness."64 
These claims seem just as distinct as the concepts of milieu and medium. One 
articulates envelopment; the other, an excess of circulating media instances. 
But the media concepts underlying these qualities need not be mutually 
exclusive.  
 
In a commentary on the significance of Aristotle’s concept of the metaxy, 
Kittler provides us with a point of departure we can use to formalise a media 
concept that reconciles these two distinct conceptions. With the metaxy, 
Kittler argues, Aristotle “is the first to turn a common Greek preposition–
metaxú, between–into a philosophical noun or concept: tò metaxú, the 
medium."65 By positing media as a noun, Aristotle identifies media as that 
which envelop us and enable perception. Kittler goes on to downplay the 
significance of the metaxy in Aristotle. For him, this is not a media concept, 
because it relegates the media function to aisthesis, or sensory perception.66 
But he also makes an offhand comment that I want to use, in a manner not 
originally intended, as the basis for an alternate media concept. With Aristotle’s 
conceptual innovation, claims Kittler, “there exists no nothing anymore, but a 
mediatic relation.”67 My proposition is this: media are, minimally, this no 
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nothing; it’s only afterwards, in practice, that they express the quality of acting 
as milieu or as medium—or, indeed, as both.  
 
This no nothing is a-ontological. It doesn’t posit media as this rather than that. It 
might be accused of being apophatic—of positing media only by positing it as 
what it is not. My intention is not to avoid the question of what media are so 
much as to avoid assigning a particular spatiality to media in advance. We’re 
now in a position to further qualify my claim that media body themselves. In 
circulation, media need not circulate for the sake of an-other body, posited as 
an ontological principle. In and through their concrete circulations, media 
articulate spatialities—operating as intermediaries, which is to say, as instances; 
or enveloping in their plurality; or, indeed, circulating as an excess of instances. 
By placing the media concept in suspension, this approach operates in a 
concrete-epistemological register: what media are depends on how they’re 
bodied, and how they’re bodied depends, at least in some cases, on how they 
circulate. What I want to propose is that in circulation, media can be bodied as 
either milieu or as medium, because circulation articulates media as either 
“placefulness" and/or “everywhereness”—as middle-place or as a multiplicity of 
middles. What mediates these capacities are media themselves, as they’re put 
in to circulation by technical ensembles and as they produce the distinctions 
that make them legible to us. In claiming that media body themselves in 
circulation, I mean to express both that they can’t be subsumed to an 
ontological principle and that in circulating for the sake of themselves, they’re 
able to express enveloping wholes. This is another way of saying that in 
circulation, media can form reciprocally-related pluralities and collections of 
instances. 
 
This returns us to the problem that I introduced at the beginning of this thesis 
and that I’ve been pursuing, circuitously, ever since—the internet meme’s 
ambiguous double status as instance and plurality. Our reconstructed concept 
of circulation provides us with the epistemological means to resolve this 
problem. In circulation, the internet meme is after the platform: the platform as 
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technical ensemble puts it in to circulation, but doesn’t define it as media; that 
is, as “content." In circulation, the internet meme doesn’t take ontological 
predicates, but rather produces the distinctions by which it might be 
conceptualised; this is another way of saying that a category, like “materiality”, 
can’t help us to think a type of media that’s defined by its own capacity for 
reinvention, because its constant mutations reinvent its relationship to such 
predicates. In circulation, the internet meme bodies itself, circulating as an 
excess of discrete media produced by users and also for the sake of something 
in excess of the discrete media the user produces: for itself. If its mediatic 
spatiality is defined both by its own capacity for reinvention and, minimally, by 
the notion that as media, it’s not nothing, then it can express “placefulness” or 
“everywhereness”, or both at once. Or: in circulation, the excess of circulating 
instances that constitute the internet meme as meme constitute, and are 
reciprocally informed by, its plurality.  
 
This proliferation of terms might invite a question: Why instance and plurality? 
Aren’t these duplicates of medium and milieu? If media are after circulation, my 
contention is that medium and milieu are, too. These are the terms we might 
ascribe to the minimal, not nothing concept of media—the media we apprehend 
once we’ve suspended the media concept—once we establish it as media, after 
circulation. That is, the not nothing, the instance-plurality, and the medium-
milieu are expressions of what media are before, in, and after circulation. These 
are not hard and fast categories; rather, they’re more akin to epistemological 
heuristics—conceptual tools that we can use to think media in circulation and, 
crucially, in indeterminacy.  
 
It might also invite another: Why instance and plurality, rather than any 
number of like pairs—to list a few of the most seminal, Charles Sanders Peirce’s 
token/type; Niklas Luhmann’s medium/form; Walter Benjamin’s 
original/reproduction?68 His pragmatism notwithstanding, Peirce’s token/type 
                                                        
68  Charles Sanders.Peirce Philosophical Writings of Peirce, edited by Justus Buchler. New York: 
Dover Publications, 1955; Niklas Luhmann. Art as a Social System. Translated by Eva M. 
Knodt. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. 102-132; Walter Benjamin. “The Work 
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is too semiotic and too idealist to be thought after circulation. Luhmann’s 
medium/form captures media’s emergent qualities, but is premised on a 
systems-theoretical framework that’s arguably too hung up on the role 
communication plays in articulating discrete entities. Benjamin’s 
original/reproduction best suits my personal theoretical interests, but it might 
also be subjected to a media-historical epistemological critique. To adapt 
Benjamin’s distinction to a postdigital media situation characterised by 
indeterminacy and to a circulating media type—the internet meme—defined by 
its own capacity for reinvention would be to glean an ontological predicate 
from a specific media-historical moment, the advent of technological 
reproducibility. That is, it would be to institute Benjamin and technical 
reproducibility as precursor, taking the specific epistemological effects of his 
media age—what he calls a “shock effect” and which he ascribes to film—to be 
universally applicable to ours.69 In lieu of shock, we have indeterminacy—terms 
that might be related to one another but for the concrete media-historical gulf 
between them. 
 
What this reconstruction of circulation and its attendant propositions articulate 
is not an alternate theoretical framework that we can use to displace the media 
concept or its cognates and dependents, but a concrete-epistemological 
reflection on how we might think media in our indeterminate postdigital media 
situation. What it offers is a concept, a method, and an approach: circulation, 
media-historical epistemology, and what I call “meme theory." 
 
 
7.5 BEFORE AND AFTER 
During a brief discussion of “infrastrucutralism” and the work of Harold A. 
Innis, Peters introduces a reflection on media that will help us to conclude this 
chapter by construing what I’m calling “meme theory” as a media-theoretical 
                                                                                                                                                            
of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reporducibility [Third Version],” In Selected Writings 
Vol. 4, 1938-1940, edited by Howard Eiland, and Michael W. Jennings. Cambridge, Mass. 
and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003. 252–83. 
69  Benjamin. “The Work of Art." 267. 
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practice. For Peters, what makes Innis’s work so compelling is that it operates 
in what he calls the “ablative case”; that is, it always thinks media as that “by 
means of which."70 The ablative case is a way of thinking media as always in 
the process of. The approach I’ve adopted in this thesis adopts a similar line of 
thinking, but construes it as reciprocal. It’s not only that media must be 
thought in the ablative case; reciprocally, so must media’s impact on our 
media-theoretical epistemologies. To think media in circulation and to be able 
to apprehend media in our indeterminate postdigital media situation 
necessitates adopting a media-theoretical practice that is situated in 
indeterminacy, concepts and methods at the ready not only to apprehend 
media in circulation, but to be recapitulated in turn. 
 
In a recent essay, Galloway asks a question that’s relevant to this reflection: 
 
Whether or not critique remains viable, we must still ponder the 
original Kantian question: is thought as such dictated by the 
regularity of an inherited structure, or is thought only possible 
by virtue of an asymmetrical and autopositional posture vis-à-
vis the object of contemplation? Having inherited the computer, 
are we obligated to think with it?71  
 
In response, the argument of this thesis would be that it’s not possible to think 
contemporary media—at scale and as defined by what Fuller calls “analysis”—
apart from the computer or the other media it represents. This does not mean 
that we need to think with the computer, but merely that it’s not possible to 
think in the same way after its advent. This raises a question that is, perhaps, 
more pertinent: once we posit that media constitute the conditions in which 
they become objects of theorisation, do media have a reductive or 
deterministic effect on our conceptions of theoretical practice? 
 
By claiming that the concept is the higher-order epistemological category 
around which theoretical practice should be organised rather than the 
                                                        
70  Peters. The Marvelous Clouds. 21. 
71  Galloway, 126 
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theoretical framework, what I’m calling “meme theory” recognises that whilst 
media theory might have its own epistemologies, media have theirs too. Whilst 
it might imply that media theory is wholly determined by its media situation, 
the aim of this approach is instead to both recognise and to formalise the 
proposition that media’s epistemologies are much more concrete and much 
more banal—and, crucially, that their epistemologies are more historically 
variable—than the concept of determination otherwise implies. Whilst it might 
imply that we have to approach media unequipped with theory, what it 
suggests is that because media produce epistemologies, our engagements with 
them are nothing if not minimally theoretical. As an approach, to start in 
indeterminacy is to come equipped with concepts that can help us assemble 
theories, frameworks, or whole epistemologies at the point of contact between 
media theory and concrete media. 
 
In this vein, the reconstruction of the concept of circulation offered by this 
chapter isn’t easily generalisable beyond the discipline of media theory. To 
briefly recall Osborne’s reflections on theoretical practice, the concept of 
circulation is not a “trans-disciplinary” concept a la “the text." As I’ve posited it 
here, it’s in fact the opposite: it’s situated, recursive, responsive, concrete, and 
contingently-epistemological. It doesn’t generalise a condition so much as 
present a set of propositions that one might use to disentangle media and 
theory from their concrete-epistemological convolutions and to lend a little 
specificity to the indeterminacy that characterises our postdigital media 
situation. Again, in claiming this, I don’t mean to critique interdisciplinary 
modes of knowledge production, only to point out that they have 
epistemological costs that aren’t always recognised or paid by theoretical 
practices carried out under the auspices of theoretical frameworks.  
  
What, then, of our indeterminate postdigital media situation? One way of 
articulating its indeterminacy might be to recognise that our media-theoretical 
practices often contribute to it, by forgetting the technical ensembles that put 
media in to circulation; by subsuming circulating media to ontological bodies; 
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by positing categories—like materiality—before media. To draw out the spatial 
metaphor, if what I’m calling “meme theory” is a practice that begins in 
indeterminacy, or with the assumption that media constitute the conditions by 
which they become objects of theorisation, what it might offer is a means 
apprehending, gaining purchase on, and perhaps even working with 
indeterminacy. Circulation perhaps provides us a means of discerning the 
lineaments of our postdigital media situation. This approach starts with 
concrete media, but it starts thinking them by starting with their before and 
their after. Instead of starting with theoretical propositions, it starts with 
media-historical epistemological problems. It starts by asking a question: How 
do media exceed themselves?
 
8. THE NEW ONLINE CULTURE WARS 
 
 
8.0 IN EXCESS 
An analysis of the internet meme in circulation has to begin by asking a 
question: How do these media exceed themselves? In this chapter, I want to use 
this question as the prompt for a series of engagements with concrete, 
circulating internet memes organised around the emergence of what I call the 
new online culture wars, which broke out—and broke out of online culture 
proper and in to the mainstream—during the contentious 2016 U.S. 
Presidential election.  
 
This moment is unavoidable in a thesis about internet memes. It is, perhaps, 
online culture’s single most defining moment in the past decade—besides the 
Gamergate moment that preceded it and that is, arguably, its direct precursor.1 
Internet memes have played such a defining role in these culture wars that 
they’ve become bound up together in popular understandings of what they are 
and what they’re for. This also makes this moment particularly apposite as the 
focus of our analyses. This chapter will focus on three meme-pluralities that 
fomented during this moment: the now-infamous Pepe the Frog meme; a 
meme that was made out of an image of an infamous far-right internet 
demagogue, Richard Spencer, being punched during Donald J. Trump’s 
inauguration parade; and a meme that circulated online in the wake of 2016’s 
seismic political events—in the West at least—as variations on the phrase—and 
the sentiment—“Fuck 2016."2  
 
                                                        
1  Adrienne Massanari. “#Gamergate and the Fappening: How Reddit’s Algorithm, 
Governance, and Culture Support Toxic Technocultures.” new media & society Pre-print 
(2015); Michael Salter. “From Geek Masculinity to Gamergate: The Technological 
Rationality of Online Abuse.” Crime Media Culture Pre-print (2017): 1–18. 
2  Know Your. Meme. “Fuck 2016.” Accessed 28 Septmber, 2018. 
https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/fuck-2016. 
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This chapter will begin with an enquiry into what it means for its examples to 
circulate as an excess of concrete instances. This capacity is what allowed the 
Pepe meme, in particular, to break in to mainstream culture. In circulation, 
though, internet memes constitute pluralities, recursively defining the 
collection of instances of Pepe, “punch a Nazi”, and “Fuck 2016” memes as 
coherent, perpetually reinvented bodies. What the reconstructed concept of 
circulation helps us to recognise is that in constituting pluralities, what internet 
memes are circulated for the sake of is not just their defining, plural selves, but 
often something more. In the case of the new online culture wars, I want to 
argue that internet memes began to circulate for the sake of, and so to body, 
another kind of plurality again: what I want to call “negativity.” I don’t mean to 
invoke this term to describe any particular affect or effect. Rather, I mean 
negativity in a very general sense. After Sianne Ngai, I want to identify 
negativity as a complex of what she calls “ugly feelings”, a set of “minor” 
emotions that have no particular object and are easily dispersed. Negativity 
can be emotional or affective, but it can also be political. It can be situated in 
specific encounters in online spaces, but it can also be targeted. Online, it’s 
technically instantiated. These internet memes are particularly interesting 
because they help us to identify one of the mechanisms that organises 
contemporary online culture: the act of targeting negativity at audiences that 
do not yet exist, but who can be manifested through the act of circulating 
internet memes that invokes them as imagined antagonists.  
 
This tactic isn’t always successful. At the massively distributed scale of the 
internet itself, it can also be terrifying. This tactic makes use of the capacity for 
internet memes to circulate for the sake of themselves to seemingly mobilise 
the internet itself against the antagonists it invokes into being. To help explain 
its dynamics, this chapter will draw on the work of Ernst Cassirer and Chantal 
Mouffe to argue that it operates as a technics of “myth." We don’t often use 
this term to discuss contemporary culture, but its political-temporal dynamics 
can help us to understand how platforms inform and afford a contestatory, 
negative form of politics that hinges on the capacity to invoke antagonists in to 
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being. What I’m calling “meme theory” helps us to unpack the cultural politics 
of these new online culture wars by apprehending them in their cultural, 
technical, mediatic, and mythic registers. After circulation, internet memes 
emerge as pluralities. Negativity is not another of these pluralities but, rather, 
their plural effect. By holding the media concept in suspension, “meme theory” 
helps us to identify what internet memes are able to body beyond themselves 
when they circulate for the sake of themselves: mediate, emergent effects that 
are at the scale of the internet itself and that actively use the indeterminacy 
that characterises our postdigital media situation as a means for the practice of 
culture and of politics. What I’m calling “negativity” operates in indeterminacy.  
 
What Pepe, the “punch a Nazi”, and the “Fuck 2016” memes teach us is that 
whilst internet memes might be made by us, but what they circulate for is an 
open question to which “negativity” is an ambiguous but ultimately plausible 
answer. Negativity isn’t what defines internet memes embroiled in the new 
online culture wars as media. What negativity is, in the ontological sense—as 
affect, feeling, politics, mediation, or all of these—only makes sense after 
circulation. But circulation also offers us a means to think the technical 
ensembles and operations that precede negativity’s bodying. By taking a 
particular moment in the new online culture wars as the focus for this 
chapter’s analyses, we can open this chapter up beyond particular internet 
memes to think the dynamics of media’s concrete circulations more broadly. I 
want to adopt this before-after framing to illustrate both how negativity 
operates and, conversely, how circulation’s status before and after media can 
also help us to identify and analyse our indeterminate postdigital media 
situation itself: by making its processes manifest. 
 
This chapter will use its engagements with this internet meme to both develop 
and to apply the media-theoretical practice I’m calling “meme theory”. Its 
analyses will be premised on the reconstructed concept of circulation that I 
posited in the last chapter, using its attendant propositions to present the 
internet meme—or, rather concrete internet memes—in their indeterminacy. It 
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will adopt a technical epistemology as a minimal framing heuristic to show that 
the internet meme’s mutative reinventions are inextricable from the 
computational architectures—the platforms—that put them in to circulation; 
that internet memes body themselves as they circulate and are circulated for 
themselves; and that they perpetually—and provisionally—reconstitute the 
ontological terms with which they might be engaged. Part of what I want to 
demonstrate in this chapter is that internet memes’ defining capacity to 
reinvent themselves necessarily informs media theory by concretely shaping 
how we might engage with media. Internet memes’ capacity to self-obsolesce 
requires a media-theoretical practice that’s formulated to remain reflexively-
responsive to its objects, lest it become obsolescent too.  
 
 
8.1 THE NEW ONLINE CULTURE WARS 
The internet is awash with negativity. It has always been difficult to talk about 
internet memes without talking about the bad feelings, questionable politics 
and outright hatefulness that perfuse meme cultures. It’s now all but 
impossible: since 2014, online culture has been ground zero for a new and 
particularly virulent string of culture wars. Historically, this term referred to the 
increasingly-polarised battle for the “soul of America”—as Pat Buchanan put in 
his infamous 1992 address to the Republican Convention—that came to define 
politics in the United States from the nineties onwards.3 It’s often used to refer 
to no-quarter institutional political contests over fundamental—and mutually-
exclusive—norms or ideals in the West more generally. The new online culture 
wars are different. These contests over norms don’t play out in political 
speeches or the broadcast media, or even in clear antagonistic expression; 
rather, their terrain is the “ironical in-jokey maze of meaning” that typifies 
online cultural production—and one of their main means is the internet meme.4  
 
                                                        
3  James D. Hunter. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York: BasicBooks, 
1991. 
4  Angela Nagle. Kill All Normies: Online Culture Wars From 4chan and Tumblr to Trump and the 
Alt-Right. Winchester and Washington: Zer0 Books, 2018. 11. 
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We can trace the genesis of these new culture wars to an event known as 
“Gamergate." In principle, the Gamergate event describes a moment of intense 
antagonism in the online gaming community over who the culture of gaming 
should be for: on one side, progressive indie game designers and game critics; 
on the other, populist gamer sub-cultures. In practice, it played out as a 
campaign of harassment targeting a female game designer named Zoë Quinn. 
In hindsight, Gamergate proved to be the moment in which creeping tensions 
between different segments of online culture metastasised into an aggressive 
new brand of far-right politics, characterised by new ideological constellations 
of racism, anti-semitism, Ethno-nationalism, misogyny, homophobia, 
transphobia, and the advocacy of violence: what’s sometimes—reductively—
referred to as the “Alt-Right."5  
 
It has to be noted that this sudden resurgence of far-right and reactionary 
tendencies into mainstream online and, later, offline political discussions has a 
prehistory. As the journalist David Niewert meticulously documents in his 
investigative account of reactionary politics in America, many of the major 
ideological trends that define the new online culture wars—like libertarianism, 
Ethno-nationalism, racism, anti-semitism, and secessionism—can be traced to 
specific precursor movements in recent U.S. Political history, many of which 
percolated in offline spaces and in protests, like the Rancher movement in rural 
Oregon or Timothy McVeigh’s Oklahoma bombing.6 What Gamergate provided 
was a catalyst and a platform for these tendencies to coalesce into something 
resembling a globalised and coherent, if tenuous, movement.7 Online, it 
intensified a series of fractures between distinct subcultural groups into new 
fault lines—between mainstream “gamers” and those they pejoratively deride 
as “social justice warriors” or, conversely, between “liberals”—adopted from the 
                                                        
5  Nagle. Kill All Normies. 
6  David Niewert. Alt-America: The Rise of the Radical Right in the Age of Trump. London and 
New York: Verso, 2018. 
7  Nagle. Kill All Normies. 
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U.S. politics term for a centrist-left partisan—and those they scorn as bigots.8 
The internet has always been characterised by an excess of negativity, but 
Gamergate gave it a new, frightening purpose—a war over the soul of online 
culture itself.  
 
Over the course of the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections, it became 
spectacularly apparent that these new culture wars and their new politics 
could spill into the mainstream. Their agents included people like Steve 
Bannon, one of Donald J. Trump’s closest advisors and the editor of Breitbart, 
a far-right website and Alt-Right hub; Richard Spencer, a proponent of U.S. 
“Ethno-states”, or areas exclusively for white people; and Milo Yiannopolous, a 
reactionary provocateur who rose to prominence as a political commentator by 
exploiting Gamergate as a platform.9 They also included a now-infamous 
internet meme known as Pepe the Frog. It’s impossible to talk about internet 
memes without addressing Pepe, the new culture wars, and the intense 
currents of negativity that circulate in and as online culture. After 2016, 
internet meme culture was caught up in a broader politics of negativity that’s 
crucial to understanding contemporary online cultural production. Pepe 
introduced the mainstream to online reactionary politics and to negativity that 




As the gloss above suggests, however, the complex of feelings, politics, 
antagonism and cultural production that’s constitutive of the Pepe, “punch a 
Nazi”, and the “Fuck 2016” memes’ context, the new online culture wars, is so 
convoluted, conjoined, and con-fused as to seem almost impossible to properly 
characterise. To specify any one of these potential subjects as the focus of an 
analysis of the new online culture wars and its internet memes necessarily 
                                                        
8  Adrienne Massanari and Shira Chess. “Attack of the 50-Foot Social Justice Warrior: The 
Discursive Construction of Sjw Memes as the Monstrous Feminine.” Feminist Media Studies 
18, no. 4 (2018): 525–42. 
9  Salter. “From Geek Masculinity to Gamergate." 8-9. 
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attenuates our capacity to analyse this moment as a whole, let alone to make 
sense the politics that have come to define it. This is why I’m adopting a 
deliberately-ambiguous term negativity as the conceptual fulcrum of this 
analysis. 
 
Negativity connotes specific emotions and affects; denial and disagreement; 
disagreeableness; an approach to politics; a philosophical movement—nihilism; 
a philosophical manoeuvre—to negate; lack; charge; even nothing. Negativity, I 
want to argue, is one of the things that internet memes circulate for the sake 
of in the distributed engagements that constitute the new online culture wars. 
To think this term in its capaciousness, we can posit negativity as a non-
specific concretion of what Sianne Ngai calls “ugly feelings."10 Ugly feelings—
Ngai specifies feelings like disgust, envy, irritation, or anxiety—are both less 
intense and more convoluted than the emotions, like anger, that are the typical 
objects of scholarly reflection. Ngai conceptualises ugly feelings as “agonistic 
emotions” informed by a “global affect of against” that, crucially, doesn’t 
necessarily take an object; whereas anger, for instance, is felt in response to 
something or someone, ugly feelings are far more diffuse.11 As Ngai puts it, 
these feelings are “algorithmic or operational, rather than value- or meaning-
based, involving processes of aversion, exclusion, and of course negation."12 
With negativity, I mean to capture the generalised and minor, but nevertheless 
significant ill-feeling and antagonism that’s become so characteristic of 
contemporary online culture. Moreover, negativity’s grammatical function as a 
mass noun also conveys the quantity-less nature of this ill-feeling and its lack 
of an object. It’s this quality that makes it particularly amenable to circulation. 
 
Generalising these feelings as negativity allows us to apprehend the process by 
which bad feeling shades into worse politics. Negativity seems to taint all 
platforms, targeting no-one in particular. At the same time, it seems always to 
be on the verge of spilling over into the kind of focused enmity that 
                                                        
10  Sianne Ngai. Ugly Feelings. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2009. 
11  Ngai. Ugly Feelings. 11. 
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characterised Gamergate and the scapegoating of Zoë Quinn. Ngai argues that 
ugly feelings “mediate between the aesthetic and the political in a nontrivial 
way."13 By engaging with negativity, we can pick apart the processes by which 
ill-feeling intensifies into targeted, intense emotion. Negativity’s ambiguity is 
productive because it denotes a pessimism or ill-intent that can manifest as a 
politics of negation. This negation might take an object, like Quinn. In a minor 
key, however, it describes the new culture wars’ more diffuse and abstract 
negation of an opposing politics that’s construed as non-specifically 
antithetical; whose motto might be, “whatever it is, we’re against it." The 
ambiguity of negativity is intentional, finally, because it captures ugly feelings’ 
capacity to conjoin “predicaments from multiple registers”, as Ngai puts it.14 To 
understand the Pepe, “punch a Nazi”, and the “Fuck 2016” memes, we need to 
understand the context from which they have emerged. To understand this 
context, we need to peel back the layers of irony and the political-emotional 
registers conjoined by the new online culture wars. Put otherwise, we need to 
apprehend negativity as feeling, politics, and, finally, as circulatory tactic. The 
new culture wars mobilise negativity by putting it in to circulation. To analyse 
these memes, I want to propose that we have to apprehend how negativity is 
both entered in to circulation by internet memes in the new online culture 
wars and, reciprocally, how its circulation holds these wars’ participants 
together in mutual antagonism.  
 
Negativity can only articulate—that is, both separate and join, after artus, or 
joint—online culture when it’s entered into circulation. This invites a counter-
question: how is negativity specifically, and feeling in general, constitutive of 
the capacity for internet memes to be in circulation? To answer this question, 
we have to go beyond Ngai’s incisive work by focusing on how political feeling 
is mediated in circulation and, further, by determining political feeling’s 
constitutive role in facilitating the circulation of internet memes for political-
cultural ends. That is, we have to explicate how negativity is afforded by the 
                                                                                                                                                            
12  Ngai. Ugly Feelings. 11-12. 
13  Ngai. Ugly Feelings. 3. 
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technological ensembles that constitute our indeterminate postdigital media 
situation. I want to turn now to the “punch a Nazi” meme to explore the 
circulatory politics of internet memes, myth, and their technologies. 
 
 
8.3 “WHO MAKES THE NAZIS?” 
The ostensible topic of this section is the internet meme created from the 
footage of one of the Alt-Right’s figureheads, Richard Spencer, being punched 
at Donald Trump’s inauguration whilst giving a live interview. But the punch 
that launched a thousand memes is entangled in a rather complex knot of 
other, offline and online, threads. We can use this meme to unspool how 
negativity works in and through the circulation of memes that creates what I 
want to identify as an antagonistic, technically-mediated, and, ultimately, 
mythic mode of politics. I also want to use this meme to analyse how online 
culture attempts to challenge this politics’ pernicious ambivalence on its own 
terms: not through pure political contestation, whatever we might take that to 
mean, but through techniques of counter-circulation.    
  
There’s a lot that could be said about Spencer. He came to prominence as the 
editor of AltRight.com and claims to have coined the term.15 He’s the director 
of the National Policy Institute, a quasi-think-tank that organises conferences 
and publications.16 His first noteworthy moment in the public eye came in late 
November 2016 when, in the wake of Steve Bannon’s appointment as election 
strategist to Trump in August, 2017, he finished his speech at his institute’s 
national conference with a Nazi-style salute, earning international notoriety.17 
What needs stressing is that Spencer is a white supremacist. Between late 
                                                                                                                                                            
14  Ngai. Ugly Feelings. 12. 
15  For context, see: Shuja Haider. “Safety Pins and Swastikas.” Viewpoint Magazine, January 4 
2018. Accessed September 28 https://www.viewpointmag.com/2017/01/04/the-safety-
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16  Graeme Wood. “His Kampf [a Profile of Richard Spencer].” The Atlantic, June 2018. 
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November and Trump’s inauguration on January 20th, Spencer became 
something of a figurehead for the burgeoning Alt-Right movement. It’s unclear 
how large this movement really is or how much traction it really gained. It has 
nevertheless exercised an outsized hold on the imagination of a traumatised 
post-Trump polity, in the U.S. and abroad.  
  
So, the punch. The dynamics of negativity that I want to unpick converge in 
the meme of Spencer being punched. The resultant meme was created in the 
wake of the inauguration of Donald Trump on January 20th, 2018. Spencer was 
at the inauguration and, whilst in the crowd, was seen giving an interview to 
CNN. Whilst Spencer was explaining to the interviewer what the badge on his 
lapel meant—incidentally, depicting Pepe the frog in profile—a passing 
protestor rushed at him and punched him in the face. This footage later 
became a meme. This punch and its memefication are a violent act and its 
recuperation, respectively. This punch is also illustrative of the particular brand 
of negativity that Spencer came to represent as an antagonist and that its 
memeification came to be positioned against within the logic of the new online 
culture wars. To think through the way that negativity is deployed by its 
antagonists, we need to identify how online culture’s generalised atmosphere 
of antagonism operates. To do so, I’d like to suggest that negativity is 
operationalised through contemporary techniques of myth-making.  
  
The internet meme invites us to update an old adage for online media: when 
legend becomes fact, we might say, post the legend. By myth, though, I don’t 
mean primitive thought. Nor do I mean to connote irrationality. Rather, I mean 
a contemporary technique that’s central to politics and that renders feelings 
workable. Besides being puerile, offensive and often bathetic, internet memes 
can be productively conceptualised as a technology of contemporary myth. 
This punch is interesting because it can be treated as a hinge point in the 
articulation of a contestatory politics that is mythic in character. Following 
                                                                                                                                                            
17  Joseph Goldstein. “Alt-Right Gathering Exalts in Trump Election With Nazi-Era Salute.” The 
New York Times, November 20 2016. Accessed September 28 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/alt-right-salutes-donald-trump.html 
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Ernst Cassirer, we can understand myth as something that binds collectivities 
through “sympathy”, or feeling, rather than “causality”, or objective concerns.18 
It gives us what Cassirer calls a “unity of feeling”,19 mixing the abstract and the 
real in a workable complex not as emotion, but as what Cassirer calls an 
“expression of emotion” that turns what we feel into an “image”, a determinate 
and apprehensible thing.20 Transposed into the mediatic specificities of our 
indeterminate postdigital media situation, negativity is made apprehensible in 
circulating media. For Cassirer, myth makes feelings real and making them 
workable through techniques of “ritualisation”, which we might think of as the 
various modes of collective production through which myth is articulated.21 
This term smacks of collective modes of worship, like religion and devotion, as 
much as of darker, more irrational forms of collective participation. Writing in 
1946 as a Jewish emigré to the United States, Cassirer had a specific political 
context in mind. Updated for new concrete mediatic realities, his language of 
myth and ritual is apposite to the new online culture wars because online 
culture in general and the internet meme in particular have increasingly been 
discussed, at least semi-ironically, using terms like “magic." I’ll return to this in 
depth in the section on Pepe. For now, I want to flag that the internet meme 
can be treated as a technique of myth. 
  
The Alt-Right updates the ignominious tradition of posting the fact when it 
becomes legend for our clickbit present. It uses negativity in a particular way: 
as a tool to propagate a contestatory, mythic politics predicated upon 
antagonism. This politics can be further conceptualised using Chantal Mouffe’s 
notion of “agonistics."22 For Mouffe, politics is, at base, antagonistic: it involves 
decisions between alternatives that cannot be reconciled through reasoned 
deliberation. Antagonism constitutes collectivities, or a “we”, by constituting 
friend/enemy distinctions in the confrontation between adversaries. Mouffe 
                                                        
18  Ernst Cassirer. The Myth of the State. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946. 38. 
19  Cassirer. The Myth of the State. 38. 
20  Cassirer. The Myth of the State. 43. 
21  Cassirer. The Myth of the State. 
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also distinguishes between a state of antagonism and a state of agon, familiar 
in democracies, in which a hegemonic situation codifies the relation between 
adversaries. Mouffe’s version of politics suggests that the moment of 
adversarial struggle is key to challenging—and, its partisans hope, in 
establishing—new hegemonic relations and alternate politics. Moments of 
decision in which exclusions and inclusions are generated are crucial to her 
conception of antagonism, and affect plays a central role in this process. As 
Mouffe puts it in a recent article, “refusing to provide democratic channels for 
the expression of collective affects lays the terrain for antagonistic forms of 
their mobilisation."23 This is not to say that not providing an outlet for 
particular forms of expression is the direct cause of the antagonistic politics I’m 
outlining. Rather, it’s to note that the irreconcilability between this antagonism 
online and more mainstream forms of politics creates conditions in which 
negativity thrives, because it feeds on this very irreconcilability. This is how 
online cultures leverage their subcultural status to outsize effect. Affects 
articulate language and feeling in specific practices. What I’d like to suggest is 
that this notion of contestation can be used to analyse how a complex of 
negativity—or, of bad vibes and worse politics—gets mobilised to political 
ends.   
  
To return to the punch again, we can treat this moment and its subsequent 
memeification as one in which negativity’s antagonistic framing and 
contestatory politics become visible. Like any important moment, it has to be 
unfolded in both temporal registers of the before and the after. The before 
component of the punch can be unpacked using one of the Alt-Right’s now-
infamous memetic avatars, Pepe the Frog. I want to turn to Pepe, now, to give 
the punch more context, to specify the antagonistic contestatory politics 
within which its memeification operates, and to illustrate how the logic of the 
new online culture wars informs contemporary online culture.  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
22  Chantal Mouffe. Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically. London and New York: Verso, 
2013. 
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8.4 FROG-FACED MOBS 
The most representative manifestation of the Pepe the Frog meme depicts a 
version of a cartoon frog with garish green skin, bulbous eyes, distended red 
lips, and a liverish cast. Like most memes, its story is contingent and a little bit 
“idiotic”, which is to say that it emerges out of online modes of performative 
idiocy.24 Pepe began as a character in a comic strip created by an illustrator 
called Matt Furie in 2005.25 In this original iteration, Pepe and a bunch of his 
friends would get into scenarios that were supposed to elicit what can only be 
described as a kind of puerile, frat boy humour. In 2008, a pane from this 
comic featuring the phrase “feels good man” became a reaction meme—a 
specific kind of internet meme that’s usually posted in reaction to a comment 
or post made by another user in a bulletin board, a thread, or a chat. In the 
years between 2008 and 2014—Gamergate’s watershed year—the Pepe meme 
continued to circulate, going through the iterations and reiterations 
characteristic of any meme. Along the way, meme-making subcultures situated 
in online fora, most notably 4chan, decided that use of Pepe by celebrities like 
Katie Perry and Nicki Minaj meant that the meme had gone too mainstream. 
So, they decided to recuperate it, tarnishing its reputation and associating it 
with hateful ideas by making it as offensive as they possibly could.26 The Pepe 
meme became a vehicle for the expression of ideas and images that tried to 
push the boundaries of what one could use a cultural product to express, from 
violent forms of misogyny and homophobia to ableism and racism and anti-
semitism of all stripes. Perhaps because of its offensiveness—perhaps for 
other, entirely-contingent reasons—the Pepe meme was enlisted in the new 
online culture wars.  
                                                                                                                                                            
23  Chantal Mouffe. “By Way of a Postscript.” Parallax 20, no. 2 (2014): 156. 
24  Olga Goriunova. “New Media Idiocy.” Convergence: The International Journal of Research into 
New Media Technologies (2012): 223-235. 
25  For an overview of the emergence of the Pepe meme, see my primer:  Scott Wark. “Does 
This Meme Prove Donald Trump is a White Supremacist?” Public Seminar October 6, 2016: 
Accessed 28 September, 2018, http://www.publicseminar.org/2016/10/does-this-meme-
prove-donald-trump-is-a-white-supremacist/. 
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After Gamergate, Pepe became a symbol of the Alt-Right. In the process, it 
also became a symbol of support for Donald J. Trump’s candidacy during the 
2016 Primaries—when he ran for nomination as the Republican Party’s 
candidate for the U.S. Presidential Election—and his subsequent Presidential 
campaign.27 This association appeared to be explicitly endorsed when Trump 
and, later, his son Donald Trump Jr. retweeted Pepe memes featuring Trump 
Sr. Pepe would later be named a symbol of hate by two influential anti-
discrimination organisations, the Anti-Defamation League and the Southern 
Poverty Law Centre, around the time that Trump Jr. retweeted his meme.28 Its 
association with Trump and with the rancorous 2016 election allowed it to 
become symbol of the Alt-Right and its new reactionary politics. In the wake of 
these events and after the crystallisation of the new online culture wars, it has 
become obligatory to talk about Pepe if one wants to talk about internet 
memes. But this meme is also a particularly good example of how a meme can 
express what Ngai identifies as the “special relationship between ugly feelings 
and irony."29  
 
As Ngai points out, irony is not a feeling per se; rather, it invests our feelings 
about something with reflexiveness, allowing us to form feelings about feelings 
we might have towards something.30 Irony is a key rhetorical register in online 
culture. With Pepe, it takes on both distance and ambivalence. Early on in the 
evolution of the Pepe meme, meme producers flipped the content of the 
reaction image, “feels good man”, to make it read “feels bad man”, without 
changing the image itself. This image of Pepe seemed capable of expressing a 
contradictory feeling; or, to put it another way, this image seemed invested 
with a constitutive ambivalence. This ambivalence expresses one of the 
                                                                                                                                                            
26  See: Wark. “Does this Meme…”; Matt Applegate and Jamie Cohen. “Communicating 
Graphically Mimesis, Visual Language, and Commodification as Culture.” Cultural Politics 13, 
no. 1 (2017): 81–100. 
27  Nagle. Kill All Normies. 
28  Wark. “Does this Meme…” 
29  Ngai. Ugly Feelings. 10. 
30  Ngai. Ugly Feelings. 10. 
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features that best defines irony online: its constitutive reciprocal relation to its 
seeming-opposite, earnestness. Pepe is not only the avatar of online negativity, 
but one of its exemplars. Negativity stretches across online culture’s 
seemingly-opposed registers as it stretches across the seemingly-opposed 
emotional registers of feeling itself. This ambivalence provides us with a key 
point of leverage for thinking the politics of circulation in online culture, 
because it opens up beyond its putative content on to a set of techniques that 
allow Pepe to become the means by which feeling can be circulated and 
manipulated. Pepe can help us to illustrate the technical predicates of feeling’s 
online circulations and the role it plays in holding online culture together by 
allowing us to demonstrate how the circulation of negativity operates as the 
propagation of myth.  
 
In an interesting appropriation of the work of Antonio Gramsci, amongst 
others, some of the proponents of the new reactionary right-wing politics have 
defined these contests as fights over cultural hegemony.31 Alongside the 
antagonistic and invocatory dynamics of “shitposting” that undergirds the new 
culture wars, this suggests that these contests are as much about positioning 
one’s opposing combatant as they are about making substantive political 
claims. This is how Nagle understands the new online culture wars in her 
recent, influential book on them. However, Nagle arguably takes the 
antagonistic positions that each side occupies in these new online culture wars 
at face value. They arguably make more sense if they’re conceptualised as 
battles over the control of the means of circulation. On the level of the meme, 
techniques of circulation can be inferred, after the fact, from what circulates. 
On the level of a broader online politics, they can be inferred from those 
claims that garner the most visibility. But at the point at which negativity is to 
be put in to circulation, producers of online culture arguably use a different set 
of techniques that are best understood as mythic. 
 
 
                                                        
31  Nagle. Kill All Normies. 40-53; see also Haider. “Safety Pins and Swastikas." 
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8.5 MEME MAGIC  
The Pepe and “punch a Nazi” memes converge in the technics of myth. 
Producers of Pepe memes and proponents of the Alt-Right alike have referred 
to the Trump-Pepe saga as “the great meme war”, arguing that the production 
of Pepe memes worked as a kind of “meme magic” to win the election for 
Trump.32 Taken at face value, this claim is indefensible and, perhaps, even 
unhinged. But it’s also somehow compelling. This term, “magic”, is arguably 
best understood as an antagonistic tactic that uses the indeterminacy in which 
circulation operates and its capacity for massive distribution to manifest 
antagonists. It’s “magical” not because Pepe won an election, but because it 
managed to set the antagonistic terms in which online politics and online 
interaction could be understood. What comes after the circulating internet 
meme has to be made sense of by what came before. Rather than 
understanding the agent of this before as the collection of acts in which users 
put internet memes in to circulation, as though these operate in causal 
connection—or, after Cassirer, “objectively”—my claim is that it should be 
understood as the circulating conjunctions of feeling and politics that I’ve been 
calling negativity.  
 
We can further substantiate this tactic of invoking antagonists by drawing on a 
semiotic term posited by Roman Jakobson: the "conative" mode of address.33 
Conative modes of address take no object, instead referring to an attempt to 
do something or to a generalised “you." They can be used to invoke an 
antagonist. This “you” is also a “them” who we, the audience to whom an 
address is really targeted, are against. Online, these modes of address are also, 
fundamentally, technical—they are mediated by the platforms that make them 
possible. What the Pepe the frog meme circulates, alongside hate, is a conative 
mode of address—it outlines a swathe of identities which it, and by extension 
those who circulate it, are putatively against. The conative address 
                                                        
32  McKenzie Wark and I write at length on the dynamics of meme magic and circulation. See: 
“Circulation and Its Discontents,” In Post Memes: Seizing the Memes of Production, edited by 
Alfie Brown, and Francis Russell, Forthcoming. Santa Barbara: punctum books, 2019. 
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encompasses a number of typical online cultural techniques, including trolling, 
or deliberately antagonising online; “shitposting”, or posting an excess of 
nonsense in order to prompt a response in a discussion; “derailing”, or 
undermining conversations by posting material that’s irrelevant; and 
“swarming”, or overwhelming an online space or community with unwanted 
material.34 These tactics and others like them turn conative modes of address 
into the techniques by which the “magic” of memes manifests antagonists by 
using the circulation of internet memes to manifest a generalised atmosphere 
of antagonism, or negativity, that not only establishes the contestatory politics 
that has come to define the new online culture wars, but also establishes the 
positions that this culture wars’ antagonists occupy. Like the older political 
contests from which they derive their name, these new online culture wars are 
fought over the means of circulation, because these means of circulation are 
also the means to define the terrain of political contestation. The claim that 
internet memes are the agents of “magic” is one of this contest’s tactical 
sorties.  
 
Returning to the “punch a Nazi” meme can help us to explicate this claim. 
Spencer was punched as he was explaining the Pepe lapel pin he was wearing 
to his interviewer. If Pepe is part of the before of this meme, its actual 
memeification is the after. This moment is one that’s repeated: literally, in that 
it was later learned that Spencer was punched a second time that day by 
another protestor; and technically, in the creation and variation of a series of 
memes. Its transition into circulation is smoothed, in this case, by the 
antagonistic position of the people who most likely shared and propagated it: 
anti-Alt Right partisans of the new online culture wars. The—causal—
explanation of why it might have circulated is less compelling, however, than 
                                                                                                                                                            
33  Roman Jakobson. “Linguistics and Poetics,” In Style in Language, 350–78. Cambridge, M.A.: 
MIT Press, 1960. 
34  On trolling, see: Whitney Phillips. This is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things: Mapping the 
Relationship Between Online Trolling and Mainstream Culture. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2015; on swarming explained through an ethnography of Anonymous, see: Gabriella 
Coleman. Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous. London: Verso, 
2014. 
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the emotional one. In circulation, this internet meme responds to the negativity 
generated by Pepe and to the politics it instantiates in kind. Spencer’s political 
platform is carefully calibrated to antagonise a particular kind of political 
subject: the much-maligned practitioner of identity politics. He often refers, for 
example, to the plight of the self-identified “white male." He also refers to the 
Ethno-states he advocates as “safe spaces." He is, in other words, a 
consummate antagoniser.35 This is how the Pepe meme could be taken up as 
the Alt-Right’s symbol: because it operates within the same logic of 
antagonising a conflict in to being.  
 
In one sense, the Alt-Right is, itself, a myth that circulates online thanks to fear, 
misunderstanding, and our contemporary political context. With Cassirer and 
Mouffe, we can understand myth as something that isn’t antithetical to political 
discourse, but rather a constituent of it. Myth is mobilised through techniques: 
that it, its antagonists or its publics don’t exist as such outside of the techniques 
of circulation that bind them. The internet meme is in circulation; it puts myth, 
antagonism, and politics in to circulation. To mistake the content of the memes 
as mythical, irrational, and, finally, inexplicable is to replicate a 
misunderstanding of media and circulation. This mistake is analogous to 
assuming that content is the content of circulation, or that content is the 
content of what platforms present. To accord the meme mythical-magical, 
rather than mythical-political, qualities, finally, is to take the ambivalence of the 
technically-mediated conative address’s ironic rhetorical mode far too literally. 
It is, in the end, to fail to theorise mediation.  
 
We can identify the punch’s memetic counter-punch as the moment that the 
mediation of the myth of the Alt-Right could be circulated otherwise. Insofar 
as this meme was promulgated by partisans on the other side of the online 
culture war divide, it demonstrates an attempt to circulate memes for the sake 
of a competing form of negativity: a joy in the violence perpetrated against 
Spencer. In saying this, I don’t mean to condone or to condemn this violence 
                                                        
35  Wood. “His Kampf." 
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either way or to establish an equivalence between the two sides of this culture 
war, which would simply reproduce its logic. I mean to demonstrate two 
things. First, the new online culture wars turn the bodying of internet memes 
into a political-technical expedient. Second, the content of these online culture 
wars is important; but their means operate in excess of their often-deplorable 
memetic instances or political claims. The new online culture wars subsist in 
circulation, resuscitating mythic-political modes to invoke antagonists where 
none previously existed and to goad those that now exist into perpetuating its 
logic.  
 
In circulation, instantial-plural internet memes express qualities of 
“placefulness” and of “everywhereness”—a sense of constituting circulations as 
apprehensible body and of circulating as an excess of concrete instances. Their 
concrete circulations trace the lineaments of our postdigital media situation, 
making parts of it manifest. In epistemological terms, this might go some way 
towards explaining why we can use exemplary forms of online cultural 
production to understand online culture at large. But it also helps us to 
understand that indeterminacy itself can be weaponised along with platform-
based technics of myth and negativity. In their placefulness and their 
everywhereness, internet memes also possess the often-frightening capacity 
to circulate as though from nowhere. In its massive distribution, the internet 
seems indeterminate; or, boundless and, so, difficult to both apprehend and to 
think. At the same time, this indeterminacy can also be turned against the 
internet’s constituent users, particular subcultures, or even offline publics. 
Negativity isn’t what defines internet memes caught up in the new online 
culture wars as media. Rather, their own capacity for reinvention and their 
capacity to body and, so, in some sense manifest the internet does. What 
negativity is, in the ontological sense—as affect, feeling, politics, mediation, or 
all of these—only makes sense after circulation. 
 
As that for the sake of which internet memes are made to circulate by the new 
online culture wars’ antagonistic logic, negativity becomes thing as much as 
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feeling, a felt thing by which the internet itself seems to obtrude on online 
culture and its users. After the new online culture wars and after negativity’s 
bodying, this antagonistic logic marks out the horizon of contemporary online 
culture. Above, I said it’s not possible to talk about internet memes without 
talking about Pepe. This is another way of saying that it’s no longer possible to 
think online culture without thinking negativity. After negativity, circulation 
itself becomes a threat.  
 
 
8.6 I’M GLAD IT’S NEARLY OVER 
The events of 2016 were so unexpected to many of the users that constitute 
contemporary online culture that the year itself became the subject of a 
meme: variations on the theme of “Fuck 2016” became commonplace on social 
media, in bulletin boards, even further afield. We could read these memes as 
expressions of a general sentiment that’s not specific to online culture or the 
internet. But it’s not too much of a stretch to conceive of it as an expression of 
online culture’s own conception of itself. If 2016 was the year of Trump’s 
election, it was also the year that the new online culture wars turned into a 
conflagration vicious enough to cross the screen. “Fuck 2016” expresses a 
political-emotional sentiment that both reacts to and feeds the negativity 
bodied by circulating internet memes. It also expresses a sense in which the 
internet was no longer the same. The imagery we associate with the internet—
blue-hued abstractions meant to convey frictionless computing, or pastel-
tinted visions of start-up culture—must now share mental space with Pepe’s 
corpulent green likeness and the Neo-Nazi symbolism of newly-emergent far-
right movements. After the advent of the new online culture wars, the internet 
felt different. I want to conclude with a brief reflection on what this might 
mean.  
 
The internet has never been a neutral space. But its platforms and online 
communities at least had the illusion of allowing its users to participate in the 
constitution of the cultures they consumed. I’ve not mentioned the user too 
much in this thesis. This has been deliberate: my goal has been to theorise the 
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internet meme and, in order to do so, to reconstruct the concept of circulation; 
there’s only so much space. Along the way, I posited a critique of the concept 
of participation—in the third chapter—that I want to pick up on now. Users 
obviously make memes. But to say that online culture is participatory or to say 
that the internet meme is in circulation is to make two radically different claims 
about the role that users play in online culture. In circulation, the internet 
meme is in excess of itself. More than this, in circulation, the internet meme 
circulates for the sake of itself. My engagement with the new online culture 
wars above provides us with the means to further qualify what this means. 
Reduced to participatory culture, the internet meme is reduced to its 
instance—and subsumed once more by the problem of thinking its ambiguous 
double status. As plurality, the internet meme is irreducible to either its 
instance or to the instance of its production by a user. Moreover, overlooking 
the role that media technologies play in putting media in to circulation also 
overlooks the possibility that the users who contribute to meme culture might 
not be humans at all, but rather bots, automated programmes, or 
computational processes performing the same role.  
 
This role is what Benjamin H. Bratton calls the “user position” to convey that 
users occupy a technically-constituted role within the technical ensembles that 
constitute the internet.36 Untangling the implications of this “user position” in 
relation to the internet meme would take several more chapters. The point I 
want to make now is that the user is also indeterminate.37 The question of 
what a user is or what it is that they can do online is subject to the 
epistemological indeterminacy and the media-theoretical necessity for an 
approach that’s able to think in indeterminacy. “Meme theory” responds to this 
necessity. After the new online culture wars, this much is clear: when internet 
memes are used to body negativity, they are no longer merely the property of 
                                                        
36  Benjamin H. Bratton. The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2015. 251. 
37  I write more about this elsewhere. See: Scott Wark. “The Subject of Circulation: On the 
Digital Subject’s Technical Individuations.” Subjectivity 12 (2019): 65–81. 
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online culture; in fact, they represent an online culture turned against itself and 
sunk in to antagonism.  
 
Recalling my earlier engagement with Jennifer in Paradise will help us to 
contextualise these reflections. If the Jennifer image was never a meme, the 
“Fuck 2016” meme imagined a future beyond the 2016 Presidential election 
and, by extension, the new online culture wars. If Jennifer could never have an 
afterlife, this meme expressed a collective wish for Pepe and its ilk to enter 
theirs. But the difference between this meme and Pepe is as stark as the 
difference between wishing and willing. Online, circulation is able to body 
negativity because it institutes a gap between the meme-instance and its 
plurality; or, between the meme produced by a user and entered in to 
circulation and the meme that circulates for the sake of something more than 
itself. If there’s a conclusion to draw from this, it might be that we produce 
online culture; but once online culture enters circulation, what it does and who 
it targets is no longer up to us. “Meme theory” has to deal not only with the 
meme’s perpetual redundancy and with our postdigital media situation’s 
indeterminacy, but with negativity: a circulating, concrete-epistemological 
excess in which online culture and circulating media become even less palatable 
and even harder to think. “Fuck 2016”, indeed. 
 
// CONCLUSION 
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Figure 1, “Distracted Boyfriend”-Angelus Novalis meme 













9.0 BEFORE AFTER 
My favourite internet meme of 2018 is a niche take on what’s known as 
“Distracted Boyfriend”.1 The Distracted Boyfriend meme typically uses a base 
image, originally taken from a stock photo database, that normally shows a 
man walking alongside a woman whilst turning back to look at another at the 
front of the frame. Their expressions tell an equally stock story: the man is 
looking at the other woman with a caricatural expression of desire on his face; 
his putative girlfriend is looking at him with an equally overwrought expression 
of disgust on hers; and the out-of-focus object of his gaze is walking away with 
a soft and seemingly-self-satisfied smile. In the particular instance that I like, 
someone’s pasted a poorly-cut-out image of the angel from Paul Klee’s Angelus 
Novus over the top of the titular boyfriend. No doubt reflecting my own 
interests and tastes, this example reflects everything that I find compelling in 
internet memes.  
 
There are many things that might be said about this meme. Iterations on the 
Distracted Boyfriend meme usually use what’s known as an object-label 
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format, which is characterised by the placement of labels over objects in an 
image. A typical Distracted Boyfriend might label its titular character with an 
agent and the other two with a pair of conflicting interests, using its crude and 
overt dramatisation of desire to reduce rational choice to impulse—ironically, of 
course. On the face of it, this meme is misogynistic. In typical online culture 
style, though, it’s also often used to ironically deride sexism. As a popular 
example of the object-label meme format, Distracted Boyfriend has lead to the 
production of numerous incongruously funny instances. As an aesthetic object, 
there’s something compelling about its composition, with the lines traced by its 
unmet gazes, its forward-backward, cross-purposes motion, and its (mis)use of 
focus, with the frontmost character blurred in the foreground. It’s crass and a 
little gross. It’s not that I like this meme’s base image. But, it’s compelling 
because it’s complex. The cropped-in Angelus Novus adds a whole extra layer 
to this complexity. In the relationship between the angel and what’s caught 
their gaze, we might read a number of things: crass desire; banal bathos; a bad 
philosophy joke. But we also see something of the possibility inherent in meme 
culture. This internet meme contains an entire epistemology of before and 
after—and of a speculative future of the internet meme. 
 
I want to conclude this thesis by contextualising the claims that I have made 
throughout it about the internet meme, circulation, and media theory. By 
framing it using this particular internet meme, though, I also want to signal my 
intention to reflect on broader questions that has shadowed many of the 
discussions in this thesis, but which I’ve yet to tackle head-on: What’s at stake 
in the practice of theorising media, in the present? And, What utility do the 
methods and theoretical practices I’ve introduced in this thesis have for other 
media? I want to conclude this thesis by suggesting that the media-theoretical 
practice I’ve called “meme theory”, the concept of circulation that I derived 
from it, and the theory of the internet meme I used this concept to formulate 
operate in the registers of the before and after. It’s in both of these registers 
                                                                                                                                                            
1  For more on this meme, see: Know Your Meme. “Distracted Boyfriend." I sourced the 
above image from this site, but its original provenance is unknown. Accessed September 
28, 2018 https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/distracted-boyfriend 
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that we’ll find the means to extrapolate this concrete and specific practice of 
theorising media to other media. It’s in both of these registers, moreover, that 
media-theoretical practice must operate if it’s to be able to grapple with the 
overwhelming profusion of circulating media that characterises this present.  
 
This strange take on the Distracted Boyfriend meme makes these registers 
manifest. To frame a response to these questions, I want to start by providing 
a brief overview of this thesis as a whole. This overview will help us to 
understand both how this thesis approached the internet meme and how it 
conceived the stakes of practicing media theory in the present. After 
responding to these questions, I want to finish by briefly returning to this 
meme and using it to reflect on some of the broader stakes of contemporary 
meme culture.  
 
 
9.1 EPISTEMOLOGICAL MEANS 
The aim of this thesis—as its title, “meme theory”, no doubt suggests—was to 
formulate a theory of the internet meme. In the introduction, however, I 
argued that this was no straightforward task, because the internet meme 
confronts media theory with a problem. This problem emerges out of the 
internet meme’s double status as instance and plurality. I argued that we could 
resolve this problem by thinking the internet meme in circulation, but that 
when we’re confronted with the question of what the circulation of media 
actually is, we produce a tautology: we understand circulation to be the 
circulation of media. I used these assertions to frame this thesis’s extended 
engagement with circulation and to qualify its aim: to formulate a theory of the 
internet meme, we need to think it in circulation. However, I also argued that 
this task of reconceptualisation was further complicated by the concrete 
conditions in which we must theorise media today. In a reworking of Friedrich 
Kittler’s infamous phrase, I argued that the ubiquity and massive distribution 
that characterise contemporary media have generated what I called an 
indeterminate postdigital media situation. To theorise media like the internet 
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meme, I argued that we had to take account of the influence that they exerted 
over our concepts of them. Together, this problem and this media situation 
constitute the context in which we have to theorise media like the internet 
meme. Any such theory, I argued, had to not only address its object, but to be 
able to remain reflexively responsive to media’s circulating indeterminacy.  
 
Rather than treat this proliferation of paradoxes as prohibiting theoretical 
practice or allowing our theories of media to be determined by media 
themselves, I drew upon the historical epistemological work of Gaston 
Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger to recast this set 
of issues as using their concept of the “problem”. For these philosophers, the 
“problem” isn’t just an issue; it plays a specific, organising epistemological role 
in a mode of enquiry that investigates how knowledge is concretely produced. 
In their usage, problems are tied to particular concepts, which are only ever 
posited in order to resolve particular problems. Using this concept, I argued 
that the internet meme could be conceived of as presenting us with a 
particular problem: how we think media in excess of themselves. Positing this 
problem changed the aim of this thesis. In order to formulate a theory of the 
internet meme, I argued that we needed to posit a concept of circulation. But 
in order to posit a concept of circulation given my claim that media inform our 
concepts of them, I also argued that we needed to work on media theory itself 
to make it capable of apprehending the internet meme in circulation and the 
influence of the circulating internet meme on media theory. The internet meme 
confronted us with what I described as a “nested problem”. This thesis’s task 
became finding this problem’s resolution using epistemological means. 
 
This brief outline helps us to apprehend the stakes that this thesis set itself. 
The analyses that I’ve presented in the previous chapters don’t exactly follow 
standard media-theoretical practice. This thesis has proceeded as an extended 
attempt to think through the internet meme’s corresponding problem. This 
problem necessitated a shift in focus from the internet meme, its theoretical 
context, to its epistemological cause: our lack of a media-theoretical concept of 
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circulation. Rather than establishing a theoretical framework and applying it to 
a series of cases, it turned the analysis of media theory itself in to a method for 
generating propositions derived from a modified version of historical 
epistemology that I called media-historical epistemology. Acknowledging that 
circulation does actually get invoked in discussions of media, this thesis used 
this approach to construe circulation as a “commonplace” term, or one that 
does conceptual work in media theory without being articulated as a concept. 
Because of its commonplace status, I argued that circulation is particularly 
prone to accruing “filiations”, or what Canguilhem conceptualises as occluded, 
persistent influences that are drawn from prior contexts, theoretical 
frameworks, or objects and that continue to inform our media-theoretical 
practices. Across a series of chapters that engaged with the platform’s capacity 
to put media in to circulation, the residual influence of the anatomical body on 
our usages of circulation, and the role that the category of materiality plays in 
media theory through concepts like infrastructure, this thesis used 
engagements with technical ensembles, theoretical frameworks, and the 
discipline itself to identify the commonplace work that circulation does and the 
persistent filiations that it activates in our media-theoretical practices. It used 
these chapters to demonstrate what we invoke circulation to think, in its role 
as a commonplace, thereby generating the “epistemological materials”—the 
media qualities—that circulation must be able to address.  
 
The analyses in these chapters culminated in Chapter 7, which used them as 
the basis for a series of propositions: after platforms, circulation is technical; in 
circulation, media’s materiality is a technical-epistemological product rather 
than an ontological predicate; circulation bodies media as milieu; and in 
circulation, media can be expressed as instance and/or plurality. In sum, these 
propositions constitute my reconstructed concept of circulation. And yet to 
use this concept to formulate a theory of the internet meme would be to hew 
against the epistemological grain that this thesis had spent an introduction and 
7 chapters establishing. Any workable theory of the internet meme, I argued, 
had to emerge in and through engagements with concrete circulating 
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examples. Using these propositions, the next chapter adopted a mode of 
theoretical practice that I called “meme theory” to theorise the internet meme 
through engagements with what I termed the new online culture wars. 
Drawing in particular on the proposition that internet memes body media as 
milieu, this chapter argued that its three examples each contribute to the 
circulation of “negativity”, a complex of feeling, politics, and antagonistic 
negation characteristic of these new online culture wars. Whilst these 
engagements drew on other theoretical resources to conceptualise 
“negativity”, they nevertheless attempted to allow our conception of what 
internet memes are and what they do in these examples to emerge in 
circulation.  
 
What’s crucial to note about this engagement with the new online culture wars 
is that it adopted what I’ve been calling circulation’s before-and-after status. 
One of the key claims I made during the series of chapters that analysed 
circulation was that circulation functions as an “organising concept”. The 
conceptual work that circulation does as a commonplace, I argued, is just as 
essential to our understanding of what media are and what they do—or, the 
media concept and the concept of mediation. So, circulation is before media 
insofar as media’s concrete circulations inform media theory and insofar as the 
concept of circulation informs the media concept. It’s after media, however, 
because circulation takes media as its object and because it articulates how we 
understand media in excess of themselves. These claims, which I made in 
Chapter 7, arose out of in-depth analyses of circulation and of media theory. 
They are nevertheless what make the concept of circulation I’ve proposed in 
this thesis applicable to other media, other contexts, and other problems.  
 
 
9.2 CIRCULATION IN GENERAL 
If our indeterminate postdigital media situation is defined by anything, it’s 
defined by the fact that media circulate in excess. The internet meme isn’t the 
only example of these media, even if I claimed that it was the definitive one for 
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online culture. The present is populated with a number of other media that 
must also be apprehended in circulation. The most obvious examples of these 
other media include viral media, spam, fake news, or clickbait. If we were to 
stretch what we mean by media, we might also think of botnets or Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, for instance, as operating in and through 
circulation. The propositions I’ve made in this thesis about circulation, media-
historical epistemology, and “meme theory” have been grounded in a reciprocal 
relationship to their objects. Throughout this thesis, I’ve consistently argued 
that the theoretical practice of “meme theory” is specific to the internet meme. 
I’ve said quite overtly that this practice can’t be ripped from its epistemological 
context and applied to other media. Nevertheless, the methods, media-
theoretical practices, and concepts I’ve introduced in this thesis can be adapted 
to the study of other circulating media types, if they’re adopted as 
epistemological frameworks rather than readymade, transposable media-
theoretical propositions. 
 
The component of this thesis that’s most easily transposed to other areas of 
media theory is the method I derived from media-historical epistemology. By 
adapting historical epistemology to the epistemological specificities of media, I 
have demonstrated throughout this thesis how methods originally formulated 
to study science and its objects can profitably be applied to media. This 
method grows out of particular strains of recent German media theory, like the 
work of Claus Pias and Joseph Vogl. It is also heavily inspired by some of the 
less-often-cited writing of Friedrich Kittler and some of the work of James W. 
Carey, whom I engaged with at length, and Harold A. Innis, who occupies this 
thesis’s theoretical background. This approach also shares something of the 
spirit of Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive engagements with philosophical 
concepts, though my emphasis on the concrete nature of knowledge 
production is not at all compatible with his deconstruction of presence. The 
method I derived from media-historical epistemology can be seen as 
contributing to a minor tendency in media theory to analyse media’s 
epistemologies. It can also be seen as complementing other recent methods 
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that historicise media, like media archaeology. As with media archaeology, 
media-historical epistemology reaches back in to the history of media to enrich 
our conception of media in the present. Only, where media archaeology 
studies media themselves, media-historical epistemology studies how they’ve 
been thought. I conceive of this method as one of a number that we might 
adopt in our media theoretical practices, rather than one that displaces all 
others. Which of these methods we might adopt to analyse particular media 
depends on the particularities of the problems they pose.  
 
The media-theoretical practice that I’m calling “meme theory” is less easily 
transposed to other media objects. As with this thesis’s structure and its 
decision to treat analyses of media theory as the means for making theoretical 
propositions, “meme theory” emerged in response to the problem posed by the 
internet meme. However, the theoretical practice I’ve developed here can be 
used to think other media if what we adopt are its epistemological precepts. 
“Meme theory” responded to the internet meme’s ambiguous double status 
and the need to be able to think it in circulation. But it also responded to the 
indeterminacy that characterises our postdigital media situation and the 
concreteness I accorded to epistemology. It began by positing a problem 
around which the concept of circulation and, indeed, media theory itself had to 
be reassembled. Some of these precepts can be used as the basis for other 
theoretical practices applied to other media. What “meme theory” tacitly 
asserts is that in the present, it’s sometimes necessary to begin with problems 
in order to orient media theory in the interrogative, by questioning how we 
might formulate theoretical practices that are adequate to our object. The 
problem is particularly crucial to this kind of practice, because it reorganises 
the hierarchical relationships between theory, concepts, and objects that 
typically govern media theory. In lieu of privileging theoretical frameworks, the 
practice I adopted in this thesis advocates for starting in an epistemological 
mode that welcomes the influence media exert over our theories of them. We 
could generalise this as thinking in indeterminacy—an exigency that will only 
become more acute as media’s circulations intensify. 
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Much of this thesis has been given over to circulation. As I keep claiming, this 
thesis has consistently asserted that circulation ought to be treated as an 
“organising concept”. How, then, might this concept be adapted to other media 
theoretical questions and practices? As an organising concept and as I’ve 
posited it in this thesis, what defines circulation is that it becomes before and 
after media. This is meant as both an epistemological proposition and a 
methodological premise. The content of the concept of circulation that I 
posited is specific to the internet meme. Per this thesis’s major claims, what 
media are in circulation is dependent on the relationship between their 
concrete circulations and our media-theoretical practices, as mediated by their 
“problem”. So, what circulation is can only be determined in relation to the 
media it takes as it’s objects. But this concept’s premises are not specific to the 
internet meme. Circulation is a concept that enjoins us to think media in 
context, through what comes before them—the platforms that put media in to 
circulation, say—and what comes after—for instance, a capacity to exceed 
themselves. The concept of circulation I proposed collapses the methods and 
theoretical practices I adopted in this thesis and rearticulates them in the form 
of propositions that allow us to think media as instances and pluralities 
simultaneously and to acknowledge how pluralities inform our conceptions of 
what media are and what they do. Taken up in other projects, the concept of 
circulation that has been so central to this thesis would necessarily become 
something else. Of course, that’s the point. 
 
If the aim of this thesis was to formulate a theory of the internet meme, what 
it ended up producing was a method, a theoretical practice, and a concept 
adequate to an object whose central characteristic is its own capacity for 
reinvention. In the introduction to this thesis, I claimed that the internet meme 
is online culture’s definitive media. I want to repeat that claim now with a 
different inflection. The internet meme is online culture’s definitive media 
because by demonstrating that media are not converged but are, rather, in 
perpetual divergence, it forces us to come up with a way of doing media 
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theory in indeterminacy. We can only do so by making media theory as specific 
as the ubiquitous media that surround us—whilst also acknowledging that its 
context is as massively-distributed as these media themselves. 
 
 
9.3 A POSTERIORI 
Alongside all that’s funny and all that’s vile, what I find in meme culture is a set 
of challenges—to propriety, to culture, to one’s friends or one’s (imagined) 
enemies, to media theory, to thinking itself. What I find internet memes 
constantly confronting me with is a sense of history and a sense of possibility. 
There’s no doubt that this is to be expected of a media type that is defined in 
relation to an already-existing plurality, yet which persists in—invites—its own 
reinvention. I want to conclude now by returning to the Distracted Boyfriend 
meme I cited above to tease out a parting thought on thinking with the 
internet meme in the present.  
 
In the passage on Klee’s Angelus Novus from Walter Benjamin’s seminal essay 
“On the Concept of History”, Benjamin says this: 
 
This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is 
turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of 
events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling 
wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would 
like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has 
been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has 
got caught in his wings with such a violence that the angel 
can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him 
into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of 
debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call 
progress.2  
 
Alongside this iteration of the Distracted Boyfriend meme, we might echo the 
first line of this oft-quoted passage: this is how one pictures the angel of 
history. Perhaps this stock imagery is even how one might picture the debris 
  278 
hurled forward by the storm we call progress, massively distributed media and 
the online culture it affords. But perhaps the time for Benjamin’s rhetoric has 
also passed, crumbled, become the epistemological debris of theory past. In 
consonance, what Benjamin’s essay and this meme capture is not a lament for 
history swept up by progress, but a mediation on how before relates to after 
and after to before.  
 
Elsewhere in this essay, Benjamin says this: “[t]he true picture of the past flits 
by. The past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant 
when it can be recognized and is never seen again."3 In another oft-quoted 
essay, Benjamin says something related, but with wholly different implications: 
“in the fields with which we are concerned, knowledge comes only flashlike. 
The text is the long roll of thunder that follows.”4 The past will flash up and be 
lost; knowledge is only produced after the event. Before what’s before will be 
after and after what was after passes in to the before—this is the complexity I 
think this idiotic internet meme captures and makes available to us. Sigrid 
Weigel identifies this conception of epistemology as a form of nachdenken, or a 
form of thinking that comes “afterward.5”  
 
In circulation, internet memes might be hard to think, but this doesn’t mean 
that they’re without thought. They’re caught up in a mode of constant cultural 
production that generates enough circulating media that images like this 
occasionally grab our attention. This is by way of saying that Benjamin’s 
characterisations of the epistemology of the past and of epistemology under 
conditions of modernity find their echo on our indeterminate postdigital media 
situation—if not, perhaps, their proper epistemological home. That media 
                                                                                                                                                            
2  Walter Benjamin. “On the Concept of History,” In Selected Writings Vol. 4, 1938-1940, 
edited by Howard Eiland, and Michael W. Jennings, 389–400. Cambridge, Mass. and 
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003. 392. 
3  Benjamin. “On the Concept of History." 390. 
4  Benjamin. The Arcades Project. Translated by Howard Eiland, and Kevin McLaughlin. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999. 456. 
5  Sigrid Weigel. “The Flash of Knowledge and the Temporality of Images: Walter Benjamin’s 
Image-Based Epistemology and Its Preconditions in Visual Arts and Media History.” Critical 
Inquiry 41, no. 2 (2015): 366. 
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contribute to the conditions in which we take them as objects of theorisation, 
that they produce their own epistemologies, that they make their own 
ontological distinctions—this is all a constituent part of the indeterminacy that 
characterises our postdigital media situation. That it’s built on top of the debris 
of a self-obsolescing culture makes thinking it difficult, but that thinking it 
necessitates thinking in its indeterminacy and after media’s circulations is no 
bad thing.  
 
As the before, internet memes snap in to frame. As an after, we can only 
assume that they’ll define themselves differently and anew. Media theory finds 
its necessity in the crossing of these temporal frames—if we can’t keep pace 
with media’s constant change, the turning of the new in to debris, why try? 
“Meme theory” rides in the angel that’s online culture’s wake. It’s not always 
pleasant—it often feels futile—but there’s no lack of inventiveness that we can 
use as the epistemological grist for the reinvention of media theory. 
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